Maddox v. Clackamas County School District No. 25

626 P.2d 924, 51 Or. App. 639, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2425

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: April 13, 1981
• Docket: 78-5-275, CA 17281
• Status: Published

Opinions

BUTTLER, J.

Plaintiff was employed as a probationary teacher by the defendant¹ School District for the 1976-77 school year under a written agreement which incorporated by reference the laws of the state of Oregon. Shortly after he commenced work, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment, and, after a skirmish over the procedural niceties contained in ORS 342.835(1),² this lawsuit was filed.

The only assignment of error on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first and second causes of action, each of which is in two counts. Count I of the first cause of action is a simple action for breach of contract and, although the complaint does not so allege, presumably plaintiff contends that defendant did not discharge him "for any cause deemed in good faith sufficient by the board.” See ORS 342.835(1). If plaintiff may maintain such an action, he could obtain judicial review of defendant’s substantive basis for terminating him. As we read ORS 342.835(1) and (3), a probationary teacher may be discharged or not renewed for any reason which the board in good faith deems sufficient, and the only review is that provided by the statute. ORS 342.835(3)³ expressly limits any "appeal” to a review of the procedures at the hearing and whether the written copy of reasons for dismissal required by the section was supplied. There is no review of the reason for discharge, or the good faith of the board.⁴

In Henthorn v. Grand Prairie School Dist., 287 Or 683, 601 P2d 1243 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the legislature intended by these statutory provisions to require what is, in essence, a quasi-judicial proceeding, and "* * * that some kind of an 'appeal’ to the courts was also intended by the legislature, although one limited to 'the procedures at the hearing’ and 'whether notice of nonrenewal was timely given.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) 287 Or at 691. The court went on to hold that a writ of review is an available means (and perhaps the only means) by which a probationary teacher may "appeal” the school board’s actions. Plaintiff here did not seek a writ of review, and we hold he may not avoid the limited statutory review by bringing an action for breach of contract any more than he could do so by bringing a declaratory judgment proceeding. See Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or 619, 552 P2d 533 (1976); Jordan v. City Council of Lake Oswego, 49 Or App 31, 618 P2d 1298 (1980), rev den (1981). Count I was properly dismissed.

Count II of the first cause of action is also for breach of contract, but plaintiff alleges that his termination was "without good cause” and that he was not afforded the procedural protections normally associated with due process, all of which he contends were in violation of ORS 342.835 and Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution. The cited statute does not require that the board have "good cause” to terminate a probationary teacher; neither does the statute require that the board afford him all of the procedures which he contends were denied him. Again, to the extent that he has a remedy, it is by writ of review.

Both Counts of plaintiffs second cause of action are premised upon plaintiffs having a property interest in his job, which a probationary teacher does not have, Papadopoulos v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 14 Or App 130, 511 P2d 854, rev den (1973), cert den 417 US 919 (1974); Davis v. Oregon State University, 591 F2d 493 (9th Cir 1978), at least in the absence of a contract giving the teacher greater rights than does the statute.

Because none of plaintiffs counts in the two causes of action alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court did not err in dismissing them.

Affirmed.

1 Although there are defendants other than the School District, for purposes of this opinion we refer to the School District as the defendant.

2 ORS 342.835(1) provides:

"(1) The district board of any fair dismissal district may discharge or remove any probationary teacher in the employ of the district at any time during a probationary period for any cause deemed in good faith sufficient by the board. The probationary teacher shall be given a written copy of the reasons for dismissal, and upon request shall be provided a hearing thereon by the board, at which time the probationary teacher shall have the opportunity to be heard either in person or by a representative of the teacher’s choice.”

3 ORS 342.835(3) provides:

"(3) If an appeal is taken from any hearing, the appeal shall be limited to:

"(a) The procedures at the hearing;

"(b) Whether the written copy of reasons for dismissal required by this section was supplied; and

"(c) In the case of nonrenewal whether notice of nonrenewal was timely given.”

4 That conclusion is reinforced by HB 3014 introduced in the 1981 Legislature, the effect of which would be to amend ORS 342.835(3) to authorize review of the question whether "a cause considered in good faith by the board of the employing district exists * * The proposed review would be by the State Board of Education, and would include a hearing, if one is requested, before a hearings officer appointed by that board.