MacNeal v. The State of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 19, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-06017·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KELLY MacNEAL, Plaintiff, 1:24-CV-6017 (LGS) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE THE STAE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Kelly MacNeal, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, the Fair Housing Act, and what appears to be Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In addition, she asserts claims under state law. Plaintiff seeks damages, and sues: (1) the State of New York; (2) the City of New York; (3) the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”); (4) the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); (5) the New York City Fire Department’s (“FDNY”) Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”); (6) DHR employee Chelsea John; (7) DHR employee Elena Perlongo; (8) DHR employee Gina Martinez; (9) DHR employee Candace Tyndall; (10) DHR employee John Herrion; (11) NYPD Police Lieutenant Corde; (12) NYPD Police Officer Castro; (13) NYPD Police Officer Orellana; (14) NYPD Police Officer Quintuna-Guaman; and (15) two unidentified “John Doe” FDNY Emergency Medical Technicians. She does not, however, provide service addresses for any of the defendants. By order dated August 14, 2024, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DHR, as well as those against the NYPD and the FDNY’s EMS; (2) directs service on the State of New York and the City of New York (whose service addresses are easily discernable); and (3) directs the Attorney General of the State of New York and the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide to the Court and to Plaintiff the service addresses of the identified individual defendants, and directs the City Corporation Counsel to provide to the Court and to Plaintiff the identities (and, if possible, shield numbers) as well as the service addresses of the unidentified “John Doe” defendants.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. Claims against the DHR, the NYPD, and the FDNY’s EMS The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DHR, an agency of the State of New York, because they are redundant of Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York, which is also a named defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD and the FDNY’s EMS. The NYPD and the FDNY’s EMS, which are agencies of the City of New York, are not separate entities that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of

New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (NYPD is not a proper defendant); Charles v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-5567 (JPC), 2023 WL 2752123, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (same as to FDNY); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD and the FDNY’s EMS, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Service on the State of New York and the City of New York Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, she is entitled to rely on assistance from the Court and the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effect service.1 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

(the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on the State of New York and the City of New York through the USMS, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out USMS Process Receipt and Return forms (“USM-285 forms”) for those defendants.

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MacNeal v. The State of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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