Lyons v. John/Jane Does

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 3, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00489
StatusUnknown

This text of Lyons v. John/Jane Does (Lyons v. John/Jane Does) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lyons v. John/Jane Does, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JEREMIAH ANDREW LYONS, Plaintiff, 22-CV-00489 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD JOHN/JANE DOES, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Jeremiah Andrew Lyons, who is appearing pro se, filed a three-page letter with 183 pages of exhibits on January 18, 2022. The Clerk of Court opened Plaintiff’s submission as a new civil action, and Plaintiff paid the filing fees on January 19, 2022. The next day, on January 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed in this action the same three-page letter with 297 pages of exhibits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff thirty days’ leave to replead his claims. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the court “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard.” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n. 3. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff does not identify the individuals allegedly involved in the events that give rise to his claims. He also does not name any Defendants. In his letter, Plaintiff asserts that he is bringing claims against “the Government of the United States of America.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He asserts further that it is “imperative to the health and well-being of my family particularly my

two sons . . . . as well as to all people of New York state with implicit concern for their families and their fellow citizens.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s letter is not the model of clarity, and it is unclear how the 183 pages of attached exhibits relate to any claims that he is attempting to assert. It does appear from the letter and several of the attachments that Plaintiff’s wife and minor children are residing in a domestic violence shelter as a result of allegations of Plaintiff’s abuse. While several of the attachments to Plaintiff’s letter suggest that there may be proceedings pending in the Bronx County Family Court, the status of these proceedings is unclear. DISCUSSION A. Rule 5.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff’s letters and the attachments include the full names and full birthdates of his two minor children. Rule 5.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that Court filings

referring to such information include only: the last four digits of a person’s Social Security number, the year of a person’s birth, and the minor’s initials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(1) - (3). A person who fails to redact such information or file it under seal waives the protections of Rule 5.2 as to his or her own information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(h). Because Plaintiff’s submissions reveal the full names and birthdates of Plaintiff’s minor children, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to limit electronic access to the submissions (ECF Nos. 1, 2) to a “case-participant only” basis. Plaintiff must comply with Rule 5.2(a)(3) when submitting any documents in the future. B. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it is not plain, and it fails to show that he is entitled to relief. In fact, the Court cannot discern any claims that Plaintiff is attempting to assert. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim because they do not allow a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). C.

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Bluebook (online)
Lyons v. John/Jane Does, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lyons-v-johnjane-does-nysd-2022.