L.W. Packard v. Standard Wool

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 18, 1996
• Docket: CV-95-270-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

L.W. Packard v. Standard Wool CV-95-270-M 04/18/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

L.W. Packard & Company, Inc., Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 95-270-M

Standard Wool, Inc., Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff, L.W. Packard & Company, Inc., brings this action

against Standard Wool, Inc., claiming that Standard breached a

contract to supply it with approximately 11,000 pounds of

cashmere fiber at $15.70 per pound. Both parties are members of

the textiles industry and belong to an organization that provides

arbitration of disputes between its members. The parties have

submitted a joint motion to refer this case to arbitration before

the Arbitration Committee of the Boston Wool Trade Association.

For the reasons set forth below, that motion is granted in part

and denied in part.

In light of the parties' agreement, referral of this matter

to arbitration is plainly appropriate. However, because the

parties have agreed to arbitrate all of the substantive issues raised in this proceeding, retaining jurisdiction and staying

this action would seem to serve no purpose. "Any post­

arbitration remedies sought by the parties will not entail

renewed consideration and adjudication of the merits of the

controversy but would be circumscribed to a judicial review of

the arbitrator's award in the limited manner prescribed by law.

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12." Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975

F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992) (guoting Sea-Land Service, Inc.

v. Sea-Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 636 F.Supp. 750, 757 (D.P.R.

1986)) .

Accordingly, the parties' Joint Motion to Refer Case to

Arbitration (document no. 13) is granted to the extent it seeks

an order of the court referring this matter to arbitration (or

approving their agreement to arbitrate their dispute). It is,

however, denied to the extent it moves the court to retain

jurisdiction over this matter. The case is dismissed under

Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, without

prejudice. Of course, the parties are free to seek appropriate

review of any award eventually entered by the arbitrator(s). The

Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

2 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judqe

April 18, 1996

cc: James F. Raymond, Esq. Richard F. Johnston, Esq.