Lux v. Benavides

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-1571
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CURTIS LUX; JUSTIN HYMES; KATHY No. 25-1571 WADKINS; AARON MATHIS; D.C. No. MICHAEL BATES; RICK GORDON; 2:23-cv-00839-MMD-NJK ISHMEL BYRD,

Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM*

v.

ALLAN BENAVIDES, AKA Allen Glickstein; SOUTHWEST CONCRETE PUMPING, LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 6, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Curtis Lux, Justin Hymes, Kathy Wadkins, Aaron Mathis, Michael Bates,

Rick Gordon, and Ishmel Byrd (collectively, Appellants) appeal the district court’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. They also appeal the denial of

their motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. We affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Appellees to

file an untimely answer raising the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) affirmative defense.

Courts have inherent authority to accept late filings. See Ahanchian v. Xenon

Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “district courts

enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in case management”). And we have further

“liberalized the requirement that defendants must raise affirmative defenses in their

initial pleadings.” Magana v. Com. of the N. Mariana Islands, 107 F.3d 1436,

1446 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended.

Appellants contend that they were denied a fair opportunity to contest the

MCA affirmative defense because Appellees asserted the defense after the close of

discovery. However, Appellants had almost six months to move to reopen

discovery or otherwise contest Appellees’ assertion of the MCA defense before

their response to Appellees’ summary judgment motion was filed. See Simmons v.

Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other

grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016)

(en banc) (“The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative

defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense. . . .”) (citations

2 25-1571 omitted). Indeed, although Appellants pursued several discovery disputes between

Appellees’ filing of the answer and the summary judgment motion, none

concerned the MCA affirmative defense. See Lux v. Buchanan, No. 2:23-cv-

00839-MMD-NJK, 2024 WL 1598805, at *2 - *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 12, 2024).

Therefore, Appellants failed to demonstrate prejudice. Cf. Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A need to reopen discovery and

therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from

a delayed motion to amend the complaint. . . .”)1 (citation omitted). “In the

absence of a showing of prejudice [,] an affirmative defense may be raised for the

first time at summary judgment. . . .” Garcia v. Salvation Army, 918 F.3d 997,

1008–09 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation and alterations omitted).

2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Appellees. See Western Towboat Co. v. Vigor Marine, LLC, 85 F.4th 919, 925

(9th Cir. 2023). The evidence submitted by Appellees established that Southwest

was subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s authority, that its business

involved interstate commerce, and that Southwest did not fall within the small

vehicle exception to the MCA. See Klitzke v. Steiner Corp., 110 F.3d 1465, 1467-

1 Even in their Reply Brief on appeal, Appellants contend that this court “should not allow further discovery on the MCA,” and that they “have no desire to force Appellees to produce discovery.” These contentions further suggest that Appellants were not prejudiced.

3 25-1571 68 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1); United States Department of

Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #19: The Motor Carrier Exemption

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (Revised Nov. 2009),

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/19-flsa-motor-carrier. Appellants

offered no countervailing evidence, but relied solely on the designation of

Southwest’s business license as a construction non-contractor. That designation

did not create a genuine dispute of material fact, because the title of a business

license is not relevant to the MCA affirmative defense analysis. See Fact Sheet.

Thus, Appellants failed to meet their burden to raise a material issue of fact. See

Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (“To

defeat summary judgment, [Appellants] must respond with more than mere hearsay

and legal conclusions. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for

relief under Rule 60(b)(1). See United States v. Asarco Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978

(9th Cir. 2005). “Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from judgment for mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . .” Washington v. Ryan, 833 F.3d

1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court

applied the Rule 60(b) standard and briefly, but adequately, explained its decision,

primarily applying the same rationale it articulated to permit the untimely answer.

See BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 216 (2025) (“To be upheld, a

4 25-1571 district court’s decision [under Rule 60(b)] need only apply the correct legal

standard and offer substantial justification for its conclusion. . . .”) (citation,

alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellants moved for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) on the basis that the court

mistakenly concluded that Appellees raised the affirmative defense prior to the

close of discovery, and that mistake led to the district court incorrectly rejecting

Appellants’ waiver argument. However, relief is not warranted under Rule

60(b)(1) for mere legal error. See Plotkin v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 1291,

1293 (9th Cir. 1982).

There was no excusable neglect or surprise because Appellants had

approximately six months from the disclosure of the MCA affirmative defense

until their response to the summary judgment motion was filed. During that time,

they did not seek any additional discovery on the MCA defense, or file a motion

under Rule 56(d), informing the court that they were unable to respond to the

motion for summary judgment without additional discovery. See Stevens v.

Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018), as amended (“Rule 56(d)

provides a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment when they have not had

sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence. . . .”) (citation and internal

quotation marks existed). Thus, Appellants made no tangible showing of

prejudice. See Garcia, 918 F.3d at 1009 (“There is no prejudice to a plaintiff

5 25-1571 where an affirmative defense would have been dispositive if asserted when the

action was filed. Rather, a party must point to a tangible way in which it was

prejudiced by the delay.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

6 25-1571