Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley

587 N.W.2d 517, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1407, 1998 WL 901580
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedDecember 29, 1998
DocketC0-98-1328
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 587 N.W.2d 517 (Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley, 587 N.W.2d 517, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1407, 1998 WL 901580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

OPINION

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.

Appellant City of Apple Valley appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment, arguing that it is immune from tort liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e (1996). We reverse.

FACTS

The Apple Valley Sports Arena is a multipurpose sports facility owned jointly by the City of Apple Valley and School District 196. Located within the facility is an indoor arena that contains tennis courts during the summer and a hockey rink during the winter.

Approximately mid-March each year, the ice rink is melted and several large mats are placed on top of the bare concrete. The mats consist of a black rubber layer on the floor side and a green laminated rubber layer on top. Although the weight of the mats generally prevents them from moving around, duct-tape is also used on the seams underneath the mats and on the surface of the mats around the perimeter to help prevent movement.

At times during the tennis season the black rubber portion of the mat curls up and separates from the green portion. When this occurs, appellant generally uses a hot glue gun to fasten the pieces together again. When there is not enough time to use a glue gun, duct-tape is placed temporarily on top of the seam.

On April 29, 1995 respondent played in a tennis tournament at the Apple Valley Sports *519 Arena. Prior to playing his second match, respondent noticed that there was black tape on the surface of the court covering the baseline seam. Respondent testified in his deposition that the tape on the court appeared to be different than the duet-tape he had seen on prior occasions.

Respondent played four games without incident; however, during his fifth game he slipped on the tape and fell. Respondent was taken to the hospital and informed that his Achilles’ tendon was ruptured. No other injuries or complaints had been reported pri- or to this incident.

Respondent sued appellant for negligently maintaining its tennis courts. Appellant moved for summary judgment arguing that (1) it was immune from liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e; (2) respondent assumed the risk of any injuries sustained; and (3) appellant owed no legal duty to respondent.

The district court issued an order denying áppellant’s motion but made no findings and incorporated no memorandum into the order explaining the ruling.

ISSUE

Is the City of Apple Valley immune from tort liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e?

ANALYSIS

The district court did not provide its reasons for denying summary judgment. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required for summary judgment decisions. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (summary judgment shall be rendered if there is no genuine issue of material fact). Nevertheless, district courts commonly include an attached memorandum with a summary judgment order. Without that memorandum, a reviewing court is left to speculate as to the district court’s reasoning. Steinhilber v. Prairie Pine Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 92, 93 n. 1 (Minn.App.1995). We must assume that the district court found issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

On appeal from summary judgment, a reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). The application of immunity is a question of law that we review de novo. Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998).

Appellant argues it is immune from liability under the recreational use immunity of Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e (1996).

Generally, municipalities are liable for their torts. Minn.Stat. § 466.02 (1996). However, a municipality is entitled to recreational use immunity from

[a]ny claim based upon the * * * operation, or maintenance of any property owned * * * by the municipality that is intended or permitted to be used * * * as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services, * * * if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of * * * recreation property or services. Nothing in this subdivision limits the liability of a municipality for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person.

Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e.

It is undisputed that appellant is a municipality that operates and maintains the tennis courts located in the sports arena. Respondent was participating in a tennis tournament when the injury occurred. The tennis courts are a “recreational area” for purposes of the statute. Based on these facts, appellant is immune from respondent’s claim under section 466.03, subd. 6e.

The exception to the immunity rule is that a municipality owes the same duty to recreational users of its facilities that a private person owes to trespassers. Id. The trespasser standard adopted in Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491 (Minn.1984), and applied in later cases, follows section 335 of the Restatement (Second) *520 of Torts. 1 See id. at 494 (citing sections 333-39 generally). See, e.g., Sirek v. State, 496 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Minn.1993) (limiting application to general trespasser standard of section 335). Under this standard, a landowner is liable for failure to warn of an artificial condition which he has created or maintained only if (1) the artificial condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (2) the landowner has actual knowledge of that danger; and (3) the danger is concealed or hidden from the trespasser. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1965); see also Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 809-10; Cobb v. State, 441 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn.App.1989). In addition,

a landowner will be liable only for failing to exercise reasonable care to warn trespassers about hidden, artificial dangers created or maintained by the landowner.

Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn.1994) (quoting Sirek,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
587 N.W.2d 517, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1407, 1998 WL 901580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lundstrom-v-city-of-apple-valley-minnctapp-1998.