Luis Zapata, et al. v. Rural/Metro Fire Dept, Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00049
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUIS ZAPATA, et al, Case No. 25-cv-0049-BJC-DEB 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER RE: ORDER TO SHOW v. CAUSE 14 RURAL/METRO FIRE DEPT, INC., 15 et al., 16 Defendants. 17

18 19 On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff Luiz Zapata filed a putative Class Action 20 Complaint for Damages and Penalties under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 21 U.S.C. § 1332(d) for violations of the California Labor Code, California Business & 22 Professions Code, and the applicable Wage Order(s) issued by the California Industrial 23 Welfare Commission (“IWC Wage Order(s)”) in the Superior Court for the County of San 24 Diego. Complaint, ECF No. 1-2. 25 On January 8, 2025, Defendants Rural/Metro Fire Department, Capstone Fire & 26 Safety Management, and Global Equities, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) removed the 27 action to this Court and contemporaneously filed an Answer to the Complaint. ECF Nos. 1 1, 2. On January 21, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Action Should 2 not be Remanded, requiring a response within fourteen days of the Order. ECF No. 5. A 3 corrected Order to Show Cause was filed on January 24, 2025, making the response due 4 February 7, 2025. ECF No. 6. On February 7, 2025, Defendants filed a Response to the 5 Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff has not filed any response or objection to 6 removal. 7 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendants properly removed the 8 action to this Court. 9 I. Legal Standard 10 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state 11 court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” 12 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002). A suit filed in state 13 court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original 14 jurisdiction over the suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Federal courts are courts of limited 15 jurisdiction. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the 16 burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Corral v. 17 Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kokkonen v. 18 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). 19 Here, Defendants rely on CAFA, which permits removal where “(a) membership in 20 the putative class is not less than 100; (b) any member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a 21 foreign country or a state different from any defendant; and (c) the aggregate amount in 22 controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00.” See Notice of Removal (“NOR”) ¶ 5 (citing 28 23 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b)). CAFA, however, contains three exceptions to removal: (1) 24 the mandatory “local controversy” exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A); (2) the 25 mandatory “home state” exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B); and (3) the 26 discretionary “home state” exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). See Adams v. W. Marine 27 Prod., Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2020). “Implicit in both subsections (d)(3) and 1 (d)(4) is that the court has jurisdiction, but the court either may or must decline to exercise 2 such jurisdiction.” Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2007) 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3)–(4)). 4 II. Discussion 5 A. Mandatory Local Controversy Exception 6 The mandatory local controversy exception provides that district courts must decline 7 jurisdiction where (1) “more than two-thirds of the plaintiffs are citizens of California”; (2) 8 “at least one defendant from whom significant relief is sought and whose alleged conduct 9 forms a significant basis for the claims is a California citizen”; (3) “the principal injuries 10 about which Plaintiffs complains were suffered in California”; and (4) “no similar class 11 action has been filed against any of the defendants in the preceding three years.” Bridewell- 12 Sledge v. Blue Cross of California, 798 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2015); 28 U.S.C. § 13 1332(d)(4)(A)(emphasis added). 14 Here, the exception does not apply here because a similar class action was filed on 15 February 6, 2024. Therefore, one of the four required elements for the exception is not 16 satisfied. On February 6, 2024, Santiago v. Rural/Metro Fire Dept., Inc., et al., was filed 17 in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2024-00005548. 1 In Santiago, as in the 18 present case, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a proposed class, including “[a]ll 19 current and former non-exempt employees of any of the Defendants within the State of 20 California.” (RJN, Ex. 1 ¶ 17.) In both actions, the plaintiffs have asserted wage-based 21 claims against Rural/Metro under California law based on the same factual allegations. 22 Both plaintiffs allege that Rural/Metro unlawfully required the plaintiffs and putative class 23 members to work during meal/rest periods without compensation or payment of premium 24

25 1 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the Complaint in Santiago v. Rural/Metro Fire Dept., Inc., et al., San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2024-00005548, pursuant to Federal 26 Rule of Evidence 201. Req.Jud.Notice (“RJN”) at 2 ECF No. 9-2. The Court grants this request, finding 27 that a court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson 1 wages (RJN, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 26–27; ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 46, 65–66); failed to pay the plaintiffs and 2 putative class members proper overtime compensation (RJN, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 25, 36–37; ECF 1-2 3 ¶ 62); failed to reimburse the plaintiffs and putative class members for business-related 4 expenses and costs (RJN, Ex. 1 ¶ 44; ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 56, 72); and failed to comply with 5 California wage-reporting requirements (RJN, Ex. 1 ¶ 25; ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 70–71). 6 Therefore, the Court finds that the mandatory local controversy exception is 7 inapplicable. 8 B. Mandatory and Discretionary Home State Controversy Exceptions 9 Under the mandatory “home state” exception, a court must decline jurisdiction when 10 “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and 11 the primary defendants, are citizens of the State” of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 12 1332(d)(4)(B). 13 With regard to discretionary abstention, the Court may decline to exercise 14 jurisdiction when “more than one-third of the putative class, and the primary defendants, 15 are citizens of the state where the action was originally filed.”’ Adams, 958 F.3d at 1220. 16 If any of the primary defendants in the case is not a citizen of the state where the action 17 was initially filed, neither home state exception applies. Singh v. American Honda Finance 18 Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2019); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 19 1. Primary Defendant 20 In determining whether a defendant is a “primary defendant,” the Ninth Circuit has 21 specified that a court must: “assume that all defendants will be found liable”; “consider 22 whether the defendant is sued directly or alleged to be directly responsible for the harm to 23 the proposed class or classes, as opposed to being vicariously or secondarily liable”; and 24 “consider the defendant’s potential exposure to the class relative to the exposure of other 25 defendants.” Id. 26 The Court finds that Defendant Rural/Metro is a “primary defendant” because it is 27 the employer of the putative class members, it is being sued directly, and Plaintiff asserts 1 Rural/Metro is directly responsible for the harm to putative class member plaintiffs. Nicole 2 Semar Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-1. Rural/Metro is incorporated in Arizona and has had 3 its principal place of business in both Arizona and Texas. Kim Duhrkopf Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 4 No. 1-5. The putative class plaintiffs here are “current and former non-exempt employees 5 “who were or are employed in California.” ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 4. Remand under CAFA is only 6 required if all the primary defendants are citizens of California. Here, Defendant is not a 7 citizen of California. Therefore, the “home state controversy” exceptions do not apply and 8 remand is not required. Singh, 925 F.3d at 1068. 9 2. Citizenship of Putative Class Members 10 Even if Defendant Rural/Metro is not considered a “primary defendant,” there is 11 insufficient evidence before the Court to determine how many of the putative plaintiffs are 12 citizens of California. Therefore, the Court cannot make a determination with regard to 13 the citizenship prong of the “home state controversy” exception. As noted above, the 14 mandatory exception requires that two-thirds of the plaintiffs be California citizens, and 15 under the discretionary exception, one-third of the plaintiffs must be California citizens. 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) & (4)(B). 17 A person's state of citizenship is established by domicile, not simply residence, and a 18 residential address in California does not guarantee that the person's legal domicile was in 19 California. King v. Great American Chicken Corp., 903 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 Here, the putative class aims to certify a class that includes current and former non-exempt 21 employees who “were or are employed in California” but is not limited to California 22 “citizens.” The putative class includes 164 former non-exempt employees who were 23 employed within the State of California, but review of the employees’ records does not 24 identify where the former employees currently live or if they considered California their 25 “permanent home” when Plaintiff filed the Complaint. See Semar Decl. ¶ 6. Because there 26 is insufficient evidence to determine what percentage of the putative class members were 27 domiciled in California when the Complaint was filed, the Court cannot determine that the “home state controversy” exception requires remanding the case to state court. When clarity on the citizenship of the putative class members arises, the Court is willing to 3 |] entertain this issue again, if necessary. 4 HI. Conclusion and Order 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants properly removed the action 6 || to this Court, and no exception to CAFA jurisdiction applies. Therefore, the Court retains 7 || jurisdiction. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: November 6. 2025 Degen Chale 12 on fe

13 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28