Luis Alberto Perez Valera, proceeding by his next friend Eylimar Isabel Portillo Luzardo v. Kevin Raycraft et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

LUIS ALBERTO PEREZ VALERA, proceeding by his next friend EYLIMAR ISABEL PORTILLO LUZARDO,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-810

v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering

KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/

OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, proceeding by his next friend Ms. Portillo Luzardo, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas

1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Ms. Portillo Luzardo to proceed as next friend of Petitioner in this action. corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)2 In an order entered on March 16, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted.3 (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 19, 2026.

(ECF No. 10.) II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Portillo Luzardo may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which [she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore, is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties

may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.

2 In addition to filing the § 2241 petition, Petitioner also filed several motions in this action asking the Court to take the following actions during the pendency of the case: order Petitioner’s immediate release, stay Petitioner’s removal and transfer, and order Petitioner’s release without a monetary bond. (ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6.) As set forth in this opinion, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, which resolves the case. In light of this, the entry of the Court’s opinion and corresponding judgment moots Petitioner’s pending motions.

3 In the March 16, 2026, Order to Show Cause, the Court also granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis and substituted Kevin Raycraft, the Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detroit Field Office, for Respondent Unknown Party. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.

1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly

and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Ms. Portillo Luzardo, Petitioner’s spouse, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Portillo Luzardo to proceed as next friend to Petitioner. III. Factual Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 10-1, PageID.93.) On February 19, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States at the Hildago, Texas, Port of Entry. (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id., PageID.93, 96.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States for a period of one year. (2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 10-2, PageID.100.) On February 5, 2026, ICE encountered and arrested Petitioner while conducting “targeted” surveillance near Flint, Michigan.4 (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 10-3, PageID.104.) Petitioner is

scheduled for an individual hearing before the Detroit Immigration Court on May 27, 2026. See Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (enter “244018177” for the A- Number, select “Venezuela” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Apr. 16, 2026).

4 As noted above, Respondents indicate that Petitioner was encountered while ICE was conducting “targeted” surveillance. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 10-3, PageID.104.) Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and there is nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner was a law enforcement target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen. (See id.) IV. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). V. Exhaustion Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s

exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv- 1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25- cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VI. Merits Discussion A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.5

The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25- cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).6 B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice

5 Additionally, to the extent that Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 because the NTA charged him as an “arriving alien,” for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument, and the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. 6 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases do not change the Court’s analysis. of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights

for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). VII. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.7 Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,

7 Although Respondents argue that the “proper Respondent is the Acting Director of ICE’s Detroit Field Office,” Respondents do not specifically seek the dismissal of any of the other named Respondents in this action. (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.62.) immediately release Petitioner from custody.8 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.

Dated: April 20, 2026 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge

8 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days, even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.