Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Extreme Networks, Inc.

367 F. Supp. 2d 649, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6371, 2005 WL 859255
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedApril 14, 2005
DocketCIV.A.03-508 JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 367 F. Supp. 2d 649 (Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Extreme Networks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Extreme Networks, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 649, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6371, 2005 WL 859255 (D. Del. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

This action was brought by Lucent Technologies, Inc. (“Lucent”) against Extreme Networks, Inc. (“Extreme”) and Foundry Networks, Inc. (“Foundry”) for patent infringement. Lucent alleges that products manufactured and sold by Extreme infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 4,769,810 (“the ’810 patent”); 4,769,811 (“the ’811 patent”); 4,914,650 (“the ’650 patent”); 4,922,486 (“the ’486 patent”); and 5,245,607 (“the ’607 patent”). Lucent further alleges that products manufactured and sold by Foundry infringe the ’810 patent, the ’486 patent, and the ’607 patent. Presently before the Court is the claim construction dispute of the parties. The parties briefed their respective positions, and the Court held a Markman hearing on January 14, 2005. This Memorandum Opinion provides the Court’s interpretation of the claim terms disputed by the parties.

BACKGROUND

The patents at issue in this lawsuit relate generally to data networking. The ’810 patent addresses the problem of *653 congestion in a packet-switching network by monitoring packets received from a customer and marking packets transmitted at an excessive rate. The ’811 patent addresses the problem of congestion in a packet-switching network by preferentially dropping marked packets in the presence of congestion. The ’486 patent enhances security in a data network by checking that transmissions between communicating parties are authorized. The ’650 patent addresses the problem of bandwidth management in a packet-switching network that handles different types of traffic, such as voice and data. The ’607 patent addresses the problem of routing a broadcast message in a network.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff 'd, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). A claim term should be construed to mean “what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.

The starting point for a claim construction analysis is the claims themselves. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed.Cir.1999) (stating that “[t]he starting point for any claim construction must be the claims themselves.”). Generally, there is a strong presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.Cir.2001). However, “[t]he intrinsic record, comprising the claims, the written description, and the prosecution history if in evidence ‘must be examined in every case to determine whether the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is rebutted.’ ” Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 345 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed.Cir.2002)).

If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the totality of the intrinsic evidence, then the claim may be construed. If, however, the meaning of a claim term is “genuinely ambiguous” after examining the intrinsic evidence, then a court may consult extrinsic evidence. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed.Cir.1997).

II. Construction of Disputed Terms

Before addressing the disputed claim terms, the Court will address two threshold questions: (1) whether the claims of the ’810 and ’811 patents are limited to packet-switching networks comprised of virtual circuits, and (2) whether the asserted claims in the ’810 patent require the monitoring and marking of packets at an “access node.”

A. Whether The Claims of the’810 and ’811 Patents Are Limited to Virtual Circuits

The first issue before the Court is whether the claims of the ’810 and ’811 patents are .limited to packet-switching networks comprised of virtual circuits. In connection with litigation between Lucent and another party in this Court, the Court construed disputed terms of the ’810 and ’811 patents, the specifications of which are virtually identical. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Newbridge Networks Corp., 168 F.Supp.2d 181 (D.Del.2001). However, the parties in the prior litigation did not raise the issue now before the Court. For the reasons discussed, the Court will construe the claims and disput *654 ed terms of the ’810 and ’811 patents not to require virtual circuits.

Lucent contends that the claims of the ’810 and ’811 patents should not be limited to packet switching networks comprised of virtual circuits. In support of its contention, Lucent cites Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed.Cir.2004). In that case, all of the disclosed embodiments of a powered fluid injector use pressure jackets. However, the Federal Circuit refused to limit the claims to require pressure jackets because “the written description does not contain a clear disavowal of embodiments lacking a pressure jacket.” Id. at 908.

Extreme and Foundry contend that the claims at issue should be limited to packet-switching networks comprised of virtual circuits because every embodiment in the patents utilizes virtual circuits. (D.I. 395 at 5; D.I. 385 at 5.) In support of their contention, Defendants cite the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.2004), and C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858 (Fed.Cir.2004).

In C.R. Bard, the Federal Circuit held that language appearing in the Summary of the Invention and Abstract sections of the patent specification narrowed the meaning of the term “plug” to mean a plug with a pleated surface. C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 866.

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367 F. Supp. 2d 649, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6371, 2005 WL 859255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lucent-technologies-inc-v-extreme-networks-inc-ded-2005.