McNEILL, Justice.
This is an appeal in the pending divorce case between appellant and appellee, from an order of the Court of Domestic Relations of Jefferson County, granting a temporary injunction against the taking of the deposition of a witness.
Appellant and appellee were married to each other August 20, 1955. In her petition for divorce appellant alleged that the parties had three children, all of tender age, and that appellant was expecting another child. The petition alleged that appellee maintained complete control of the property of the parties and that she had no knowledge concerning the community estate or the separate estate of appellee, but that appel-lee owned considerable separate property of which she had little knowledge. She prayed for divorce, for custody of the children, for division of the estate of the parties and order for proper support of their children.
Appellant filed notice to take the deposition of H. E. Dishman. Mr. Dishman is trustee in three trusts created by appellee’s father for the benefit of appellee and other beneficiaries. Dishman was served with subpoena duces tecum ordering him, at the time of taking the deposition, to produce the records of income and assets and other records of these trusts. Before the date for taking the deposition, on application of the trustee Dishman, the trial court granted a. temporary restraining order forbidding the taking of the deposition, and at the time set a hearing on application to make the restraining order a temporary injunction. On the hearing the court granted the temporary injunction against taking the deposition.
Each of the trusts involved are spendthrift trusts. We adopt the following from ap-pellee’s brief describing these trusts:
“Harry Lucas and his wife Mildred Lucas by deed of April 5, 1948, filed for record on April 12, 1948, recorded in Volume 690, page 336, Deed Records of Jefferson County, Texas, conveyed certain property to H. E. Dishman as trustee of The Philip Bland Lucas Trust for the benefit of their son Philip Bland Lucas and their sister Loraine Lucas Simmons, said trust to endure for the lives of said son and sister, or the survivor of them, to use and expend the trust estate, the income or corpus, or both, for the benefit of said son and sister, or either of them, in the manner and amounts and at the times the trustee may in his sole discretion determine meet and proper. Philip Bland Lucas was then 14 years, old. Loraine Lucas Simmons is still living.
“Harry Lucas died on August 26, 1951, and by his will dated May 16, 1951, probated in the County Court of Jefferson County, Texas, on September 10, 1951, and entered in Volume 157, Page 386, probate minutes of said court, devised unto H. E. Dishman and Mildred Lucas as trustees for the benefit of his two sons Harry Lucas, Jr. and Philip Bland Lucas, in two equal shares, all of his property in the State of Louisiana, one share to be known as The Lucas Louisiana “B” Trust for the benefit of Philip Bland Lucas, the same to terminate 10 years after testator’s death or at the expiration of 10 years after the majority of said beneficiary, whichever shall be later, which termination date will be July 15, 1965, and devised all of the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, (except the bequest of his interest in the estate of his deceased father Joe Lucas in two equal shares to The H. Lucas, Jr. Trust and The Philip Bland Lucas Trust aforesaid) in two equal shares, one of which shares be constituted The Lucas Texas 'B’ Trust for the benefit of his son Philip Bland [375]*375Lucas, said trust to endure until July 15, 1964, and authorized, empowered and directed his trustees during the minority of said son to pay and deliver to his wife Mildred Lucas such sum or sums as in their discretion may be required for the maintenance, support and education of said son, but provided that after said son reached his majority said trustees may pay to him from time to time and for any purpose such sums of money as may in the trustees’ sole discretion seem proper, and also provided that the trustees pay to his mother Annie Lucas and to his sister Loraine Lucas Simmons such sums of money, from time to time, as in their sole judgment and discretion may assure their medical care, maintenance, support and comfort. Philip Bland Lucas was then 17 years old. Annie Lucas and Loraine Lucas Simmons are still living.
“The above mentioned deed and will contained the same or similar language which created said trusts 'spendthrift’ trusts:
“ ‘No title in the Trust Estates here'by created nor in the income accruing therefrom until delivered to the beneficiary, or in the accumulation thereof, shall vest in any beneficiary hereunder, and no beneficiary shall have the right or power to transfer, assign, anticipate or encumber his or her income therefrom during the continuance or life of the Trusts hereby created, and neither the principal nor the income of the said Trust Estates shall be liable in any manner in the possession of the Trustees for the debts, contracts, liabilities or engagements of any beneficiary, nor the same be subject to process or seizure of any court.’ ”
The trial court’s action was based upon his belief that since the trusts each provided, in effect, that no title in the trust -estate, nor the income accruing therefrom, shall vest in any beneficiary until delivered to the beneficiary, and because of the spendthrift provisions of each trust, as long as property of the trusts, either principal or income, is held by the trustee and not delivered to the beneficiary, the beneficiary would have no right therein; and because the beneficiary has no right therein, neither would his wife nor children.
The injunction should not have been granted. Rule 186a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by order of July 26, 1960, effective January 1, 1961, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 186b the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will not be admissible at the trial of the cause in which the deposition is taken if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to relate to the discovery of admissible evidence at such trial.”
The primary object of judicial inquiry is to seek and establish the relevant facts. Therefore the liberal use of means of discovery will be upheld. One of the most effective means of discovery is by the use of depositions; and restraint against their employment should be cautiously exercised.
[376]*376 We do not accept the broad statement of appellee that the trustees hold the absolute title to all of the properties in said trusts, and that the beneficiary Philip B.
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McNEILL, Justice.
This is an appeal in the pending divorce case between appellant and appellee, from an order of the Court of Domestic Relations of Jefferson County, granting a temporary injunction against the taking of the deposition of a witness.
Appellant and appellee were married to each other August 20, 1955. In her petition for divorce appellant alleged that the parties had three children, all of tender age, and that appellant was expecting another child. The petition alleged that appellee maintained complete control of the property of the parties and that she had no knowledge concerning the community estate or the separate estate of appellee, but that appel-lee owned considerable separate property of which she had little knowledge. She prayed for divorce, for custody of the children, for division of the estate of the parties and order for proper support of their children.
Appellant filed notice to take the deposition of H. E. Dishman. Mr. Dishman is trustee in three trusts created by appellee’s father for the benefit of appellee and other beneficiaries. Dishman was served with subpoena duces tecum ordering him, at the time of taking the deposition, to produce the records of income and assets and other records of these trusts. Before the date for taking the deposition, on application of the trustee Dishman, the trial court granted a. temporary restraining order forbidding the taking of the deposition, and at the time set a hearing on application to make the restraining order a temporary injunction. On the hearing the court granted the temporary injunction against taking the deposition.
Each of the trusts involved are spendthrift trusts. We adopt the following from ap-pellee’s brief describing these trusts:
“Harry Lucas and his wife Mildred Lucas by deed of April 5, 1948, filed for record on April 12, 1948, recorded in Volume 690, page 336, Deed Records of Jefferson County, Texas, conveyed certain property to H. E. Dishman as trustee of The Philip Bland Lucas Trust for the benefit of their son Philip Bland Lucas and their sister Loraine Lucas Simmons, said trust to endure for the lives of said son and sister, or the survivor of them, to use and expend the trust estate, the income or corpus, or both, for the benefit of said son and sister, or either of them, in the manner and amounts and at the times the trustee may in his sole discretion determine meet and proper. Philip Bland Lucas was then 14 years, old. Loraine Lucas Simmons is still living.
“Harry Lucas died on August 26, 1951, and by his will dated May 16, 1951, probated in the County Court of Jefferson County, Texas, on September 10, 1951, and entered in Volume 157, Page 386, probate minutes of said court, devised unto H. E. Dishman and Mildred Lucas as trustees for the benefit of his two sons Harry Lucas, Jr. and Philip Bland Lucas, in two equal shares, all of his property in the State of Louisiana, one share to be known as The Lucas Louisiana “B” Trust for the benefit of Philip Bland Lucas, the same to terminate 10 years after testator’s death or at the expiration of 10 years after the majority of said beneficiary, whichever shall be later, which termination date will be July 15, 1965, and devised all of the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, (except the bequest of his interest in the estate of his deceased father Joe Lucas in two equal shares to The H. Lucas, Jr. Trust and The Philip Bland Lucas Trust aforesaid) in two equal shares, one of which shares be constituted The Lucas Texas 'B’ Trust for the benefit of his son Philip Bland [375]*375Lucas, said trust to endure until July 15, 1964, and authorized, empowered and directed his trustees during the minority of said son to pay and deliver to his wife Mildred Lucas such sum or sums as in their discretion may be required for the maintenance, support and education of said son, but provided that after said son reached his majority said trustees may pay to him from time to time and for any purpose such sums of money as may in the trustees’ sole discretion seem proper, and also provided that the trustees pay to his mother Annie Lucas and to his sister Loraine Lucas Simmons such sums of money, from time to time, as in their sole judgment and discretion may assure their medical care, maintenance, support and comfort. Philip Bland Lucas was then 17 years old. Annie Lucas and Loraine Lucas Simmons are still living.
“The above mentioned deed and will contained the same or similar language which created said trusts 'spendthrift’ trusts:
“ ‘No title in the Trust Estates here'by created nor in the income accruing therefrom until delivered to the beneficiary, or in the accumulation thereof, shall vest in any beneficiary hereunder, and no beneficiary shall have the right or power to transfer, assign, anticipate or encumber his or her income therefrom during the continuance or life of the Trusts hereby created, and neither the principal nor the income of the said Trust Estates shall be liable in any manner in the possession of the Trustees for the debts, contracts, liabilities or engagements of any beneficiary, nor the same be subject to process or seizure of any court.’ ”
The trial court’s action was based upon his belief that since the trusts each provided, in effect, that no title in the trust -estate, nor the income accruing therefrom, shall vest in any beneficiary until delivered to the beneficiary, and because of the spendthrift provisions of each trust, as long as property of the trusts, either principal or income, is held by the trustee and not delivered to the beneficiary, the beneficiary would have no right therein; and because the beneficiary has no right therein, neither would his wife nor children.
The injunction should not have been granted. Rule 186a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by order of July 26, 1960, effective January 1, 1961, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 186b the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will not be admissible at the trial of the cause in which the deposition is taken if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to relate to the discovery of admissible evidence at such trial.”
The primary object of judicial inquiry is to seek and establish the relevant facts. Therefore the liberal use of means of discovery will be upheld. One of the most effective means of discovery is by the use of depositions; and restraint against their employment should be cautiously exercised.
[376]*376 We do not accept the broad statement of appellee that the trustees hold the absolute title to all of the properties in said trusts, and that the beneficiary Philip B. Lucas has no title or interest therein except a contingent interest, i.e., he would have only such interest in funds therefrom as may be paid and delivered to him from time to time by the trustees in their “sole discretion”. When this cause was submitted it was stated that the trustees had paid appellee $35,000 or $40,000 per year for several years, but since the present suit was filed all payments of income to appellee from the trusts have been stopped. A supplemental transcript reflects that ap-pellee has recently filed a motion to reduce temporary alimony for his wife and support of his children from $1,000.00 per month, as first set by the court, because of lack of funds. Under the facts, we think appellant would be entitled to inquire into the incomes of the various trusts and the amounts, regularity and time of support payments which have been made by the trustees to appellee as beneficiary. This inquiry would bear upon the setting of any amount of temporary alimony and support of the children. The “sole discretion” stressed by appellee is one that may not be exercised arbitrarily. First National Bank of Beaumont v. Howard, 149 Tex. 130, 229 S.W.2d 781; State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 45, 308 S.W.2d 4 (11). It is certainly proper for appellant to inquire into this feature of the trusts and trustee’s action. See Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, 2d Ed., Sec. 560, pp. 118-128.
The trusts involved were created at least in part for the support of appellee. Being the husband of appellant and father of her children, he owes them the duty of support. When a man is married the obligation to his family is considered as a part of the cost of support for himself. It is against public policy to allow such a person to be well taken care of by a trust when those who have every right to look to him for support are doing without. Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, D.C., 126 F.Supp. 19; 96 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 225 F.2d 545. See also, Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, Sec. 223, pp. 484-492.
Appellant urges that the accumulated undistributed income from the trusts constitutes community property of the parties. In view of the fact that one of the trustees in two of the trusts is not a party to this proceeding, and believing that she is a necessary party for the purpose of passing on this question, we decline to do so here. McDonald v. Alvis, 154 Tex. 570, 572, 281 S.W.2d 330.
The injunction is dissolved.