Lozada v. Stricko

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lozada v. Stricko

212 A.D.2d 514, 623 N.Y.S.2d 118

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 6, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 212 A.D.2d 514 (Lozada v. Stricko) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lozada v. Stricko, 212 A.D.2d 514, 623 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the third-party defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.), dated August 26, 1994, which denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the third-party defendants’ motion to dismiss the third-party complaint as time-barred. To the extent that the third-party action is based on the failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract and seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action, the third-party action was timely brought within the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (see, Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., 58 NY2d 1026; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs., 43 NY2d 389).

We have considered the appellants’ remaining contentions [515]*515and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Copertino, Pizzuto and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the third-party defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.), dated August 26, 1994, which denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the third-party defendants’ motion to dismiss the third-party complaint as time-barred. To the extent that the third-party action is based on the failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract and seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action, the third-party action was timely brought within the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (see, Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., 58 NY2d 1026; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs., 43 NY2d 389).

We have considered the appellants’ remaining contentions [515]*515and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Copertino, Pizzuto and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

212 A.D.2d 514, 623 N.Y.S.2d 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lozada-v-stricko-nyappdiv-1995.

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