OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
In a case of first impression, the Lower Merion School District (District) petitions for review of the August 17, 2004, order of the Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education (Department), which ordered the District to provide occupational therapy services to Student Doe1 pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of [926]*9261973 (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794. We affirm.
Student Doe is a six-year old student residing in the District with his parents (Parents Doe). Parents Doe requested that their child be evaluated to assess his needs and determine whether he was entitled to services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1487, and/or under Section 504. Following that evaluation, the District determined that Student Doe was not eligible for special education services under the IDEA and its Pennsylvania implementing regulations, set forth at 22 Pa. Code Chapter 14 (Chapter 14), but Student Doe was eligible to receive occupational therapy services under Section 504 and its Pennsylvania implementing regulations, set forth at 22 Pa.Code Chapter 15 (Chapter 15).2 The District offered Parents Doe a Section 504 Service Agreement for Student Doe that included accommodations and services in the form of one thirty-minute session of direct occupational therapy per week and ongoing teacher consultation to follow through with the accommodations.
Parents Doe enrolled Student Doe for the 2004-05 school year in a full-day kindergarten program at an independent private school outside of the District, which offers only half-day kindergarten. However, Parents Doe requested that the District provide Student Doe with occupational therapy at a public school in the District, and Parents Doe dually enrolled Student Doe in the District so that he could receive this therapy. Parents Doe did not seek transportation costs to the public school nor private school tuition reimbursement.
The District refused to provide occupational therapy to Student Doe, asserting that, in order to receive Section 504 services, Student Doe must be attending a public school in the District. Subsequently, a Hearing Officer reviewed the matter; the specific legal issue presented was whether Student Doe is “entitled to receive services from the ... District under a Section 504 Service [Agreement] if he is dually enrolled and his parents bring him to a District facility to receive those services while he is attending an independent, private school.” (R.R. at 4; Hearing Officer’s decision at 2.)
After considering the arguments of both parties,3 the Hearing Officer answered this question in the affirmative and issued a Department order, dated August 17, 2004, requiring the District to provide Student Doe with the occupational therapy services outlined in the Section 504 Service Agreement so long as he is dually enrolled and receives those services at a public school in the District. (R.R. at 12; Hearing Officer’s decision at 10.) In doing so, the Hearing Officer relied on Veschi v. Northwestern Lehigh School District, 772 A.2d 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.) appeal denied, 567 Pa. 753, 788 A.2d 382 (2001), in which this court, in the IDEA/Chapter 14 context, considered a fact pattern almost identical to that presented here and ruled in favor of the student.
[927]*927In its petition for review of the August 17, 2004, order,4 the District argues that the Hearing Officer erred as a matter of law in ruling that Section 504 requires a public school district to provide services to an otherwise eligible student enrolled in and attending a private school. The District acknowledges that, in Veschi, this court decided that IDEA-eligible students attending private schools were entitled to special education and related services from public schools. However, the District notes that no cases address whether public school districts must provide Section 504 services to Section 504,-eligible students attending private schools. According to the District, because the purpose behind Section 504 and the IDEA differ and because there are critical differences between the express language of Section 504 and the IDEA, as well as substantial differences between their respective federal and state regulations, the reasoning in Veschi, when applied to this case, actually supports the conclusion that the District is not required to provide Student Doe with Section 504 services so long as Student Doe is attending a private school. We disagree.
I. Statutory and Regulatory Law
Section 504 was enacted to promote, inter alia, the inclusion and integration of persons with disabilities into mainstream society. See 29 U.S.C. § 701; J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet School District, 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.2000). To that end, Section 504 is “designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 84 C.F.R. § 104.1, by providing in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity[5] receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). In the field of education, Section 504 complements the IDEA. While the IDEA requires federally funded agencies to provide a free appropriate public education with special education and related services for eligible students,6 Section 504 prohibits such agencies from discriminating against students with disabilities. Pawlet. However, the federal regulations promulgated under Section 504 adopt the IDEA language of free appropriate public education and require that:
A recipient [of federal financial assistance] that operates a public elementary [928]*928or secondary education program or activity shall provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person’s handicap.
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (emphasis added). Section 504’s federal regulations define an “appropriate education” as “the provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met.” 34 C.F.R. § 104
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OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
In a case of first impression, the Lower Merion School District (District) petitions for review of the August 17, 2004, order of the Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education (Department), which ordered the District to provide occupational therapy services to Student Doe1 pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of [926]*9261973 (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794. We affirm.
Student Doe is a six-year old student residing in the District with his parents (Parents Doe). Parents Doe requested that their child be evaluated to assess his needs and determine whether he was entitled to services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1487, and/or under Section 504. Following that evaluation, the District determined that Student Doe was not eligible for special education services under the IDEA and its Pennsylvania implementing regulations, set forth at 22 Pa. Code Chapter 14 (Chapter 14), but Student Doe was eligible to receive occupational therapy services under Section 504 and its Pennsylvania implementing regulations, set forth at 22 Pa.Code Chapter 15 (Chapter 15).2 The District offered Parents Doe a Section 504 Service Agreement for Student Doe that included accommodations and services in the form of one thirty-minute session of direct occupational therapy per week and ongoing teacher consultation to follow through with the accommodations.
Parents Doe enrolled Student Doe for the 2004-05 school year in a full-day kindergarten program at an independent private school outside of the District, which offers only half-day kindergarten. However, Parents Doe requested that the District provide Student Doe with occupational therapy at a public school in the District, and Parents Doe dually enrolled Student Doe in the District so that he could receive this therapy. Parents Doe did not seek transportation costs to the public school nor private school tuition reimbursement.
The District refused to provide occupational therapy to Student Doe, asserting that, in order to receive Section 504 services, Student Doe must be attending a public school in the District. Subsequently, a Hearing Officer reviewed the matter; the specific legal issue presented was whether Student Doe is “entitled to receive services from the ... District under a Section 504 Service [Agreement] if he is dually enrolled and his parents bring him to a District facility to receive those services while he is attending an independent, private school.” (R.R. at 4; Hearing Officer’s decision at 2.)
After considering the arguments of both parties,3 the Hearing Officer answered this question in the affirmative and issued a Department order, dated August 17, 2004, requiring the District to provide Student Doe with the occupational therapy services outlined in the Section 504 Service Agreement so long as he is dually enrolled and receives those services at a public school in the District. (R.R. at 12; Hearing Officer’s decision at 10.) In doing so, the Hearing Officer relied on Veschi v. Northwestern Lehigh School District, 772 A.2d 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.) appeal denied, 567 Pa. 753, 788 A.2d 382 (2001), in which this court, in the IDEA/Chapter 14 context, considered a fact pattern almost identical to that presented here and ruled in favor of the student.
[927]*927In its petition for review of the August 17, 2004, order,4 the District argues that the Hearing Officer erred as a matter of law in ruling that Section 504 requires a public school district to provide services to an otherwise eligible student enrolled in and attending a private school. The District acknowledges that, in Veschi, this court decided that IDEA-eligible students attending private schools were entitled to special education and related services from public schools. However, the District notes that no cases address whether public school districts must provide Section 504 services to Section 504,-eligible students attending private schools. According to the District, because the purpose behind Section 504 and the IDEA differ and because there are critical differences between the express language of Section 504 and the IDEA, as well as substantial differences between their respective federal and state regulations, the reasoning in Veschi, when applied to this case, actually supports the conclusion that the District is not required to provide Student Doe with Section 504 services so long as Student Doe is attending a private school. We disagree.
I. Statutory and Regulatory Law
Section 504 was enacted to promote, inter alia, the inclusion and integration of persons with disabilities into mainstream society. See 29 U.S.C. § 701; J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet School District, 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.2000). To that end, Section 504 is “designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 84 C.F.R. § 104.1, by providing in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity[5] receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). In the field of education, Section 504 complements the IDEA. While the IDEA requires federally funded agencies to provide a free appropriate public education with special education and related services for eligible students,6 Section 504 prohibits such agencies from discriminating against students with disabilities. Pawlet. However, the federal regulations promulgated under Section 504 adopt the IDEA language of free appropriate public education and require that:
A recipient [of federal financial assistance] that operates a public elementary [928]*928or secondary education program or activity shall provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person’s handicap.
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (emphasis added). Section 504’s federal regulations define an “appropriate education” as “the provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (emphasis added.) Further, the provision of a “free education” means provision of educational and related services without cost to the handicapped person or to his or her parents or guardian except for those fees that are imposed on non-handicapped persons or their parents or guardian.7 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(c)(1). However, if a recipient of federal funds has made a free appropriate public education available to a handicapped person, and the person’s parents choose to place the person in a private school, the recipient is not required to pay for the person’s education in the private school. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(c)(4).
Importantly, Parents Doe do not seek reimbursement for Student Doe’s private school tuition; they do not ask that any Section 504 services be provided for Student Doe at the private school; and they assume the cost of transporting Student Doe to a District facility for the services. What Parents Doe do seek is to obtain what has been recognized as a crucial element of Student Doe’s “appropriate education,” i.e., “related services” for free.8 However, the District maintains that, because Parents Doe do not choose to have Student Doe receive a free “regular education” at the District, Student Doe is not entitled to receive the free “related services” mandated by Section 504. In doing so, the District attempts to distinguish between substantive classes and “related services,” acknowledging that Student Doe’s dual enrollment permits him to avail himself of the former at a District facility, but rejecting the idea that Student Doe may dual enroll in the District to take advantage of the latter.9 As stated, however, [929]*929section 504’s federal regulations define “appropriate education” to include both “regular or special education and related aids and services.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, we reject the distinction made by the District as having no basis in law.
In addition, Chapter 15 regulations, 22 Pa.Code §§ 15.1-15.11, setting out the procedures for implementation of Section 504 in Pennsylvania, require only that a child be enrolled in the district from which he seeks services and does not require that the student attend classes at a district public school in order to receive those services. Specifically, the state regulations require that:
A school district shall provide each protected handicapped student enrolled in the district, without cost to the student or family, those related aids, services or accommodations which are needed to afford the student equal opportunity to participate in and obtain the benefits of the school program and extracurricular activities without discrimination and to the maximum extent appropriate to the student’s abilities.
22 Pa.Code § 15.3 (emphasis added). As previously indicated, Student Doe is enrolled in the District.
Nevertheless, focusing on the use of the definite article “the” rather than the indefinite article “a,” the District asserts that Section 504 only requires a recipient of federal funds to provide services that are necessary to allow a Section 504-eligible person meaningful access to the recipient’s program, not to any school program.10 [930]*930The District argues that, because the service requested by Parents Doe is not a means to permit Student Doe access to the District’s program, Section 504 does not require the District to provide that service.11
While we do not dismiss the District’s argument out of hand, we do note, as did the Hearing Officer, that the wording in the state regulation “is ‘enrolled’ and not ‘attending.’ It is also noted that the regulation’s wording is ‘the school program’ and not ‘the public school program.’ ” 12 (Hearing Officer’s decision at 7 (emphasis added)). Indeed, as the Hearing Officer pointed out, it is the District’s interpretation of this regulation that is at the very core of this case, and we must reject that interpretation.
We recognize that there are differences between Section 504 and the IDEA, and Section 504 does not specifically provide for services to private school students in the way that the IDEA does.- However, neither Section 504, nor the applicable federal or state regulations promulgated to effectuate Section 504, bar private school students from dual enrollment in a public school district in order to receive Section 504 services at a district facility.
To the contrary, with its emphasis on the needs of the student, the mandate in Section 504 and its federal implementing regulations clearly require that a public school district provide a “free appropriate public education” to each qualified student in its jurisdiction. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a). Moreover, an appropriate education constitutes “provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet the individual needs of handicapped persons.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (emphasis added). Here, the District’s interpretation would frustrate the purpose of Section 504 in that it [931]*931would exclude Student Doe from receiving those services that have been determined to be part of a free appropriate education for him.
Because Section 504 is remedial legislation, M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School District of the City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.2003), and should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purpose, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), we are not persuaded by the District’s argument that the distinctions between the IDEA and Section 504 demand a different result than that reached by the Hearing Officer. The fact that the state regulations employ narrower language than that used in the federal regulations to implement Section 504 is of no moment because the regulation cannot be interpreted to rewrite or contravene its enabling legislation.13 See Lisa H. v. State Board of Education, 67 Pa.Cmwlth. 350, 447 A.2d 669 (1982), aff'd, 502 Pa. 613, 467 A.2d 1127 (1983); Barr v. Department of Public Welfare, 62 Pa.Cmwlth. 211, 435 A.2d 678 (1981).
II. Caselaw Analysis
Courts in the Third Circuit have consistently applied an IDEA/Chapter 14 analysis when deciding cases under Section 504/Chapter 15. Therefore, we also agree with Parents Doe that, to resolve the present matter, it is entirely appropriate to review caselaw decided under the IDEA. In W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492-93 (3d Cir.1995), the court stated:
There appear to be few differences, if any, between IDEA’S affirmative duty and [Section] 504’s negative prohibition. Indeed, the regulations implementing [Section] 504 adopt the IDEA language, requiring that schools which receive or benefit from federal financial assistance ‘shall provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction.’ 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a).
See also Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999). In addition, courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have consistently followed the holdings in Matula and Ridgewood. See, e.g., Susavage v. Bucks County Schools Intermediate Unit No. 22, 2002 WL 109615 (No. Civ. A. 00-6217, E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 22, 2002); Christen G. ex rel. Louise G. v. Lower Merion School District, 919 F.Supp. 793 (E.D.Pa.1996).
The District contends, however, that the courts have recognized that children eligible for Section 504 services are not entitled to all of the protections afforded children eligible under the IDEA, citing Molly [932]*932L. ex rel B.L. v. Lower Merion School District, 194 F.Supp.2d 422 (E.D.Pa.2002), a case in which the District was a party.14 In Molly L, the parents of a disabled child brought an action against the District challenging the appropriateness of a proposed Section 504 Service Agreement for then-child and seeking tuition reimbursement for her enrollment in private school. The court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, because the District established that its Section 504 Service Agreement conferred the “meaningful benefit” embodied in Section 504’s free appropriate public education requirement, the parents were not entitled to reimbursement of the private school tuition. As previously stated, Parents Doe did not enroll Student Doe in private school because they were dissatisfied with the Section 504 Service Agreement proposed for Student Doe, and they do not seek tuition reimbursement on that basis.
In fact, to the extent that the District’s relies on Molly L to support the position that Section 504 cases cannot be resolved by reference to the IDEA, that reliance is misplaced. The court in Molly L. granted summary judgment in the District’s favor; however, far from rejecting application of an IDEA analysis in that Section 504 case, the court cited Matulo, and Ridgewood and noted that “[t]he substantive requirements of [Section 504] in the education context are equivalent to the requirements set forth in the [IDEA].... Thus, although IDEA does not apply in this case, the Court’s analysis is informed by IDEA and cases interpreting that statute.” Molly L., 194 F.Supp.2d at 426-27 (citations and footnotes omitted). We agree that the analysis used in cases interpreting the IDEA can be utilized in Section 504 cases.
III. Veschi
The issue presented here, although newly considered in the context of Section 504, has been resolved previously in the context of the IDEA. In Veschi the parents of a child with speech and language disabilities appealed a Department decision holding that the public school district was not obligated to provide speech and language therapy services to the child while he was enrolled at a private, parochial school. Like Parents Doe, the parents in Veschi did not seek tuition reimbursement for their son’s private school education and did not seek to have the therapy provided at the non-public school; rather, they requested provision of services to their son at the school district facility while he still attends his parochial school (dual enrollment). The parents in Veschi argued that they had a constitutionally protected right to decide where their child went to school, see Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), and they asserted that where the school district had determined that their son needed certain IDEA-related services, the school district had an obligation under the IDEA to provide those services at the public school [933]*933without requiring their son to forego his private school enrollment.
This court agreed and held that a private school student can be dually enrolled in order to receive IDEA-related services provided at a district school that would be conducting those services for public school children. The court noted that the IDEA was intended to provide handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free education, and the IDEA should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of these objectives. Veschi (citing School Committee of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985)).
Here, in ruling in favor of Student Doe, the Hearing Officer relied on Veschi, quoting the following language from that case.
While the parents of a child with disabilities unilaterally enrolled in a private school must bear the financial burden of tuition where the education agency has offered a free, appropriate education at public expense, that fact does not relieve the public education agency, under either federal or state law, from providing ‘special education and related services’ to voluntarily placed private school students. Moreover, such aid, when provided, must be comparable to that received by exceptional children in public schools. The services offered must reflect a genuine opportunity to participate and the public education agency, by limiting the Veschis’ school choice, fails to provide that ‘genuine opportunity.’ When exceptional private school children have a right to ‘comparable’ or ‘equitable’ services, school choice decisions should be made on factors other than the fear of total deprivation of those services. That said, we hold that Vincent may remain at St. Joseph’s while simultaneously receiving special education services from the District.
Id. at 475.
We agree with the Hearing Officer that this analysis, although reached in the context of the IDEA in Veschi, applies with equal force in this Section 504 case. Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of June, 2005, the order of the Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education, dated August 17, 2004, is hereby affirmed.