Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. O'Neil

89 S.E. 862, 119 Va. 611, 1916 Va. LEXIS 136
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedSeptember 11, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 89 S.E. 862 (Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. O'Neil) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. O'Neil, 89 S.E. 862, 119 Va. 611, 1916 Va. LEXIS 136 (Va. 1916).

Opinion

Sims, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

In the court below there was a demurrer to the evidence, which was overruled by such court, so that the evidence must be considered by this court under the rule applicable in such case.

The appellant, the defendant in the court below, acquired its right of way adjoining the land of the wife of the appellee, plaintiff in the court below, by deed from the father and mother of such wife, David C. Nickels and Clarissa Nickels, of date July 25, 1889. This right of way consisted of a strip of land passing through the farm of the grantors, leaving still owned by the latter considerable land on both sides, north and south, of such right of way. Many years before and at the time of this conveyance to the defendant, there was an established pathway in use by the grantors in passing to and from the said land on both sides of such right of way and- by occupants of 'four or five small houses on said farm, two of which were south of the said right of way (one on same location as plaintiff’s dwelling house subsequently built), and such pathway was used by the occupants of the latter also for such passing to and fro and as an outlet to and from the public road which passed through the farm. This pathway was located from the point where it entered the old county road at the east crossing of the railroad, afterwards constructed by the defendant, in a southwesterly direction several hundred feet along and over said right of way, and passed from the latter on to the land of said farm south of the said right of way at [613]*613the point where the defendant subsequently erected the stile hereinafter mentioned; thence on over said land south of said right of way—that is to say, the location of such pathway was the same when the defendant obtained its deed as when it afterwards constructed a stile across it. Many years before and at the time of such deed there was no obstruction across this pathway and it was in the open and visible use aforesaid.

The said deed was as follows:

“This deed made this the 26th day of July, 1889, between David C. Nickels and Clarissa, his wife, of the county of Wise and State of Virginia, parties of the first part, and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation doing business under the laws of Virginia, party of the second part:

“Witnesseth: That in consideration of the fact that said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company has located and now proposes to construct its Cumberland Valley branch over the lands of said David C. Nickels, situate, lying and being in the county of Wise, and State of Virginia, and ‘the advantages to be derived therefrom to the said David C. Nickels, his heirs and assigns, and in consideration that said company erect and maintain suitable and necessary crossings over said road and the further consideration of the sum of sixty-five dollars, cash in hand paid;’ the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the said parties of the first part have this day given, granted, bargained and sold and by these presents do convey to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, for its Cumberland. Valley branch, a strip, piece or parcel of land one hundred feet in width, beginning at a point in the center line of said railroad as now located where said line crosses [614]*614the division line between the lands of Matilda Martin and said David C. Nickels, the bearing of which line is south 31 30 east thence with a width one hundred (100) feet, measured equally fifty (50) feet on each side of said center line and running parallel therewith for a distance of one thousand and ten (1,010) feet to a line of the lands of the Virginia Coal and Iron Company, the bearing of which line is north 21 degrees east, containing two and 32-100 acres, be the same more or less.

“To have and to hold said strip or parcel of land with its appurtenances and privileges to the said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, its seccessors and assigns, forever.

“And the said parties of the first part, for themselves, their heirs and assigns, do- hereby release the said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, its successors and assigns from any further payment for or on account of the appropriation and occupancy of said strip of land as well as for all damages that may accrue by or result from the location, construction and operation of said Cumberland Valley branch of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad over and upon said strip or parcel of land, and the said David C. Nickels and Clarissa, his wife, warrants generally the land hereby conveyed, and said company is to fully protect said Nickels spring from all injury.

“Witness the following signatures and seals, this day and year first above written.

“D. C. Nickels, (Seal) “Clarissa Nickels. (Séal)

“Virginia, in Wise County, towit:

“I, W. S. Palmer, a Notary Public in and for the County and State aforesaid, do certify that D. C.' [615]*615Nickels and Clarissa Nickels, his wife, whose names are signed to the foregoing deed bearing date the 25th day of July, 1889, have acknowledged the same before me in my county aforesaid.

“Given under my hand, this 26th day of July, 1889.

“W. S. Palmer, N. P. W. C.”

David Nickels having given his daughter, the wife of plaintiff, a parcel of land, part of said farm south of the railroad right of way, and put her in possession of it, her husband, the plaintiff, “one or two years” after said railroad was constructed, built a dwelling house about seventy-five or a hundred feet south of the point where said pathway left the right of way of said railroad company, erected a paling fence along the line of such right of way dividing it from the land of his wife to the south of it, opposite the dwelling house lot, and placed a gate across said pathway at the point at which it left said right of way; and the plaintiff and his family and others having occasion to use it, continued to use such pathway without objection or hindrance from the defendant until the defendant, in March, 1913, in fencing in its right of way, in the absence of the plaintiff and his wife from home, but over the protest of his wife’s mother (who was left in charge and possession of their home) and in disregard of her request fór a gate, took down the paling fence above referred to and built a woven wire fence, about five feet in height, with a barbed wire at the top about four inches above the woven wire, along the line of said right of way; and in the place of said gate across said pathway it constructed steps or a stile six feet in width, extending out three feet each side of the woven wire fence. The steps were nine inches by eight inches rise, except that the top step was about six inches [616]*616wide, was immediately over the top of the woven wire, and a strand of barbed wire was about six inches over the top step, so that in passing over this stile one would go up the steps, three feet in width on one side of the wire fence, step over the barbed wire over the top step, turn on the top step about six inches in width cumbered with the barbed wire, and go down in the same direction he. came up, but on the opposite side of the wire fence.

Plaintiff being away from home at work on railroad construction when the fence and stile last named were constructed, promptly complained of the stile to the defendant on his return. On this point and as to condition and use of the stile by plaintiff and others, the plaintiff and his wife testified as follows:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 S.E. 862, 119 Va. 611, 1916 Va. LEXIS 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-nashville-railroad-v-oneil-va-1916.