DIXON, Justice.
Petitioner, Louisiana Irrigation and Mill Company, sought an injunction prohibiting defendant, James W. Pousson, from interfering with a described “lateral aqueduct servitude.” The described servitude was a canal about thirty feet wide utilized to conduct water from a main irrigation canal known as the “Abbott-Duson Canal.” The Abbott-Duson Canal, in turn, carried water about fourteen miles from Bayou Des Cannes. The lateral canal involved in this litigation crossed the lands of several owners including lands owned by the defendant. There is no allegation that plaintiff possessed the canal under color of title. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant dug his own irrigation well and began pumping water into plaintiff’s canal, and by using the canal for irrigation purposes, disturbed the plaintiff’s rights of possession.
In responsive pleadings, the defendant claimed to be the owner and the possessor [977]*977of all canals involved in this litigation, particularly for more than one year prior to the institution of plaintiff’s suit and for more than one year prior to the disturbance alleged by plaintiff.
The trial court overruled exceptions and denied the motion to dissolve, and, after trial on the rule for preliminary injunction, rendered judgment enjoining the defendant from interfering with plaintiff’s use of the irrigation canal. The Court of Appeal reversed, deciding that plaintiff lacked the requisite possession to support injunctive relief under C.C.P. art. 3663. 252 So.2d 151.
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff’s classification of the servitude involved as a continuous and apparent servitude, because of the provisions of C.C. art. 727,1 and as a real right subject to “quasi possession.” 2 The court further concluded that the “quasi possession” of the servitude claimed by the plaintiff had not been continuous for the year prior to March 20, 1970, the date found to be the beginning of the disturbance of the possession by defendant. Its ruling was confined to a portion only of the canal (252 So.2d 151, 155) as it crossed the lands of the defendant, since the plaintiff might have been in possession of other portions of the canal which crossed lands owned by other persons.
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal: before plaintiff can obtain an injunction under C.C.P. art. 3663(2) 3 it must have been in possession of the immovable 4 or real right for a year before the disturbance.
From the evidence the Court of Appeal found that the lateral canal involved was used by the plaintiff to furnish water to rice farmers for the purpose of irrigating rice crops for many years prior to 1967 (with the exception of the lower end of [979]*979the canal, which was not constructed until 1965). Plaintiff maintained the levees and outlets, and ran water through the canal during the rice irrigation season, which normally begins in March and might extend through July in each year.
In 1962 the defendant, through whose land portions of the canal pass, dug his own well and constructed his own irrigation canal, paralleling a portion of plaintiff’s canal. From 1962 until 1967 defendant irrigated his rice from his own well and from the canal which he constructed.
Plaintiff corporation is in the business of irrigating lands planted to rice, and furnishes water to farmers in return for a share of the rice crop. The canal involved in this suit was not used in 1967, since plaintiff had no contracts to furnish water to farmers adjacent to that canal in that year. Rice fields are rotated. Some of the fields for which plaintiff would have furnished water were planted to soybeans. In 1967, while defendant irrigated his own fields from his own well, some of the water from the canal which the defendant had constructed escaped and wet the bean crop of one of the owners of land through which the canal passed. Thereupon, defendant switched from his canal to plaintiff’s unused canal, the one involved in this suit.
In 1968 plaintiff used a short portion of the canal here involved. In that year, the defendant again used a major portion of plaintiff’s canal to carry his own water to irrigate his own rice crop.
In 1969 plaintiff used the entire canal, and its use was exclusive. Plaintiff first began pumping water through the canal for the 1969 season on May 12, 1969. This factual conclusion by the Court of Appeal gave plaintiff “every benefit of the doubt.” 5
The 1967 and 1968 usurpation of the lateral canal by defendant clearly resulted in a loss of possession by plaintiff. Possession is lost “when the possessor of an estate allows it to be usurped and held for a year, without, during that time, having done any act of possession, or interfered with the usurper’s possession.” C.C. art. 3449. Plaintiff’s possession again commenced on May 12, 1969, continuing through the 1969 season. On March 20, 1970 defendant again occupied the lateral canal, pumping water from his own well into the canal to irrigate his own crops and that of others.
Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the plaintiff did not have possession of the canal [981]*981for one year preceding' the disturbance by the defendant on March 20, 1970.
The arguments of the plaintiff are without substance. We find the evidence adequately supports the Court of Appeal in its factual findings, both as to the nature and extent of plaintiff’s possession, and the open adverse possession of the defendant.
In addition, plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeal should have maintained its “plea of estoppel.” In effect, plaintiff argues that, since the defendant never objected to plaintiff’s use of the canal, and constructed his own canal system, and once asked plaintiff’s canal manager to allow defendant to use plaintiff’s canal, defendant should be estopped from contesting plaintiff’s possession or ownership.
There is no substance to the argument. Even if “estoppel” were available in an action concerning possession of an immovable, there is no showing that defendant’s actions, with respect to plaintiff’s use of the canal, ever amounted to any more than sufferance. Defendant considered the benefit accruing to his neighbors, who did not have their own irrigation system and who depended on plaintiff for water. The plaintiff never relied to its detriment on any act of the defendant, an essential element to any theory of “estoppel.”
For the purposes of this decision, we have adopted, as did the Court of Appeal, plaintiff’s position that this irrigation canal constituted a continuous and apparent servitude. This is the legal position most favorable to the plaintiff. Many significant issues are suggested, but not decided. Some are of such importance that they should not be “decided” in dicta nor on an inadequate record. This opinion does not, for example decide that a rice irrigation lateral canal is an aqueduct or other continuous, apparent servitude, or even a predial servitude of any kind, as between plaintiff and defendant. An explanation of the limitations of this opinion is attached as an appendix.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal dissolving the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction previously entered, and remanding the case to the district court for determination of damages and attorney’s fees is affirmed, at plaintiff’s cost.
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DIXON, Justice.
Petitioner, Louisiana Irrigation and Mill Company, sought an injunction prohibiting defendant, James W. Pousson, from interfering with a described “lateral aqueduct servitude.” The described servitude was a canal about thirty feet wide utilized to conduct water from a main irrigation canal known as the “Abbott-Duson Canal.” The Abbott-Duson Canal, in turn, carried water about fourteen miles from Bayou Des Cannes. The lateral canal involved in this litigation crossed the lands of several owners including lands owned by the defendant. There is no allegation that plaintiff possessed the canal under color of title. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant dug his own irrigation well and began pumping water into plaintiff’s canal, and by using the canal for irrigation purposes, disturbed the plaintiff’s rights of possession.
In responsive pleadings, the defendant claimed to be the owner and the possessor [977]*977of all canals involved in this litigation, particularly for more than one year prior to the institution of plaintiff’s suit and for more than one year prior to the disturbance alleged by plaintiff.
The trial court overruled exceptions and denied the motion to dissolve, and, after trial on the rule for preliminary injunction, rendered judgment enjoining the defendant from interfering with plaintiff’s use of the irrigation canal. The Court of Appeal reversed, deciding that plaintiff lacked the requisite possession to support injunctive relief under C.C.P. art. 3663. 252 So.2d 151.
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff’s classification of the servitude involved as a continuous and apparent servitude, because of the provisions of C.C. art. 727,1 and as a real right subject to “quasi possession.” 2 The court further concluded that the “quasi possession” of the servitude claimed by the plaintiff had not been continuous for the year prior to March 20, 1970, the date found to be the beginning of the disturbance of the possession by defendant. Its ruling was confined to a portion only of the canal (252 So.2d 151, 155) as it crossed the lands of the defendant, since the plaintiff might have been in possession of other portions of the canal which crossed lands owned by other persons.
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal: before plaintiff can obtain an injunction under C.C.P. art. 3663(2) 3 it must have been in possession of the immovable 4 or real right for a year before the disturbance.
From the evidence the Court of Appeal found that the lateral canal involved was used by the plaintiff to furnish water to rice farmers for the purpose of irrigating rice crops for many years prior to 1967 (with the exception of the lower end of [979]*979the canal, which was not constructed until 1965). Plaintiff maintained the levees and outlets, and ran water through the canal during the rice irrigation season, which normally begins in March and might extend through July in each year.
In 1962 the defendant, through whose land portions of the canal pass, dug his own well and constructed his own irrigation canal, paralleling a portion of plaintiff’s canal. From 1962 until 1967 defendant irrigated his rice from his own well and from the canal which he constructed.
Plaintiff corporation is in the business of irrigating lands planted to rice, and furnishes water to farmers in return for a share of the rice crop. The canal involved in this suit was not used in 1967, since plaintiff had no contracts to furnish water to farmers adjacent to that canal in that year. Rice fields are rotated. Some of the fields for which plaintiff would have furnished water were planted to soybeans. In 1967, while defendant irrigated his own fields from his own well, some of the water from the canal which the defendant had constructed escaped and wet the bean crop of one of the owners of land through which the canal passed. Thereupon, defendant switched from his canal to plaintiff’s unused canal, the one involved in this suit.
In 1968 plaintiff used a short portion of the canal here involved. In that year, the defendant again used a major portion of plaintiff’s canal to carry his own water to irrigate his own rice crop.
In 1969 plaintiff used the entire canal, and its use was exclusive. Plaintiff first began pumping water through the canal for the 1969 season on May 12, 1969. This factual conclusion by the Court of Appeal gave plaintiff “every benefit of the doubt.” 5
The 1967 and 1968 usurpation of the lateral canal by defendant clearly resulted in a loss of possession by plaintiff. Possession is lost “when the possessor of an estate allows it to be usurped and held for a year, without, during that time, having done any act of possession, or interfered with the usurper’s possession.” C.C. art. 3449. Plaintiff’s possession again commenced on May 12, 1969, continuing through the 1969 season. On March 20, 1970 defendant again occupied the lateral canal, pumping water from his own well into the canal to irrigate his own crops and that of others.
Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the plaintiff did not have possession of the canal [981]*981for one year preceding' the disturbance by the defendant on March 20, 1970.
The arguments of the plaintiff are without substance. We find the evidence adequately supports the Court of Appeal in its factual findings, both as to the nature and extent of plaintiff’s possession, and the open adverse possession of the defendant.
In addition, plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeal should have maintained its “plea of estoppel.” In effect, plaintiff argues that, since the defendant never objected to plaintiff’s use of the canal, and constructed his own canal system, and once asked plaintiff’s canal manager to allow defendant to use plaintiff’s canal, defendant should be estopped from contesting plaintiff’s possession or ownership.
There is no substance to the argument. Even if “estoppel” were available in an action concerning possession of an immovable, there is no showing that defendant’s actions, with respect to plaintiff’s use of the canal, ever amounted to any more than sufferance. Defendant considered the benefit accruing to his neighbors, who did not have their own irrigation system and who depended on plaintiff for water. The plaintiff never relied to its detriment on any act of the defendant, an essential element to any theory of “estoppel.”
For the purposes of this decision, we have adopted, as did the Court of Appeal, plaintiff’s position that this irrigation canal constituted a continuous and apparent servitude. This is the legal position most favorable to the plaintiff. Many significant issues are suggested, but not decided. Some are of such importance that they should not be “decided” in dicta nor on an inadequate record. This opinion does not, for example decide that a rice irrigation lateral canal is an aqueduct or other continuous, apparent servitude, or even a predial servitude of any kind, as between plaintiff and defendant. An explanation of the limitations of this opinion is attached as an appendix.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal dissolving the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction previously entered, and remanding the case to the district court for determination of damages and attorney’s fees is affirmed, at plaintiff’s cost.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
APPENDIX
The determination of the nature of the right involved in the case before us is not necessarily as simple as maintained by the plaintiff.
Servitudes which affect the free use of property are to be interpreted in favor of the owner of the property affected. C.C. art. 7S3. The owner of the soil is presumed to be the owner of constructions [983]*983made on the soil. C.C. arts. 504, 506; Ouachita Parish School Board v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54; Louisiana Land & Pecan Company v. Gulf Lumber Company, 134 La. 784, 64 So. 713. To combat this presumption, we might find it relevant to determine whether the canal was constructed by the landowner or by the irrigation company, an area in which the evidence before us is both spafse and conflicting.
Although the Civil Code refers to aqueducts,1 and defines the servitude of aqueduct as a continuous apparent servitude, it is not necessary to the decision rendered here to decide whether this rice irrigation lateral canal is an aqueduct.
The subject of this litigation, as between plaintiff and defendant, is perhaps not even a predial servitude, because the plaintiff’s rights in the matter will accrue to it in the form of money or shares of rice crops. The plaintiff is not the owner of an estate benefited by the “servitude” of allowing an irrigation canal to run through the estate of another. 2 The irrigation canal is apparent, like a paved or graveled highway or road is apparent. However, unlike ancient aqueducts, which conducted [985]*985water by gravity from a natural source to a distant user, the use of the lateral irrigation canals requires the activity of man (like the right of passage, or of “drawing water”) to elevate by pumps water from a nearby source to be placed in the lateral canal to flow by the force of gravity to the lands of ultimate users. We do not, therefore, decide that the servitudes involving irrigation canals, as between the water pumper and the landowner, are continuous predial servitudes. Granting that the canal here is apparent, because of its perceivable exterior works, it is possible that the servitude is not subject to possession, and therefore not protected by the injunction provisions of C.C.P. art. 3663(2). In Ogborn v. Lower Terrebonne Refining & Manufacturing Company, 129 La. 379, 56 So. 323, this court approved the French doctrine that the exercise of a discontinuous servitude “does not survive the act of man; it ceases the moment this act ceases.” Since discontinuous servitudes are not susceptible of possession, according to French doctrine, they are not protected in France by possessory actions. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, 29 La.L.R. 1, 38.3
It is because of these questions, posed principally by the defendant, but not essen[987]*987tial to our decision, that we qualify our opinion.