Lorie Atwater v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 LORIE ATWATER, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00021-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Lorie Atwater sued Defendant County of Los Angeles (the “County”) 13 and other individual defendants alleging First Amendment retaliation, due process, and 14 equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and disability-based discrimination 15 under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the Los Angeles County 16 Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) and its supervisors and outside counsel. (ECF No. 1 17 (“Complaint”).) Before the Court is Defendant County’s motion to dismiss the Complaint 18 for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim 19 upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 (ECF No. 28 (“Motion”).) 20 Atwater previously filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2), and 21 individual Defendants Chaena B. Dade, Molshree Gupta, Kjar, McKenna & Stockalper, 22 LLP (“KMS”), Maria L. Nixon, and Sergeant Oleg Polissky filed a motion to dismiss (ECF 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 personal jurisdiction.3 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 The following facts are adapted from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1). This action 5 arises from a dispute involving alleged misconduct by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 6 Department and associated officials. Plaintiff Atwater is a current resident of Lyon County, 7 Nevada and a former resident of California and officer of the LASD. (Id. at 3.) Defendant 8 LASD is a California-based municipal public entity. (See id.) 9 Atwater alleges that, “Beginning in 2020, LASD initiated retaliatory enforcement 10 actions including invented charges related to firearm ownership and alleged threats.” (Id. 11 at 5.) After being “warned by an insider that LASD was ‘after her,’” Atwater “relocated to 12 Nevada in October 2020.” (Id.) On May 1, 2020, Atwater alleges that “LASD personnel 13 conducted a DNA seizure,” which she construes as “retaliatory escalation.” (Id.; see also 14 ECF No. 31 at 8.) Atwater further claims that, after relocating to Nevada, she suffered 15 professional, reputational, and emotional harm—including the “inability to work, 16 homelessness, and bankruptcy”—arising from criminal and administrative reporting that 17 “falsely entered as a felony conviction,” which, in turn, resulted in the loss of her California 18 insurance license. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 7.) 19 There is separate pending litigation in California connected to these allegations. 20 On February 20, 2024, Atwater filed an earlier action in the United States District Court 21 for the Centra District of California (Case No. 2:24-cv-01371-CV) against the County and 22 2Because the Court will grant Defendant County’s Motion (ECF No. 28), it will deny 23 all other pending motions as moot. Moreover, having found a lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant County, the Court sua sponte dismisses the claims against the 24 individually named, initially “non-moving” Defendants on the same basis, as they are in a position similar to the County. See generally Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 25 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A [d]istrict [c]ourt may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a 26 position similar to that of moving defendants.”). The Court further notes that the individually named Defendants raise the same or similar arguments as the County in their 27 later-filed motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42).

28 3Because the Court grants the Motion based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, it does not reach or address the Defendant’s arguments as to other grounds for dismissal. 2 interactions with the LASD in 2019 and 2020 in California. (See ECF Nos. 28-5; 28-1.) 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 As noted, Defendant County seeks dismissal of Atwater’s claims under Federal 5 Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)4 and 12(b)(6)5. (ECF No. 28.) For the reasons discussed 6 below, the Court agrees that dismissal is proper for lack of personal jurisdiction under 7 Rule 12(b)(2). 8 “Personal jurisdiction must exist for each claim asserted against a defendant.” 9 Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) 10 (citation omitted). A two-part analysis governs whether a court retains personal 11 jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. See Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 12 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). “First, the exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the 13 requirements of the applicable state long-arm statute.” Id. Because “Nevada’s long-arm 14 statute, NRS [§] 14.065, reaches the limits of due process set by the United States 15 Constitution,” the Court moves on to the second part of the analysis. Baker v. Eighth Jud. 16 Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Nev. 2000) (citation omitted). 17 “Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with federal due process.” 18 Chan, 39 F.3d at 1404-05 (citation omitted). “Due process requires that nonresident 19 defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of 20 jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 21 1405 (citing Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Courts analyze this 22 constitutional question with reference to two forms of jurisdiction: general and specific 23 24

25 4Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. 26 5See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that, to 27 withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff must allege facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 28 (2009) (holding that a district court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in a complaint, while legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth). 2 255, 262 (2017). 3 Defendant County argues that Atwater fails to make, and cannot make, the 4 required prima facie showings of general or specific jurisdiction. (ECF No. 28 at 6.) In 5 response, Plaintiff contends that jurisdiction is proper based on Atwater’s relocation to 6 Nevada and the alleged “subsequent conduct” and “continuing harm” that ensued. (ECF 7 No. 31 at 8.) The Court agrees with Defendant, as Plaintiff’s claims are not substantially 8 related to nor arise out of any alleged “forum contacts” with Nevada, and Plaintiff appears 9 to conflate any resulting harm with events that occurred in California. (See ECF No. 37 at 10 6.) 11 A. General Jurisdiction 12 Defendant County expressly challenges general jurisdiction. (ECF No. 28 at 11- 13 12.) Atwater counters that she seeks redress, in part, for “the revocation of [her] 14 professional license in California” due to “California administrative records associated 15 with the [May 1, 2020] incident” and for the “California authorities” to pursue inquiries by 16 the “Nevada Attorney General’s Office” regarding the underlying events. (ECF No. 31 at 17 4-5.) When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction 18 has the burden to establish jurisdiction is proper. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. 19 AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Taylor 20 v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967) (“the party asserting 21 jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it if his allegations are challenged in any 22 appropriate manner”) (citation omitted). Atwater’s response falls well short of her burden 23 to establish general jurisdiction, and the Court finds that it lacks general jurisdiction over 24 Defendant. 25 “For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant . . . the defendant 26 must engage in ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts,’ . . . that 27 ‘approximate physical presence’ in the forum state.” CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 28 1074 (citations omitted). The overriding inquiry is whether the defendant’s “affiliations with 2 forum [s]tate.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (citation omitted). 3 Defendant is not “at home” in Nevada. Rather, Defendant County is a municipal public 4 entity formed, chartered, and operating in California. Moreover, Defendant’s activities, as 5 alleged in the Complaint, are neither “substantive” nor “continuous and systematic” 6 enough as to render it having a physical presence in the forum. 7 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her prima facie burden 8 of establishing that general jurisdiction over Defendant exists. 9 B. Specific Jurisdiction 10 Specific jurisdiction exists where “[a] nonresident defendant’s discrete, isolated 11 contacts with the forum support jurisdiction on a cause of action arising directly out of its 12 forum contacts[.]” CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1075. In examining whether specific 13 jurisdiction exists, the minimum contacts inquiry is “defendant-focused”—the relationship 14 to be examined is that between the defendant and the forum state, and that relationship 15 must arise out of the defendant’s own contacts “with the forum state itself, not . . . with 16 persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014). Specifically, a 17 court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant only where “the defendant’s suit- 18 related conduct” creates “a substantial connection with the forum [s]tate.” Williams v. 19 Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., 851 F.3d 1015, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Walden, 571 20 U.S. at 284-85) (emphasis added). To be clear, a plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant 21 and the forum state cannot drive the jurisdictional analysis, even though “a defendant’s 22 contacts with the forum [s]tate may be intertwined with [its] transactions or interactions 23 with the plaintiff or other parties.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 286, 289. 24 The Ninth Circuit provides a three-prong test for analyzing an assertion of specific 25 jurisdiction: “(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 26 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by 27 which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 28 thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which 2 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.” 3 CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 4 Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). The party asserting jurisdiction 5 bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. See id. (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 6 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). If it does so, the burden then shifts to the party 7 challenging jurisdiction to set forth a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction 8 would be unreasonable. See id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 9 476-78 (1985)). 10 The first prong, which refers to both purposeful availment and purposeful direction, 11 is often determinative. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 12 L’Antisemitisme (“La Ligue”), 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Defendant 13 argues that the County “did not purposefully avail [itself] of the privilege of conducting 14 activities in Nevada” or otherwise direct conduct toward the forum. (ECF No. 28 at 13.) In 15 this case, Atwater was a California resident who later chose to relocate to Nevada on her 16 own accord. (Id.) Thus, Defendant contends that any Nevada-related contact—arising 17 from the underlying California litigation—was incidental to and necessitated by Atwater’s 18 relocation, rather than the result of Defendant’s own purposeful conduct. (Id.) As to the 19 second prong for claim relatedness, Defendant argues that Atwater’s claims do not arise 20 out of any forum-related activities, as the alleged conduct occurred entirely in California. 21 (See id. at 14.) Accordingly, the Court agrees and finds that Atwater fails to satisfy the 22 purposeful availment or direction requirement and that her claims do not arise out of or 23 relate to any forum-related activities. 24 Lastly, even assuming Atwater could satisfy the first and second prongs, the Court 25 finds that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Defendants would be unreasonable. 26 Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice is an 27 inquiry into whether a court’s exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. See 28 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Reasonableness turns on the consideration of seven 2 affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict 3 with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating 4 the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance 5 of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the 6 existence of an alternative forum.” Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) 7 (citation omitted). 8 The Court agrees that all factors suggest that the exercise of jurisdiction over 9 Defendant County would be unreasonable. The first factor weighs strongly against the 10 exercise of jurisdiction because the extent and degree of Defendant’s interjection into 11 Nevada’s affairs is marginal; rather, as Defendant points out, it was Atwater who decided 12 to relocate to Nevada on her own volition. (ECF No. 28 at 15.) Factor two also weighs 13 against the exercise of jurisdiction because Defendant is burdened by defending this case 14 where it is not a resident, i.e., Nevada. Factors five and seven work in tandem against the 15 exercise of jurisdiction, as California is both an available alternative forum and the more 16 efficient forum for resolution of this dispute, given that it is the locus of the events at issue 17 and the site of ongoing related litigation. And, finally, as to factor six, Atwater will not be 18 precluded from obtaining effective relief in California. Thus, all factors suggest it would be 19 unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction over Defendant. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 22 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 23 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 24 Motion before the Court. 25 It is therefore ordered that Defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion to dismiss 26 (ECF No. 28) is granted. 27 It is further ordered that the individual Defendants are also dismissed for a similar 28 reason—lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, their motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42) 1 || is denied as moot. It is further ordered that Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining 2 || order (ECF No. 2) is denied as moot. 3 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 4 DATED THIS 9" Day of April 2026. 5

7 MIRANDA M. DU 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28