Lopez v. General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01743
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VERONICA B. LOPEZ, individually, and Case No. 24-cv-01743-BAS-DEB on behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 (1) DENYING MOTION TO GENERAL DYNAMICS REMAND (ECF No 8); AND 15 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC., 16 et al., (2) GRANTING MOTION TO 17 Defendants. DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF No. 7) 18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff Veronica B. Lopez brings this putative class action against Defendants 23 General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. (“General Dynamics”), and Does 24 1 through 10 (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging multiple violations of the California 25 Labor Code and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 26 § 17200. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 31–95, ECF No. 6.) Presently before the 27 Court are two motions: (1) Lopez’s Motion to Remand this action to the San Diego County 28 Superior Court (Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 8); and (2) General Dynamics’s Motion to 1 Dismiss and Strike Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f) (Mot. 2 to Dismiss, ECF No. 7). Both Motions are fully briefed. (See ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12.) 3 The Court finds both Motions suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 4 without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set 5 forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) and GRANTS 6 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND General Dynamics’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). 7 BACKGROUND 8 I. Factual Background 9 Veronica Lopez, a former employee of General Dynamics, worked as an “hourly, 10 non-exempt Quality Assurance Representative” in San Diego, California, from 11 approximately November 8, 2021, to April 7, 2023. (FAC ¶ 7.) Lopez alleges that 12 Defendants, through their business practices, violated multiple provisions of the California 13 Labor Code and engaged in conduct that violated the UCL. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 89.) Specifically, 14 she asserts eight causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages (Cal. Lab. Code 15 §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime compensation (Cal. Lab. Code 16 §§ 1194, 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512); 17 (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) failure to 18 indemnify necessary business expenses (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); (6) failure to timely pay 19 final wages at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201–203); (7) failure to furnish accurate 20 itemized wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); and (8) unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent 21 business practices in violation of the UCL (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), which are 22 predicated on the alleged Labor Code violations. (Id. ¶¶ 31–95.) Lopez brings this action 23 individually and as a class action on behalf of “certain current and former employees of 24 Defendants . . . who have been employed by [] Defendants in California as [] hourly-paid, 25 non-exempt employee[s] during the statute of limitations period applicable to the claims 26 pleaded here.” (Id. ¶ 2.) 27 28 1 II. Procedural Background 2 On September 30, 2024, General Dynamics removed the action from San Diego 3 County Superior Court, invoking the Court’s jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness 4 Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (Notice of Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1.) 5 Lopez filed the operative FAC approximately two months later. (ECF No. 6.) 6 Shortly thereafter, on December 9, 2024, General Dynamics moved pursuant to 7 Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action in the FAC 8 (“the Eighth Cause of Action”), which alleges violations of the UCL, and to strike 9 language asserting those allegations and seeking injunctive relief. (ECF No. 7.) Lopez 10 filed an opposition (ECF No. 9), and General Dynamics filed a reply (ECF No. 10). 11 Separately, about a month after General Dynamics filed its motion, Lopez moved to 12 remand the case, arguing that General Dynamics failed to establish the amount in 13 controversy exceeds $5 million and invoking the “local controversy” exception to CAFA. 14 (ECF No. 8.) General Dynamics filed an opposition (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff replied 15 (ECF No. 12). Thereafter, General Dynamics submitted its Notice of Supplemental 16 Authority in Support of Opposition to Lopez’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 13), to which 17 Lopez filed a response (ECF No. 15). 18 MOTION TO REMAND 19 I. Legal Standard 20 “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore- 21 Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1447(c)). The propriety of removal depends on whether the case could have been 23 originally filed in federal court. Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 24 (1997) (“Defendants generally may remove ‘any civil action brought in a State court in 25 which the [federal] district courts . . . have original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1441(a))). Whether removal was proper is determined primarily based on the pleadings 27 as they existed at the time the complaint was filed and removal was effected. Strotek Corp. 28 v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). 1 The Class Action Fairness Act expands original jurisdiction, as its “provisions 2 should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard 3 in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.” Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. 4 Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (quoting Dart Cherokee 5 Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)); see also Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 6 Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Congress intended CAFA to be interpreted 7 expansively.”). Furthermore, CAFA extends “federal jurisdiction to state-law claims in 8 class actions under relaxed diversity requirements.” Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 966 9 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2020). 10 Under CAFA, federal courts have original jurisdiction over class actions when the 11 following requirements are satisfied: (1) minimal diversity exists; (2) the proposed class 12 includes at least 100 members; and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 13 inclusive of attorneys’ fees but exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5). 14 Class members’ claims may be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy 15 requirement. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1195. The amount in controversy “encompasses all relief 16 a court may grant on that complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. 17 Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (quoting Chavez v. 18 JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th Cir. 2018)). As a general rule, courts 19 strictly construe removal statutes against removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 20 (9th Cir. 1992). By contrast, “no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.” 21 Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89. Nevertheless, “the burden of establishing removal 22 jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego 23 v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). 24 Generally, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation 25 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 26 U.S. at 89. But when, as here, a plaintiff challenges the defendant’s asserted amount in 27 controversy, “evidence establishing the amount is required.” Id. “In such a case, both 28 1 sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 2 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. 3 Under this standard, a defendant may rely on “reasonable assumptions” to support 4 its amount in controversy showing. Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 5 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197–99). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, 6 “in assessing the amount in controversy, a removing defendant is permitted to rely on ‘a 7 chain of reasoning that includes assumptions.’”1 Id. at 925 (quoting Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 8 1199). However, those “assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some 9 reasonable ground underlying them.” Id. “An assumption may be reasonable if it is 10 founded on the allegations of the complaint.” Id. In addition, a defendant may rely on 11 “evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary- 12 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” 13 Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 14 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). 15 II. Analysis 16 Lopez advances two principal arguments in support of her Motion to Remand: first, 17 that General Dynamics has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 18 amount in controversy exceeds $5 million as required under CAFA; and second, that the 19 “local controversy” exception applies, thereby mandating remand to state court. (ECF No. 20 8-2 at 1:11–3:1.) The Court begins by addressing Lopez’s challenge to General 21 Dynamics’s amount in controversy calculation, including her objections to the violation 22

23 1 General Dynamics submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority citing Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 24 131 F.4th 804 (9th Cir. 2025), in support of its opposition to Lopez’s Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 13.) 25 In Perez, the Ninth Circuit vacated a sua sponte remand order, holding that the district court improperly imposed an unduly high evidentiary burden by requiring proof to support the amount in controversy. Id. 26 at 810. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that a removing defendant “need include only a plausible allegation,” and that “[e]vidence establishing the amount is required . . . only when the plaintiff contests, or the court 27 questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. at 808 (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). Although Lopez argues that Perez is distinguishable because her Motion to Remand affirmatively contests removal, 28 1 rates and assumptions underlying General Dynamics’s estimates. The Court then turns to 2 the applicability of the local controversy exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4), 3 evaluating whether she has met her burden to show the statutory criteria are satisfied. 4 A. “Short and Plain” Statement Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) 5 Lopez raises a factual attack on General Dynamics’s amount in controversy 6 assertions, contending that the company relies on unsupported assumptions and fails to 7 provide evidentiary support, despite having exclusive access to the relevant employment 8 records. (ECF No. 8-2 at 1:21–2:11.) Specifically, Lopez argues General Dynamics “does 9 not provide a single document in support of [its] assumptions[,]” and asserts that “[r]ather 10 than develop a factual record on Plaintiff’s claims prior to removal in state court, Defendant 11 removed without any evidence that the violation rates it proposes are actually at issue in 12 this litigation.” (Id. at 2:6–9.) However, the United States Supreme Court has made clear 13 that a notice of removal is required to provide only a “short and plain statement of the 14 grounds for removal” and need not include evidentiary submissions at the outset. See Dart 15 Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 83–84. More precisely, it “need include only a plausible allegation 16 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 89. As 17 previously noted, it is only after the plaintiff contests the removal, as Lopez does here, that 18 the defendant must then establish, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the amount 19 in controversy exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Id. at 88–89. 20 Lopez further takes the position that General Dynamics’s “failure to provide 21 competent evidence is particularly inexcusable since Defendant, as the employer, has ready 22 access to all the facts, records, and information necessary to support its amount in 23 controversy calculations.” (ECF No. 8-2 at 9:12–15.) Nevertheless, as other courts in this 24 district have explained, “a party’s access to additional information does not necessarily 25 render the assumptions made by that party unreasonable.” Shachno v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 26 No. 22-CV-1215-TWR (JLB), 2023 WL 316367, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023). 27 As is inescapable at this early stage of the litigation, the removing party must be able to rely “on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy 28 1 its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,” as long as the reasoning and underlying 2 assumptions are reasonable. 3 4 Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 993 (quoting LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201 5 (9th Cir. 2015)). Hence, when General Dynamics filed its Notice of Removal, it was 6 required only to plausibly allege the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 7 B. General Dynamics’s Calculation of the Amount in Controversy 8 General Dynamics asserts that, based on conservative estimates and considering 9 only four of Lopez’s eight claims—specifically, meal period violations, rest period 10 violations, waiting time penalties, and wage statement violations—the amount in 11 controversy exceeds CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold. (ECF No. 11 at 12 2:19– 3:3.) According to General Dynamics, “the amount in controversy for purposes of 13 jurisdiction under CAFA totals at least $6 million, even before considering Plaintiff’s 14 requests for attorneys’ fees.” (Id. at 2:22–3:2.) 15 To determine the amount in controversy, General Dynamics makes assumptions 16 based upon Lopez’s initial Complaint, filed in state court before removal, and a declaration 17 from its Data Analytics Director, Michele Shuster. (NOR, Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1- 18 2; Declaration of Michele Shuster (“Shuster Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 11-2.) Ms. Shuster’s 19 Declaration provides an analysis of General Dynamics’s employment records, which 20 supports an approximation of the amount in controversy based upon the totals of 70,448 21 workweeks worked by 869 putative class members between July 23, 2020, and July 23, 22 2024. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 3.) These employees were typically scheduled for 7–8 hour shifts, 23 five days per week, and recorded an average of 38 hours per week with an average shift 24 length of 7.6 hours. (Id.) Their average hourly rate of pay was $28.38. (Id. ¶ 4.) 25 Ms. Shuster also identified from her review of the employee data that 308 of the 869 26 hourly non-exempt employees ended their employment between July 23, 2021, and June 27 23, 2024. (Id. ¶ 5.) These former employees worked an average of 38 hours per week and 28 had an average base pay rate of $27.63. (Id.) Additionally, Ms. Shuster determined that 1 General Dynamics provides wage statements to non-exempt employees in California on a 2 biweekly basis and that 529 such employees collectively received approximately 10,652 3 wage statements between July 23, 2023, and July 23, 2024, with none receiving more than 4 27 statements during that period. (Id. ¶ 6.) 5 1. Unpaid Meal and Rest Periods 6 Lopez alleges that Defendants failed to provide compliant meal and rest periods in 7 violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512, as well as the applicable Industrial 8 Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. (Id. ¶¶ 49–56.) According to the Complaint, 9 Defendants “maintained a systematic, company-wide policy and practice” of not 10 authorizing or permitting employees to take meal and rest breaks in compliance with 11 California law. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 16–17, 51, 55.) 12 Lopez contends that employees were neither fully relieved of duty nor adequately 13 informed of their rights to take a meal or rest period and were required to perform off-the- 14 clock work—including temperature checks and bag inspections—before clocking in for 15 shifts. (Id. ¶¶ 15–17.) She asserts that “Defendants made it impossible or impracticable to 16 take these uninterrupted [meal and rest] periods.” (Id. ¶¶ 51, 55.) She also avers that 17 Defendants lacked adequate policies or practices to “verify” rest periods and failed to 18 “maintain accurate records of employee work periods[,]” rendering it infeasible to 19 demonstrate that rest breaks were properly provided. (Id. ¶ 17.) Based on these assertions, 20 Lopez seeks to be “paid one hour of additional wages at the regular rate of pay for each 21 workday [] she was not provided with all required meal [or rest] period(s), plus interest 22 thereon.” (Id. ¶¶ 52, 56.) 23 Using the information provided in the Shuster Declaration and based on Lopez’s 24 allegation that Defendants maintained a “policy and practice” of failing to provide 25 compliant meal and rest periods (Compl. ¶ 4.), General Dynamics assumes, on a 26 conservative basis, that each putative class member missed one meal and one rest period 27 per workweek, yielding an assumed 20% violation rate. (ECF No. 11 at 10:16–19, 11:6– 28 18.) As a result, General Dynamics estimates that Lopez’s meal and rest period claims 1 place at least $3,998,628 in controversy, based on 70,448 workweeks, an average hourly 2 rate of $28.38, and the assumed violation rate. (Id. at 11:18–22.) 3 2. Noncompliant Payment of Wages When Due 4 Lopez alleges that throughout the statutory period, Defendants willfully failed to 5 timely pay all wages due—including minimum, overtime, meal and rest period premium 6 wages—at the time of termination, or within seventy-two hours of leaving Defendants’ 7 employ, in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 63–64.) 8 Lopez thus seeks waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203 for up to 30 days’ wages. 9 (Id. ¶¶ 65–66.) 10 To calculate the amount in controversy for this cause of action, Ms. Shuster identifies 11 308 employees whose employment ended between July 23, 2021, and June 23, 2024, 12 reflecting the applicable three-year period for Labor Code § 203. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 5.) Ms. 13 Shuster further calculated that these former employees worked an average of 7.6 hours per 14 day and earned an average final hourly rate of $27.63. (Id.) Labor Code § 203 provides 15 for a waiting time penalty of up to 30 days of wages at the employee’s daily rate of pay. 16 Therefore, General Dynamics calculates that Lopez’s claim for waiting time penalties 17 under Labor Code § 203 places at least $1,940,289 in controversy. (ECF No. 11 at 14:14– 18 18.) 19 3. Noncompliant Wage Statements 20 Lopez alleges that Defendants “intentionally and willfully” violated California 21 Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide “accurate, itemized wage statements” showing all 22 applicable hourly rates and gross and net wages earned, including total hours worked, 23 wages for regular and overtime hours, and premium wages for missed meal and rest 24 periods. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 70.) Lopez claims that “the wage statements inaccurately 25 understated the wages, hours, and wage[] rates . . . and Plaintiff and the Class were paid 26 less than the wages and wage rates to which they were entitled.” (Id. ¶ 20(h).) 27 Relying again on the Shuster Declaration, General Dynamics calculates that 529 28 California non-exempt employees received approximately 10,652 wage statements during 1 the one-year statutory period applicable to § 226. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 6.) General Dynamics 2 assumes one violation per wage statement and, applying the statutory penalties of $50 for 3 the initial violation and $100 for each subsequent violation, calculates the amount in 4 controversy for wage statement violations to be $1,038,750, an amount that exceed the 5 $975,000 initially estimated in the Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 11 at 16:17–19; NOR 6 ¶ 38.) 7 4. Attorneys’ Fees 8 Lopez’s Complaint seeks recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” in connection 9 with her alleged Labor Code violations, including pursuant to California Code of Civil 10 Procedure § 1021.5, which authorizes a court to award attorneys’ fees to a successful party 11 in any action that enforces an important right affecting the public interest. (Compl., Prayer 12 for Relief ¶¶ 8, 13, 18, 23, 28, 33, 38, 43.) General Dynamics calculates attorneys’ fees as 13 25% of the amount placed in controversy by Lopez’s Third Cause of Action for failure to 14 provide meal periods, Fourth Cause of Action for failure to provide rest periods, and 15 Seventh Cause of Action for failure to provide accurate wage statements. (ECF No. 11 at 16 19:20–22.) Consequently, General Dynamics asserts that the amount in controversy for 17 removal purposes should include at least $1,259,344 in estimated attorneys’ fees. (Id.) 18 C. Whether the Amount in Controversy Is Met 19 1. Legal Standard Governing Challenges to the Amount in 20 Controversy 21 A plaintiff “can contest the amount in controversy by making either a ‘facial’ or 22 ‘factual’ attack on the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 23 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020). “A facial attack accepts the truth of the [defendant’s] 24 allegations but asserts that they are ‘insufficient on their face to invoke federal 25 jurisdiction.’” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Safe Air 26 for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In contrast, “[a] factual attack 27 ‘contests the truth of the . . . allegations’ themselves.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 699 (citation 28 modified) (quoting Salter v. Quality Carriers, 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020)). A factual 1 attack may also make a “reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which 2 [defendant’s allegations] are based are not supported by evidence.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 3 700 (citing Salter, 974 F.3d at 964; Ibarra, 775 at 1199.) 4 General Dynamics, like the defendant in Harris, construes Lopez’s Motion to 5 Remand as raising a factual challenge. Harris, 980 F.3d at 700. By submitting proof in 6 the form of Ms. Shuster’s Declaration, General Dynamics offers further evidence in 7 support of its assumptions. Id. Once the plaintiff contests the reasonableness of a 8 defendant’s assumptions, the defendant “need not make [plaintiff’s] case for [her] or prove 9 the amount in controversy.” See id. at 701. However, the defendant now bears “the burden 10 of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its assumptions [are] reasonable.” Id. 11 The Court applies this standard in evaluating Lopez’s challenges to General Dynamics’s 12 proposed violation rates, waiting time penalties, and estimated attorneys’ fees. 13 2. Lopez’s Challenge to General Dynamics’s Showing 14 Lopez argues that she is not required to present contrary evidence until General 15 Dynamics satisfies its burden establishing the amount in controversy required for removal. 16 (ECF No. 12 at 3:8–9.) While there is no per se rule requiring a plaintiff to produce 17 evidence or propose alternative assumptions to put the defendant to its burden, see Ibarra 18 775 F.3d at 1199, once a defendant presents reasonable assumptions supported by 19 evidence, as General Dynamics has done here, a plaintiff may rebut them by submitting 20 declarations or other evidence addressing the frequency or nature of the alleged violations. 21 Id.; see also Harris, 980 F.3d at 700. Lopez has not done so in her reply. Instead, she 22 reiterates her objections to the reasonableness of General Dynamics’s assumption and the 23 applicability of the local controversy exception to CAFA. (ECF No. 12 at 1:6–13.) She 24 further contends that General Dynamics has failed “to meet its burden of proof by a 25 preponderance of the evidence” (Id. at 1:5–6), and argues that it did not “supply the proper 26 equations used to reach the alleged sums” (Id. at 1:15–17). 27 Ultimately, the Court disagrees with Lopez’s contention that General Dynamics’s 28 assumptions are either unsupported by evidence or unreasonable. General Dynamics 1 responds to Lopez’s factual attack with the Declaration of Michele Shuster, who has 2 analyzed its employment records—“includ[ing] personnel files, dates of employment, time 3 records, and pay data”—to inform the company’s calculations. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 2.) Based 4 on this analysis and the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds that General Dynamics 5 has made reasonable assumptions in support of its amount in controversy estimates. See 6 Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89; Arias, 936 F.3d at 925 (“An assumption may be reasonable 7 if it is founded on the allegations of the complaint.”) 8 Whether the alleged violations occur from time to time, as a part of a pattern and 9 practice, or uniformly, as alleged in Lopez’s Complaint, has a substantial bearing on the 10 amount in controversy calculation. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 925–26 (differentiating the 11 varying allegations a plaintiff may use in the complaint and the corresponding impact it 12 has on the reasonableness of the assumed violation rate). The frequency of alleged 13 violations informs the court’s adoption of a violation rate expressed as a percentage when 14 calculating the amount in controversy. See Powell v. USI Ins. Serv., LLC, No. 2:23-cv- 15 04129-ODW (BFMx), 2023 WL 6276578, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) 16 (distinguishing between allegations of a pattern and practice, which could not reasonably 17 support a 100% violation rate, and allegations of a uniform policy, which could plausibly 18 support a 100% violation rate). 19 As previously discussed, Lopez describes Defendants’ conduct as being attributable 20 to a “systematic, company-wide policy and practice,” and further alleges that it was carried 21 out in a “willful and deliberate” manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 4–5.) Moreover, she avers that the 22 violations occurred “throughout the statutory period” and that her experience working for 23 Defendants was “typical and illustrative.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 24 i. Violation Rate 25 a. Missed Meal and Rest Periods 26 General Dynamics calculates the amount in controversy for missed meal breaks and 27 rest periods using the relevant employment records and then applies a violation rate of 20% 28 for both claims, “based on an assumed rate of just one meal period violation and one rest 1 period violation per work week.” (ECF No. 11 at 8:19–9:1.) Thus, the Court evaluates the 2 violation rates for both claims in tandem, as Lopez’s Complaint alleges that “[t]hroughout 3 the statutory period . . . Defendants’ policy and practice was to not provide meal periods to 4 Plaintiff and the Class,” and similarly, “to not authorize and permit Plaintiff and the Class 5 to take rest periods in compliance with California law.” (Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.) 6 District courts have held that violation rates ranging from 25% to 60% may be 7 reasonably assumed as a matter of law based on “pattern and practice or policy and practice 8 allegation[s].” Avila v. Rue21, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (citation 9 modified); Elizarraz v. United Rentals, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-09533-ODW (JC), 2019 WL 10 1553664, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2019) (applying a 50% violation rate to the meal period 11 claim and a 30% violation rate to the rest period claim); Bryant v. NCR Corp., 284 F. Supp. 12 3d 1147, 1151 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (applying a 60% violation rate for the meal period claim 13 and a 30% violation rate to the rest period claim); Alvarez v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. CV 17- 14 7220 PSG (AFMx), 2017 WL 5952181, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017) (applying a 60% 15 violation rate to both the meal and rest period claims). 16 According to the Complaint, Lopez attributes the missed meal and rest periods to a 17 “systematic, company-wide policy and practice,” language that General Dynamics relies 18 upon to support a 20% violation rate. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Because the amount in controversy is 19 determined based on the allegations in the Complaint, and General Dynamics appropriately 20 relies on those allegations, the Court finds that the assumed 20% violation rate is a 21 reasonable assumption. See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 792; Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. As a result, 22 the Court finds persuasive General Dynamics’s calculation that produces a total of 23 $3,998,628 in controversy for the missed meal and rest period claims. 24 b. Wage Statement and Waiting Time Penalties 25 General Dynamics assumes one violation per wage statement and that all former 26 employee class members are entitled to waiting time penalties. (ECF No. 11 at 16:22–25, 27 13:24–25.) This assumption effectively applies a 100% violation rate for both claims. The 28 Court finds General Dynamics’s violation rate is reasonable based upon the allegations in 1 the Complaint, provided these claims are derivative of Lopez’s other claims. (Id. at 17:10– 2 13.) This is consistent with Lopez’s position, as she contends that her “wage statement 3 allegations are derivative of [her] allegation that Defendant[s] failed to pay them and the 4 putative class members for all hours worked.” (ECF No. 8-2 at 14:23–25.) 5 Lopez’s Complaint alleges that “Defendants maintained a systematic, company- 6 wide policy and practice of . . . [f]ailing to provide employees with accurate, itemized wage 7 statements containing all the information required by the California Labor Code and IWC 8 Wage Orders.” (Compl. ¶ 4(g).) She further asserts that Defendants “fail[ed] to pay 9 Plaintiff and [] Class members who are no longer employed by Defendants their wages 10 earned and unpaid at the time of discharge, or within seventy-two (72) hours of their 11 leaving Defendants’ employ, [] in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202.” 12 (Id. ¶ 64.) Moreover, because the Court has found a 20% violation rate reasonable for 13 Lopez’s missed meals and rest break claims, assuming one violation per pay period is 14 likewise reasonable. See Cavada v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 5677846, at 15 *8–9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2019) (finding that based upon one missed meal and rest period, 16 defendant’s assumption of a 100% violation rate for wage statement and waiting time 17 penalties was reasonable); Brumbach v. Hyatt Corp., No. 20-cv-2231-WQH-KSC, 2021 18 WL 926692, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2021) (concluding that where a plaintiff alleges a 19 “consistent and uniform policy,” it is reasonable to assume that every employee who 20 separated from employment experienced unpaid wages). 21 Additionally, the Complaint asserts “Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover 22 from Defendants . . . up to 30 days maximum pursuant to California Labor Code § 203.” 23 (Compl. ¶ 66.) Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks maximum statutory penalties, “Defendant 24 need not produce evidence, and it is reasonable to assume . . . that Plaintiff could obtain 25 [the] statutory penalty of [the] maximum 30 days.” See Avila, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 26 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the Court finds General Dynamics’s 100% violation rate for 27 these derivative claims to be supported by the Complaint and based on reasonable 28 assumptions. Accordingly, the Court finds that General Dynamics’s estimated $1,940,289 1 in waiting time penalties and $1,038,750 in wage statement violations are reasonable for 2 purposes of establishing the amount in controversy. 3 ii. Attorneys’ Fees 4 General Dynamics estimates attorneys’ fees based on the amount it places in 5 controversy from Lopez’s claims for meal and rest period violations and wage statement 6 violations. (ECF No. 11 at 19:20–22.) In support, it cites a prior comparable case, Enrique 7 Lopez v. Pacific Dutch Group, LLC, No. 21CV01197 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Barbara Cty., 8 Aug. 1, 2022) (“Pacific Dutch Group”), in which Lopez’s counsel, Mr. Seung L. Yang, 9 secured a 35% fee award while at a different firm. (ECF No. 11-4, Exs. B, C.) Based on 10 this showing, General Dynamics seeks an application of a 25% benchmark, yielding an 11 estimated $1,259,344 in attorneys’ fees. However, Lopez contends that General 12 Dynamics’s attorneys’ fee estimate “disregards the fact that some of the claims do not 13 allow for the statutory recovery of attorneys’ fees.” (ECF No. 12 at 13:8–10.) The Court 14 agrees. 15 Courts have recognized that a 25% benchmark for attorneys’ fees does not apply 16 automatically. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 928; Avila, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1192. Thus, “the 17 defendant must prove the amount of attorneys’ fees at stake by a preponderance of the 18 evidence; [the court] may not relieve the defendant of its evidentiary burden by adopting a 19 per se rule for one element of the amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Fritsch, 20 899 F.3d at 796. Furthermore, “when a statute or contract provides for the recovery of 21 attorneys’ fees, prospective attorneys’ fees must be included in the assessment of the 22 amount in controversy.” Arias, 936 F.3d at 922 (citing Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794). 23 A defendant may satisfy its evidentiary burden in multiple ways. For example, it 24 may identify awards in cases “similar enough to the case at hand that the court can conclude 25 it is more likely than not that the plaintiff may incur a similar fee award.” Weaver v. 26 Amentum Servs., Inc., No. 22-CV-00108-AJB-NLS, 2022 WL 959789, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 27 Mar. 30, 2022). A defendant may also “introduce[] evidence of billing rates for Plaintiffs’ 28 counsel” or evidence of “fees Plaintiffs’ counsel has been awarded in similar cases.” Id.; 1 see also Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 774 n.4 (9th Cir. 2020) (accepting 2 estimated attorneys’ fees of 25% given “evidence that Greene’s attorney sought 35 percent 3 in a similar case”). 4 Here, General Dynamics meets its evidentiary burden for seeking an application of 5 a 25% benchmark by identifying a comparable case,2 Pacific Dutch Group, in which 6 Lopez’s counsel previously obtained a 35% fee award. However, as the Ninth Circuit has 7 made clear, attorneys’ fees are “limited by the applicable . . . statutory requirements that 8 allow fee-shifting in the first place.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 796. 9 While General Dynamics seeks to apply a 25% benchmark across multiple claims, 10 attorneys’ fees are not available on meal and rest period claims under California Labor 11 Code § 226.7. Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1252 (2012). That said, 12 for claims alleging an employer’s failure to provide accurate, itemized wage statements, 13 Labor Code § 226 expressly authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees by the 14 prevailing employee. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(1), (h). Accordingly, applying a 25% 15 attorneys’ fee rate to the $1,038,750 attributed by General Dynamics to the wage statement 16 17 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, General Dynamics requests that the Court take judicial 18 notice of the following publicly filed documents in support of its calculation of attorneys’ fees: (1) the Articles of Incorporation for The Sentinel Firm, APC—counsel of record for Lopez in this matter—filed 19 with the California Secretary of State on June 7, 2023, and available at https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov (ECF No. 11-4, Ex. A); (2) the Minute Order entered by the Santa Barbara County Superior Court on 20 August 1, 2022, granting final approval of the class action settlement in Pacific Dutch Group (Id. Ex. B); 21 and (3) the Declaration of Allen Feghali, then co-counsel for the plaintiff in Pacific Dutch Group, filed in support of final approval of settlement in that action on July 8, 2022 (Id. Ex. C). The Sentinel Firm, APC 22 was formed in 2023 by Seung L. Yang, formerly a partner at Moon & Yang, APC, the firm that represented the plaintiff in the Pacific Dutch Group settlement action. 23 These documents are proper subjects of judicial notice as matters of public record whose 24 authenticity is not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 25 Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record . . . as long as the facts noticed are not subject to reasonable dispute.” (citation modified)); see also 26 Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record”); Nat’l Grange of the Ord. of 27 Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1075 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (taking judicial notice of a filing with the California Secretary of State). Accordingly, the request for judicial 28 1 violations yields an estimated $259,687.50 in attorneys’ fees. However, even excluding 2 attorneys’ fees entirely, General Dynamics’s amount in controversy calculation still 3 exceeds the $5,000,000 threshold required under CAFA. 4 In sum, General Dynamics’s estimated damages for Lopez’s Third, Fourth, and 5 Seventh Causes of Action—based on reasonable assumptions grounded in the allegations 6 set forth in the Complaint—combined with an attorneys’ fees estimate properly limited to 7 the statutory violations that allow for fee recovery, results in a total amount in controversy 8 of $7,237,354.50. 9 10 Cause of Action Amount in Controversy 11 Failure to Provide Required Meal and Rest $3,998,628.00 12 Periods 13 Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized $1,038,750.00 14 Statement Penalties 15 Failure to Pay Wages When Due Penalties $1,940,289.00 16 Total $6,977,667.00 17 Attorneys’ Fees (25% Benchmark) $259,687.50 18 Total with Attorneys’ Fees $7,237,354.50 19 20 D. Whether the “Local Controversy” Exception to CAFA Applies 21 In addition to challenging the evidentiary basis and reasonableness of General 22 Dynamics’s assumptions regarding the amount in controversy, Lopez argues that the Court 23 should remand this matter because “it falls squarely within the ‘local controversy’ 24 exception of CAFA, 28 USC § 1332(d)(4)(A).” (ECF No. 8-2 at 2:12–13.) “The local 25 controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction is a narrow exception, and Plaintiff[] bear[s] 26 the burden of showing its application.” Allen v. Boeing Co., 821 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 27 2016) (citing Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015)). 28 1 “However, if the exception applies, the district court must remand the case to state court.” 2 Id. (citing Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2007)). 3 The “local controversy” exception applies when: 4 (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was 5 originally filed; 6 (II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 7

8 (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class; 9

10 (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 11

12 (cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; and 13

14 (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action 15 was originally filed . . . . 16 17 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). “In determining whether these requirements are satisfied, ‘a 18 federal district court is limited to the complaint.’” Evangelista v. Just Energy Mktg. Corp., 19 No. SACV 17-02270-CJC(SSx), 2018 WL 1026370, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2018) (citing 20 Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, 631 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)). 21 Here, Lopez has not met the burden of establishing that all elements of the local 22 controversy exception are satisfied; most notably, she has not shown that General 23 Dynamics is a citizen of the state in which the action was originally filed. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc).3 Although Lopez asserts that General Dynamics is a 25 26 27 3 The Court notes that General Dynamics also argues Lopez has failed to demonstrate that more than two-thirds of the putative class members were domiciled in California at the time of removal and that 28 1 “California based defendant, who has its principal place of business in California” (ECF 2 No. 8-2 at 17:6–8), the paragraph of the Complaint cited in support states only that General 3 Dynamics is “(a) A Virginia corporation that maintains offices, has agents, employs 4 individuals, and/or transacts business in the State of California; [and] (b) A business entity 5 conducting business in numerous counties throughout the State of California, including in 6 San Diego.” (Comp. ¶ 9.) These allegations are insufficient to establish that General 7 Dynamics is a California citizen for purposes of the local controversy exception. As a 8 corporate defendant, General Dynamics is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and 9 foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it 10 has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). “This corporate dual 11 citizenship rule applies to CAFA actions.” Bruns v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., No. 22cv1369- 12 L-JLB, 2022 WL 4229309, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022). Accordingly, because General 13 Dynamics is incorporated in Virginia—and Lopez concedes as much—the only way it 14 could satisfy the citizenship requirements under the local controversy exception is if its 15 principal place of business is in California. 16 A corporation’s principal place of business refers to “the place where a corporation’s 17 officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 18 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). Commonly referred to as the corporation’s “nerve center,” the 19 principal place of business “should normally be the place where the corporation maintains 20 its headquarters.” Id. at 93. Simply alleging that General Dynamics “has its principal place 21 of business in California,” as Lopez does in its Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8-2 at 17:6– 22 8), and supporting that assertion with generalized claims that Defendant “maintains offices, 23 has agents, employs individuals, and/or transacts business . . . in numerous counties 24 throughout the State of California” (Compl. ¶ 9), is insufficient to establish that its principal 25 place of business is in California. Zelidon v. Ground Servs. Int’l Inc., No. 2:22-cv-01626- 26

27 has not satisfied the requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc), it denies the motion to 28 1 SVW-AS, 2022 WL 3013228, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2022) (finding declarant’s 2 conclusory statements about the location of corporate headquarters and corporation’s 3 activities insufficient to establish a corporation’s principal place of business). 4 Likewise, Lopez’s argument that General Dynamics “is registered with the 5 California Secretary of State to conduct business in California” is equally unpersuasive. 6 (ECF No. 12 at 13:22–23.) The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the 7 address listed on government filings is not dispositive of the issue of a corporation’s 8 principal place of business. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97 (rejecting the suggestion that “the mere 9 filing of a form like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Form 10-K listing a 10 corporation’s ‘principal executive offices’ would, without more, be sufficient proof to 11 establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center.’”); see also Eckerle v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, 12 CIV. 10–00474 SOM, 2010 WL 3984687, at *2 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2010) (“[J]ust because 13 a corporation is registered to do business in a certain state does not make that state its 14 ‘principal place of business.’”). 15 Accordingly, because Lopez has failed to offer any evidence to show that General 16 Dynamics’s principal place of business is California, and it is undisputed that General 17 Dynamics is incorporated in Virginia, she has not met her burden of proving that General 18 Dynamics is “a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc). Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this requirement under the local 20 controversy exception to CAFA thus renders the exception inapplicable. 21 * * * 22 Overall, General Dynamics persuasively shows the amount in controversy surpasses 23 the $5,000,000 required by CAFA. Furthermore, because General Dynamics establishes 24 subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to CAFA, and the 25 Court finds that the local controversy exception does not apply, the Court has jurisdiction 26 over the action under CAFA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is denied. 27 28 1 MOTION TO DISMISS 2 I. Legal Standard 3 Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a cause of action for “failure to state a 4 claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) 5 dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of 6 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare 7 Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 8 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 9 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 10 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 12 The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and draw all 13 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 14 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court need not accept conclusory allegations as 15 true; rather, it must “examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the description 16 of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 17 1992) (citation omitted). 18 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 19 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 20 alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and 21 conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 22 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 23 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 24 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged 25 enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 26 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[] their 27 claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 28 dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a 1 probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has 2 acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. 3 When a court grants a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 4 claim, it must also decide whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a)(2), granting 5 leave to amend rests within the trial court’s sound discretion. Swanson v. United States 6 Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has held that leave to 7 amend should be freely granted. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 8 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). 9 II. Analysis 10 General Dynamics moves to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action in the FAC, in 11 which Lopez alleges that “the California Labor Code [violations] . . . constitute unfair, 12 unlawful and/or fraudulent business practices in violation of [the UCL]” (FAC ¶ 81), and 13 further moves to strike language asserting those allegations and seeking injunctive relief.4 14 (ECF No. 7-1 at 1:21–22.) 15 The UCL “prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it 16 defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” Kwikset Corp. v. 17 Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). Each 18 “prong” of the UCL provides a separate theory of liability. See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. 19 v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (quoting Podolsky v. First 20 Healthcare Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 632, 647 (1996)) (“Because Business and Professions 21 Code section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair 22 competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.”). Actions 23 brought under the UCL are equitable in nature, meaning plaintiffs may seek only injunctive 24

25 26 4 Because the Court grants General Dynamics’s Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action with leave to amend, its Motion to Strike is DENIED as premature. See Shubin v. Farinelli Fine Antiques 27 Corp., Case No. C 15-1401 LB, 2015 WL 3464443, at *4 (N.D. Cal., May 29, 2015) (denying motion to strike where the underlying claim was dismissed with leave to amend, rendering the motion premature); 28 1 relief or restitution, not damages. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 2 1134, 1144 (2003)); see also Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 337 (“Injunctions are ‘the primary 3 form of relief available under the UCL to protect consumers from unfair business 4 practices,’ while restitution is a type of ‘ancillary relief.’”) (citation omitted). 5 Lopez asserts that General Dynamics’s business practices “[have] been, and 6 continue[] to be, unfair, unlawful, and harmful to Plaintiff, other Class members, and to 7 the general public.” (FAC ¶ 79.) Lopez avers that she and the class “ha[ve] no plain, 8 speedy, and/or adequate remedy at law” and that, absent prospective relief, they “will 9 continue to suffer irreparable harm.” (Id. ¶ 93.) Lopez seeks injunctive and declaratory 10 relief, “restraining the Defendants . . . from engaging in any of the []described unfair, 11 unlawful and/or fraudulent business practices in the future.” (Id. ¶ 92.) In addition, she 12 seeks “restitution of the wages withheld and retained by Defendants during a period that 13 commences four years prior to the filing of this complaint[.]” (Id. ¶ 95.) Finally, Lopez 14 seeks attorneys’ fees under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, asserting that she 15 “seeks to enforce important rights affecting the public interest.” (Id. ¶¶ 79, 95.) 16 General Dynamics argues that Lopez cannot state a cause of action under the UCL 17 because she “fails to assert nonconclusory facts that she lacks an adequate remedy at law 18 and therefore fails to adequate[ly] plead a claim for equitable relief under [the UCL].” 19 (ECF No. 7-1 at 1:3–5.) Additionally, General Dynamics contends that “as a former 20 employee, she lacks Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief for herself and the 21 putative class she seeks to represent.” (Id. at 1:19–21.) 22 In response, Lopez asks the Court to deny General Dynamics’s motions to dismiss 23 and strike, setting forth five key grounds: (1) Defendant “lacks subject matter jurisdiction 24 to bring its motion to dismiss and strike in federal court” because it “improperly removed 25 this action based on unsupported assumptions regarding jurisdiction under [CAFA]”;5 (2) 26

27 5 As previously discussed, the Court finds that General Dynamics has satisfied its burden to 28 1 Even if the Court grants any part of Defendant’s motions, it “should remand the UCL claim, 2 allowing Plaintiff to seek relief in state court”; (3) Lopez has “Article III standing to pursue 3 injunctive relief for herself and the Putative Class because the [UCL] permits cumulative 4 relief,” allowing her “to seek remedies under the UCL and other statutory claims, including 5 California labor code claims, that would otherwise provide for an adequate remedy at law”; 6 (4) The “UCL claims are not wholly derivative of the labor code claims”; and (5) dismissal 7 would be “premature,” since “there is no procedural bar to a federal court plaintiff pleading 8 alternative remedies,” and the Court “should not reach the issue of dismissal or strike until 9 a later procedural posture, when there is more certainty as to whether the legal relief sought 10 would in fact be adequate.” (ECF No. 9 at 1:6–23.) 11 A. Lopez Lacks Article III Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief 12 A challenge to standing is properly raised under Rule 12(b)(1). Maya v. Centex 13 Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[L]ack of Article III standing requires 14 dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 12(b)(1).”) (emphasis omitted). Although General Dynamics raised its standing challenge 16 under Rule 12(b)(6), “federal courts have a duty to raise, sua sponte, questions of standing.” 17 Iten v. Los Angeles, 81 F.4th 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 18 Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)); Jones v. L.A. Cent. Plaza LLC, 74 F.4th 1053, 1058 19 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[A] jurisdictional issue such as Article III standing may be raised sua 20 sponte by the court at any time.”) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) 21 (requiring that “the court must dismiss the action” if it “determines at any time that it lacks 22 subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 23 The statutory standing requirements under the UCL are distinct from the standing 24 requirements applicable in federal court. California Business and Professions Code 25 § 17204 provides that a plaintiff “who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or 26

27 exception does not apply. Accordingly, Lopez’s jurisdictional challenge to the Motion to Dismiss lacks 28 1 property as a result of the unfair competition” has standing to seek relief under the UCL. 2 Nevertheless, in federal court, a plaintiff must still satisfy the requirements of Article III to 3 pursue injunctive relief, even if she would otherwise have standing in state 4 court. Kajberouni v. Bear Valley Cmty. Servs. Dist., 641 F. Supp. 3d 888, 895 (E.D. Cal. 5 2022) (“[A] state statute cannot alter the constitutional standing requirements of federal 6 courts.” (citing Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1022 (9th 7 Cir. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit explained: 8 Even if Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 permits a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief in California state courts as a private attorney general even though he or 9 she currently suffers no individualized injury as a result of a defendant’s 10 conduct, “a plaintiff whose cause of action [under § 17204] is perfectly viable in state court under state law may nonetheless be foreclosed from litigating 11 the same cause of action in federal court, if he cannot demonstrate the requisite 12 injury” to establish Article III standing.

13 Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1001–02 14 (9th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, “Article III 15 standing requires an injury that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” and 16 a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief “must demonstrate a real or immediate threat of an 17 irreparable injury.” Id. at 1021 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Because the 18 plaintiff in Hangarter lacked a “contractual relationship” with the defendant, the court 19 concluded that he faced no personal threat of future harm and therefore lacked standing to 20 pursue injunctive relief. Id. 21 In the employment context, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly applied this principle of 22 standing, determining that a “former employee has no claim for injunctive relief addressing 23 the employment practices of a former employer absent a reasonably certain basis for 24 concluding he or she has some personal need for prospective relief.” Bayer v. Neiman 25 Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of 26 Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding a former employee “lacked 27 standing to sue for injunctive relief from which she would not likely benefit”); Slayman v. 28 FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding former 1 employees “lacked Article III standing to seek prospective relief”). Here, because Lopez 2 has not alleged any facts sufficient to support a conclusion that she has a need for 3 prospective relief—or even could benefit from it—as a former employee of General 4 Dynamics, she lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief. 5 B. Lopez Fails to Plead Inadequacy of Legal Remedies for Restitution 6 Relying on Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 2020), 7 and Guzman v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 2022), General Dynamics 8 argues that dismissal is appropriate because Lopez fails to allege nonconclusory facts 9 demonstrating that she lacks an adequate remedy at law. (ECF No. 7-1 at 1:2–16.) As a 10 result, the Court “lacks equitable jurisdiction over the UCL claim necessary for [it] to 11 exercise its remedial power under principles of equitable relief—as held by the Ninth 12 Circuit’s binding precedent.” (Id. at 1:2–10.) The Court agrees. 13 To obtain equitable relief pursuant to the UCL, a plaintiff must establish the 14 inadequacy of a remedy at law as a prerequisite to such relief. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 (a 15 plaintiff “must establish that [the plaintiff] lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing 16 equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL . . . .”). At the pleading stage, courts 17 “generally require plaintiffs seeking equitable relief to allege some facts suggesting that 18 damages are insufficient to make them whole.” Gibson v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., 19 LLC, 2020 WL 5492990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020) (citing cases); Sonner, 971 F.3d 20 at 844 (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of UCL claim where plaintiff did not establish 21 an inadequate remedy at law). 22 Lopez contends that Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1021 n.13 (9th 23 Cir. 2020) controls, arguing that the UCL “offer[s] ‘cumulative relief,’ such that [a] 24 plaintiff can seek equitable relief even when there is also a legal remedy available[.]” (ECF 25 No. 9 at 5:17–18.) In Moore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of 26 the plaintiffs’ UCL, California Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, and 27 California False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 claims in part 28 because the “Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot seek equitable relief under the 1 UCL or FAL, given an adequate legal remedy under the CLRA, is foreclosed by statute 2 [since] . . . [t]he UCL, FAL and CLRA explicitly provide that remedies under each act are 3 cumulative to each other.” 966 F.3d at 1021 n.13. 4 Nonetheless, the Court finds that Lopez’s UCL claim is insufficiently pleaded. 5 Arguing that the UCL permits “cumulative relief” does not relieve her of the obligation to 6 allege facts showing that legal remedies are inadequate. In Sonner, the Ninth Circuit held 7 that a plaintiff “must establish that [it] lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing 8 equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL” and noted that “[r]egardless of whether 9 California authorizes its courts to award equitable restitution under the UCL . . . when a 10 plain, adequate, and complete remedy exists at law, [] federal courts rely on federal 11 equitable principles before allowing equitable restitution in such circumstances.” 971 F.3d 12 at 844–45. Although Lopez argues that Moore—decided shortly after Sonner—controls, 13 Sonner was amended just one month after Moore was filed, and neither the 14 amended Sonner opinion nor Moore reference the other. See generally Sonner, 971 F.3d 15 834; Moore, 966 F.3d 1007. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Sonner in Guzman, 16 holding that “[i]n order to entertain a request for equitable relief, a district court must have 17 equitable jurisdiction, which can only exist under federal common law if the plaintiff has 18 no adequate legal remedy.” 49 F.4th at 1313. 19 Lopez urges the Court to rely on Ayala v. U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc., which declined 20 to follow Sonner and determined that the plaintiff’s UCL claim was redressable “despite 21 having an adequate legal remedy” because “remedies under the UCL are cumulative.” No. 22 EDCV 16-137-GW-KKx, 2022 WL 16859754, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2022) (citing 23 Moore, 966 F.3d at 1021 n.13). That unpublished decision is not precedential and does not 24 bind the Court, whereas Guzman—a more recent, published Ninth Circuit opinion— 25 constitutes controlling authority. Moreover, the Moore footnote relied upon in Ayala has 26 been recognized by other courts as nonbinding dicta. See, e.g., Heredia v. Sunrise Senior 27 Living LLC, No. 8:18-cv-01974-JLS-JDE, 2021 WL 819159, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 28 2021) (“The Court . . . concludes that the clear holding in Sonner, not the dictum in Moore, 1 controls whether Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is subject to an ‘adequate legal remedy’ 2 requirement.”); Shay v. Apple Inc., No. 20cv1629-GPC(BLM), 2021 WL 1733385, at *4 3 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2021) (“[A]ll district courts . . . confronted with the argument that Moore 4 should be the authority courts should follow instead of Sonner have all rejected the 5 significance of the footnote in Moore.”). 6 In sum, because Lopez has failed to plead facts demonstrating that she lacks an 7 adequate remedy at law, the Court finds that she does not have equitable standing to seek 8 restitution under the UCL. 9 C. Lopez’s UCL Claims Are Derivative of Her Labor Code Violations 10 Lopez contends that the UCL claims asserted on behalf of herself and the putative 11 class “are not wholly derivative of the labor code claims in that different relief is sought 12 under each of the respective claims.” (ECF No. 9 at 8:14–16.) However, the Court is not 13 persuaded that the mere fact that the remedies available under the UCL and California 14 Labor Code are different relieves a plaintiff of the obligation to satisfy Sonner’s threshold 15 requirement to plead facts establishing that legal remedies are inadequate. Lopez’s Eighth 16 Cause of Action rests exclusively on the same allegations underlying her seven Labor Code 17 claims and does not identify any independent basis for equitable relief. (FAC ¶¶ 77–95.) 18 Lopez further argues the “UCL claim is not wholly derivative of [the] labor code 19 claims in that the UCL claim provides additional relief to a slew of former and current 20 employees that would otherwise be excluded from seeking redressability.” (ECF No. 9 at 21 8:27–9:3.) Lopez contends that “the scope of the Putative Class would be greatly limited 22 by the California Labor Code’s three-year statute of limitations . . . By contrast, under the 23 UCL’s statute of limitations provision, ‘[a]ny action to enforce any cause of action pursuant 24 to [the UCL] shall be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.’” (Id. 25 at 8:22–26.) However, courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that “a different 26 limitations period is not sufficient to demonstrate inadequacy of a legal remedy.” Taylor 27 v. Sam’s W., Inc., 2020 WL 12947973, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) (collecting cases); 28 Gutierrez v. Ericsson Inc., EDCV 23-1665-GW-SHKx, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32829, at 1 *16–17 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (“[E]ven if a Labor Code damages claims were time 2 barred . . . that fact alone would not establish class members’ entitlement to equitable relief 3 under the UCL, given that the only bases for such a claim are those very same time-barred 4 Labor Code claims.” (citing Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1313)); Fan v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 5 No. 1:21-cv-01355 WBS KJN, 2022 WL 16964099, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022) 6 (“[M]ultiple courts––including courts comparing the statutes of limitations of the UCL and 7 the California Labor Code––have found that a shorter statute of limitations alone does not 8 render a legal remedy inadequate.”). Consistent with these decisions, the Court finds that 9 Lopez has not sufficiently alleged the absence of an adequate legal remedy. 10 Ultimately, “[n]owhere in the [FAC] do[es] Plaintiff[] clearly allege facts suggesting 11 that monetary damages would not make [her] whole.” See Clevenger v. Welch Foods Inc., 12 No. SACV 20-01859-CJC (JDEx), 2022 WL 18228288, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2022); 13 Easton v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:20-cv-06070-AB-RAO, 2022 WL 17886002, at *3 14 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2022) (“Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Plaintiff does 15 not have an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff’s [FAC] shows that Plaintiff’s claim is based 16 on the same conduct that makes up Plaintiff’s other causes of actions—failure to pay 17 wages.”). 18 In sum, the Eighth Cause of Action is wholly derivative of the Labor Code claims, 19 and the fact that the UCL and Labor Code provide different remedies or have different 20 statutory limitations periods does not alter the Sonner analysis or establish equitable 21 jurisdiction in federal court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the FAC does not adequately 22 plead the absence of an adequate legal remedy, and the Eighth Cause of Action must be 23 dismissed. 24 D. Remand of the UCL Claim to State Court Is Not Warranted 25 Having concluded that Lopez lacks equitable jurisdiction to proceed with her UCL 26 claim in federal court, the Court is not persuaded that remanding the UCL claim to state 27 court is warranted. See Kim v. Walmart, Inc, No. 2:22-CV-08380-SB-PVC, 2023 WL 28 196919, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2023) (denying partial remand because “[l]ack of 1 equitable jurisdiction over some claims cannot serve as a basis for remanding a case in its 2 entirety” and “[the plaintiff] cites no authority that permits the Court to enter a partial 3 remand in this case”); see also Travonne Hooks v. Dignity Health, No. CV 22-07699 DSF 4 (PDx), 2022 WL 17968833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2022) (dismissing without prejudice 5 plaintiff’s equitable claims because the plaintiff also brought claims establishing adequacy 6 of legal remedies). Lopez cites to Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 3d 7 869, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2021), in support of her argument that the UCL claim should be 8 remanded to state court. (ECF No. 9 at 4:6–20.) In Guthrie, the court addressed the novel 9 argument that a plaintiff’s failure to plead the lack of an adequate legal remedy under 10 Sonner warranted remand of a case seeking only equitable relief. 561 F. Supp. 3d at 875– 11 76. However, the key distinction here is that Lopez also brings claims under the California 12 Labor Code, which provide for legal remedies, and therefore must plead the inadequacy of 13 those remedies to proceed with her UCL claim for equitable relief in federal court. 14 Lopez also “requests that this Court preserve the UCL claims and prayers for relief 15 on the basis that there is no federal procedural bar to pleading alternative remedies and a 16 determination to dismiss or strike the UCL claims and prayers for relief would be 17 premature at this juncture.” (ECF No. 9 at 11:11–15.) As discussed previously, Sonner 18 explains that a plaintiff must show that legal remedies are inadequate before seeking 19 equitable restitution under the UCL, as federal courts apply federal equitable principles 20 regardless of state law. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844–45. Consequently, the argument that a 21 plaintiff may plead equitable remedies in the alternative “has been explicitly rejected by 22 numerous courts post-Sonner.” Clevenger, 2022 WL 18228288, at *4 (collecting cases); 23 Diaz v. Georgia Pac. Corrugated LLC, 2022 WL 20689543, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022) 24 (“Diaz argues that he may plead his claim for equitable relief in the alternative, but that 25 argument was foreclosed by Sonner.”). Thus, the Court finds that Lopez may not plead the 26 Eighth Cause of Action in the alternative. 27 That said, because it is not entirely clear that amendment would be futile, the Court 28 dismisses the Eighth Cause of Action with leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1 |} 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Leave to amend should be granted ‘if it appears at all possible 2 the plaintiff can correct the defect.’”) (quoting Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701); Ctr. for 3 Diversity v. United States Forest Serv., 80 F.4th 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2023) 4 ||(‘Amendment is futile when ‘it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by any 5 |}amendment.’”’) (quoting Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F 4th 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2022)). 6 Accordingly, the Eighth Cause of Action in the FAC is DISMISSED WITH 7 || LEAVE TO AMEND. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 10 (ECF No. 8.) Furthermore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss, and the Eighth 11 || Cause of Action in the FAC is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. (ECF No. 7.) 12 If Lopez wishes to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) amending the Eighth 13 ||Cause of Action, Plaintiff may file a SAC by August 25, 2025. Lopez is cautioned that 14 SAC may not add new claims or parties, or otherwise change the allegations, except to 15 ||correct the identified deficiencies, absent leave of the Court or stipulation by the parties 16 || pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. If Lopez does not file a SAC by that date, 17 ||the dismissal of the Eighth Cause of Action will be deemed with prejudice, and the case 18 proceed on the remaining claims. General Dynamics shall file a response to 19 || the operative complaint, be it the FAC or the SAC, by no later than September 8, 2025. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 DATED: August 11, 2025 (yi. (Duhark 3 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 24 25 26 27 28 ay.