Lookenbill v. Garrett

490 A.2d 857, 340 Pa. Super. 435, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 8893
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 22, 1985
Docket416
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 490 A.2d 857 (Lookenbill v. Garrett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lookenbill v. Garrett, 490 A.2d 857, 340 Pa. Super. 435, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 8893 (Pa. 1985).

Opinion

WICKERSHAM, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County granting summary judgment in favor of appellee.

Appellant, Edward D. Lookenbill, and appellee, Mary Lee Garrett, a/k/a Mary Lee Kuhn, are the sole litigants in a real estate partnership dispute. At all times relevant to this appeal, appellant was a licensed real estate agent or salesman and appellee was a licensed real estate broker. Appellant obtained his license in February or March of 1980 and began working as an agent for appellee. On June 29, 1981, appellant and appellee entered into a written partnership agreement, for the express purpose of “operating a real estate practice.” Appellant paid $12,500.00 to appellee for a one-half interest in this partnership, $2,500.00 of which was to provide the initial capitalization of the partnership. A fictitious name registration listing the partnership as M & E Hanover Realty was filed. At some point thereafter, appellant was advised that a partnership consist *438 ing of a broker and an agent is illegal and unenforceable under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act and the rules and regulations of the Real Estate Commission. On April 30, 1982, appellant filed suit against appellee, alleging that appellee knew or should have known that their partnership was illegal and unenforceable and that the parties could lose their licenses, that appellee acted fraudulently and intentionally to obtain money for the illegal partnership from appellant, and that as a result appellant lost the $12,500.00 investment plus interest. Following various pre-trial filings and depositions of both parties, appellee moved for summary judgment on the issue of the legality of the contract. On September 26, 1983, the trial court sustained appellee’s motion. Appellant filed this timely appeal. The State Real Estate Commission has filed an amicus brief in support of appellant’s position.

The question presented to us is whether an agreement to form a partnership for the purpose of operating a real estate practice is an illegal agreement when one partner is a licensed real estate broker and the other partner is a licensed real estate agent. In other words, we must decide whether the Real Estate Commission’s regulation that all members of a partnership seeking a broker’s license must be duly licensed brokers themselves is inconsistent with the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act. The trial court found the regulation to be inconsistent with the Act, which resulted in its decision that the parties’ agreement was legal.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1035(b), a party shall be entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Skowronski v. Bailey, 330 Pa.Super. 83, 478 A.2d 1362 (1984); Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa.Super. 135, 476 A.2d 928 (1984). Summary judgment should not be entered unless a case is clear and free from doubt. Rich *439 land Mall Corp. v. Kasco Construction Co., Inc., 337 Pa.Super. 204, 486 A.2d 978 (1984); Skowronski v. Bailey, supra.

‘In reviewing summary judgment, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party’s pleadings, giving the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. To uphold summary judgment, there must be not only an absence of genuine factual issues, but also an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’

Curry v. Estate of Thompson, 332 Pa.Super. 364, 368, 481 A.2d 658, 659 (1984), quoting Rybas v. Wapner, 311 Pa.Super. 50, [54], 457 A.2d 108, [109] (1983).

The Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. § 455.101-.902. 1 (hereinafter “the 1980 Act”) provides, in pertinent part:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to engage in or conduct, or to advertise or hold himself out as engaging in or conducting the business, or acting in the capacity of a broker or sales person ... within this Commonwealth without first being licensed or registered as such as provided in this act.

63 P.S. § 455.301.

In section 201 of the 1980 Act, a person is defined as any individual, corporation, partnership, association, or other entity.

Definitions of a broker and a salesperson are also provided in section 201 of the 1980 Act. 2 A broker may be either *440 an individual or an entity such as a partnership. The licensure of partnerships as real estate brokers was and is permitted under both the 1929 and 1980 Acts. Section 6(c) of the 1929 Act, now repealed, provided:

(c) No copartnership, association or corporation shall be licensed by the department or commission as a real estate broker, unless all of the members of any such copartnership or association and all of the officers of any such corporation, intending to actually engage in or actually engaging in the real estate business, are duly licensed real estate brokers.

63 P.S. § 436(c) (repealed).

The Real Estate Commission’s regulation at 49 Pa.Admin.Code § 35.21(a) (hereinafter “the Code”), adopted in 1966, was promulgated pursuant to section 6(c) of the 1929 Act. The regulation provides the following general requirement for corporate and partnership licensure as a real estate broker:

(a) A partnership, association or corporation may be licensed as a real estate broker, if all members of any such partnership or association or all officers of any such corporation who intend to engage in or actually engage in *441 the real estate business themselves are duly licensed as real estate brokers.

49 Pa.Admin.Code § 35.21(a).

In the 1980 Act, which repealed the 1929 Act, 3 provisions for the licensure of both individual and entity brokers are contained in sections 511, 512, and 513. Section 511 establishes requirements that an applicant must meet in order to qualify for a broker’s license. 63 P.S. § 455.511. Section 512 sets forth certain requirements for applying for a broker’s license. 63 P.S. § 455.512. Section 513 provides:

If the applicant for a broker’s license is a corporation, partnership or association, then the provisions of sections 511 and 512 shall apply to the individual designated as broker of record.

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Bluebook (online)
490 A.2d 857, 340 Pa. Super. 435, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 8893, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lookenbill-v-garrett-pa-1985.