1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GABRIEL PIES LONSDALE, Case No. 25-cv-02358-AJB-DEB Booking No. 25707540, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL, SAN FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 16 DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL 17 COUNSELING OFFICE, DEPUTY (Doc. No. 2) 18 ROJAS ARJIS,
19 Defendants. 20 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiff Gabriel Pies Lonsdale (“Plaintiff” or “Lonsdale”), who is detained at the 24 San Diego Central Jail and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 1.) 26 In his Complaint, Lonsdale alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing 27 to provide him with a “voodoo diet,” and “printouts” of voodoo prayers. (See id. at 3–5.) 28 He seeks $900 million in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) For the reasons explained 1 below, the Court DENIES Lonsdale’s IFP motion and DISMISSES this civil action. 2 II. IFP MOTION 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Generally, a person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405.1 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Absent fee payment, the action may proceed only if the filer 6 seeks, and the court grants, leave to IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). “All persons, not just 8 prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 9 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Lonsdale, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. 10 “To help staunch a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation 11 Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three-strikes rule.” 12 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones v. 13 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 14 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three 15 or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or 16 fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(g)); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). “A negative consequence that 18 may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to 19 file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 20 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 22 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 23 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 24 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of 27 $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, “[a] strike-call under Section 2 1915(g) [] hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s 3 prejudicial effect.” Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724–25. “[I]f a case was not dismissed on one of 4 the specific enumerated grounds, it does not count as a strike under § 1915(g).” Harris v. 5 Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 6 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o qualify as a strike for § 1915(g), a case as a whole, not just 7 some of its individual claims, must be dismissed for a qualifying reason.”) (citing 8 Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). Once a 9 prisoner accumulates three strikes, however, § 1915(g) precludes his ability to proceed IFP 10 in any other civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he “makes a plausible allegation 11 that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 12 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 13 B. Discussion 14 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 15 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket 16 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 17 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 18 (9th Cir. 2005). This is one of those instances, as public court dockets show Lonsdale is no 19 longer eligible to proceed IFP because while incarcerated, he has had more than three prior 20 prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed 21 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 22 201(b)(2), this Court may take judicial notice of the docket records in Lonsdale’s prior 23 cases. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating a court may take 24 judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as other courts’ records). The 25 following records show Lonsdale, who is also known as “Gabriel Pies-Lonsdale,” 26 accumulated three qualifying strikes before he filed this case: 27 (1) Lonsdale v. Gempler, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01589-WJM-NRN (D. Col. June 1, 2020) (Report & Recommendation [R&R] to dismiss Third 28 1 Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) [ECF No. 48]; Id., (D. Col. July 1, 2020) (Order adopting 2 R&R and dismissing case) [Doc. No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GABRIEL PIES LONSDALE, Case No. 25-cv-02358-AJB-DEB Booking No. 25707540, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL, SAN FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 16 DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL 17 COUNSELING OFFICE, DEPUTY (Doc. No. 2) 18 ROJAS ARJIS,
19 Defendants. 20 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiff Gabriel Pies Lonsdale (“Plaintiff” or “Lonsdale”), who is detained at the 24 San Diego Central Jail and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 1.) 26 In his Complaint, Lonsdale alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing 27 to provide him with a “voodoo diet,” and “printouts” of voodoo prayers. (See id. at 3–5.) 28 He seeks $900 million in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) For the reasons explained 1 below, the Court DENIES Lonsdale’s IFP motion and DISMISSES this civil action. 2 II. IFP MOTION 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Generally, a person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405.1 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Absent fee payment, the action may proceed only if the filer 6 seeks, and the court grants, leave to IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). “All persons, not just 8 prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 9 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Lonsdale, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. 10 “To help staunch a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation 11 Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three-strikes rule.” 12 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones v. 13 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 14 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three 15 or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or 16 fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(g)); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). “A negative consequence that 18 may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to 19 file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 20 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 22 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 23 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 24 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of 27 $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, “[a] strike-call under Section 2 1915(g) [] hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s 3 prejudicial effect.” Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724–25. “[I]f a case was not dismissed on one of 4 the specific enumerated grounds, it does not count as a strike under § 1915(g).” Harris v. 5 Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 6 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o qualify as a strike for § 1915(g), a case as a whole, not just 7 some of its individual claims, must be dismissed for a qualifying reason.”) (citing 8 Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). Once a 9 prisoner accumulates three strikes, however, § 1915(g) precludes his ability to proceed IFP 10 in any other civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he “makes a plausible allegation 11 that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 12 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 13 B. Discussion 14 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 15 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket 16 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 17 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 18 (9th Cir. 2005). This is one of those instances, as public court dockets show Lonsdale is no 19 longer eligible to proceed IFP because while incarcerated, he has had more than three prior 20 prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed 21 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 22 201(b)(2), this Court may take judicial notice of the docket records in Lonsdale’s prior 23 cases. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating a court may take 24 judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as other courts’ records). The 25 following records show Lonsdale, who is also known as “Gabriel Pies-Lonsdale,” 26 accumulated three qualifying strikes before he filed this case: 27 (1) Lonsdale v. Gempler, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01589-WJM-NRN (D. Col. June 1, 2020) (Report & Recommendation [R&R] to dismiss Third 28 1 Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) [ECF No. 48]; Id., (D. Col. July 1, 2020) (Order adopting 2 R&R and dismissing case) [Doc. No. 49]; 3 (2) Pies-Lonsdale v. Banachi, Case No. 3:22-cv-00310-LAB-BLM, 2022 4 WL 1478510, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2022) (Order granting IFP, 5 dismissing complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and granting leave to amend) [ECF No. 6 5]; id. (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022) (Order dismissing civil action for 7 failing to amend and/or prosecute) [Doc. No. 9];2 and 8 (3) Pies-Lonsdale v. Lemus, Case No. 3:22-cv-00309 TWR (JLB), 2023 WL 300188, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2023) [Doc. No. 18] (Order 9 granting motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 10 directing Plaintiff to show cause why case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute); id. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023) (Order dismissing 11 civil action for failure to prosecute) [Doc. No. 19].3 12 13 Because Lonsdale accumulated these prior qualifying dismissals while incarcerated, 14 he may not proceed IFP unless he meets § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. To do 15 so, his pleading must contain a “plausible allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of 16 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting U.S.C. 17 § 1915(g)). The alleged danger must also “stem[] from the violations of law alleged in [the] 18 complaint.” Ray, 31 F.4th at 701. 19 Lonsdale’s Complaint lacks any plausible allegations that he faced imminent danger 20 of serious physical injury at the time of filing. Imminent danger requires an allegation that 21
22 2 See Harris, 863 F.3d at 1142 (finding that a failure to amend does “not negate the determination 23 already made by the Court that the complaint [plaintiff] had filed . . . failed to state a claim.”). “A prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunit[y] to amend.” Id. 24 at 1143. 25 3 Lonsdale has recently added two additional strikes in Lonsdale v. Stephan, et al., Case No. 3:25- cv-00733-TWR-VET (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (Order dismissing First Amended Complaint for failure to 26 state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) without further leave to amend) [Doc. No. 6], and in Lonsdale v. El Cajon Police Dept., et al., Case No. 25-cv-01619-BAS-JLB, 2025 WL 27 2646163 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) [Doc. No. 4] (Order denying IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismissing civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)), but both these qualifying 28 1 harm is “ready to take place” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Cervantes, 493 2 || F.3d at 1056. Plaintiffs allegations he was denied a religious diet and copies of “voodoo 3 || prayers” are insufficient to suggest imminent danger of physical injury. See e.g., Uhuru v. 4 || Velasquez, 2021 WL 619768, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (finding vague allegations related to 5 practice of religion insufficient to meet imminent danger exception). Consequently, 6 || Lonsdale does not qualify for a § 1915(g) exception and may not proceed IFP in this case. 7 || See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Ray, 31 F.4th at 701. 8 Ht. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons explained, the Court: (1) DENIES Lonsdale’s Motion to Proceed 10 ||IFP (Doc. No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (2) DISMISSES this civil action 11 || without prejudice based on his failure to pay the full $405 civil filing fee required by 28 12 ||/U.S.C. § 1914(a); (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith 13 |}/pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a 14 ||judgment of dismissal and to close the file. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: September 26, 2025 © 7 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 a