Long v. McDermott

813 S.W.2d 622, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1679, 1991 WL 122860
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 5, 1991
Docket01-90-00467-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 813 S.W.2d 622 (Long v. McDermott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long v. McDermott, 813 S.W.2d 622, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1679, 1991 WL 122860 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinions

OPINION

MIRABAL, Justice.

This is an appeal by writ of error from a default judgment.

This lawsuit arises out of an automobile collision that occurred on February 7, 1989, on U.S. Highway 290. McDermott sued Long for negligence and gross negligence, and upon Long’s failure to file an answer, McDermott obtained a default judgment in the principal amount of $6,852.22, representing $6,452.22 for collision damage to McDermott’s vehicle, and $400 for loss of use of the vehicle. We affirm.

McDermott’s pleadings in the trial court incorrectly listed Long’s address as “6800 Hollister, No. 2702” rather than “5800 Hol-lister, No. 2702.” The original petition and citation were served on defendant Long on October 18, 1989, notwithstanding the single-digit typographical error in his address. The constable’s return states that there is no such address as “6800 Hollister,” and that Long was served at “5800 Hollister, No. 2702.” On appeal, Long does not challenge the propriety of service of process.

Long did not answer McDermott’s lawsuit, and McDermott moved for default judgment. The motion for default judgment was set for hearing November 16, 1989, and default judgment was granted November 16, 1989. McDermott’s motion for default judgment contains a certificate of service on Long by certified mail; the certificate of service repeats the typographical error. McDermott also filed a certificate of last known address that repeated the error. The crux of Long’s complaint on appeal is that it is clear on the face of the record that both the motion for default judgment and the notice of entry of default judgment were sent to the wrong address, and that he therefore did not receive due notice.

The elements necessary for appellate review by writ of error are: (1) the petition for writ of error must be filed in the trial court within six months of the date of the final judgment, (2) the petitioner for writ of error must be a party to the action who did not participate in the actual trial of the case, and (3) the error must be apparent from the face of the record. Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex.1985); Brown v. McLennan County Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.1982); Tex.R.App.P. 45. Here, the first two elements are met; the issue on this appeal is whether reversible error appears on the face of the record.

In point of error one, Long complains that the trial court erred in granting default judgment against him because no notice of the court’s intention to call this case for trial or to hold a hearing on the motion for default judgment was ever sent to or received by Long or his attorneys as [624]*624required by rules 239, 239a, and 21a of Tex.R.Civ.P.

After a citation and petition are served on a defendant, the plaintiff has no legal duty to notify the defendant before taking a default judgment on the causes of action asserted in the served petition. The rules do not require separate notice of the hearing on unliquidated damages. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp. v. Ramsey, 695 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.). Other Texas courts of appeals agree with our disposition of this issue. See Daylin, Inc. v. Juarez, 766 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, writ denied); Olivares v. Cauthom, 717 S.W.2d 431, 434 (San Antonio 1986, writ dism’d); Helfman Motors, Inc. v. Stockman, 616 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We disagree with the dissent’s assertion that Peralta1 and Lopez2 require a different result.

We overrule point of error one.

In point of error two, Long complains that the trial court erred in granting McDermott’s motion for default judgment and entering judgment against Long because no notice of the signing of the order was ever sent to him as required by Tex.R.Civ.P. 239a.3

In point of error three, Long complains that the trial court erred in not giving him notice that an order granting McDermott’s motion for default judgment had been signed on November 16, 1989.

A party’s failure to comply with the certificate and notice provisions of Rule 239a does not constitute reversible error in an appeal by writ of error. Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied). The purpose of Rule 239a is to afford a defendant notice of the default judgment which has been rendered against him so that he can timely file a motion for new trial or an appeal. It is designed as an administrative convenience for the parties, and the failure to file a certificate of last known address, or to give notice of the entry of default judgment, does not constitute reversible error. City of Houston v. Amey, 680 S.W.2d 867, 873 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Bloom, 767 S.W.2d at 468; Buddy L., Inc. v. General Trailer Co., 672 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Grayson Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Jackson, 566 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Essentially, appellant is seeking to reverse a judgment valid on the face of the record because of something occurring after the judgment was rendered. Appellant cannot succeed with this argument in a writ of error appeal.4

We overrule appellant’s points of error two and three.

We affirm the judgment.

O’CONNOR, J., dissents.

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Bluebook (online)
813 S.W.2d 622, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1679, 1991 WL 122860, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-v-mcdermott-texapp-1991.