Londonderry School District SAU 12 v. State

958 A.2d 930, 157 N.H. 734, 238 Educ. L. Rep. 307

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Decided: October 15, 2008
• Docket: 2006-258
• Status: Published

Opinions

HICKS, J.

The petitioners brought this action in 2005 seeking a declaratory judgment that House Bill (HB) 616, the statute previously governing education funding and allocation, was unconstitutional. At the conclusion of the proceedings below, the Superior Court (Groff, J.) declared the legislation unconstitutional on its face because HB 616 “failed to fulfill [the State’s] duty to define a constitutionally adequate education, failed to determine the cost of an adequate education, . . . failed to satisfy the requirement of accountability, and ... create[d] a non-uniform tax rate in violation of Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” Londonderry Sch. Dist. v. State, 154 N.H. 153, 155 (2006).

On appeal, we affirmed the ruling that the State had failed to define a constitutionally adequate education, retained jurisdiction over the core definitional issues pending legislative response and stayed the remaining issues. Id. at 162. This was because “the definition of a constitutionally adequate education is essential to all other issues.” Id.

The legislature has now responded to the definitional issue by enacting Laws 2007, chapter 270, which is codified at RSA chapter 193-E. The petitioners do not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of this definition. In addition to defining a constitutionally adequate education, RSA chapter 193-E also paved the way for the State to determine the cost of an adequate education by creating a Joint Legislative Oversight Committee to study the issues. The legislature has since passed several statutes in an attempt to satisfy its duty to determine the cost of and fund a constitutionally adequate education. See Laws 2007, ch. 262; Laws 2007, 263:35 (superseding HB 616’s funding plan until the year 2009); Laws 2008, ch. 173 (determining the cost of a constitutionally adequate education and outlining various funding mechanisms). Laws 2008, chapter 173 also establishes legislative committees to investigate funding issues and satisfying the fourth duty of ensuring the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education through accountability.

In response to our July 25,2008 order requiring the interested parties to file brief memoranda in light of this legislation, the petitioners and amicus curiae NEA New Hampshire allege several infirmities in Laws 2008, chapter 173. In addition to highlighting that the accountability requirement has yet to be met, they claim insufficiency in the universal cost per pupil, the allocated differentiated aid and the student-teacher ratio. The petitioners further take issue with chapter 173’s two-year funding phase-in provisions because they allege that this carries forward certain infirmities of HB 616 during the interim. The petitioners, however, offer to forego a challenge to this funding if the State provides the allotted funds and does not otherwise reduce the budget. We note that the petitioners have previously informed the court that they would assent to a dismissal of this case without prejudice “if the State will commit to making a good faith effort to fulfill, by June 30, 2008, the remaining three mandates of its constitutional duty to provide an adequate education to every child in the state.”

The State and amici curiae, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, assert that the action is now moot because “[t]he education funding plan before the court in the present case, . . . []HB 616[], is no longer in effect and is not based on the existing statutory definition of an adequate education.” The State and amici curiae, in essence, maintain that, with the enactment of Laws 2007, chapter 270 and Laws 2008, chapter 173, the State has now taken sufficient steps toward satisfying its constitutional duty to render the prior dispute over HB 616 moot by establishing costing and funding legislation and creating a legislative oversight committee as an affirmative first step towards ensuring accountability. The State also points out that neither chapter 270 nor chapter 173 has been challenged by the petitioners or subjected to a factual inquiry before the trial court.

We find that the action is now moot. “Generally ... a matter is moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because issues involved have become academic or dead.” In re Juvenile 2005-212, 154 N.H. 763, 765 (2007). A challenge seeking only prospective or declaratory relief is generally mooted where intervening legislative activity renders the prior law inapplicable. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of R.A., 155 N.H. 98, 100-01 (2007) (challenge moot where relevant statute no longer in effect); State in the Interest of Jane Doe, 118 N.H. 330, 333 (1978) (declining to entertain question of statutory construction where statute was repealed); Keene v. Gerry’s Cash Mkt., Inc., 113 N.H. 165, 168 (1973) (recognizing that dispute over injunctive relief was moot where ordinance at issue repealed).

We are, however, hesitant to dismiss a dispute as moot simply because one party voluntarily ceases the challenged practice or attempts to remedy its failure to act. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). This is particularly so where, as here, the action implicates constitutional rights and duties. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83; see also Royer v. State Dep’t of Empl. Security, 118 N.H. 673, 675 (1978). However, we find no indication that either chapter 270 or chapter 173 is substantially similar to HB 616. We presume that, in enacting chapters 270 and 173, the legislature acted in good faith and crafted a responsive mandate intended to address the constitutional infirmities of the prior legislation. See D.H.L. Associates, Inc. v. O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000); see also Zessar v. Keith, 536 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Usually . . . legislative action will provide [adequate] assurance ... because when the defendants are public officials we place greater stock in their acts of self-correction, so long as they appear genuine.” (quotation and ellipsis omitted)); Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 193 (1993) (expressing confidence that political branches would “fulfill their responsibility ... to defin[e] the specifics of, and the appropriate means to provide through public education, the knowledge and learning essential to the preservation of a free government”).

Although we are mindful of the petitioners’ claims that the new legislation presents new problems, it is precisely for this reason that the controversy before this court is now moot. HB 616, as it relates to the original petition, is no longer in effect. While the dissenters correctly point out that we have previously decided disputes that are moot when the matter involves “a pressing public interest,” see, e.g., Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 155 N.H. 693, 695 (2007), on the scant record remaining before us we decline to continue jurisdiction. Ensuring a constitutionally adequate education is undoubtedly a matter of pressing public interest. However, in contrast to other matters of sufficient public interest where the relevant authorities under review remained in effect, see, e.g., Sullivan v. Town of Hampton Bd. of Selectmen, 153 N.H. 690, 692 (2006), the relevant statutory provisions at issue in this case are no longer in effect and retaining jurisdiction would not cure “continued uncertainty in the law.” Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 930-31 (1977) (quotation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Sanborn, 130 N.H. 430 (1988).

For the reasons stated herein, we decline to exercise our discretion to retain jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice as moot.

Dismissed.

Dalianis and Galway, JJ., concurred; Broderick, C.J., dissented; Duggan, J., dissented.