[Cite as Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-297.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
JODI L. LOGAN : : Appellant : C.A. No. 2024-CA-13 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CV 026 : CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD OF : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas ELECTIONS, ET AL. : Court) : Appellees :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on January 31, 2025
RICK L. BRUNNER, PATRICK M. QUINN, & HANNAH FARD, Attorneys for Appellant
JEFFREY A. STANKUNAS & RYAN C. SPITZER, Attorneys for Appellee
.............
LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Jodi L. Logan appeals from the trial court’s judgment
granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to her
declaratory judgment and wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims.
Because we conclude that Logan failed to demonstrate that her termination was in -2-
contravention of a clear public policy, she has failed to meet the clarity element of her
wrongful termination claim. Additionally, she failed to demonstrate that there was a
justiciable controversy between the parties, as she sought neither a determination
regarding the rights, status, or other legal relations between the parties nor a
determination of a question of construction or validity arising under a constitutional
provision, statute, or rule. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} Logan formerly served as Deputy Director of the Champaign County Board
of Elections (“the Board”). In May 2022, Logan was placed on administrative leave from
her position as Deputy Director pending an investigation into allegations that she had
failed to follow established protocol within the office and had made false statements to
the Board after she reportedly raised concerns to the Ohio Secretary of State about
possible election procedure violations by certain members of the Board. In July
2022, Logan’s employment with the Board was terminated.
{¶ 3} In September 2022, Logan commenced this action in the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas asserting claims for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy and declaratory judgment against the Board, the director of the Board, the
chairperson of the Board, and three members of the Board (collectively “the Champaign
County Defendants”), and the Secretary of State. In her complaint, Logan claimed that
she had observed certain violations of the Secretary of State’s election directives and -3-
office security requirements and additional actions and associations that created an
appearance of impropriety during early voting in April 2022. She alleged that the Board’s
Director had failed to keep a record of people who entered the Board’s offices during early
voting, met with candidates alone, and voiced support for a particular candidate in a
contested primary. She also alleged that procedures pertaining to the security and
tabulating of absentee ballots had not been followed.
{¶ 4} Logan’s allegations specifically concerned actions of the Champaign County
Defendants that purportedly violated the Secretary of State’s election directives. The
Secretary of State had issued the election directives and advisories upon which the
allegations against the Champaign County Defendants arose and was named in this
action as the chief elections officer of the state. In her complaint, Logan set forth the
following statutory provisions concerning the authority of the Secretary of State:
13. Pursuant to ORC § 3501.05(B) the Ohio Secretary of State shall issue
instructions by directives and advisories to the Champaign County Board of
Elections as to the proper methods of conducting elections to members of
Board of Elections.
14. Pursuant to ORC § 3501.05(C) the Ohio Secretary of State shall issue
rules and instructions to the Champaign County Board of Elections for the
conduct of elections.
15. Pursuant to ORC § 3501.05(N) the Ohio Secretary of State shall
investigate irregularities in elections.
16. Pursuant to ORC § 3501.053(A) the Ohio Secretary of State may issue -4-
instructions as to the proper way of conducting elections to members of
Board of Elections by permanent or temporary directives.
{¶ 5} According to Logan, pursuant to R.C. 3501.05(B) and R.C. 3501.053, the
Secretary of State issued election directive 2021-10, which mandated a bipartisan team
in election procedures and provided that the boards of elections must provide voters with
24/7 access to the secure receptacle, that the secure receptacle must be monitored 24/7,
and that at least once daily, one Republican and one Democratic member of the board or
board staff must together check, retrieve the contents, and re-lock the receptacle.
{¶ 6} The Secretary of State also issued election directive 2020-12, which outlined
security measures and provided that the board of elections must mitigate security
vulnerabilities and adopt a security policy regarding the overall security of its office. At a
minimum, each board was required to have an after-hours monitored security system to
cover the rooms used to store the voting equipment, ballots, tabulation, and voter
registration servers and to maintain restricted access, sign-in, and supervision of visitors
to areas of the board’s office that house the voting equipment, election materials,
tabulation, and voter registration servers, networks, and computers.
{¶ 7} Logan also set forth certain provisions from the ethics policy adopted by the
Secretary of State. Under the ethics policy, members and employees of the boards of
elections were to avoid actions and associations that created an appearance of
impropriety, undermined public confidence in Ohio elections officials, or interfered with
the performance of duties by Ohio elections officials. Additionally, all members and
employees of the boards of elections were required to sign a statement indicating their -5-
knowledge of and familiarity with Ohio ethics laws and the Secretary of State’s ethics
policy. Questions about the ethics policy could be addressed to the board’s legal counsel,
the county prosecuting attorney, the county elections attorney, or the Ohio Ethics
Commission. Violations of the ethics policy could be reported to the director of elections
in the Secretary of State’s office, and reports could be made anonymously by mailing a
written statement in a sealed envelope to the Secretary of State’s office to the attention
of the director of elections. According to Logan, the Board did not develop a chain of
command policy for the Director and Deputy Director but did adopt a policy related to
security in the office, which stated:
“a. Do not go into the ballot room without both a Dem & Rep
b. Always handle ballots and all election material in pairs Dem & Rep”
{¶ 8} Despite the foregoing directives and policies, Logan alleged that she had
observed violations of election procedures during early voting for the May 2022 primary
election. As a result, she verbally reported her concerns to the Board’s Director and
Chairperson, but the violations allegedly continued. She then contacted the Secretary of
State’s office regarding her concerns, seeking guidance and claiming that the ethics
policy from the Secretary of State required her to report violations of election procedures
and gave her a reasonable expectation of anonymity in reporting.
{¶ 9} In response to Logan’s allegations and concerns, the Secretary of State’s
office sent a letter to the Board on April 29, 2022, reporting that the office had received
calls from several concerned constituents regarding lack of bipartisan oversight and
requiring a written response from the Board by May 16, 2022, regarding the allegations -6-
of improper procedure.
{¶ 10} By letter dated May 16, 2022, the Chairperson responded to the Secretary
of State’s office regarding the reported concerns. In the letter, the Chairperson stated that
the Board immediately met with the Director, Logan, and the security employee regarding
the allegations, noting that Logan stated that she had heard from others about the
concerns but that she had no personal knowledge of the same, and thus, she had not
brought such issues to the Board prior to its receipt of the April 29 letter. The Board stated
that, when Logan was asked why she had not brought those issues to the Board, she
indicated that she had not believed there was anything to report. At the conclusion of the
letter, the Chairperson extended appreciation to the office for identifying the names of the
complainants, indicating that it helped with the Board’s investigation. Logan did not
receive a copy of the Board’s response letter, and on May 23, 2022, she sought further
clarification by email from the Secretary of State’s office regarding proper election
procedures related to her concerns.
{¶ 11} On May 26, 2022, the Board placed Logan on administrative leave by letter,
wherein she was advised that: she had failed to follow the chain of command and report
any perceived violations of election procedures to the Director and the Board; she had
provided false statements to the Board by denying when asked whether she had reported
perceived violations of election procedures to the Secretary of State’s office; and she had
failed to follow protocol for her benefit but to the detriment of her work office.
{¶ 12} On July 18, 2022, Logan was advised by letter that the Board had concluded
its investigation into the allegations against her but invited her to meet with the Board and -7-
truthfully answer all questions posed. Logan attended the meeting, appearing with her
legal representative and providing a verbal statement to the Board through counsel.
{¶ 13} Thereafter, the Board made several findings, including: Logan was an
unclassified employee; she failed to report perceived election violations to the Board and,
instead, made a complaint to the Secretary of State’s office, thereby failing to follow the
chain of command; the Board learned from the Secretary of State’s office that Logan had
made a complaint to the office with her concerns; Logan had lied to the Board by claiming
that she had no personal knowledge of any alleged violations in election procedure and
had no knowledge regarding the basis of the complaint to the Secretary of State’s office;
and Logan had breached her fiduciary duty to the Board by withholding information critical
to the Board’s investigation. The Board concluded, among other things, that Logan had
been insubordinate by lying to the Board, had failed to disclose her perceived allegations
of election violations within the work office, and had failed to follow the chain of command,
which delayed the Board’s review of the allegations and ability to remedy any violations.
The Board noted that its findings of misconduct were not related to Logan’s reporting of
alleged violations to the Secretary of State. The Board terminated Logan’s employment.
{¶ 14} In her complaint, Logan sought a declaratory judgment, reinstatement of
her employment to her previous position, and back pay with benefits and attorney’s fees.
She alleged that she had been subjected to disparate and discriminatory employment
standards and had been wrongfully terminated as the Board sought to cover up its
wrongdoing. She also alleged that the Secretary of State had an interest in the outcome
of the proceedings. Because the Secretary of State was named as a defendant, Logan -8-
initially brought the action in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court pursuant to Civ.R.
3(C)(4), which requires that an action brought against an officer in the officer’s official
capacity must be brought in the county where the officer maintained his principal office.
{¶ 15} The Secretary of State filed a motion to dismiss Logan’s complaint against
him pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). The Champaign County Defendants also
filed a motion to dismiss the Secretary of State pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), (2), (3) and
(6) and to transfer the matter to the proper venue. The Champaign County Defendants
argued that venue in Franklin County was improper because it was solely based upon
joining the Secretary of State to the action as an “interested party.”
{¶ 16} The Franklin County Common Pleas Court granted the Secretary of State’s
motion to dismiss, finding that he was not a proper party to the action, which rendered
moot the Champaign County Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to him. The court
then granted the Champaign County Defendants’ motion to change venue, transferring
the case to the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 17} The Champaign County Defendants then filed a second Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
motion to dismiss in the Champaign County court for failure to state a claim, which Logan
sought to strike as improper and untimely. The trial court ultimately denied Logan’s motion
to strike and granted the Champaign County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the merits,
thereby dismissing Logan’s complaint as to the remaining Defendants. Logan appealed.
{¶ 18} On appeal, Logan argued that the Franklin County Common Pleas Court
had erred in granting the Secretary of State’s motion to dismiss and that the Champaign
County Common Pleas Court had erred in granting a second motion to dismiss by the -9-
Champaign County Defendants. We concluded that there was no error in dismissing
Logan’s declaratory judgment action against the Secretary of State but agreed that the
trial court had erred in granting the Champaign County Defendants’ successive Civ.R.
12(B) motion. Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2023-Ohio-4688, ¶ 35, 45 (2d
Dist.). We explained that the Champaign County Defendants had not waived their right to
raise their defense for failure to state a claim; rather, they had only forfeited their
opportunity to raise that defense in the context of a successive Civ.R. 12 motion, other
than one for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at ¶ 46. We then remanded the matter. Id. at
¶ 47.
{¶ 19} Thereafter, the Champaign County Defendants filed an answer to Logan’s
complaint and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that (1) Logan had failed
to assert a justiciable controversy because her declaratory judgment request challenged
specific facts, not the validity of a statute or administrative regulation and (2) Logan had
failed to identify a public policy that manifested from a state or federal constitution, statute,
administrative regulation, or the common law.
{¶ 20} The trial court agreed with the Champaign County Defendants and granted
their motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Logan had failed to allege a
justiciable issue suitable for resolution in a declaratory judgment action and that the
directives and ethics policy upon which she relied with respect to her wrongful termination
claim did not establish a clear public policy that was necessary to satisfy the clarity
element for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Logan appeals. -10-
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Logan’s Wrongful Termination Claim
{¶ 21} Logan’s first assignment of error states:
The trial court erred in applying an incorrect standard and in
prematurely granting Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
where the Complaint adequately pled a cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
{¶ 22} In her first assignment of error, Logan asserts several arguments. She
initially contends that the trial court erred when it failed to construe all the allegations in
her complaint as true and in her favor. She argues that the trial court did not properly
apply the Civ.R. 12(C) standard because the court failed to accept all allegations in her
complaint as true, overlooked reasonable inferences that should be drawn in her favor,
prematurely assessed the evidence by evaluating and weighing its credibility, and
dismissed the complaint even though it was not beyond doubt that Logan could prove no
set of facts entitling her to relief. She argues that the trial court prematurely adjudicated
the merits of her wrongful termination claim and rendered its decision before fully
exploring the factual allegations. Logan claims that the facts were disputed and that her
wrongful termination claim could not be dismissed without proper adjudication of the facts
by a jury. She also contends that the court erred in finding no violation of the public policy
in election law and the Secretary of State’s directives, arguing that: the public policy
exception elements were met; the allegations in her complaint averred a sufficiently clear
public policy that established the clarity element; a sufficiently clear public policy was
established through election law, the ethics policy, and the directives of the Secretary of -11-
State; and the trial court’s overly narrow interpretation and application of the public policy
exception constituted reversible error.
{¶ 23} A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings presents questions of
law, the determination of which is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and
any writings attached to the pleadings. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161 (1973);
Civ.R. 10(C). “Civ.R. 12(C) provides that, after the pleadings are closed, but within a time
as to not delay the trial, any party can move for judgment on the pleadings.” Trimbach v.
Bath Twp., 2021-Ohio-2058, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). “ ‘Determination of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and any writings
attached to the complaint.” Id., quoting Offil v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2012-Ohio-
6225, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially a Civ.R.
12(B) motion to dismiss filed after the pleadings are closed. Id., citing Cirino v. Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 2021-Ohio-1382, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 24} “ ‘Unlike a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment, which authorizes the
court to evaluate evidentiary materials submitted for their probative worth, Civ.R.
12(C) imposes a structural test: whether on their face the pleadings foreclose the relief
requested.” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Greenview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Staffco Constr.,
Inc., 2016-Ohio-7321, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). “The non-moving party is entitled to have all the
material allegations in the pleadings construed in his [or her] favor as true.” Id., citing
Greenview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at ¶ 11. “The trial court may grant a judgment
on the pleadings only where no material factual issue exists and one of the parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id., citing Discover Bank v. Swartz, 2016-Ohio- -12-
2751, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). We review motions for judgment on the pleadings de novo.
Crenshaw v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-3913, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford,
2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.
{¶ 25} In Ohio, the common-law doctrine of employment-at-will generally governs
employment relationships. Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 2002-Ohio-3994, ¶ 5. “Under this
doctrine, a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either the employee or
the employer; thus, a discharge without cause does not give rise to an action for
damages.” Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 (1995); see also Mers v.
Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 26} However, in response to perceived abuses of the employment-at-will
doctrine, and following the trend of other states, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized
a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In Greeley v.
Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234-35 (1990), the Court
recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on a
violation of a specific statute. “[A]fter Greeley, an employee terminated in violation of a
statute could maintain a common-law action for damages.” Wiles at ¶ 5.
{¶ 27} Subsequent to Greeley, the Supreme Court expanded and refined the
scope of the tort of wrongful discharge, holding that “a valid Greeley claim is not limited
to situations where the discharge violates a statute.” Wiles at ¶ 6. “The existence of such
a public policy may be discerned by the Ohio judiciary based on sources such as the
Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, legislation, administrative rules and
regulations, and the common law.” Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 384 (1994). In -13-
other words, “if an employee is discharged or disciplined in contravention of a clear public
policy articulated in the Ohio or United States Constitution, federal or state statutes,
administrative rules and regulations, or common law, a cause of action for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy may exist as an exception to the general
rule.” Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 11, citing Painter at paragraph three
of the syllabus and Greeley at paragraph one of the syllabus. However, “an exception to
the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will should be recognized only where the public
policy alleged to have been violated is of equally serious import as the violation of a
statute.” Painter at 384, citing Greeley at 234.
{¶ 28} “To be successful in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim,
a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) Clarity - That clear public policy existed and was
manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in
common law; (2) Jeopardy – That dismissing employees under these circumstances
would jeopardize the public policy; (3) Causation – The dismissal was motivated by
conduct related to that public policy; and (4) Justification – The employer lacked an
overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal.” Trimbach, 2021-Ohio-2058,
at ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2019-Ohio-3308, ¶ 12.
“The clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law for the court to decide, and the
elements of causation and justification are questions of fact to be determined by the fact-
finder.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 10, citing House v. Iacovelli, 2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 12.
{¶ 29} Logan’s wrongful termination claim was grounded in common law tort. The
crux of her claim was based on the election directives issued by and the ethics policy -14-
adopted by the Secretary of State. Logan maintains that the ethics policy required her to
report violations in election procedures and that she had a reasonable expectation of
anonymity regarding her reports. When questioned about the allegations by the Board,
she suggested that the ethics policy gave her the right to remain anonymous, and as a
result, she did not reveal to the Board that she had reported her concerns to the Secretary
of State. She further believes that she was terminated in order for the Board to avoid
embarrassment due to its wrongdoing and failure to properly administer elections.
{¶ 30} In support of her argument, Logan points out that R.C. 3501.05 provides the
duties of the Secretary of State and requires the Secretary of State to issue instructions
regarding election duties by directives; to prepare rules and instructions for the conduct
of elections; to investigate the administration of election laws, frauds, and irregularities in
elections in any county; and to report violations of election laws to the attorney general or
prosecuting attorney. She contends that she reported the alleged violations because of
the directives and based on the ethics policy (where it was noted that violations may be
reported to the Secretary of State and may be made anonymously in writing).
{¶ 31} Here, at issue in the trial court was whether the allegations in Logan’s
complaint were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the clarity element of her wrongful
discharge claim. The clarity element of the claim requires a plaintiff to allege facts
“demonstrating that the employer’s act of discharging him contravened a ‘clear public
policy.’ ” Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 383. “Under the clarity element analysis, an employee
cannot simply allege that clear public policy exists because of a general societal interest,
but rather must set forth a specific law.” Creveling v. Lakepark Indus., Inc., 2021-Ohio- -15-
764, ¶ 52 (6th Dist.), citing Dohme, 2011-Ohio-4609. “The courts of Ohio generally have
found that Greeley claims cannot lie with every public policy, even ‘good’ ones, and
appropriately so. Without these limitations, Greeley claims could evolve from exceptions
to the employment at-will doctrine to the rule itself.” Crowley v. St. Rita’s Med. Ctr., 931
F.Supp.2d 824, 831 (N.D. Ohio 2013). Still, what constitutes a “clear public policy”
remains the subject of debate. In Dohme, the Court set forth certain examples of clear
public policies, including “assisting investigations, permitting Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) complaints, ensuring public safety, and eliminating
unsafe working conditions.” Dohme, 2011-Ohio-4609, at ¶ 18,
{¶ 32} In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Champaign County
Defendants argued that Logan had failed to satisfy the clarity element of her claim. In
agreeing with the Champaign County Defendants, the trial court observed that, while the
elections directives cited by Logan were issued under Ohio Adm. Code 111:3-1-01 (which
authorizes permanent and temporary directives from the Secretary of State regarding the
proper method of conducting an election), Logan could not simply allege that a clear
public policy precluding her termination arose from the directives and ethics policy; rather,
she was required to set forth a specific law evincing that public policy.
{¶ 33} The trial court then engaged in a lengthy, thoughtful analysis setting forth
examples of statutes and regulations that may substantiate such public policy, including
statutes addressing workplace safety (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
making it illegal to terminate an employee in retaliation for filing a complaint or instituting
a proceeding with OSHA under 29 U.S.C. 660(c)(1), and R.C. 4101.11 and R.C. 4101.12 -16-
requiring employers to provide a safe workplace); workers’ compensation (e.g., R.C.
4123.90 prohibiting an employer from discharging, demoting, reassigning, or taking any
punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted a
proceeding under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or disease which occurred
in the course of employment with that employer); unemployment compensation; public
health and safety (e.g., 49 U.S.C. 44701 et seq. authorizing the Federal Aviation
Administration to regulate the production of aircraft, perform inspections, and set forth
standards); food and drug safety; and mandatory reporting (e.g., R.C. 2151.421 requiring
mandatory reporters to immediately report that a child has suffered or faces a threat of
suffering abuse or neglect or face criminal prosecution for failing to report).
{¶ 34} The court determined that Logan had not identified a constitutional
provision, statute, administrative rule, or common law principle that articulated the clear
public policy needed to satisfy the clarity element of a wrongful discharge claim. It
reasoned that the election directives made no provision for employees who reported
violations to remain anonymous and did not prohibit retaliation against employees who
made such reports. In coming to its conclusion, the trial court relied, in part, on our
reasoning in Trimbach and, in particular, on Judge Michael L. Tucker’s concurring
opinion, which we find persuasive. Concurring with the majority, Judge Tucker stated that
“ ‘any exception to the employment-at-will doctrine should be narrowly applied.’ ”
Trimbach, 2021-Ohio-2058, at ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (Tucker, J., concurring), quoting McGlothen
v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), citing Dean v. Consol. Equities Realty
#3, L.L.C., 2009-Ohio-2480, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Judge Tucker explained, “Supreme Court -17-
caselaw seems to support the conclusion that, to meet the clarity element, the public
policy must either require employee reporting, prohibit retaliation for reporting, or relate
to employee or public safety.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 24, citing Crowley, 931
F.Supp.2d at 830 (N.D. Ohio), citing Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 2011-Ohio-2723
(clarity element met where statute protects an employee who asserts a workers
compensation claim); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 (1997) (clarity
element met when public policy is employee safety as reflected by the federal OSHA
statute (29 U.S.C. 660 (c)) and related Ohio statutes).
{¶ 35} Our task is to determine whether the conduct Logan alleged to have
occurred violated a “clear public policy” of this state. Logan was required to allege facts
demonstrating that the Champaign County Defendants’ act of discharging her
contravened a clear public policy derived from the state or federal constitution, a statute
or administrative regulation, or common law.
{¶ 36} We agree with the trial court that members of boards of elections act under
the control of the Secretary of State. A board’s duties are set forth in R.C. 3501.11 and
include the appointment and removal of the director, deputy director, and employees; the
investigation of irregularities, nonperformance of duties, or certain violations of the
Revised Code by election officers and other persons; and the reporting of facts related to
any investigation to the Secretary of State. Accordingly, upon receiving Logan’s
complaints regarding the Champaign County Defendants, the Secretary of State referred
the matter for investigation by the Board, which also had the duty to administer oaths,
issue subpoenas, summon witnesses, and compel the production of evidence in -18-
connection with any such investigation. While Logan claims that she had a reasonable
expectancy of anonymity under the ethics policy, the thoroughness of any investigation
required by the Board would have been hindered if persons who reported possible
violations, such as Logan, could not have been compelled to give evidence to the Board
regarding those alleged violations.
{¶ 37} Upon our review of her complaint, we conclude that Logan did not cite any
specific statement of law in support of her public policy claim that was drawn from the
federal or state constitution, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations,
or common law. Logan had the obligation to specify the sources of law that supported the
clear public policy upon which she relied for her claim. Without specific sources of law,
she had not articulated the clarity element with specificity. See Dohme, 2011-Ohio-4609.
As a result, Logan failed to establish that her discharge was “in contravention of a clear
public policy articulated in the Ohio or United States Constitution, federal or state statutes,
administrative rules and regulations, or common law,” and her action failed “because
establishment of the clarity element is essential to the survival” of her claim. Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶ 38} We want to emphasize that there is no question that maintaining the
integrity of election procedures is important. However, not every important issue qualifies
as one that satisfies the clarity element in a wrongful termination claim. Under the
circumstances in this case, we cannot say that the election law in R.C. Chapter 3501, the
election directives, or the ethics policy cited by Logan required employee reporting,
prohibited retaliation for reporting, or related to employee or public safety. As a result,
even with the factual allegations in the pleadings construed in Logan’s favor, we conclude -19-
that the Champaign County Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶ 39} The trial court did not err in granting the Champaign County Defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Logan’s wrongful termination in
violation of public policy claim. Logan’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Judgment on the Pleadings on the
Declaratory Judgment Claim
{¶ 40} Logan’s second assignment of error states:
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant did not state a claim for
declaratory judgment.
{¶ 41} Logan contends that the trial court erred in finding that she did not state a
claim for declaratory judgment. According to Logan, her declaratory judgment claim was
grounded in a real and substantive controversy between adverse parties; the controversy
was justiciable in character; and speedy relief was necessary to preserve her rights. She
asserts that her claims involved an ongoing harm with future implications. She further
contends that her declaratory judgment action was distinguishable from her wrongful
discharge claim. We disagree.
{¶ 42} Declaratory judgment actions are governed by R.C. Chapter 2721. R.C.
2721.02 refers to “rights, status, or other legal relations” as the subject of the court’s
declaratory powers. These rights do not extend to everyone who is practically affected by
the controversy involved, but only to those persons who are legally affected. Schriber
Sheet Metal & Roofers, Inc. v. Shook, 64 Ohio App. 276, 285 (2d. Dist. 1940); Shoemaker -20-
v. City of Piqua, 2000 WL 1514085, *2 (2d Dist. Oct. 13, 2000), citing Shook. R.C. 2721.03
states, in part:
any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing
constituting a contract or any person whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined
in section 119.01 of the Revised Code, municipal ordinance, township
resolution, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument, constitutional provision,
statute, rule, ordinance, resolution, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.
{¶ 43} Ohio courts have consistently held that, for declaratory relief to be
considered an appropriate remedy, the plaintiff must establish the following three
essential elements: (1) that a real controversy exists between the parties; (2) the
controversy is justiciable in nature; and (3) the particular situation is one in which speedy
relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. See Williams v. Akron, 54 Ohio
St. 2d 136, 144 (1978). When determining if a “real controversy” exists, Ohio courts have
found that the controversy must be based upon legal rights and obligations. Superior
Dairy, Inc. v. Stark County Milk Producers’ Assn., 89 Ohio App. 26, 31 (5th Dist. 1950).
{¶ 44} When an action or proceeding in which declaratory relief is sought involves
the determination of an issue of fact, “that issue may be tried and determined in the same
manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in
which the action or proceeding is pending.” R.C. 2721.10. However, courts may refuse to -21-
render a declaratory judgment “if the judgment or decree would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the action or proceeding in which the declaratory
relief is sought.” R.C. 2721.07.
{¶ 45} We review a trial court’s decision regarding justiciability of a declaratory
judgment action for an abuse of discretion. Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-3208, ¶ 13. “The
term ‘abuse of discretion’ means an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision.”
State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 2002-Ohio-2219, ¶ 14, citing State
ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 92 Ohio St.3d 529, 533 (2001).
{¶ 46} In her claim for declaratory judgment, Logan sought several declarations,
many of which pertained to issues of fact. She claimed that there was a justiciable
controversy as to whether she had been wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy.
In granting the Champaign County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
trial court explained that, though styled as a declaratory judgment action, the crux of
Logan’s claim was that she was wrongfully terminated after the Champaign County
Defendants allegedly failed to follow the Secretary of State’s election directives and then
fired her after she reported those violations to the Secretary of State.
{¶ 47} The trial court pointed to the following declarations sought by Logan in her
claim for declaratory judgment:
That pursuant to Complaint Exhibit 3 [ethics policy], Plaintiff had duty
to report the violations to the Ohio Secretary of State;
That pursuant to Complaint Exhibit 3 [ethics policy], Plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of anonymity about her reports to the Ohio -22-
Secretary of State;
That Plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement to her position with back pay
and/or a public apology by the Defendants;
That Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for her wrongful
termination and public humiliation;
That Defendants, other than the Secretary of State have
demonstrated malice and reprehensible behavior towards the Plaintiff;
That as a result of the conduct, reprehensible behavior and malice
of the Defendants, other than the Secretary of State, these Defendants have
demonstrated malice and forethought and reprehensible behavior towards
the Plaintiff, that the Defendants other than the Ohio Secretary of State
should be required to pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees and in the case of the
individuals that said payments be made from their personal funds[.]
Complaint, ¶ 91.4, 91.5, 91.21, 91.22, 91.23, 91.24. In citing these declaration requests,
the trial court surmised that the same identified public policy concerns and remedies
sought in Logan’s declaratory judgment action also served as the basis for her wrongful
termination claim, thereby rendering her declaratory judgment action and wrongful
termination claims indistinguishable. We agree.
{¶ 48} For a court to proceed with a declaratory judgment action, there must be a
real and justiciable controversy between the parties with adverse legal interests where
speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of parties. Logan complained of actions
of the Champaign County Defendants in 2022 related to her termination of employment, -23-
and thus, she sought a declaratory judgment, reinstatement of her employment to her
previous position, and back pay with benefits and attorney’s fees. We agree with the trial
court that, though her claim was styled as one for declaratory judgment, the core of her
claim was that she had been wrongfully terminated.
{¶ 49} To state a claim for declaratory judgment, Logan was required to allege
facts showing that a real justiciable controversy existed between the parties necessitating
speedy relief to preserve her rights. As found by the trial court, Logan did not seek a
determination as to the construction or validity of a constitutional provision, statute, rule,
or policy directive pertaining to election procedures or a declaration of rights or status
under such provisions. Instead, Logan sought a determination that the Champaign
County Defendants had violated the Secretary of State’s election directives and that they
had wrongfully terminated her employment after she informed the Secretary of State of
those violations—neither of which related to the rights, status, or other legal relations
between the parties or a determination of a question of construction or validity arising
under a constitutional provision, statute, or rule.
{¶ 50} Moreover, Logan did not allege an ongoing harm or potential for future
harm, but rather, alleged past harm—e.g., the termination of her employment. As a result,
Logan’s complaint did not demonstrate that speedy relief was necessary to preserve her
rights, as the actions about which she complained had occurred in 2022. and therefore
the damage, if any, had already occurred. See Bunting v. Watts, 2018-Ohio-3357, ¶ 19
(5th Dist.), citing Mansfield Plumbing Products LLC v. Estate of Sparks, 2005-Ohio-3121,
¶ 17-18 (5th Dist.). -24-
{¶ 51} Finally, we note that declaratory judgment is inappropriate when “a
resolution of the controversy depends greatly upon a determination of the facts of the
case, . . . especially when the same facts are at issue in a pending action.” Therapy
Partners of Am., Inc. v. Health Providers, Inc., 129 Ohio App.3d 572, 578 (10th Dist.
1998), citing Videtto v. Marsh, 112 Ohio App. 151, 153 (3d Dist. 1960). Logan’s claim for
declaratory judgment and the declarations sought depended on a determination of the
facts of the case, which were the same facts at issue in her wrongful termination claim.
Thus, declaratory judgment was inappropriate. Likewise, as we already concluded, Logan
did not satisfy the clarity element for her wrongful termination claim, and consequently,
she cannot bring a declaratory judgment action against the Champaign County
Defendants premised on the same factual allegations set forth in that claim. Accordingly,
we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings on Logan’s
declaratory judgment claim when a declaratory judgment would not have terminated the
controversy giving rise to this action—namely that Logan was allegedly wrongfully
terminated by the Champaign County Defendants.
{¶ 52} We conclude that, as a matter of law, Logan’s complaint did not set forth
the necessary elements for a declaratory judgment claim. Accordingly, Logan’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
I. Conclusion
{¶ 53} Having overruled both of Logan’s assignments of error, we will affirm the
............. -25-
WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.