[Cite as Joy v. MetroHealth Sys., 2026-Ohio-1557.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
MATTHEW JOY, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115437 v. :
THE METROHEALTH SYSTEM, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-115532
Appearances:
Walter | Haverfield, LLP, John E. Schiller, and Alexandra V. Dattilo, for appellant.
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Stephen S. Zashin, and Lauren M. Drabic, for appellee.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Joy (“Dr. Joy”) appeals the trial court’s
granting of defendant-appellee The MetroHealth System dba MetroHealth Medical
Center’s (“MetroHealth”) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision. I. Facts and Procedural History
In April 2025, Dr. Joy — an anesthesiologist who formerly worked for
MetroHealth for over 23 years — filed a complaint against MetroHealth asserting
two causes of action: (1) breach of contract and (2) wrongful termination in violation
of public policy.1 Therein, Dr. Joy asserted that his employment was renewed every
two years since his initial hiring in 1999, the latest being in March 2022. According
to Dr. Joy, his employment was wrongfully terminated in June 2023 “in retaliation
for his persistent dedication to patient safety and his refusal to look the other way
when MetroHealth staff failed to properly follow protocol and important patient
safety guidelines.” Dr. Joy claimed that he made written and oral complaints to
appropriate medical staff, but MetroHealth justified his immediate termination by
falsely claiming that he lacked professionalism and failed to perform his duties in
accordance with its value system.
Dr. Joy asserted that MetroHealth’s employee handbook and system
policy titled “EC-04 — Reporting Concerns” (“Reporting Policy”) prohibited
1 In his appellate briefs, Dr. Joy argues — for the first time — that the facts pled in
his two-count complaint are sufficient to support a third claim or legal theory: promissory estoppel. As noted by MetroHealth, this argument was not introduced at the trial-court level and, therefore, was not preserved for appellate review. A party cannot raise new claims or arguments for the first time on appeal, and a failure to present an issue before the trial court results in a waiver of that issue for appellate purposes. Garrett v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2022-Ohio-2770, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing Lycan v. Cleveland, 2019-Ohio-3510, ¶ 32- 33 (8th Dist.) (“It is well-established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally barred and a reviewing court will not consider issues that the appellant failed to raise in the trial court.”), and Cleveland Town Ctr., L.L.C. v. Fin. Exchange Co. of Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio-384, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Therefore, we limit our review to the two claims contemplated at the trial-court level: breach of contract and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. retaliation against employees for raising patient safety concerns or reporting
suspected wrongdoing in good faith. Dr. Joy alleged that MetroHealth did not
enforce its value system uniformly, consistently, or predictably and his immediate
dismissal was unreasonable, unjustified, and in violation of MetroHealth’s
disciplinary procedures. Dr. Joy further alleged that MetroHealth’s policies against
retaliation constitute a clear and important expression of public policy since it is a
governmental entity.
Based on these facts, Dr. Joy claimed that MetroHealth breached his
employment contract — created by his March 2022 renewal and MetroHealth’s
handbook, Reporting Policy, and other relevant policies and procedures — “by
terminating [him] improperly in retaliation for reporting issues of patient safety and
violations of policies and procedures, and federal regulations, that required
MetroHealth employees to follow his instructions in furnishing anesthesia services.”
Dr. Joy also claimed that his wrongful termination was motivated by his reporting
of patient concerns “stemming from MetroHealth employees’ failure to follow his
instructions in furnishing anesthesia services” despite the existence of (1) “[a] clear
public policy against retaliation for reporting patient safety concerns . . . manifested
in Ohio law,” (2) “its own policies against retaliation,” and (3) “a clear public policy
for the orderly and supervised furnishing of anesthesia . . . under state and federal
law.”
Dr. Joy attached a copy of the two-page Reporting Policy to the
complaint. The Reporting Policy applied to “Workforce Members,” which included “employees, providers, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose conduct, in
the performance of work for [MetroHealth], [was] under direct control of such
entity, whether or not they [were] paid by [MetroHealth].” The Reporting Policy
“outline[d] the expectations and procedures for Workforce Members to timely
report potential violations of [MetroHealth’s] Code of Conduct, policies, procedures,
laws or regulations applicable to [MetroHealth].” Finally, the Reporting Policy
established that MetroHealth maintained an “open-door policy”; encouraged
Workforce Members, patients, visitors, vendors, and community members to report
concerns; and “prohibit[ed] retaliation against Workforce Members who report
suspected wrongdoing in good faith.”
In response, MetroHealth filed an answer and asserted several
affirmative defenses. In its answer, MetroHealth denied the existence of an
employment contract, countering that Dr. Joy was an at-will employee who “was last
approved for reappointment based on continuation of clinical privileges” via a letter
dated March 15, 2022 (“Reappointment Letter”). MetroHealth also denied Dr. Joy’s
characterization of MetroHealth’s policies, asserting that it had “numerous
unilaterally-issued system-wide employment policies, including [the Reporting
Policy], that [were] made available to employees and posted on MetroHealth’s
intranet.” Finally, MetroHealth denied that Dr. Joy was wrongfully terminated for
reporting patient safety concerns. MetroHealth attached a copy of the
Reappointment Letter, which stated in relevant part: “This reappointment is
effective 02/01/2022 with clinical privileges continuing until your next scheduled reappointment date of 01/30/2024 unless circumstances warrant consideration of
status change or employment change prior to the expiration date.” The
Reappointment did not contain any terms of employment beyond the general
requirement that medical staff comply with MetroHealth’s policies, provisions, and
emergency plans.
Along with its answer, MetroHealth filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. MetroHealth argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law since (1) no contract existed between MetroHealth and Dr. Joy — an at-will
employee — and (2) the complaint failed to identify the existence of a clear public
policy in connection with Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination claim. First, MetroHealth
argued that Dr. Joy failed to assert that the parties entered into a contractual
agreement. MetroHealth claimed that the Reappointment Letter’s language “did
not guarantee [Dr. Joy’s] continued employment with MetroHealth” or
“demonstrate[d] an intent to create an agreement” with him; rather, “it simply
granted a continuation of [Dr. Joy’s] clinical privileges while making clear that
MetroHealth could reconsider his employment status at any time.” (Emphasis
omitted.) MetroHealth further asserted that its unilaterally issued Reporting Policy
“simply outline[d] the expectations and procedures for MetroHealth employees to
report violations” and did “not contain any language expressly or implicitly
guaranteeing MetroHealth employees continued employment.” MetroHealth
argued that there was no mutual assent to the terms of the Reporting Policy and nothing in it altered the at-will nature of Dr. Joy’s employment or created an
employment contract between Dr. Joy and MetroHealth.
Second, MetroHealth argued that Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination-in-
violation-of-public-policy claim failed as a matter of law since he did not sufficiently
plead the cause of action’s “clarity element.” MetroHealth asserted that Dr. Joy was
required to articulate, with specificity, the existence of a clear public policy and its
manifestation in a state or federal constitution, statute, administrative regulation,
or in common law. MetroHealth claimed that Dr. Joy’s “reliance on an internal
system policy and vague references to state and federal law fall far short of satisfying
the clarity element.” According to MetroHealth, the Reporting Policy could not be
used as a basis for Dr. Joy’s claim since “it [did] not even apply county-wide, much
less statewide,” and Dr. Joy failed to cite any source for his contention that a public
policy existed related to the orderly and supervised furnishing of anesthesia.
Dr. Joy opposed the motion, countering that he properly pled his
claims and dismissal was inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings since the
complaint’s allegations must be accepted as true and reasonable inferences must be
construed in his favor. Dr. Joy reiterated his allegation that his March 2022
reappointment, MetroHealth’s handbook, the Reporting Policy, and “potentially
other relevant policies and procedures” created a contract of employment between
him and MetroHealth. According to Dr. Joy, the Reporting Policy formed “part of
his employment contract with MetroHealth” since it created “a specific condition of
employment that MetroHealth employees [would] not be retaliated against for good faith reports of suspected wrongdoing.” Dr. Joy further argued that his allegations
related to the wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim satisfied
Civ.R. 8(A)’s pleading requirements. Dr. Joy also referenced — for the first time —
two specific examples of the alleged “clear public policies related to the supervised
furnishing of anesthesia under Ohio law, i.e., public policies related to patient
safety.”
In response, MetroHealth filed a reply in support of its motion,
arguing that — even after accepting the complaint’s allegations as true — Dr. Joy
could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. MetroHealth reiterated that a
contract did not exist between the parties and asserted that Dr. Joy “effectively
concedes as much [by] disingenuously attempting to repackage a MetroHealth
employment policy into an employment agreement, despite no intent whatsoever —
express or implied — by either party to create such an agreement.” MetroHealth
further reiterated that Dr. Joy’s complaint “assert[ed] in a conclusory fashion” that
clear public policies existed but failed to cite any specific source for that conclusion.
According to MetroHealth, the clarity element of Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination-in-
violation-of-public-policy claim could not be satisfied by vague references to its
policies or “general purported policies.” MetroHealth also argued that the two
examples Dr. Joy cited in his brief in opposition — which failed to satisfy the clarity
element in any event — should not be considered since they were not pleaded in the
complaint. MetroHealth emphasized that the trial court should not accept Dr. Joy’s
legal conclusions as true absent any legal basis to support them. Accordingly, MetroHealth requested that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety since Dr. Joy
could not establish his claims as a matter of law.
Ultimately, the trial court granted MetroHealth’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Dr. Joy’s complaint for breach of contract
and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Dr. Joy appealed the trial
court’s ruling, raising a single assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in dismissing [Dr. Joy’s] complaint with prejudice at the pleading stage. [Dr. Joy’s] complaint alleged specific facts supporting his claim that he was terminated from his employment as a physician in retaliation for raising bona fide patient safety concerns in violation of [MetroHealth’s] policies and public policy.
II. Law and Analysis
In his sole assignment of error, Dr. Joy argues that the trial court
erred in granting MetroHealth’s motion for judgment on the pleadings since the
“complaint alleged facts that, when assumed as true, supported a cognizable claim
for retaliatory termination in violation of [MetroHealth’s] policies and . . . public
policy.”
A motion for judgment on the pleadings only presents questions of
law and tests “the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted.” Crenshaw v. Howard,
2022-Ohio-3914, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Edwards v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-2933, ¶ 7
(8th Dist.). Therefore, we apply the de novo standard of review on appeal and
conduct an independent examination without affording deference to the trial court’s
decision. Rowe v. Hoist & Crane Serv. Group, 2022-Ohio-3130, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture &
Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851, ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Edn. Comm. for Foreign Med.
Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18.
Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C),
which provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” In ruling on a
Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the court is restricted to the allegations in the pleadings and
any writings attached as exhibits to the pleadings. Schmitt v. Educational Serv. Ctr.,
2012-Ohio-2210, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); Edwards v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-2933, ¶ 7-9 (8th
Dist.) (noting that “written instrument” attached to a pleading — a term that “has
primarily been interpreted to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights
and obligations” — qualifies as part of that pleading).
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings does not allow a court to
weigh the evidence; instead, it simply tests the sufficiency of the complaint.’” Koz v.
Newburgh Hts., 2025-Ohio-1555, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Ware v.
Booth, 2024-Ohio-2102, ¶ 5. When reviewing a complaint’s sufficiency, courts must
be mindful that Civ.R. 8(A) — which governs the general rules of pleadings —
requires only “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is
entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party
claims to be entitled.” Nevertheless, “[e]ven under Ohio’s liberal pleading rules and
notice-pleading standard . . . a cause of action must be factually supported and
courts need not accept bare assertions of legal conclusions.” Francis v. Northeast Ohio Neighborhood Health Servs., 2021-Ohio-3928, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Tuleta
v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).
Indeed, it is well-established that “‘[a] well-pled complaint must
include factual allegations going to each element of the claim’” and those factual
allegations must be accepted as true when reviewing a Civ.R 12(C) motion. Mundy
v. Golightly, 2022-Ohio-83, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-
3971, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.); Rowe at ¶ 21, citing Pincus v. Dubyak, 2021-Ohio-3034, ¶ 17
(8th Dist.). However, “‘conclusory statements without any factual allegations in
support are insufficient’” and unsupported conclusions cannot defend against a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mundy at id., quoting Torrance at id.; Rowe
at id., citing Pincus at id. Thus, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where,
after considering the material allegations of the pleadings and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
the court finds that no material factual issues exist, and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Rayess at ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride
IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).
With these concepts in mind, we consider whether the trial court
erred in granting MetroHealth’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion and dismissing Dr. Joy’s
complaint for breach of contract and wrongful termination in violation of public
policy. A. Breach-of-Contract Claim
“To succeed on a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate ‘the existence of a binding contract or agreement; the non-breaching
party performed its contractual obligations; the other party failed to fulfill its
contractual obligations without legal excuse; and the non-breaching party suffered
damages as a result of the breach.’” Jordan v. Giant Eagle Supermarket, 2020-
Ohio-5622, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 104 Ohio
App.3d 95, 108 (8th Dist. 1995). A binding contract exists only where the following
elements are present: “‘offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the
bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and
legality of object and of consideration.’” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16,
quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio
1976). Moreover, a contract is unenforceable where there is no “meeting of the
minds as to the essential terms.” Id., citing Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v.
Ohio Dept. of Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio St. 3d 366, 369 (1991).
In the instant case, the parties dispute whether an employment
contract exists between Dr. Joy and MetroHealth. In his complaint, Dr. Joy alleged
that the MetroHealth’s renewal of his employment in March 2022, handbook,
Reporting Policy, and other relevant policies and procedures created a contract of
employment between him and MetroHealth. Dr. Joy attached the Reporting Policy
to his complaint to support this conclusion. On appeal, Dr. Joy claims that the
Reporting Policy carved out exceptions to his at-will employment since it created a duty to report concerns and prohibited MetroHealth from retaliating against
employees who reported.
In its answer, MetroHealth countered that Dr. Joy was an at-will
employee and an employment contract did not exist. MetroHealth attached the
Reappointment Letter to its answer. On appeal, MetroHealth argues that and the
documents referenced by Dr. Joy do not give rise to an employment contract.
Rather, MetroHealth claims that (1) the Reappointment Letter made clear that Dr.
Joy’s continued reappointment could be terminated at any time and (2) neither the
Reporting Policy nor any other MetroHealth policy altered the at-will nature of Dr.
Joy’s employment.
“Ohio adheres to the concept of at-will employment, meaning that in
the absence of a contract, employment is terminable at-will by either the employer
or the employee, at any time, and for any reason not contrary to law.” Galgoczy v.
Chagrin Falls Auto Parts, 2010-Ohio-4684, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). However, the at-will-
employment doctrine is subject to certain exceptions, including: “(1) the existence
of an implied or express contract which alters the terms of discharge; (2) the
existence of promissory estoppel where representations or promises were made to
an employee; and (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” Brunaugh
v. Anomatic Corp., 2025-Ohio-4833, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.). Nevertheless, the party
seeking to prove the existence of a contract “has a heavy burden” since at-will
employment is presumed and “all of the elements of a contract must be established, including a ‘meeting of the minds’ to show that employment was intended to be
other than at-will.” Galgoczy at ¶ 4.
Generally, employee handbooks, manuals, and policies will not affect
at-will employment, do not constitute an employment contract, and are insufficient,
by themselves, to create a contractual obligation upon an employer. Strasser v.
Fortney & Weygandt, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5738, *6 (8th Dist. Dec. 20, 2001);
Evans v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1148, *10 (8th Dist. Mar. 15,
2001); Brunaugh at ¶ 15. To alter the nature of at-will employment, both parties
must have intended for the language in the handbooks, manuals, or policies to be
legally binding. Clayton v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2015-Ohio-1547, ¶ 11 (8th
Dist.). “In other words, the employee’s belief that the handbook affords him
contractual rights does not mean that it does unless the employer intends it to do
so.” Fennessey v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 2009-Ohio-3750, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). Thus,
“‘[a]bsent mutual assent * * * a handbook becomes merely a unilateral statement of
rules and policies which create no obligation[s] and rights.’” Clayton at ¶ 11, quoting
Tohline v. Cent. Trust Co., N.A., 48 Ohio App.3d 280, 282 (1st Dist. 1988); Ney v.
May Eng. Co. LLC, 2025-Ohio-5081, ¶ 66 (7th Dist.) (“Without a manifestation of
mutual assent to be bound by the handbook or policy, the writing is a unilateral
statement of rules and policies.”).
Nothing in the Reporting Policy or Reappointment Letter supports
the conclusion that an employment contract existed between Dr. Joy and
MetroHealth. The Reporting Policy does not constitute a specific promise of employment that would modify Dr. Joy’s at-will employment relationship. The two-
page policy applies to all “employees, providers, volunteers, trainees, and other
persons whose conduct, in the performance of work for [MetroHealth], are under
direct control of such entity, whether or not they are paid by [MetroHealth]” and
even encourages patients, visitors, vendors, and community members to report
concerns. The Reporting Policy does not contain any statement that MetroHealth
intends to be bound by a specific termination procedure or that any employee has
job security. It merely states that retaliation is prohibited “against Workforce
Members who report suspected wrongdoing in good faith.” Neither the Reporting
Policy’s language nor the complaint’s factual allegations — as distinguished from
complaint’s conclusory statement that MetroHealth’s handbook, Reporting Policy,
and other relevant policies and procedures created an employment contract —
indicate that the Reporting Policy represents anything more than a unilateral
statement of rules and policies.
Despite the complaint’s allegations, our review of the Reappointment
Letter further reveals that an employment contract was not created between Dr. Joy
and MetroHealth. The Renewal Letter simply approved Dr. Joy’s reappointment
and granted a continuation of his clinical privileges. Beyond broadly stating that
medical staff are required to comply with MetroHealth’s policies, provisions, and
emergency plans, the Renewal Letter does not contemplate any terms of Dr. Joy’s
employment or contain several of the essential elements of contract formation. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting MetroHealth’s
Civ.R. 12(C) motion and dismissing Dr. Joy’s breach-of-contract claim.
B. Wrongful-Termination-in-Violation-of-Public-Policy Claim
In his single assignment of error, Dr. Joy also challenges the trial
court’s dismissal of his wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.
As mentioned above, the tort of wrongful termination in violation of
public policy is an exception to the at-will-employment doctrine. House v. Iacovelli,
2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 11, citing Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., 49 Ohio
St.3d 228 (1990). Such a claim is specifically limited to at-will employees and
cannot be brought by a contract employee. Sullivan v. Walsh Jesuit High School,
2024-Ohio-2437, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), citing Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73
Ohio St.3d 254, 258 (1995). A plaintiff must establish four elements to prove a
wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim:
(1) that a clear public policy existed and was manifested either in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation or in the common law (“the clarity element”), (2) that dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (“the jeopardy element”), (3) that the plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy (“the causation element”), and (4) that the employer lacked an overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (“the overriding-justification element”).
Iacovelli at ¶ 12, quoting Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2019-Ohio-3308,
¶ 12. While the causation and overriding-justification elements are questions to be
determined by the finder of fact, the clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law to be determined by the court. Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65,
70 (1995).
On appeal, Dr. Joy argues that he sufficiently pled facts satisfying the
clarity element for his wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.2
Dr. Joy asserts that a clear public policy can be discerned from several sources and
identifies various administrative, state, and federal codes and regulations — many
of which are mentioned for the first time on appeal.
“‘[T]o satisfy the clarity element of a claim of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy, a terminated employee must articulate a clear public
policy by citation to specific provisions in the federal or state constitution, federal or
state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common law.’” Rowe v. Hoist
& Crane Serv. Group, 2022-Ohio-3130, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Dohme v. Eurand
Am., Inc., 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 23-24 (“Unless the plaintiff asserts a public policy and
identifies federal or state constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, or
common law that support the policy, a court may not presume to sua sponte identify
the source of that policy.”). Thus, “‘an employee cannot simply allege that clear
public policy exists because of a general societal interest, but rather must set forth
specific law.’” Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-297, ¶ 31 (2d
Dist.), quoting Creveling v. Lakepark Indus. Inc., 2021-Ohio-764, ¶ 52 (6th Dist.).
2 Dr. Joy also claims that he pled sufficient facts to satisfy the jeopardy element of
his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. However, the parties did not raise any issues or present any arguments regarding the jeopardy element before the trial court. Therefore, we limit our review to the single element contemplated at the trial- court level: the clarity element. Our review of the complaint reveals that Dr. Joy claims that his
wrongful termination was motivated by his reporting of patient concerns “stemming
from MetroHealth employees’ failure to follow his instructions in furnishing
anesthesia services.” However, Dr. Joy did not cite any specific statement of law in
support of his public-policy claim. Rather, Dr. Joy generally alleges that “[a] clear
public policy against retaliation for reporting patient safety concerns exists and is
manifested in Ohio law” and in MetroHealth’s “own policies against retaliation.”
Moreover, Dr. Joy broadly claims that “a clear public policy for the orderly and
supervised furnishing of anesthesia exists under state and federal law.” Dr. Joy was
obligated to articulate specific sources of law — drawn from the state or federal
constitution, statutes, administrative regulations, or the common law — that
support the clear public policy upon which his claim relies. Since Dr. Joy failed to
do so, he did not sufficiently plead the clarity element, an essential element to his
claim’s survival. Logan at ¶ 37 (affirming the granting of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings where the plaintiff did not cite specific statements of law from federal
or state constitutions and statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common
law in support of her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim),
citing Dohme. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting MetroHealth’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Dr. Joy’s claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
Thus, after considering the material allegations of the pleadings and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Dr. Joy, the trial court properly concluded that material factual issues did not exist and found
that MetroHealth was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Civ.R. 12(C).
Accordingly, Dr. Joy’s single assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR