Mr. Justice GRAY
delivered the opinion of the court.
This matter is before us on reserved constitutional questions pursuant to the procedure contemplated by §§ 1-191 — 1-[532]*532193, W.S.1957, and Rule 52(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. It involves Ch. 39, S.L. of Wyoming, 1963, commonly known as the right-to-work law.
Plaintiffs1 commenced an action below seeking a declaration that the law in question is unconstitutional on the sole ground that in certain respects the act is in conflict with and repugnant to the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. (1958), § 141 et sequitur. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants 2 from enforcing the act.
The portions of Ch. 39, supra, with which we are primarily concerned are as follows:
“AN ACT to provide that employment shall not be conditional upon membership or non-membership in, nor upon the payment or non-payment of money to, a labor organization, * * *
* * * * * *
“Section 2. No person is required to become or remain a member of any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
“Section 3. No person is required to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
“Section 4. No person is required to pay or refrain from paying any dues, fees, or other charges of any kind to any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
“Section 5. No person is required to have any connection with, or be recommended or approved by, or be cleared through, any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.”
Other sections provide civil and criminal penalties for violations.
From the pleadings and the admissions made at the pretrial conference certain facts that we regard as important and necessary to disposition of the controversy were agreed upon. For example, it is established that the unions are labor organizations as defined in § 1(a), Ch. 39, S.L. of Wyoming, 1963, and as defined in § 152(5), 29 U.S.C. (1958). Also, that the employers are subject to the provisions of Ch. 39, and are engaged in an industry affecting commerce as defined in § 142(1), 29 U.S.C. (1958). For many years the unions were and are now the collective bargaining representatives of the employees of plaintiff employers and were so recognized by the employers in keeping with the provisions of § 158(a) (5) and § 158(d), 29 U.S.C. (1958). During this time the unions and the employers entered into many collective bargaining agreements establishing wages, hours of employment, and working conditions; and several such agreements were in effect at the time Ch. 39 was enacted. It is also shown that the unions and the employers were desirous of continuing the relationship, but being fearful that in so doing each might be subjected to the rather severe penalties imposed by Ch. 39 the within action was commenced for the purposes above stated.
By the foregoing we do not want to leave the impression that the action was entirely devoid of factual dispute. Among other things, the agreements provided that the unions would act as exclusive referral agencies for employment with the employers, an arrangement now commonly known as an exclusive “hiring hall.” In the trial court defendants vigorously assailed the provisions relating to such matter, asserting, as they do here, that the provisions were discriminatory upon their face. [533]*533Furthermore, that the provisions were administered by the unions in such a fashion .as to discriminate against nonunion applicants and, upon a ruling of the trial court that these contentions were immaterial, made offers of proof to sustain their position. With respect to this phase of the case much more could be set forth. However, inasmuch as the trial court has ruled that the matter of discrimination is not an issue in the case necessary for decision and we have concluded that the controlling constitutional questions can be answered without regard to the contentions, it would seem that further elaboration of the point would serve no useful purpose.
Following pretrial the court entered an order for the purpose of reserving the questions submitted and, among other things, therein stated that no dispute exists as to any of the material facts in the case. As a conclusion of law the court further stated that if Ch. 39 is constitutional then it is necessary for the court to declare that the contracts mentioned are void. On the other hand, if Ch. 39 is declared to be unconstitutional then plaintiffs are entitled to restrain defendants from commencing or prosecuting any criminal actions against the plaintiffs for continuing to observe the terms of the said agreements. The court also concluded that the constitutional questions presented were important and difficult and on its own motion ordered the questions reserved for decision by this court.
The questions so ordered were as follows :
“a. Is Chapter 39 of the Session Laws of Wyoming of 1963 unconstitutional in that it prevents plaintiff labor organizations, as representatives of the majority of employees of plaintiff employers, from serving as exclusive bargaining agent for all of said employees, and in that it prevents plaintiffs from so contracting?
“b. Is Section S of Chapter 39 of the Session Laws of Wyoming of 1963 unconstitutional in that it prevents plaintiffs from using a non-discriminatory, exclusive referral system administered by plaintiff labor organizations whereby plaintiff labor organizations refer employees to plaintiff employers and in that it prevents plaintiffs from so contracting?
“c. If Section S of Chapter 39 of the Session Laws of Wyoming of 1963 is unconstitutional, is the entire Act unconstitutional ?
Before proceeding further, we must confess that we have been somewhat bothered with the wording of the questions. It is difficult to determine just what the questions encompass and whether the questions are so stated as to be susceptible of categorical answers. In fact, it is rather forcefully argued by defendants that we are not free to answer the questions because unauthorized assumptions and conclusions on the record made form the basis for the questions propounded. We are reminded of cases in which we declined to reach, a decision because of apparent deficiencies in the record before us. White v. Board of County Commissioners of Albany County, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484; State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135. Certainly we are cognizant of the pronouncements made in those cases and the reasons underlying the decisions. And we are also inclined to agree with defendants’ contentions that the questions are not stated with the clarity and preciseness desired. Nevertheless, we are not inclined to agree that what we have said previously sustains the defendants’ premise that the record here is such that we are without jurisdiction. We purposefully set forth above the facts established as the result of the pretrial conference. Those facts were as binding upon the trial court as they are here and, as we view it, sufficiently disposed of the necessary and controlling factual questions. Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P.
When we add to those facts the conclusion of the trial court that those facts made necessary a decision on constitutional questions and a statement by the court of what it perceived those questions to be, there is present all of the essentials necessary to [534]*534support the order reserving the questions. True, we may not be able to answer the questions as propounded, but that is not fatal. This court is free within the foui-corners of the record to restate the questions deemed to have been raised in order to achieve a proper and beneficial result. Board of Com’rs of Carbon County v. Rollins, 9 Wyo. 281, 62 P. 351, 352. Under the circumstances, we are persuaded that we should follow that course. The matter is of great public interest throughout the state. Decision thereon unfortunately has been delayed and we think we ought not, if it can be prevented, cause further delay by remanding the case without answers to constitutional questions that seem clearly to control disposition of the case. In thus proceeding we do no injustice to either party inasmuch as the essential underlying facts have been agreed upon.
Consequently we shall proceed to restate the questions. Before doing so, however, it is well to point out that the focal point of this controversy centers around § 5 of Ch. 39. It is not argued by plaintiffs that the legislature was without power to determine local policy with respect to “the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.” Section 14 (b), Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 164(b), 29 U.S.C. (1958). That is understandable in view of the several holdings of state courts and the United States Supreme Court recognizing the right. Retail Clerks Intl. Assoc., Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179; Annotation 92 A.L.R.2d 598. The real contention of plaintiffs is that § 5 set forth above goes beyond those limits and is in direct contravention of the provisions of § 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 159(a), 29 U.S.C. (1958). The contention poses difficult and important questions for the reason that so far as we can find no court has been confronted with a case containing provisions similar to § 5 set forth above. Under those circumstances it appears proper specifically to limit the questions to the basic questions presented, and we perceive those to be as follows:
1. Is § 5 of Ch. 39, S.L. of Wyoming, 1963, in contravention of Art. VI of the Constitution of the United States ?
2. If question number one is answered in the affirmative, is Ch. 39, S.L. of Wyoming, 1963, unconstitutional in. its entirety?
Directing our attention to question number one it is first necessary to refer to certain constitutional provisions and valid laws of the United States.
Section 8 of Art. I, U.S.Const., provides at clause 3, “The Congress shall have' Power * * * To regulate Commerce- * * * among the several States * Art. VI, at clause 2, provides, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof' * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” It follows that insofar as activities of an employer and employees affect interstate commerce they-are subject to the federal law. Defendants’' counsel concede this, citing Hill v. State of Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782, rehearing denied 326 U.S. 804, 66 S.Ct. 11, 90 L.Ed. 489; Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 216, 342 P.2d 236.
Section 9(a) of the Labor Management. Relations Act (1947), § 159(a), 29 U.S.C... (1958), states:
“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other • conditions of employment * *
[535]*535Defendants’ counsel also agree and admit that under the foregoing provisions of § 9(a) plaintiff employers are obligated to recognize a properly designated majority union as the bargaining representative for all employees, union members as well as nonunion, in the bargaining unit. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 116 F.2d 748, 751, modified 7 Cir., 119 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 313 U.S. 565, 61 S.Ct. 843, 85 L.Ed. 1524; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation Limited v. National Labor Relations Board, 1 Cir., 114 F.2d 930, 941, certiorari dismissed 312 U.S. 710, 61 S.Ct. 448, 85 L.Ed. 1141.
Thus, we need only to inquire whether or not § 5 is in conflict with the above provisions of § 9(a). In order more precisely to point up our problem we turn to the language of § 5 which, among other things, says that no person is required to have “any connection with” a labor organization in his employment. Such a phrase is usually given a broad interpretation. Kokusai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Columbia Stevedoring Co., D.C.N.Y., 23 F.Supp. 403, 405, 406, affirmed 2 Cir., 100 F.2d 1016. It can mean a relationship that is either proximate nr remote. S. P. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State Street Realty Co., 134 N.J.Eq. 237, 35 A.2d 40, 45. As used here we observe that it sets aside, as a class, persons who are not members of a union, and undertakes complete divorcement of members of that class from any relationship with a union. We say this because the phrase clearly goes beyond the conditions imposed by §§ 2 and 4 of Ch. 39. Consequently we have no difficulty in concluding that the phrase was used, and intended to be used, in its broadest sense when applied to a “condition of employment or a continuation of employment.” With that premise we relate it to the matter of collective bargaining.
When that is done we fail to see how a labor organization could possibly serve as bargaining agent or representative for all employees without a nonunion employee having a connection with such organization. In the first place the definition of agency itself includes a fiduciary relationship between a principal and his agent. The principal is the person whom the agent represents and from whom he derives his authority; the agent is one who acts for another by authority from him. See 2 C.J. S. Agency § 1, pp. 1023-1025, and 3 Am. Jur.2d, Agency, § 1, p. 419. Application of the principle to the field of labor management is succinctly described in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825, 832-833, as follows:
“A union selected as a bargaining agent by a majority of employees (in an appropriate unit) of an employer, in an industry affecting commerce, becomes the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment. Labor Management Relations Act, § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). The exclusiveness of the agency exists whether the relations between the employer and union are conducted on an open, agency or union shop basis. The powerful role carries with it the responsibility of exercising the utmost good faith toward all employees represented, union and non-union, in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the employer, and in administering the agreement during its lifetime. The union-management compact becomes the code of the plant, and in policing it the union has the duty of treating all employees fairly, particularly with respect to employment of procedures established therein to adjust and settle their individual grievances.”
Thus, it is apparent, in the light of the relationship itself, that a labor union could not act as bargaining agent for all employees without going to all employees (union and nonunion) for instructions and advice. Who else, except all employees, can tell the union what wages to demand; what working hours and general working [536]*536conditions are acceptable; and when the employees would rather strike than accept wages and working conditions which are offered them?
We visualize these things happening at mass meetings of all employees — where the principal (all employees) meets with the agent (the union) in order to settle questions of importance which have to be settled before negotiations can begin. Also, during that period of time while negotiations are under way, it is apparent that no progress could be made unless the negotiating agent could check back frequently with its principal.
Connections and relationships between the labor organization which negotiates and nonunion employees, in our opinion, cannot be avoided either during contract negotiations or grievance negotiations. The latter may be just as important as the first.
If a contract, negotiated for all employees by a labor union, is violated and a nonunion employee has a complaint, it would surely be the duty of the union as agent and negotiator to present the grievance. Here again, a connection between the union and the employee is unavoidable, if the union is to be the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees, as the federal law contemplates and allows.
State and federal courts have been consistent in holding that under § 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 159(a), 29 U.S.C. (1958), an individual employee has the right to maintain a direct action for damages where there is no arbitration clause barring such an action; and where arbitration is the exclusive remedy under the contract, to demand arbitration if the union is neglectful of his rights, Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297, 301. But before an individual employee can maintain a suit, he must show that he has exhausted his contractual remedies. Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88, 91. Although wc find no case where the employee trying to bring suit outside of union-grievance procedure was a non-member of the union, the Maryland case, at 144 A.2d 93, quotes Professor Cox’s article, 8 Lab.L.J. 850 (1957), at p. 858:
“ * * * The bargaining representative would be guilty of a breach of duty if it refused to press a justifiable grievance either because of laziness, prejudice or unwillingness to expend money on behalf of employees who> were not members of the union. Individual enforcement would then become appropriate. * * * ”
Attention is also directed to Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America, D.C.Md., 171 F.Supp. 782, 791, affirmed 4 Cir., 273 F.2d 614, certiorari denied 363 U.S. 849, 80 S.Ct. 1628, 4 L.Ed.2d 1732. From these cases we have clear holdings from both state and federal courts that § 9 of the Labor Management Relations Act (1947),, § 159, 29 U.S.C. (1958), contractually binds, all employees to an exclusive representative. When that exclusive representative-is a labor organization, a nonunion employee is necessarily required to have a connection with a labor organization.
From what we have said it is quite apparent that § 5, Ch. 39, cannot stand as. written. Neither do we think it can be-saved simply by deleting therefrom the phrase which we have discussed. By clear and unequivocal language the section goes beyond mere implementation of §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the act. As stated above, the legislature demonstrated a clear intent and purpose by the section to set apart from the processes of collective bargaining, upon matters protected by the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), those employees who were not members of a union. That, of course, could not be done. Any such attempt is to impinge upon an area that is not open to the states under the provisions of § 14(b), Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 164(b), 29 U.S.C. (1958). The very least that would be required to uphold the section would be a proviso similar to that contained in the law of the State of Florida, § 12, Declaration of Rights, Fla.Const., F.S.A., that the section. [537]*537“shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer.” See Schermerhorn v. Local 1625 of Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, Fla., 141 So.2d 269, 272, affirmed 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179. That would have to be done by the legislature, not by this court.
Consequently we have no alternative but •to hold that § 5, Ch. 39, must yield to the supreme law of the land, which is the United States Constitution and the valid laws of the United States made in pur.suance thereof. We advise that the answer 'to reserved question “a” as restated by ■question number one is “yes.”
Because of that answer we find it unnecessary to undertake to answer question “b.”
The answer to question “c” as restated by question number two presents the question ■of whether § 5 may be deleted from Ch. 39 without invalidating the act in its entirety.
While it is true that the act fails to contain a provision commonly called a “separability clause,” that is of no great importance. Such a clause accomplishes little ■more than to direct special attention to .applicable legal principles. Hanson v. Town of Greybull, 63 Wyo. 467, 183 P.2d 393, 399-400. In this jurisdiction we have consistently followed the rule that if the •offending provisions of a statute are distinct and are not inseparably entangled with the remaining provisions of the act, and it also reasonably appears that the legislature would have passed the act with■out the offending provisions, the valid portions will be left to stand, provided the remainder is sufficiently complete to accomplish the purpose of the act. The paramount consideration is legislative intent. Addison v. Fleenor, 65 Wyo. 119, 196 P.2d 991, 993; Hanson v. Town of Greyhull, supra, at 183 P.2d 399; State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 639. Just recently we pointed out that even with respect to penal provisions if a part of the penalty prescribed goes beyond the powers of the legislative body, such portion may be severed without declaring the remaining provisions invalid. City of Rawlins v. Frontier Refining Company, Wyo., 396 P.2d 740, 746.
With the foregoing in mind we examine the act to ascertain, if possible, the legislative intent. Turning first to the title set forth above, it will be noted that it clearly and specifically states the purposes intended to be accomplished. It provides in part that “employment shall not be conditional upon membership or non-membership in, nor upon the payment or non-payment of money to, a labor organization.” Reference to §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the act readily discloses that the sections deal fully with the conditions of employment enumerated in the title and furthermore arc in keeping with the provisions of § 14(b), Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 164(b), 29 U.S.C. (1958), as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The efficacy of the sections to serve the stated public purpose of the act will in no way be jeopardized or diminished by deletion of § 5. Neither do we think that the deletion would be disruptive of the indicated legislative intent to establish for this state the “attitudes and philosophies on the subject” of labor relations, insofar as that might be done under § 14(b). Retail Clerks Intl. Assoc., Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct. 219, 223, 11 L.Ed.2d 179. The fact that in carrying out the intent the legislature flexed a bit of muscle does not make separability insurmountable or unwise. As we said in Hanson v. Town of Greybull, supra, at 183 P.2d 399:
“ * * * where more is done than legally could be done, that portion of the statute for which there is authority can be held operative and valid and the law held void as to the residue. * ⅜ *»
We are disposed to believe that had the legislature’s attention been called to the usurpation of power contained in § 5, it [538]*538would have removed it from the act and enacted the remainder.
Also, we would point out that the burden of establishing' that the act was meant to be indivisible is upon the parties attacking the statute. Bell v. Gray, Wyo., 377 P.2d 924, 926; Steffey v. City of Casper, Wyo., 357 P.2d 456, 469, rehearing 358 P.2d 951. We find nothing in the record from which it can be said that plaintiffs have met the burden.
We therefore advise that the answer to reserved question "c” as restated by question number two is "no.”
The cause will be remanded to the district court for such proceedings as may be advised.