Lliguicota v. Diamond Nail Salon, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJanuary 5, 2024
Docket3:19-cv-02017
StatusUnknown

This text of Lliguicota v. Diamond Nail Salon, LLC (Lliguicota v. Diamond Nail Salon, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lliguicota v. Diamond Nail Salon, LLC, (D. Conn. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

MARIA OLGA LLIGUICOTA, Plaintiff,

v. No. 3:19-cv-02017 (VAB)

DIAMOND NAIL SALON, LLC., et al., Defendants.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Maria Olga Lliguicota (“Plaintiff”), having prevailed at trial, moves for attorney’s fees and costs for her counsel, Troy Law, PLLC (“Troy Law”), in this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) action. For the following reasons, Troy Law’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. I. Factual and Procedural Background The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the case and will only summarize the facts relevant to the issue of attorneys’ fees. Troy Law represented Lliguicota and Shangming Lu in a FLSA class action against the employer Diamond Nail Salon, LLC (“Defendant”). See Complaint, ECF No. 1 (Dec. 29, 2019). On or around April 14, 2021, the defendant attempted to enter into a settlement with Lu without Troy Law’s knowledge. See Notice of Pro Se Appearance by Shangming Lu, ECF No. 63 (Apr. 14, 2021). On May 11, 2021, Defendants filed a motion seeking to enforce that settlement. Plaintiff’s counsel filed an opposition to this motion on June 1, 2021. See Motion for Settlement, ECF No. 68 (May 11, 2021). On June 6, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as to Lu. See Motion to

Withdraw Except for Purposes of Fee Resolution and Setting a Charging Lien as to Plaintiff Shangming Lu, ECF No. 70 (June 2, 2021). On February 2, 2022, the Court granted, in part, the motion the withdraw. See Order, ECF No. 145 (Feb. 2, 2022). After initially denying the motion to approve settlement, see Order, ECF No. 72 (June 18, 2021), then U.S. District Judge Sarah A.L. Merriam approved the settlement as to Lu’s claims on March 28, 2022. See Order, ECF No. 170 (Mar. 28, 2022). Lliguicota proceeded to a jury trial on her claims, one held in March 2023. See Minute Entry, ECF No. 243 (Mar. 20, 2023); Minute Entry, ECF No. 244 (Mar. 21, 2023). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, see Jury Verdict, ECF No. 247 (Mar. 22, 2023), and judgement was entered in the amount of $29,977.80 for Lliguicota. See

Judgement entered in favor of Maria Olga Lliguicota, ECF No. 250 (Mar. 23, 2023). On April 5, 2023, Plaintiff moved for Attorney Fees and Costs requesting a total for $77,974.83 in fees and costs. See Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, ECF No. 256 (Apr. 5, 2023); Affidavit re Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, ECF No. 257 (Apr. 5, 2023) (“Decl.”); Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 258 (Apr. 5, 2023) (“Mem.”). On April 19, 2023, Defendant filed their objection. See Objection re Motion for Cost and Fee, ECF No. 260 (Apr. 19, 2023) (“Obj.”). II. DISCUSSION A. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (“CMWA”), successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover “reasonable” attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. §

216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action”); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-68 (“employee shall recover, in a civil action, [. . .] costs and such reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court”). Connecticut courts define the “prevailing party” as the one in whose favor the judgement is entered. Russell v. Russell, 882 A.2d 98, 107 (Conn. 2005) (“Our Supreme Court and this court [. . .] repeatedly have cited favorably the following definition of a prevailing party: ‘[A] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded’”) (quoting Frillici v. Westport, 823 A.2d 1172, 1184 (Conn. 2003); Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard’s Dairy, 780 A.2d 916, 919 (Conn. 2001).

Even “if [a] party obtains judgment on even a fraction of the claims advanced, or is awarded only nominal damages, the party may nevertheless be regarded as the ‘prevailing party.’” Simms v. Chaisson, 890 A.2d 548, 552 (Conn. 2006) (quoting Russell, 882 A.2d at 107). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has stated, that “it is difficult to see why one who has secured a judgment of the court in his favor should not be viewed as a party who has prevailed in the action in question, irrespective of the route by which he received that judgment[.]” Wallerstein, 780 A.2d at 919. Here, Plaintiff argues they prevailed at trial when the jury entered a judgement in their favor. See Judgement entered in favor of Maria Olga Lliguicota, ECF No. 250 (Mar. 23, 2023). The Court agrees. Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiff is the prevailing party and entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. B. Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Second Circuit modified its traditional “lodestar” approach for a “presumptively reasonable fee” determination. McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In Arbor Hill,1 this Court proposed the use of a modified version of the lodestar approach and recommended abandonment of the term ‘lodestar’ for the alternative term ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’ In brief, the Court suggested that a district court’s efforts to approximate the reasonable fee that a competitive market would bear—the implicit goal of the lodestar approach—would be better served by considering case-specific ‘reasonableness’ factors earlier in the calculation.”) (citation omitted). In applying the presumptively-reasonable-fee standard; the district court is to multiply the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See McDaniel v. Cty. of Schnectady, 595

F.3d at 417 n.2. To do so, a district court “engage[s] in a four-step process: (1) determine the reasonable hourly rate; (2) determine the number of hours reasonably expended; (3) multiply the two to calculate the presumptively reasonable fee; and (4) make any appropriate adjustments to arrive at the final fee award.” Silver v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., No. 3:09-cv-912 (PCD), 2010 WL 5140851, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2010). A district court must also consider the factors outlined in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty of Albany, 522 F.3d

1 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2008) (reciting the twelve Johnson factors, including, inter alia, “the time and labor required” and “whether the fee is fixed or contingent”). Plaintiff argues that their application for attorneys’ fee is reasonable based upon reasonable hours worked and reasonable hourly rates. Mem. at 2. They argue that the product of

their rate and hours is the lodestar and that the lodestar does not need to be proportional to damages recovered. Id.

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Related

Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority
575 F.3d 170 (Second Circuit, 2009)
McDaniel v. County of Schenectady
595 F.3d 411 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Simms v. Chaisson
890 A.2d 548 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2006)
Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard's Dairy
780 A.2d 916 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2001)
Frillici v. Town of Westport
823 A.2d 1172 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2003)
Russell v. Russell
882 A.2d 98 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2005)
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.
488 F.2d 714 (Fifth Circuit, 1974)

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Lliguicota v. Diamond Nail Salon, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lliguicota-v-diamond-nail-salon-llc-ctd-2024.