Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves

105 So. 3d 683, 2012 La. LEXIS 3267, 2012 WL 6015585
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided December 4, 2012·No. No. 2012-C-0232·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

WEIMER, Justice.

|,The issue in this matter is whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. The resolution of this issue requires inquiry into the differences in the manner in which sheriffs’ offices were funded prior to and after the passage of 1976 La. Acts 689. Harmonizing and reconciling the various provisions of the legislation in question, we conclude that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriffs office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs1 are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those |2taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2003, the Livingston Parish Council on Aging (Council), a non-profit corporation serving the needs of the elderly in Livingston Parish, adopted a resolution authorizing an election to establish a two-millage property tax for a 10-year period. These taxes were to be used by the Council to pay the costs of programs for the elderly. The millage proposition was passed by a majority vote of the parish’s electorate. In 2004, the Sheriff of Livingston Parish (Sheriff) began collecting the property tax on the Council’s behalf, deducting a commission equal to 12 percent of the ad valorem taxes collected.

In 2010, the Council filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Sheriff, seeking a judgment declaring the Sheriffs deduction of a commission from the property tax collected on the Council’s behalf to be improper and ordering the Sheriff to remit the commissions that had been withheld by him. Finding the Sheriffs deduction of a commission to be improper, the trial court ordered all commissions or fees collected by the Sheriff since December 2004 in connection with the Council’s two-millage assessment be returned to the Council. The court further prohibited the Sheriff from deducting or collecting commissions or fees on future millage assessments to which the Council is entitled.

After reviewing the statutory provisions related to the financing of the office of the sheriff and the sheriffs general fund,2 the [685]*685appellate court reversed the trial | acourt’s judgment. Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Willie Graves, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, 11-0787 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/21/11) (unpublished). The reversal was based on a finding that former La. R.S. 33:9008 (now La. R.S. 13:5903) is inapplicable to the Council’s assessment that was approved by the voters after the Sheriffs initial millage was fixed in 1977. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the Sheriff was acting within the authority vested in him by former La. R.S. 33:1423(0 (now La. R.S. 13:5523(0) m deducting a commission from the ad valo-rem taxes imposed for the Council’s benefit beginning in 2004.

The Council’s writ application to this court was granted for consideration of whether the Sheriff had acted within his statutory authority in deducting a commission fee in connection with the Council’s two-millage assessment. See Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Willie Graves, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, 12-0232 (La.4/20/12), 85 So.3d 1279.

DISCUSSION

In 1976, legislation was passed that modified the method in which the office of the sheriff was funded. See 1976 La. Acts, 689 (Act 689). That legislation amended former La. R.S. 33:1421 and 1423 (now La. R.S. 13:5521 and 5523 respectively)3 and added former La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008 (now La. R.S. 13:5901 through 5911).

The function of statutory interpretation and the construction to be given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. Red Stick Studio Development, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dept, of Economic Development, 10-0193 (La.1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187-88, quoting M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Id. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent, as well as the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. See Id.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-0439 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Words and phrases shall be read in their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. Id. When the wording of a section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. La. R.S. 1:4. Unless otherwise specifically provided therein, all laws or parts of laws in conflict with a provision of a law subsequently enacted by the legislature are repealed by the law subsequently enacted. La. R.S. 24:176(A).

When the meaning of a statute cannot be ascertained by the application of the provisions of La. R.S. 1:3, et seq., the court shall consider the intent of the legislature as best evidenced by the text of a law. See La. R.S. 24:177(A) and (B)(1). The occasion and necessity for the law, the circumstances under which it was enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and eontempo-[686]*686raneous legislative history may also be considered in determining legislative intent. La. R.S. 24:177(B)(2)(a). The legislature is presumed to have enacted an article or statute in light of the preceding law involving the same subject matter and court decisions construing those articles or statutes, and where the new article or statute is worded differently from the | ¡¡preceding law, the legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law. La. R.S. 24:177(C).

To fully understand the impact of the 1976 legislation on the funding of sheriffs’ offices, we examine the applicable laws in this area as they existed prior to and after the 1976 changes.4 At the time the legislature considered the proposed legislation, sheriffs’ offices were funded based on the number of state representatives serving a parish (the representative allowance) and by commissions deducted on taxes collected on behalf of taxing authorities as provided in La. R.S. 33:1423. After the enactment of subsection E in 1966, La. R.S. 33:1423 provided:5

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Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves, 105 So. 3d 683, 2012 La. LEXIS 3267, 2012 WL 6015585 (La. 2012).

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