Liverpool v. The City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 13, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-04629·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTON LIVERPOOL, Plaintiff, 20-CV-4629 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Rhode Island, brings this action pro se, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that on March 23, 2018, he was in a bus operated by the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) that hit the wall of the sally port of the Manhattan Detention Center (MDC), causing him injuries. By order dated June 30, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are from Plaintiff Anton Liverpool’s complaint. On March 23, 2018, Plaintiff was detained at the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC) on Rikers Island. That morning, unknown “John Doe” officers, woke Plaintiff for his court appearance. (Compl. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff protested that he did not want to be transported to court “during a nor’easter” because he “would not been seen.” (Id. at 1¶ 9). The officers told Plaintiff that he would receive a disciplinary infraction if he failed to comply, and he eventually agreed to cooperate and was handcuffed, shackled, and placed on the bus. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20). Officer Surpris, Badge #6065, was driving the DOC bus, and a “John Doe” Officer was assisting him. (Id. at ¶ 21). As Officer Surpris arrived at MDC, at 125 White Street, in

Manhattan, he accelerated, and the bus hit “the structure of the building.” (Id.) Plaintiff suffered injuries to his head, back, and neck, particularly in areas where he was still recovering from a prior bus accident. (Id. at ¶ 23-24). Four officers at MDC failed to “maintain a safe port of entrance.” (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiff sues Officer Surpris, the City of New York, a “John Doe” Officer, and numerous supervisory officials (AMKC’s Acting Deputy Warden of Security, Acting Warden, and John Doe Intake Supervisor; MDC’s Acting Deputy Warden of Security, Acting Intake Area Supervisor (Captain), Acting Supervisor of Transportation, Acting Warden, and Acting Watch/Tour Supervising Command; the “Acting Supervisor of Transportation of Rikers Island” and “Acting Watch/Tour Command of Rikers Island”). He seeks damages for the injuries that he

suffered in the bus accident. DISCUSSION A. Claims Under Federal Law The negligence of a correction official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional deprivation under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). A commonplace vehicle accident may be actionable as a tort claim for negligence under state law, see Carrasquillo v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 2d 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), but such an event is not ordinarily the basis for a claim of a federal constitutional deprivation. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[M]ere negligence is insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim under section 1983.”); Carrasquillo, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (“Auto accidents do not, in and of themselves, give rise to federal causes of action.”). Generally, “[a]llegations of a public official driving too fast . . . are grounded in negligence” and are not actionable under Section 1983.” Cuffee v. City of New York, No. 15-CV- 8916 (PGG) (DF), 2017 WL 1134768, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017).

To establish a due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution under § 1983, an inmate must show that a government official made a deliberate decision to deprive him of his life, liberty, or property. See Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (relying on Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (1986)).

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