Liverpool v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 7, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-05527
StatusUnknown

This text of Liverpool v. The City of New York (Liverpool v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liverpool v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTON F. LIVERPOOL, Plaintiff, -against- THE CITY OF NEW YORK; SHILO DRUG AND THERAPEUTIC COUNSELING 1:19-CV-5527 (CM) PROGRAM; DR. JACKSON, DIRECTOR ORDER TO AMEND AND HEAD PSYCHIATRIST CLINICIAN OF SHILO THERAPEUTIC PROGRAM; PAROLE OFFICER JOHN DOE #1; SHILO STAFF JOHN DOE #2; SHILO STAFF JANE DOE, et al., Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Anthony P. Travisono Intake Service Center in Rhode Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated July 18, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions

from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Named as Defendants are the Shilo Drug and Therapeutic Counseling Program (Shilo), Shilo Director and Head Psychiatrist Dr. Jackson, and two Doe Shilo staff members (Shilo Defendants); a John Doe parole officer; the City of New York; Brooklyn Legal Services attorney Alicia Briody; Queens Legal Aid Society employee Jane Doe #3; and Brooklyn Defender Service attorney Jane Doe #4. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 12-14.) The complaint contains the following allegations. In June or July 2016, Plaintiff was released “from the courts of Queens County NY and the Department of Corrections” to Shilo. (Id. ¶ 16.) After an intake with his assigned counselor, Parole Officer John Doe “inappropriately fondled” Plaintiff’s buttocks. According to Plaintiff, he reported the incident to Defendants, but none of them took any action to ensure his safety at Shilo. (Id. ¶ 22). According to Plaintiff, Shilo employees John Doe #2 and Jane Doe #1 told Plaintiff to “just leave it alone.” (Id. ¶ 18.). Plaintiff claims that the Shilo Defendants, in failing to act on his complaint, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, and were

negligent in providing mental health treatment. He further states that his attorneys were “indifferent” to his allegations and “failed to mitigate” the harm to him “through the court’s system.” (Id. ¶¶ 19-29.) DISCUSSION A. Parole Officer Plaintiff’s allegation that a John Doe parole officer groped him could state a claim under § 1983. But Plaintiff does not provide enough information for the parole officer’s identity to be ascertained. Moreover, Plaintiff has not established the parole officer’s connection to Shilo. For example, it is not completely clear that the groping incident occurred at Shilo, or what relationship, if any, the parole officer had with Shilo. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that provides more facts about the incident, the parole officer, and his

relationship to Shilo. B. Shilo Defendants To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor”; (2) violated a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Shilo appears to be a private treatment facility, not a state actor. If that is the case, Shilo and its employees are not state actors. A private entity’s activity can be attributed to the government in three situations: (1) the entity acts using the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state (the “compulsion test”); (2) the entity willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its functions are entwined with state policies (the “joint action” or “close

nexus” test); or (3) the state has delegated a public function to the entity (the “public function” test). Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). The fundamental question under each test is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are “fairly attributable” to the government. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). Plaintiff asserts that he was released from DOC custody to Shilo. But even if Plaintiff was required to participate in an inpatient treatment program as an alternative to incarceration, he has not plausibly alleged that the Shilo Defendants are state actors who would be subject to liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Phoenix House Programs of New York, No. ECF 1:14- CV-3918 (RA), 2015 WL 5671902, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015) (“That Plaintiff opted to

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Bluebook (online)
Liverpool v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liverpool-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2019.