Little Rock School District v. Judith Hart

2025 Ark. App. 529

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 529 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-24-559

LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT Opinion Delivered November 5, 2025

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH V. DIVISION [NO. 60CV-20-4812] JUDITH HART APPELLEE HONORABLE LATONYA HONORABLE, JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Little Rock School District (LRSD) appeals from a Pulaski County Circuit Court

order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellee Judith Hart. Essentially,

LRSD argues that (1) a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 is not a

violation of the Teachers’ Fair Dismissal Act (TFDA);1 (2) LRSD’s 5 percent threshold for

triggering reduction-in-force procedures is valid and enforceable; (3) LRSD did not violate

the TFDA; and (4) LRSD had “just and reasonable cause” to not renew Hart’s contract for

the 2020–2021 school year. We reverse and dismiss in part and reverse and remand in part.

1 The parties’ arguments concern the TFDA, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1501 to -1510 (Repl. 2021). The TDFA was in effect at all times relevant to this case although it has since been replaced by the LEARNS Act. I. Background

Hart was a teacher at McClellan High School in LRSD during the 2019–2020 school

year. During that time, LRSD was under control of the Arkansas Department of Education

because the LRSD School Board had been stripped of its powers by the Arkansas State Board

of Education. The secretary of the Arkansas Department of Education, Johnny Key, was

acting in the place of LRSD’s School Board. Secretary Key established a Community

Advisory Board to hold hearings and make recommendations to him on any teacher

contracts that would be nonrenewed.

On January 8, 2020, LRSD adopted a “Reorganization Resolution” that stated, “[I]n

order to comply with the recent directive of the Arkansas State Board of Education regarding

the reorganization of Hall High School” and “to treat all employees at the impacted schools

in the same way,” all positions at McClellan and J.A. Fair High Schools, in addition to those

vacated by the Arkansas State Board of Education at Hall High School, would be “declared

vacant.” The Reorganization Resolution noted that employees whose positions were vacated

would have the opportunity to apply for open positions at Hall High School and the new

Southwest High School. The Reorganization Resolution also alerted employees that “LRSD

expects to employ fewer teachers, building administrators and support staff in the 2020–

2021 school year,” so “teachers, building administrators and support staff who do not secure

an open position could receive a recommendation for nonrenewal.”

Hart has been a licensed teacher in the State of Arkansas since 1980. She had worked

as a teacher and a guidance counselor for the district since 1986. On May 24, 2019, Hart

2 signed an employment contract for the 2019–2020 school year. The parties do not contest

that Hart was a nonprobationary employee. Following the Reorganization Resolution, Hart

applied for roughly twenty positions that she met the qualifications to fill, but she never

received a single interview. She did not secure a position,2 and it was recommended that

Hart’s contract not be renewed for the 2020–2021 school year. On June 10, 2020, Hart

participated in a hearing in front of the LRSD Advisory Board. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the LRSD Advisory Board unanimously upheld the nonrenewal of Hart’s contract.

On December 13, 2021, Hart filed an amended complaint against LRSD alleging that

her nonrenewal violated the TFDA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the

Arkansas Age Discrimination Act. On December 17, 2021, Hart moved for partial summary

judgment with respect to the TFDA and reduction-in-force-policy issues. On December 21,

2021, LRSD filed a response to Hart’s motion for partial summary judgment and a

countermotion for summary judgment. On July 29, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing

on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. After ruling from the bench, the circuit

court filed a written order in which it granted Hart’s motion and found that LRSD’s

reduction-in-force policy did not comply with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-

2407 (Repl. 2021) and that LRSD had not acted in accordance with the TFDA and its own

policy; accordingly, the circuit court found Hart’s nonrenewal void since her dismissal was

2 It is not clear from the record why she did not secure a position.

3 not “unavoidable.” Following this, Hart dismissed her age-discrimination claims pursuant to

Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a).

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material

fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baker v.

Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 593, 534 S.W.3d 742. Ordinarily, upon reviewing a circuit court’s

decision on a summary-judgment motion, this court would examine the record to determine

whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. However, when the parties agree on the

facts, this court simply determines whether the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id. In the instant case, the parties have stipulated to the underlying facts surrounding

the case. As to issues of law presented, this court’s standard of review is de novo. Id.

This court’s rules regarding statutory construction are clear and well established. We

review issues of statutory construction de novo because it is for this court to decide what a

statute means. Burkett v. Exxon Tiger Mart, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 93, at 4, 304 S.W.3d 2, 5.

However, this court will accept a circuit court’s interpretation of the law unless it is shown

that the court’s interpretation was in error. Cockrell v. Union Planters Bank, 359 Ark. 8, 194

S.W.3d 178 (2004). The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent

of the legislature. Rodgers v. Ark. Parole Bd., 2024 Ark. 176, 700 S.W.3d 876. We first construe

a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in

common language. Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146, 489 S.W.3d 162. When the language

of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no

4 need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Pillow v. Dir., 2024 Ark. App. 76, 684

S.W.3d 302.

Our standard of review in matters involving the TFDA is limited to whether the

circuit court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Kasinger v. E. End Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs.,

2011 Ark. App. 595, 385 S.W.3d 885. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm

conviction that an error has been made. Id. Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility

are within the province of the fact-finder. Id. Whether a school district has complied with

the TFDA, however, is a question of law. Id. A circuit court’s conclusions on a question of

law will be given no weight on appeal. Id.

III. LRSD’s Reduction-in-Force Policy and the TFDA

As a preliminary matter, LRSD makes, for the first time on appeal, the novel

argument that Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 is an “unrelated statute” to the

TFDA.3 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must object at the first opportunity and

obtain a ruling from the circuit court. Stell v. Stell, 2021 Ark. App. 478, at 2, 638 S.W.3d

855, 857. We will not review a matter on which the circuit court has not ruled, and the

burden of obtaining a ruling is on the movant; matters left unresolved are waived and may

3 The court notes that the TFDA requires a school district to abide by the school district’s “applicable personnel policies.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1503(c). Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 mandates that each school district shall have a written policy on reduction in force based upon criteria for a layoff and recall of employees. Accordingly, while Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 is not technically a part of the TFDA, a violation of section 6-17-2407 violates the TFDA.

5 not be raised on appeal. Id. LRSD did not raise this issue below at any point. Accordingly,

this argument was not preserved for appeal, and we do not address it now. See Dicholkar v.

McMillon, 2024 Ark. App. 155, at 17, 686 S.W.3d 542, 553.

Likewise, the circuit court noted that LRSD performed a “layoff” because Hart’s

nonrenewal was not “unavoidable.” Hart concedes in her brief that any reduction was

unavoidable: “It is uncontroverted in the record that . . . LRSD experienced an unavoidable

reduction in workforce.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, Hart has abandoned the argument

that LRSD performed a layoff. See DePriest v. AstraZeneca Pharms., L.P., 2009 Ark. 547, 351

S.W.3d 168 (finding that arguments not made on appeal are considered abandoned.).

As to LRSD’s reduction-in-force policy, we faced a nearly identical issue in Overton v.

Little Rock School District, 2025 Ark. App. 123, at 6–7, 708 S.W.3d 813, 816–17. In Overton,

an assistant principal with Hall High School during the 2019–2020 school year failed to

obtain an open position within the district during the same Reorganization Resolution. Like

Hart, Overton argued that LRSD’s reduction-in-force policy was contradictory to the TFDA

and requested that her nonrenewal be found void. In that case, we held:

Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 requires a school district to have a written policy on reduction in force based on the criteria listed in the statute. The statute does not prohibit the use of a threshold number to trigger reduction-in-force policies. Arkansas precedent is clear regarding a school board’s broad authority to determine its policies. See Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 12–13, 643 S.W.3d 763[, 772]. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. v. Lewis, 2017 Ark. App. 264, 521 S.W.3d 142. Therefore, considering this precedent and the clear and unambiguous language contained

6 in the statute, we conclude LRSD complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-2407.

Overton, 2025 Ark. App. 123, at 6–7, 708 S.W.3d at 817. We again confirm that LRSD’s

reduction-in-force policy was valid and enforceable, and it did not conflict with Arkansas

Code Annotated section 6-17-2407.

Next, LRSD argues that a reduction in force never occurred; thus, LRSD did not

violate its policy. In response, Hart argues both that a reduction in force occurred and that

LRSD violated the TFDA by failing to follow its own policy. For the reasons previously stated,

LRSD’s policy states that a reduction in force is not triggered until 5 percent of the affected

population is reached. It is undisputed that LRSD lost only thirty teachers between the

2019–2020 and the 2020–2021 school years, despite anticipating that it may lose as many as

ninety-four teachers. Regardless, both the projected loss and the actual loss were well below

the LRSD’s 5 percent threshold. There can be no violation of LRSD’s reduction-in-force

policy when a reduction in force does not occur. Overton, 2025 Ark. App. 123, at 7, 708

S.W.3d at 817.

IV. Nonrenewal of Hart’s Contract

Finally, LRSD argues that it had good cause for not renewing Hart’s contract, despite

her position as a nonprobationary teacher. Under the TFDA, a teacher who achieved

nonprobationary status could be terminated or have her contract not renewed only when

[t]here is a reduction in force created by districtwide reduction in licensed personnel, for incompetent performance, conduct which materially interferes with the continued performance of the teacher's duties, repeated or material neglect of duty, or other just and reasonable cause.

7 Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1510(b). In the instant case, we have already determined that there

has not been a reduction in force; accordingly, LRSD’s argument that a reduction in force is

a legitimate basis for nonrenewal of Hart’s contract fails. Furthermore, LRSD does not allege

that Hart performed incompetently, neglected her duties, or conducted herself in such a way

that interfered with her continued performance. Accordingly, LRSD could elect not to renew

her contract only if there was “other just and reasonable cause.”

LRSD argues that absent a finding that the LRSD Community Advisory Board (the

Board) abused its discretion, the circuit court could not override the Board. Again, this

argument was not raised below. Accordingly, this argument was not preserved for appeal,

and we do not address it now. See Dicholkar, 2024 Ark. App. 155, at 17, 686 S.W.3d at 553.

The circuit court declared LRSD’s nonrenewal of Hart’s contract as void because

LRSD did not substantially comply with the TFDA and LRSD’s applicable personnel policies

pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407. As this court has previously stated,

LRSD did not fail to comply with the TFDA or LRSD’s reduction-in-force policy. Therefore,

the circuit court clearly erred on this point.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand on this claim for further determination as to

whether LRSD had “just and reasonable” cause to not renew Hart’s contract. See Mattox v.

Mountain Home Sch. Dist., 2024 Ark. App. 303, at 15–16, 689 S.W.3d 453, 462 (reversing

and remanding upon finding that the circuit court erred in its initial determination).

8 V. Conclusion

We reverse and dismiss the claim that LRSD’s 5 percent threshold conflicted with

the TFDA. We further reverse and dismiss the claim that LRSD failed to abide by its

reduction-in-force policy. Finally, we reverse and remand on the final claim and direct the

circuit court to determine whether Hart’s nonrenewal was for just and good cause.

Reversed and dismissed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

VIRDEN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Christopher Heller, for appellant.

Mitchell, Blackstock, Wright & Alagood, PLLC, by: Michael Muskheli, for appellee.