Lisco v. Love

219 F. Supp. 922, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7957
District Court, D. Colorado·Decided July 16, 1963·No. Civ. A. 7501, 7637·Published·Cited by 25 cases

Opinions

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated actions attack the apportionment of the membership of the bicameral Colorado legislature. At the 1962 General Election, two initiated constitutional amendments were submitted [924] to the electorate. One, known as Amendment No. 7, provided for a House of Representatives with the membership apportioned on a per capita basis and for a Senate which was not so apportioned. The other, Amendment No. 8, apportioned both chambers on a per capita basis. Amendment No. 7 carried in every county of the state and Amendment No. 8 lost in every county.1 The contest over the conflicting theories presented by these two proposals has now shifted from the political arena to the court. The issue is whether the Federal Constitution requires that each house of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a per capita basis.

The plaintiffs are residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters within the Denver Metropolitan Area. The defendants are various state officials2 and the Colorado General Assembly. The complaints as originally filed on March 28 and July 9, 1962, respectively, challenged the apportionment of legislative membership under the then existing constitutional and statutory provisions. Because the suits presented substantial questions as to the constitutionality of state statutes and sought injunctive relief, a three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The proponents of Amendment No. 7, which had then been submitted to the Colorado Secretary of State for inclusion on the ballot at the 1962 General Election, were permitted to intervene.3

On August 10, 1962, after trial, the court held 4 that it had jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs had capacity to sue, that the evidence established disparities in apportionment “of sufficient magnitude to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination,” and that the defendants-had shown no rational basis for the disparities. The court noted that the aforementioned initiated constitutional' amendments would be on the ballot at the ensuing General Election, declined to-enjoin the forthcoming primary election and to devise a plan of apportionment, and continued the cases until after the-General Election. Following the approval by the electorate of Amendment No. 7, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to assert that Amendment No. T violates the Fourteenth Amendment to-the United States Constitution by apportioning the Senate on a basis other than population and that, as the provisions of Amendment No. 7 are not sever-able, the entire amendment is invalid.. In answering the amended complaints, the defendants renewed their jurisdictional objections and asserted the constitutionality of Amendment No. 7.

We are convinced that the allegations of the complaints are sufficient, to establish federal jurisdiction under 28-U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the plaintiffs have standing to sue.5 The relief sought is a declaration that Amendment No. 7 is void, that the theretofore existing statutory apportionment is void, and that the court fashion appropriate injunctive relief to assure equality in voting rights. Although the prime attack is now against a provision of the state constitution rather than a state statute, the necessity of adjudication by a three-judge district court is still pres-; ent.6

The Colorado legislature met in January, 1963, and passed a statute, H.B. No. 65, implementing Amendment No. 7. [925] No question is raised concerning the implementing legislation.

Amendment No. 7 7 created a General Assembly composed of a Senate of 39 members and a House of Representatives of 65 members. The state is divided into 65 representative districts “which shall be as nearly equal in population as may be” with one representative to be elected from each district. The state is also divided into 39 senatorial districts, 14 of which include more than one county. In counties apportioned more than one senator, senatorial districts are provided which “shall be as nearly equal in population as may be.” Mandatory provisions require the revision of representative districts and of senatorial districts within counties apportioned more than one senator after each Federal Census.

The defeated Amendment No. 8 8 proposed a three-man commission to apportion the legislature periodically. The commission was to have the duty of delineating, revising and adjusting senatorial and representative districts. Its actions were to be reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court. The districting was to be on a strict population ratio for both the Senate and the House with limited permissible variations therefrom.

The record presents no dispute over the material and pertinent facts. The parties disagree as to the conclusions to be drawn from these facts. The plaintiffs rely entirely on statistics said to show that population disparities among the senatorial districts result in over-representation of rural areas. The defendants and intervenors assert that the senatorial districts, and the apportionment of senators thereto, have a rational basis and violate no provisions of the Federal Constitution.

The prime position of the plaintiffs is that representation in proportion to population is the fundamental standard commanded by the Federal Constitution. They say that this standard requires that each house must be made up of members representing substantially the same number of people.

The principle of equal weight for each vote is satisfied by a system under which all members of the legislature are elected at large. Such system would result in absolute majority rule and would effectively deny representation to minority interests. Although it would assure no dilution of the weight of any individual’s vote, it presents the danger of dilution of the representative and deliberative quality of a legislature because of the practical difficulties of intelligent choice by the voters and because of the hazard of one-party domination.

The disadvantages of elections at large are overcome by the principle of districting. This principle provides representation to interests which otherwise would be submerged by the majorities in larger groups of voters.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7957 (D. Colo. 1963).

219 F. Supp. 922 (Lisco v. Love) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In Re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly
647 P.2d 191 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1982)
Don Gillette v. William McNichols
517 F.2d 888 (Tenth Circuit, 1975)
Westbrook v. Mihaly
471 P.2d 487 (California Supreme Court, 1970)
Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri
279 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Missouri, 1968)
Silver v. Jordan
241 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. California, 1965)
Reynolds v. Sims
377 U.S. 533 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Guntert v. Richardson
394 P.2d 444 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1964)
Butterworth v. Dempsey
229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Connecticut, 1964)
Marshall v. Hare
227 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Michigan, 1964)
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado
377 U.S. 713 (Supreme Court, 1964)
In Re Apportionment of State Legislature—1964
126 N.W.2d 731 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1964)
Baker v. Carr
222 F. Supp. 684 (M.D. Tennessee, 1963)
Moss v. Burkhart
220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1963)
Lisco v. Love
219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colorado, 1963)