Moss v. Burkhart

220 F. Supp. 149, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10317
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 17, 1963
DocketCiv. 9130
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 220 F. Supp. 149 (Moss v. Burkhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10317 (W.D. Okla. 1963).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This matter came on for further hearing on March 8, 1963, pursuant to Order of August 3, 1962, 207 F.Supp. 885. The plaintiff Moss, appeared by his attorney, Mr. Sid White. Mr. Norman Reynolds, who represented the Governor when these proceedings were commenced, appeared pro se and with Mr. G. T. Sprad-ling, attorney for the Council Of Democratic Neighborhood Clubs. Mr. Delmer Stagner, who represented Mr. William-Burkhart, State Treasurer, when these-proceedings were commenced, appeared for Mr. Burkhart, individually, as an-intervening plaintiff. Mr. Charles Nes-bitt, Attorney General, who has succeeded to office since the August hearing,, and his First Assistant, Mr. W. J. Monroe, appeared representing the present. State Treasurer, Cowboy “Pink” Williams, substitute defendant for Mr. Burkhart; Mr. S. F. Shaw, State Auditor, substitute defendant for Mr. Andy Anderson; the members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission, who were original defendants and now compose the-Commission; and, the present members, of the State Election Board, substitute' defendants for the original defendant members. The present Governor of the-State, who succeeded to his office since' the commencement of the proceedings* did not appear in person or by counsel'. His predecessor having been made a party, and having participated in the proceedings, the present Governor is automatically substituted as a party, upon succession to the office. The intervening: State Senators and the parties intervening as Oklahomans For Local Government, appeared by their attorneys,. Mr. James Rinehart, Senator Walt Allen,. Mr. Leon Hirsh, and Mr. James C. Har-kin. Mr. Frank Carter appeared for the-Oklahoma Farm Bureau and Mr. Lewis-H. Munn. Mr. Richard McGee was allowed to intervene for Mrs. Phyllis P-Brodski, a taxpayer and registered voter. Mr. Tom Tate appeared, as a member of the House of Representatives, and" filed a Memorandum. Mr. U. Simpson. Tate appeared as attorney for A. Willie-James, J. W. Simmons, J. W. Tyler and". Amos T. Hall, as interested parties, and, has filed Requested Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law. The Congress. Of Parents And Teachers, and The.League Of Women Voters filed separate? *151 briefs amicus curiae, in support of their respective plans for reapportionment.

Pursuant to the August, 1962 hearing, ■on Motion of the intervening Senators and Oklahomans For Local Government, to alter and amend the interlocutory decree of June 19, 1962, the Court did clarify the decree to apply to the elections of 1964 and all future elections following the 1962 election, which was then in being. Upon consideration of the remedies urged upon the Court at the August hearing, for redress of the deprivation or impairment of voting rights, vouchsafed to the plaintiff and his class by the Fourteenth Amendment, the ■Court decided to defer further action to the 1963 general session of the Oklahoma Legislature, to be convened early in the •following January. Further hearing on the remedies to be afforded the aggrieved class, was accordingly passed un"til March 8, 1963.

In the extraordinary circumstances, it was deemed appropriate to promulgate some guidelines or standards which, in the judgment of the Court, would insure ■compliance with the equal protection of the laws, with respect to the exercise of suffrage rights for the election of members of both branches of the Oklahoma Legislature. Consistent with our previously declared fundamental principle of apportionment based on substantial numerical equality, as firmly enunciated in the Oklahoma Constitution, and our concept of the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, we stated that the House of Representatives should be reapportioned in accordance with the mandate of the Oklahoma Constitution, except as to the ceilings established in Section 10(d), Article V for populous counties. As to that, we were of the -view that the arbitrary restrictions thus imposed, were invidiously discriminatory •against the plaintiff and his class, hence, •constitutionally intolerable. We left the matter of forming Legislative Districts ■among the counties, for both the House .and the Senate, to the discretion of the Legislature, subject only to the requirement of the Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to substantial numerical equality and contiguity, “ * * * so that each voter of the state will have approximately the same power and influence in electing members of the two Houses of the Legislature and in shaping legislation, as every other voter.” Jones v. Freeman, Okl., 146 P.2d 564, 567. In that respect, we recommended the Proposed Order And Decree, filed on July 30, 1962, by the then Acting Attorney General, as a practical and helpful guide to the orderly reapportionment for both Houses. See: Price v. Moss; Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. Moss, D.C., 207 F.Supp. 885; Review Denied, 374 U.S. 103, 83 S.Ct. 1687.

Having thus invoked the spirit and intent of the Oklahoma Constitution, as a reliable guide for compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, and having been assured by the leaders of the Oklahoma Legislature, in open Court, that once their constitutional duty was made clear, it would be discharged with befitting honor and fidelity, we withheld any redress for deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights, by the prolonged malap-portionment. We were also mindful of the pendency of an Initiative' Petition, providing for a Constitutional Commission, to reapportion the Legislature in accordance with the Oklahoma Constitution, and the prospects of its submission to the people at the November election.

At the November election, the Initiative Petition did receive an affirmative majority of the total votes cast on the Petition (335,045 to 273,287, or a majority of 61,758). The then Governor proclaimed that it had become law. The Commission created thereunder was constituted, and proceeded to reapportion both houses of the Legislature, in accordance with the Oklahoma Constitution, except only to the extent necessary to comply with the guidelines set out in the August 3, 1962 Order of this Court.

The intervening Senators filed in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, an original action to annul the Initiative Petition, on the ground that it had not received the *152 constitutionally required affirmative vote, and to litigate the identical constitutional issues heretofore presented for decision in this proceedings. On petition of the plaintiff and his class, to enjoin the intervenors from prosecuting the original proceedings in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, we restrained the parties from relitigating the constitutional questions presented here, but deferred to the Oklahoma Court the resolution of the question whether the Initiative Petition had become the law of the State. See: Memorandum Decision Granting Restraining Order, attached as Appendix “A”; Review Denied, Baldwin v. Moss, 374 U.S. 93, 83 S.Ct. 1687, 10 L.Ed.2d 1026. In the State proceedings, the Supreme Court determined that the Initiative Petition “failed of adoption for lack of sufficient affirmative votes.” Allen v. Burkhart, Okl., 377 P.2d 821.

When this cause came on for hearing on March 8, 1963, for further consideration of the remedy to be afforded to the plaintiff and his class, the intervening Senators offered Oklahoma Senate Resolution No. 8 and Enrolled House Bill No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gill v. Whitford
585 U.S. 48 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Texas Attorney General Reports, 2003
Opinion No.
Texas Attorney General Reports, 2003
Egan v. Hammond
502 P.2d 856 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1972)
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Dunn
336 F. Supp. 1219 (M.D. Tennessee, 1972)
Sims v. Amos
336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Alabama, 1972)
Skolnick v. State Electoral Board of Illinois
336 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Illinois, 1971)
Baker v. Carr
247 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Tennessee, 1965)
Schaefer v. Thomson
240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyoming, 1964)
Reynolds v. State Election Board
233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1964)
Guntert v. Richardson
394 P.2d 444 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1964)
Butterworth v. Dempsey
229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Connecticut, 1964)
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors
388 P.2d 888 (California Supreme Court, 1964)
Davis v. McCarty
1964 OK 5 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1964)
Yorty v. Anderson
384 P.2d 417 (California Supreme Court, 1963)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
220 F. Supp. 149, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moss-v-burkhart-okwd-1963.