Lipp v. United States

181 Ct. Cl. 355, 1967 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 139, 1967 WL 8891
United States Court of Claims·Decided October 13, 1967·No. No. 183-66·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This case was referred to Trial Commissioner W. Ney Evans with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for conclusions of law. The commissioner has done so in a report and opinion filed on June 12,1967. Defendant has filed no exceptions to or brief on tliis report and the time for so filing pursuant to the Bules of the court has expired. On July 17, 1967, plaintiff filed a motion that the court adopt the opinion, findings of fact, [358] and recommended conclusion of law, as filed by the commissioner, as the basis for judgment in the case, to which defendant has filed no opposition or response. Since the court agrees with the commissioner’s findings, opinion, and recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case without oral argument. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover, and judgment is entered for plaintiff with the amount of recovery to be determined pursuant to Eule 47(c)(2).

OPINION OP COMMISSIONER*

Evans, Commissioner:

The plaintiff in this case was, at last report (April 25,1966), in the terminal stages of multiple sclerosis, after suffering from the disease for 20 years or more. When his claim was previously before this court, it was denied as time barred. Lipp v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 197, 301 F. 2d 674 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963). It is now before the court under Private Law 89-215, approved March 1, 1966, authorizing waiver of the time bar.1

The findings of fact, initially made 'by the late Commissioner Eobert K. McConnaughey and adopted by the court as reported by him, are now retained, modified only insofar as necessary to update them.

Among the more significant facts established 'by the evidence are these:

(1) Multiple sclerosis is considered incurable.

(2) The diagnosis (identification) of the disease, always difficult, was not confirmed in plaintiff’s case until after his release from the service on January 26, 1946 (in the course of demobilization and not for physical disability).

(3) Medical opinion now unanimously relates the onset of the disease to symptoms known to have existed in 1941 (and possibly in 1940).2

[359] (4) During his military service, plaintiff never sought to be examined for physical disability and never requested an opportunity to appear before an Army Retiring Board.

The diagnosis of multiple sclerosis was confirmed in 1948, and relates back in time as hereinabove indicated. Plaintiff made his first request to appear before a Retiring Board on December 19, 1948. Further requests were made on May 26, 1949, and June 16, 1950. All three requests were denied. Beginning December 1, 1951, plaintiff applied to the Correction Board, and filed additional applications on March 15, 1954, July 10,1957, and July 29,1963 (the latter being after his claim was denied by this court). All of these applications were denied.

Each of the administrative denials listed above turned essentially on findings (1) that plaintiff had the disease prior to entry into the service; (2) that the condition was not aggravated by his service; and (3) that he had made no request for examination for disability prior to his separation.

The rationale of the administrative decisions is set forth in detail in the findings of fact. It reflects a sincere effort to reach sound conclusions that are fair to the officer, while at the same time protecting the integrity of the retirement system.3

However, a shift in emphasis upon what is required to reach sound conclusions in keeping with the integrity of the system results in changing the whole picture, and it is my opinion that the shift in emphasis is required in this case by the facts and the law. I have reference, specifically, to the presumptions (1) of sound physical condition upon entering service and (2) of aggravation by service, and the requirements for rebutting those presumptions. The presumptions and the requirements for rebuttal are set forth in Army regulations,4 and an agency is, of course, bound by its own regulations. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).

The presumption of sound condition upon entering active service obtained (at that time) unless “* * * clear and unmistakable evidence * * * demonstrates that the * * * disease * * * existed prior to * * * active service.” “Medi[360] cal judgment alone, as distinguished from well-established medical principles, will not be considered sufficient to rebut the presumption of * * * sound condition * * Finding 88 notes that “* * * no established medical principle has been shown that compels the conclusion” that plaintiff had multiple sclerosis prior to his entry into service in December 1940. The same finding notes that the record does not contain “clear and unmistakable evidence that demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that he had multiple sclerosis before he entered on active duty in December 1940.”5

In my opinion, plaintiff is entitled, on the facts of the case, to the benefit of the presumption of sound condition upon entering active service.

The record as a whole further supports the acceptance of the January 1941 episode (after plaintiff’s entry into service) as the recognized onset of the disease. Finding 35 relates that “* * * the first physical symptoms * * * are varied, and in themselves subtly ambiguous and inconclusive. More frequently than not they will sustain or assist a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis only when coupled with a subsequent medical history wherein a cumulation of later manifestations lends character, retroactively, to early symptoms which might be attributable to other causes in the absence of the later, more conclusive evidence * * *.” Finding 20 states that “the expert testimony for both parties * * * based upon a cumulation of more recent evidence * * * indicates no dissent from the view that the plaintiff was suffering from multiple sclerosis on January 10,1941.”

Accepting, for the purposes of discussion, the insistence in the administrative findings that the disease existed prior to active service, I would give plaintiff the benefit of the presumption of service-aggravation, since “only specific findings of ‘natural progress’ of the disease * * *, based on well-[361] established medical principles, are able to overcome the presumption of service-aggravated * * (Finding 33(b) g(2).) The last paragraph of finding 40 reads as follows:

In summary, it is impossible to find, among the cautious, conflicting, tentative statements of the authorities, any established principle that would sustain a generalized determination whether environmental factors do or do not aggravate multiple sclerosis. There is no clear or unmistakable evidence that they do or that they do not. There is ample proof that no one really knows.

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Lipp v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 355, 1967 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 139, 1967 WL 8891 (cc 1967).

181 Ct. Cl. 355 (Lipp v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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