Knight v. United States

202 Ct. Cl. 1043
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedAugust 31, 1973
DocketCong. No. 2-71
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 202 Ct. Cl. 1043 (Knight v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knight v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 1043 (cc 1973).

Opinion

By the Review Panel:

H.R. 4473, a “bill conferring jurisdiction upon the United States Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of John T. Knight”, was referred by H. Res. 240, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., approved July 6, 1971, to the Chief Commissioner of the [1045]*1045Court of Claims pursuant to sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28, United States Code, for further proceedings in accordance with applicable law “notwithstanding any statute of limitations pertaining to suits against the United States, or any lapse of time, or bars of laches * * *.”

The Chief Commissioner referred the case to Trial Commissioner C. Murray Bernhardt for proceedings in accordance with the applicable rules and designated the above-named members of the review panel to consider the trial commissioner’s opinion on the reference, the subject matter of which is plaintiff’s claim that his active service in the Army from 'May 1942 to October 1947 aggravated a preexisting deafness and thereby entitled him to disability retirement.

On February 13, 1973, the trial commissioner filed an opinion concluding that as a matter of “equity” plaintiff is entitled to disability retirement pay, less any appropriate off-sets, from and after October 20, 1947, and recommending that the Congress should direct the Comptroller General of the United States to compute and report to it the net amount due plaintiff. Defendant has timely excepted to the trial commissioner’s opinion, while plaintiff embraces that opinion “without reservation.”

The review panel has carefully considered the record, the trial commissioner’s opinion, defendant’s exceptions thereto, and the briefs and oral argument of the parties. Our conclusions in the matter are that plaintiff has no legal claim because of the bar of limitations; that, but for limitations, plaintiff would have a valid legal claim; that, in all the circumstances, waiver of the bar is equitable; and that, accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to Congressional relief.

I. The Terms of the Reference

Any claim plaintiff may have to disability retirement pay is admittedly barred by limitations. Knight v. United States, (order of the court reported in 163 Ct. Cl. 576 (1963)). See also Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 310 F.2d 381 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963); Lipp v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 197, 301 F.2d 674 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963).

[1046]*1046Plaintiff urges that the review panel “need not even concern itself with the Statute of Limitations or Laches”, since the House of Representatives “had obviously considered these points and decided them in favor of plaintiff.”1 We disagree.

The “notwithstanding” clause in H. Res. 240 was intended, not as a direction to disregard any portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2509, but rather to insure that the Chief Commissioner’s report to the House of Representatives included findings and conclusions on the merits of the matter, not simply a finding that limitations is a bar.

The reference and its legislative history make it quite clear that, whatever conclusions might be reached as to delay, laches, limitations, or exhaustion of remedies, the House of Representatives intended that the Chief Commissioner’s report to it should also encompass the question whether, apart from such considerations, plaintiff’s “demand is a legal or equitable claim or a gratuity * *

II. The Merits of Plaintiff’s Demand

Following plaintiff’s resignation from the Regular Army January 10, 1920, he became partially deafened to a permanent degree, as a result of injuries sustained in combat September 12,1918, in France. About 1929 he began to wear a hearing aid, and in October 1930, the VA awarded him compensation for service-connected disability (56 percent temporary partial for otitis media,2 chronic, catarrhal, both ears), apparently under a 1925 Veterans’ Bureau schedule for rating disabilities.3

In February 1942 plaintiff, then nearly 48 years of age, was physically examined for appointment in the Army of the United States. The report of that examination reflected that plaintiff was permanently incapacitated for active service, and his rejection by reason of defective hearing was recommended. In March 1942 he was again physically examined for such appointment and was again found permanently incapacitated for active service. Audiometric testing then re[1047]*1047vealed a bearing loss (44.8 percent in tbe right ear and 49 percent in tbe left ear) deemed stationary in character. He was recommended for limited service only, with a waiver.

In April 1942, following plaintiff’s written acknowledgement of bis bilateral defective bearing (and sinusitis) and bis statement of desire to enter active military service, tbe Surgeon General recommended a waiver for “audiometer finding of defective bearing * * *” and sinusitis, and on April 23, 1942, orders were issued waiving plaintiff’s said “physical defects” and appointing him a major, Army of tbe United States.4 He entered on active duty as such May 8, 1942.

At tbe time of plaintiff’s entry on active duty, be was functioning sufficiently well, even with impaired bearing, to succeed in bis civilian engineering business. Without using a bearing aid, be was able to bear telephones ring, doors and windows open and close, footsteps, voices, outside noises such as storms, and tbe sound of running water.

Plaintiff served on active duty from May 8, 1942, being promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1942 and to colonel July 1, 1944, continuously to October 19, 1947, when be was relieved from active duty by reason of physical disability but without retirement pay, under circumstances hereinafter set forth. His service from May 1942 to October 1947 was uniformly rated as superior.

To about May 1944, plaintiff served in engineering assignments in tbe United States. From about May 1944 to May 1947 be served in South America, eventually becoming Theater Engineer, United States Army Forces South America, with responsibility for all engineering projects in a broad area of that continent. In South America be frequently flew in military aircraft, usually operating at 'high altitudes, uninsulated for temperature changes, and without protection against air pressure variation. He was subjected to marked [1048]*1048changes in climatic conditions and air pressure, often in rapid succession.

In May 1947, plaintiff returned to the United States, and shortly thereafter he was transferred to Walter Heed General Hospital for evaluation, treatment ¡and disposition.

At Walter Keed General Hospital, plaintiff underwent several physical examinations, was the subject of a Disposition Board proceeding, and on July 11,1947, appeared before an Army Retiring Board.

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Related

Paul v. United States
20 Cl. Ct. 236 (Court of Claims, 1990)
Knight v. United States
213 Ct. Cl. 663 (Court of Claims, 1977)

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202 Ct. Cl. 1043, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knight-v-united-states-cc-1973.