OPINION
BAILEY, Judge.
Case Summary
Appellants-Defendants John Ling, Jr., and Board of Trustees of Vermillion County Hospital, Vermillion County Hospital, Doctor Gerald Longa, and Doctor Frank Spendal (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the trial court's partial denial of its motion for preliminary determination in favor of Appellees-Plaintiffs, Clinton S. Webb, as Administrator of the Estate of Katherine Ruth Webb; Viola K. Chrimes, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Charles Mal-kin; Marylin Whittington, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Ocie Gebhart; and Mary Hedden, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Russell Hedden (collectively referred to as, "Appellees").
We reverse and remand.
Issue
Appellants raise one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court's partial denial of their motion for preliminary determination was erroneous because the Class Action Tolling Rule does not apply to Appellees medical malpractice claims and, thus, such claims are time-barred.
Facts and Procedural History
During the period between late 19983 and early 1995, more than 140 patients died in the intensive care unit of Vermillion County Hospital ("Hospital"), most of who were under the care of hospital nurse Orville Lynn Majors ("Nurse Majors"). Nurse Majors was eventually convicted of murdering seven of these patients. See Majors v. State, 773 N.E.2d 231, 239 (Ind.2002).
Katherine Ruth Webb ("Webb"), Charles Malkin ("Malkin"), Ocie Gebhart ("Gebhart"), and Russell Hedden ("Hed-den") all died while in the Hospital under the care of Nurse Majors. Specifically, Webb died on August 3, 1994, Malkin died on December 20, 1994, Gebhart died on December 15, 1994, and Hedden died on February 3, 1995. Within two years of their loved one's death, Appellees, on behalf of the decedents, filed complaints in federal and state courts, alleging class and negligence actions. Thereafter, on April 10, 1996, a class of plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs")-not including our Appellees-filed a proposed class action complaint ("Pro
posed Class Complaint") with the Department of Insurance, asserting that the care and treatment provided to their decedents did not meet the applicable standard of care for medical providers. On April 20, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary determination of law in the trial court, requesting class certification for purposes of the Proposed Class Complaint, which they later agreed to dismiss in March of 2000. The Plaintiffs' proposed complaint is still pending with the medical review panel.
In addition to the Proposed Class Complaint, Appellees filed individual proposed complaints with the Department of Insurance. In particular, Clinton S8. Webb filed a proposed complaint for medical malpractice, on behalf of Webb, on July 24, 1997. Viola K. Chrimes, filed a proposed complaint on Malkin's behalf on April 4, 2000. Marylin Whittington filed a proposed complaint on behalf of Gebhart on February 21, 1997. Mary Hedden filed a proposed complaint on Hedden's behalf on February 21, 1997.
In 2008 and 2004, Appellants invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court under Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1 when they filed several motions for preliminary determinations of law, i.e., motions for summary judgment, which were accompanied by evidentiary exhibits. Appellants argued that Appellees' proposed complaints were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they were not filed within two years of the occurrences of the alleged malpractices. In response, Appellees contended that their proposed complaints were timely because the Proposed Class Complaint was filed within two years of the malpractice occurrences. At some point, the trial court consolidated the motions for preliminary determination. Subsequently, on September 8, 2004, the trial court, in relevant part, denied Appellants' motion for preliminary determination, concluding that the Proposed Class Complaint tolled the applicable statute of limitations for Appellees' claims. On September 21, 2004, Appellants requested that the trial court certify its order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. We accepted jurisdiction on February 11, 2004. Appellants now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
A motion for preliminary determination, when accompanied by evidentiary matters, "is akin to a motion for summary judgment and is subject to the same standard of review as any other summary judgment disposition." Jacobs v. Manhart, 770 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The purpose of summary judgment is to end litigation where there can be no factual dispute and where a determination may be made as a matter of law. LeBrun v. Conner, 702 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). As such, summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no evidence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Levy v. Newell, 822 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Ind. Trial Rules 56(C) and 56(B). When the moving party asserts the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and makes a prima facie showing that the action was commenced outside of the statutory period, the nonmoving party has the burden of establishing an issue of fact material to a theory that avoids the affirmative defense. Boggs v. Tri-State Ra
diology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied.
Additionally, when material facts are not in dispute, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts. Jacobs, 770 N.E.2d at 349. When there are no disputed facts with regard to a motion for summary judgment and the question presented is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo. Id.
IIL Analysis
On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously denied their motions for preliminary determination because Appellees' proposed complaints were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, such as those asserted by Appellees, is found at Indiana Code Section 34-18-7-1(b):
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OPINION
BAILEY, Judge.
Case Summary
Appellants-Defendants John Ling, Jr., and Board of Trustees of Vermillion County Hospital, Vermillion County Hospital, Doctor Gerald Longa, and Doctor Frank Spendal (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the trial court's partial denial of its motion for preliminary determination in favor of Appellees-Plaintiffs, Clinton S. Webb, as Administrator of the Estate of Katherine Ruth Webb; Viola K. Chrimes, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Charles Mal-kin; Marylin Whittington, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Ocie Gebhart; and Mary Hedden, Individually and as Surviving Next of Kin and Administrator of the Estate of Russell Hedden (collectively referred to as, "Appellees").
We reverse and remand.
Issue
Appellants raise one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court's partial denial of their motion for preliminary determination was erroneous because the Class Action Tolling Rule does not apply to Appellees medical malpractice claims and, thus, such claims are time-barred.
Facts and Procedural History
During the period between late 19983 and early 1995, more than 140 patients died in the intensive care unit of Vermillion County Hospital ("Hospital"), most of who were under the care of hospital nurse Orville Lynn Majors ("Nurse Majors"). Nurse Majors was eventually convicted of murdering seven of these patients. See Majors v. State, 773 N.E.2d 231, 239 (Ind.2002).
Katherine Ruth Webb ("Webb"), Charles Malkin ("Malkin"), Ocie Gebhart ("Gebhart"), and Russell Hedden ("Hed-den") all died while in the Hospital under the care of Nurse Majors. Specifically, Webb died on August 3, 1994, Malkin died on December 20, 1994, Gebhart died on December 15, 1994, and Hedden died on February 3, 1995. Within two years of their loved one's death, Appellees, on behalf of the decedents, filed complaints in federal and state courts, alleging class and negligence actions. Thereafter, on April 10, 1996, a class of plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs")-not including our Appellees-filed a proposed class action complaint ("Pro
posed Class Complaint") with the Department of Insurance, asserting that the care and treatment provided to their decedents did not meet the applicable standard of care for medical providers. On April 20, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary determination of law in the trial court, requesting class certification for purposes of the Proposed Class Complaint, which they later agreed to dismiss in March of 2000. The Plaintiffs' proposed complaint is still pending with the medical review panel.
In addition to the Proposed Class Complaint, Appellees filed individual proposed complaints with the Department of Insurance. In particular, Clinton S8. Webb filed a proposed complaint for medical malpractice, on behalf of Webb, on July 24, 1997. Viola K. Chrimes, filed a proposed complaint on Malkin's behalf on April 4, 2000. Marylin Whittington filed a proposed complaint on behalf of Gebhart on February 21, 1997. Mary Hedden filed a proposed complaint on Hedden's behalf on February 21, 1997.
In 2008 and 2004, Appellants invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court under Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1 when they filed several motions for preliminary determinations of law, i.e., motions for summary judgment, which were accompanied by evidentiary exhibits. Appellants argued that Appellees' proposed complaints were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they were not filed within two years of the occurrences of the alleged malpractices. In response, Appellees contended that their proposed complaints were timely because the Proposed Class Complaint was filed within two years of the malpractice occurrences. At some point, the trial court consolidated the motions for preliminary determination. Subsequently, on September 8, 2004, the trial court, in relevant part, denied Appellants' motion for preliminary determination, concluding that the Proposed Class Complaint tolled the applicable statute of limitations for Appellees' claims. On September 21, 2004, Appellants requested that the trial court certify its order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. We accepted jurisdiction on February 11, 2004. Appellants now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
A motion for preliminary determination, when accompanied by evidentiary matters, "is akin to a motion for summary judgment and is subject to the same standard of review as any other summary judgment disposition." Jacobs v. Manhart, 770 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The purpose of summary judgment is to end litigation where there can be no factual dispute and where a determination may be made as a matter of law. LeBrun v. Conner, 702 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). As such, summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no evidence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Levy v. Newell, 822 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Ind. Trial Rules 56(C) and 56(B). When the moving party asserts the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and makes a prima facie showing that the action was commenced outside of the statutory period, the nonmoving party has the burden of establishing an issue of fact material to a theory that avoids the affirmative defense. Boggs v. Tri-State Ra
diology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied.
Additionally, when material facts are not in dispute, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts. Jacobs, 770 N.E.2d at 349. When there are no disputed facts with regard to a motion for summary judgment and the question presented is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo. Id.
IIL Analysis
On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously denied their motions for preliminary determination because Appellees' proposed complaints were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, such as those asserted by Appellees, is found at Indiana Code Section 34-18-7-1(b):
A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (@) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until the minor's eighth birthday to file.
This occurrence-based statute of limitations has been upheld as constitutional when applied to plaintiffs who are able to discover the alleged malpractice and injury within two years from the occurrence. See Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (Ind.1999).
Moreover, under Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act, a medical malpractice action may not be brought against a health care provider until the claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the Department of Insurance and an opinion has been issued by a medical review panel. See Ind.Code § 34-18-8-4; see also Putnam County Hosp. v. Sells, 619 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the submission of a proposed complaint to the medical review panel is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim). The failure to file a proposed complaint with the Department of Insurance within two years is ordinarily fatal to a claimant's medical malpractice lawsuit. Mayfield v. Continental Rehabilitation Hosp. of Terre Haute, 690 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.
Here, Appellees concede that they discovered the alleged malpractice within two years of the occurrences at issue, i.e., August 3, 1994 in the case of Webb, December 20, 1994 in the case of Malkin, December 15, 1994 in the case of Gebhart, and February 3, 1995 in the case of Hedden. Indeed, we note that each Appellee filed negligence actions in state and federal courts within two years of their loved one's death. Appellees did not, however, timely file their proposed complaints with the Department of Insurance within two years of the occurrence, as required by Indiana Code Section 34-18-8-4.
Nevertheless, Appellees argue that their complaints are timely because of the filing of the Proposed Class Complaint. To support this contention, Appellees rely upon the Class Action Tolling Rule that was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), reh'g denied. There, in an effort to protect the policies behind class actions-ie., the promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation-the Court held that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." Id. (emphasis added). In so doing, the Court recognized that a tolling rule for class
actions is consistent with the purposes served by statutes of limitations. Id. It noted, for example, that limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights, both of which are met when a class action is commenced. Id.
Further, the Court observed that, because a class complaint notifies the defendants of the substantive claims being brought against them, as well as the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment, the defendants will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 756; see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). Tolling the statute of limitations, therefore, creates no potential for unfair surprise, regardless of the method class members choose to enforce their rights upon denial of class certification. Parker, 462 U.S. at 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392.
Pursuant to the Class Action Tolling Rule, the commencement of a class action lawsuit tolls the applicable statute of limitations during the period between the filing of the action and the trial court's ruling on the question of class certification. See Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426, 440 (Ind.Ct.App.1979). The question before us, however, is whether filing a proposed complaint with the Department of Insurance-on behalf of a class of individuals tolls the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims.
Put another way, does the filing of a proposed class action complaint commence an action for purposes of the Class Action Tolling Rule? To resolve this question, we first note that, in Indiana, there is one form of action, i.e., a civil action. Ind. T.R. 2. Indiana Trial Rule 3, which governs the commencement of an action, provides:
A civil action is commenced by filing with the court a complaint or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by statute, by payment of the prescribed filing fee or filing an order waiving the filing fee, and, where service of process is required, by furnishing to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and summons as are necessary.
(Emphasis added).
In light of these rules, we are convinced that the filing of a proposed complaint to the Department of Insurance is not the equivalent of commencing an action as required by the Class Action Tolling Rule. Indeed, while a proposed complaint would undoubtedly constitute an equivalent pleading or statutory document under Trial Rule 3, it is not filed with the court, but rather with the Department of Insurance. For this reason, it does not commence an action under our trial rules.
We find support for this conclusion in the Medical Malpractice Act. In particu
lar, Indiana Code Section 34-18-8-4, which governs medical malpractice actions and is entitled "Prerequisites to commencement of action; presentation of claim to medical review panel," provides:
Notwithstanding section 1 of this chapter,
and exeept as provided in sections 5[
] and 6[
] of this chapter, an action against a health care provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before:
(1) the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established under IC 34-18-10 (or IC 27-12-10 before its repeal); and
(2) an opinion is given by the panel.
(Emphasis added). Thus, presentment of the proposed complaint to the medical review panel is a condition precedent to, and not the legal equivalent of, commencing an action in a court of law.
Moreover, we recognize that Indiana Code Section 34-18-87, which is entitled "Commencement of action while claim being considered by medical review panel," provides:
(a) Notwithstanding section 4 of this chapter, beginning July 1, 1999, a claimant may commence an action in court for malpractice at the same time the claimant's proposed complaint is being considered by a medical review panel. In order to comply with this section, the:
(1) complaint filed in court may not contain any information that would allow a third party to identify the defendant;
(2) claimant is prohibited from pursuing the action; and
(3) court is prohibited from taking any action except setting a date for trial, an action under IC 34-18-8-8[
] (or IC 27-12-8-8 before its repeal), or an action under IC 34-18-11 (or IC 27-12-11 before its repeal);
until section 4 of this chapter has been satisfied.
(Emphasis added). By its express terms, this statute permits claimants, such as Ap-pellees, to simultaneously file a proposed complaint with the Department of Insurance and a complaint in the trial court-thereby commencing an action for medical malpractice-provided that the latter filing contain no identification information on the defendants.
Indiana Code Section 34-18-8-7 clarifies that it is the filing of the complaint with the trial court that commences the medical malpractice action, and not the filing of the proposed complaint. Pursuant to this statute, plaintiffs, such as Appellees, who wish to proceed in a medical malpractice class action may file the proposed complaint with the trial court and request a preliminary determination of class certification, at the same time that such complaint is being considered by the medical review panel. Indeed, Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1 provides:
(a) A court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to a proposed complaint filed with the commissioner under this article may, upon the filing of a copy of the proposed complaint and a written motion under this chapter, do one (1) or both of the following:
(1) preliminarily determine an affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or
(2) compel discovery in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Procedure.
(b) The court has no jurisdiction to rule preliminarily upon any affirmative defense or issue of law or fact reserved for written opinion by the medical review panel under IC 34-18-10-22(b)(1), IC 34-18-10-22(b)(2), and IC 34-18-10-22(b)(4).
(c) The court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion filed under this chapter only during that time after a proposed complaint is filed with the commissioner under this article but before the medical review panel gives the panel's written opinion under IC 34-18-10-22.
(d) The failure of any party to move for a preliminary determination or to compel discovery under this chapter before the medical review panel gives the panel's written opinion under IC 34-18-10-22 does not constitute the waiver of any affirmative defense or issue of law or fact.
Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-2 permits a party, the commissioner, or the chairman of a medical review panel, if any, to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, for the limited purposes enunciated in Section 1, by paying the statutory filing fee to the clerk and filing a copy of the proposed complaint and motion with the clerk. Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-4 provides that, upon the filing of a copy of the proposed complaint and motion with the court, "all further proceedings before the medical review panel shall be stayed automatically until the court has entered a ruling on the motion." Accordingly, there are other procedural avenues to present a class action complaint in the context of a medical malpractice action.
Because the Class Action Tolling Rule is inapplicable to the present dispute, the filing of the Proposed Class Complaint-even if it encompassed Appellees' contentions-did not toll the statute of limitations for Appellees medical malpractice claims. Accordingly, the trial court's partial denial of Appellants' motion for preliminary determination was erroneous. Instead, inasmuch as Appellees claims were time barred by the two-year statute of limitations, the trial court should have granted Appellants' motion for preliminary determination, as it related to the Class Action Tolling Rule.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's partial denial of Appellants' motions for preliminary determination and remand for an entry of judgment in favor of Appellants.
Reversed and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.