Linenweber v. Southwest Airlines Co

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 19, 2023
Docket3:20-cv-00408
StatusUnknown

This text of Linenweber v. Southwest Airlines Co (Linenweber v. Southwest Airlines Co) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Linenweber v. Southwest Airlines Co, (N.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

ROBERT G. LINENWEBER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-00408-K

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., GARY C. KELLY, TAMMY ROMO, and MIKE VAN DE VEN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”), Gary C. Kelly, Tammy Romo, and Mike Van de Ven’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (the “Motion to Dismiss”), Doc. No. 27, Defendants’ Appendix in Support of Defend- ants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 28, Lead Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) Canadian Elevator Industry Pension Trust Fund and Elevator Constructors Union Local No. 1 Annuity & 401(k) Fund’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Com- plaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, Doc. No. 29, Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 30, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Purported “Scheme and Course of Business” Claim Under SEC Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), Doc. No. 31, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 32, Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Purported “Scheme and Course of Business” Claim Under SEC Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), Doc. No. 33, and the Parties’ No- tices of Recent Authority and Responses thereto, Doc. Nos. 35, 37–38, 40–41, 43–44,

46–47, 49–50. Upon consideration of the Parties’ filings, the Court GRANTS Defend- ants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismisses all claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (the “Complaint” or “Compl.”). Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants made misleading statements to investors

fails because Defendants’ alleged misstatements about deficiencies in Southwest’s safety and regulatory compliance practices are generalized expressions of optimism that would not mislead investors or are neither false nor misleading on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ “misstatement” claim also fails because Plaintiffs do not plead with particularity that Mr. Kelly, Ms. Romo, or Mr. Van de Ven (the “Officer Defend-

ants”), speaking as officers of Southwest, made their alleged misstatements severely recklessly or with the intent to mislead investors. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not suggest that the Officer Defendants actually learned of Southwest’s alleged operational defi- ciencies or would have benefited from concealing them more than a typical executive

would benefit from concealing moderately unfavorable news about his or her business. While Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are independently liable for engaging in a fraud- ulent or deceptive “scheme,” Defendants’ alleged scheme consists of making misstate- ments to investors. Plaintiffs’ “scheme” claim fails for the same reasons as their “mis- statement” claim. Since Defendants’ alleged misstatements and scheme are their only

alleged primary violations of the securities laws, Plaintiffs’ remaining claim seeking to hold the Officer Defendants derivatively liable for Southwest’s primary violations fails for lack of a properly alleged primary violation.

I. BACKGROUND A. Southwest’s Safety and Compliance Issues This is a putative class action against Southwest. The Court draws the following facts from Plaintiffs’ class action Complaint and assumes they are true. Southwest is a commercial passenger airline regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), a division of the Department of Transportation (“DOT”).

Compl. ¶ 18. As of December 21, 2019, Southwest operated approximately 750 Boe- ing aircraft of various types. Id. ¶ 29. During the proposed class period, spanning February 7, 2017 through January 29, 2020, Gary C. Kelly was Southwest’s CEO, Tammy Romo was Southwest’s CFO, and Mike Van de Ven was Southwest’s COO. Id. at 5 n.2; id. ¶¶ 18–21. Mr. Kelly sat on Southwest’s board of directors, which had

a Safety and Compliance Oversight Committee. Id. ¶ 136(j). Mr. Van de Ven was Southwest’s “Accountable Executive in all matters of Safety and Security” and respon- sible for Southwest’s “Safety and Security Management System,” or “SMS,” an internal risk management system. Id. ¶¶ 27, 129(b), 136(c).

Southwest has had a long and public history of “safety and maintenance issues.” Id. ¶ 28. Between 2009 and 2015, Southwest experienced a variety of safety incidents, including problems with aircraft engines and fuselage skin, as well as pilot error. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37–38, 40, 41. On multiple occasions, the FAA investigated, settled with, or fined Southwest for deficient maintenance and repair practices. Id. ¶¶ 34–40.

During the proposed class period, four safety and regulatory compliance issues arose for Southwest. First, the FAA granted Southwest airworthiness certificates for eighty-eight previously-owned aircraft unusually quickly and later discovered that some of the aircraft had maintenance or maintenance documentation deficiencies. Id. ¶ 74. Second, some of Southwest’s flights experienced “balance weight” issues, meaning that

the aircraft in flight carried excessive weight by FAA standards. Id. ¶ 73. Third, South- west made unspecified changes to its pilot training program with the FAA’s approval but without conducting an SMS risk assessment. Id. ¶ 77. Fourth, an engine on a Southwest aircraft failed in April 2018, releasing pieces of the engine’s fan assembly

that broke one of the aircraft’s windows and caused the death of a passenger. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiffs allege that Southwest subsequently lobbied for more time to conduct engine inspections designed to prevent similar incidents, but Plaintiffs do not contend that Southwest’s failure to prevent the April 2018 engine failure violated FAA regulations

or resulted from Southwest’s other safety and compliance issues. Id. ¶¶ 44, 50, 55. In December 2017, the FAA opened an investigation into potential maintenance issues with Southwest’s previously-owned aircraft. Id. ¶ 74. The FAA entered an action plan with Southwest permitting Southwest to inspect and repair the aircraft by July 2020. Id. ¶ 75. In January 2018, the FAA learned about Southwest’s balance weight

issues. Id. ¶ 57. The FAA entered an action plan with Southwest to correct the issues, but Southwest continued reporting flights that carried too much weight under FAA standards. Id. ¶¶ 72–73.

By July 2018, DOT’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) opened an inves- tigation into the FAA’s oversight of Southwest. Id. ¶ 58. In June 2019, the FAA re- moved three managers in the office overseeing Southwest “amid allegations of lax safety enforcement raised by agency whistleblowers and various government inquiries.” Id. ¶ 61. Reporting on the removal, the Wall Street Journal noted that the OIG was inves-

tigating Southwest’s previously-owned aircraft and balance weight issues. Id. South- west’s stock price fell by 0.59% in the next trading session. Id. ¶ 62. On January 30, 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported that the OIG would release a report criticizing the FAA’s oversight of Southwest and stating that FAA employees

“raised concerns about the culture at Southwest” and complained about Southwest’s resistance to providing the FAA with information. Id. ¶¶ 63, 67. Anticipated areas of criticism included the FAA’s supervision of Southwest’s handling of its previously- owned aircraft and balance weight issues. Id. ¶¶ 63–65. While noting that Mr. Kelly

previously said “we have opportunities to improve” balance weight monitoring, the Wall Street Journal observed that Southwest “long held that heavier-than-expected bag- gage loads fall well within its planes’ operating safety margins.” Id. ¶ 65.

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