Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Lake County denying defendants’ motion made under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 72) to vacate a judgment entered by the trial court.
On March 4, 1969, defendant, Charles and Dorothy Welter, entered into an installment contract with the plaintiff, Limar-Pinehurst, Inc., for the purchase of a vacant lot in Lake County. The contract contained the usual forfeiture clause.
By June 12,1972, defendants were in default and an amendment to the contract was executed by the parties. In September of 1972 defendants again failed to make payments and none have been made since that date. On June 8, 1973, a notice of intent to declare a forfeiture was mailed to defendants by certified mail, reton receipt requested. The return receipt indicated that delivery of the notice was made on June 11, 1973.
A declaration of forfeiture was executed by plaintiff on July 13, 1973, and recorded on August 9, 1973. On November 30, 1973, plaintiff filed a verified petition for declaratory judgment seeking to have defendants’ interest in the property forfeited. Personal service was made on defendants on December 9, 1973. An appearance by Walsh and Fielding as attorneys for defendants was filed January 9,1974. No answer or other responsive pleading was ever filed by defendants. On January 24,1974, a notice of motion for default judgment was mailed to (and was thereafter received by) counsel for defendants. The motion stated that on February 5, 1974, plaintiff would move for a default judgment for failure of defendants to plead or answer. Counsel for plaintiff appeared on February 5 to present the motion to the trial court. No one appeared for defendants. The trial court continued the matter until February 15,1974, then to February 27, and again to March 6. On March 6, after a hearing, the court defaulted the defendants and entered judgment forfeiting their interest in the subject land.
On May 13, defendants filed their petition to vacate the order of March 6. The defense attorney’s attached affidavit set forth by way of defense the fact that plaintiff’s notice of intent to declare forfeiture failed to demand possession of the premises. Defendants claim the notice was therefore fatally defective inasmuch as it failed to comply with the statutory notice required by section 3 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 57, par. 3.) As an additional defense, the affidavit asserted that forfeiture would be grossly inequitable considering the sum defendants had invested in the property compared to the total value of the property as set forth in the contract of sale.
In explanation of defendants’ failure to contest the forfeiture prior to judgment, the affidavit stated that on January 8, 1974, defense attorney had received a telephone call from Charles Welter; that he authorized Mr. Welter to file an appearance in affiant’s name, and asked Welter to forward all documents relating to the action; that Welter did not forward the documents; that affiant received the notice of motion for default but assumed it was for money due and owing and there was no defense against such money judgment; that affiant did not receive a copy of the judgment entered March 6; that a realtor who was trying to sell the property for defendants informed them that there was a title problem; that affiant thereafter, on April 26,1974, discovered that default judgment had been entered on March 6.
A hearing was held, and the trial court denied defendants’ section 72 petition to vacate the judgment for plaintiff.
Section 72 provides, under certain circumstances, for relief from final judgments up to two years after the judgment date. We have recently had occasion to review the purposes and circumstances which properly invoke a section 72 petition. We said:
“The purpose of a petition under Section 72 is to enable a party to bring before the court facts not appearing of record which, if known to the court at the time of judgment, would have prevented its rendition * * 9. In order to vacate a default judgment under this section, the petitioner must show (1) the existence of a meritorious defense and (2) freedom from negligence on his own part. 9 9 9
Where there is fraud or unfair conduct on the part of the plaintiff, the second requirement — due diligence by defendant— need not be strictly enforced * * In re Adoption of Barker, 37 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1976).
Where such circumstances exist, the equitable powers of the court will be invoked to prevent an injustice. These guidelines distinguish a section 72 petition from a motion to vacate a default judgment within 30 days. Unless these standards are adhered to, no default judgment would become final for two years.
The defendants’ section 72 petition does not meet either of the above requirements. On appeal, defendants no longer contend that the notice of forfeiture given was insufficient. Defendants therefore waive this possible defense.1 Rather, defendants apparently look for meritorious defense in the “unfairness” which would be suffered by defendants if they must forfeit both the property (reportedly worth *21,000) and the *8000 they have already paid toward the *11,000 purchase price thereof. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that this constitutes a meritorious defense to a forfeiture, nor do they argue fraud, unfairness, or even inequality in bargaining position with respect to the underlying sales contract which provided for forfeiture as a consequence of purchaser’s default. Under these circumstances, we find that defendants faffed to set forth a meritorious defense.
Similarly, defendants did not establish freedom from negligence in their failure to defend the action prior to judgment or within 30 days thereof. It is undisputed that since September of 1972, defendants have been in default on the contract; that they were served with notice of intent to declare a forfeiture in June of 1973; that in December of 1973, personal notice was had on defendants notifying them of the plaintiff’s petition for declaratory judgment; that on January 24, 1974, notice of motion for a default judgment on February 5 was sent to (and received within a few days by) defendants’ attorney. Nevertheless, no answer was filed and no one appeared on the February 5 date or on the dates of successive continuances (February 15, 22, and March 6). That this course of neglect was occasioned only in part by defendants’ failure to keep their counsel fully informed (by forwarding the requested pertinent documents) and in part by an erroneous belief by defendants’ attorney regarding the nature of the default sought, does nothing to negate the lack of due diligence amply evident on this record. It is clear that in the usual case a section 72 petitioner is bound by the negligence of his attorney. Sora Loan Corp. v. Shlifka, 2 Ill. App. 3d 137, 139-40 (1971).
This is not a case where the fraud or unfair conduct of plaintiff softens the rigorous application of the due diligence standard.
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Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Lake County denying defendants’ motion made under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 72) to vacate a judgment entered by the trial court.
On March 4, 1969, defendant, Charles and Dorothy Welter, entered into an installment contract with the plaintiff, Limar-Pinehurst, Inc., for the purchase of a vacant lot in Lake County. The contract contained the usual forfeiture clause.
By June 12,1972, defendants were in default and an amendment to the contract was executed by the parties. In September of 1972 defendants again failed to make payments and none have been made since that date. On June 8, 1973, a notice of intent to declare a forfeiture was mailed to defendants by certified mail, reton receipt requested. The return receipt indicated that delivery of the notice was made on June 11, 1973.
A declaration of forfeiture was executed by plaintiff on July 13, 1973, and recorded on August 9, 1973. On November 30, 1973, plaintiff filed a verified petition for declaratory judgment seeking to have defendants’ interest in the property forfeited. Personal service was made on defendants on December 9, 1973. An appearance by Walsh and Fielding as attorneys for defendants was filed January 9,1974. No answer or other responsive pleading was ever filed by defendants. On January 24,1974, a notice of motion for default judgment was mailed to (and was thereafter received by) counsel for defendants. The motion stated that on February 5, 1974, plaintiff would move for a default judgment for failure of defendants to plead or answer. Counsel for plaintiff appeared on February 5 to present the motion to the trial court. No one appeared for defendants. The trial court continued the matter until February 15,1974, then to February 27, and again to March 6. On March 6, after a hearing, the court defaulted the defendants and entered judgment forfeiting their interest in the subject land.
On May 13, defendants filed their petition to vacate the order of March 6. The defense attorney’s attached affidavit set forth by way of defense the fact that plaintiff’s notice of intent to declare forfeiture failed to demand possession of the premises. Defendants claim the notice was therefore fatally defective inasmuch as it failed to comply with the statutory notice required by section 3 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 57, par. 3.) As an additional defense, the affidavit asserted that forfeiture would be grossly inequitable considering the sum defendants had invested in the property compared to the total value of the property as set forth in the contract of sale.
In explanation of defendants’ failure to contest the forfeiture prior to judgment, the affidavit stated that on January 8, 1974, defense attorney had received a telephone call from Charles Welter; that he authorized Mr. Welter to file an appearance in affiant’s name, and asked Welter to forward all documents relating to the action; that Welter did not forward the documents; that affiant received the notice of motion for default but assumed it was for money due and owing and there was no defense against such money judgment; that affiant did not receive a copy of the judgment entered March 6; that a realtor who was trying to sell the property for defendants informed them that there was a title problem; that affiant thereafter, on April 26,1974, discovered that default judgment had been entered on March 6.
A hearing was held, and the trial court denied defendants’ section 72 petition to vacate the judgment for plaintiff.
Section 72 provides, under certain circumstances, for relief from final judgments up to two years after the judgment date. We have recently had occasion to review the purposes and circumstances which properly invoke a section 72 petition. We said:
“The purpose of a petition under Section 72 is to enable a party to bring before the court facts not appearing of record which, if known to the court at the time of judgment, would have prevented its rendition * * 9. In order to vacate a default judgment under this section, the petitioner must show (1) the existence of a meritorious defense and (2) freedom from negligence on his own part. 9 9 9
Where there is fraud or unfair conduct on the part of the plaintiff, the second requirement — due diligence by defendant— need not be strictly enforced * * In re Adoption of Barker, 37 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1976).
Where such circumstances exist, the equitable powers of the court will be invoked to prevent an injustice. These guidelines distinguish a section 72 petition from a motion to vacate a default judgment within 30 days. Unless these standards are adhered to, no default judgment would become final for two years.
The defendants’ section 72 petition does not meet either of the above requirements. On appeal, defendants no longer contend that the notice of forfeiture given was insufficient. Defendants therefore waive this possible defense.1 Rather, defendants apparently look for meritorious defense in the “unfairness” which would be suffered by defendants if they must forfeit both the property (reportedly worth *21,000) and the *8000 they have already paid toward the *11,000 purchase price thereof. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that this constitutes a meritorious defense to a forfeiture, nor do they argue fraud, unfairness, or even inequality in bargaining position with respect to the underlying sales contract which provided for forfeiture as a consequence of purchaser’s default. Under these circumstances, we find that defendants faffed to set forth a meritorious defense.
Similarly, defendants did not establish freedom from negligence in their failure to defend the action prior to judgment or within 30 days thereof. It is undisputed that since September of 1972, defendants have been in default on the contract; that they were served with notice of intent to declare a forfeiture in June of 1973; that in December of 1973, personal notice was had on defendants notifying them of the plaintiff’s petition for declaratory judgment; that on January 24, 1974, notice of motion for a default judgment on February 5 was sent to (and received within a few days by) defendants’ attorney. Nevertheless, no answer was filed and no one appeared on the February 5 date or on the dates of successive continuances (February 15, 22, and March 6). That this course of neglect was occasioned only in part by defendants’ failure to keep their counsel fully informed (by forwarding the requested pertinent documents) and in part by an erroneous belief by defendants’ attorney regarding the nature of the default sought, does nothing to negate the lack of due diligence amply evident on this record. It is clear that in the usual case a section 72 petitioner is bound by the negligence of his attorney. Sora Loan Corp. v. Shlifka, 2 Ill. App. 3d 137, 139-40 (1971).
This is not a case where the fraud or unfair conduct of plaintiff softens the rigorous application of the due diligence standard. The defendants assert that the failure of plaintiff’s counsel to notify defense counsel by phone or mail of continuance dates, or to supply defense counsel with a copy of the petition for declaratory judgment (even though one such copy had been served on defendants personally) constitutes a breach of professional courtesy. Such actions are not required by law. No case has been made that such is the customary practice in the community. Plaintiff did provide legal notice to the defendants of the nature of the action and the date on which the default hearing was to be heard. Moreover, defendants do not suggest that these alleged breaches were intended to mislead defense counsel or to conceal entry of the default judgment. These alleged professional breaches on the part of plaintiff are manifestly insufficient to constitute a fraud or unfair conduct, and do not justify this court’s easing the due diligence requirement.
Defendants allege that since plaintiff did not advise defendants of the default judgment within 30 days of its entry, the judgment may be tinged with such unfairness as to warrant relaxation of the due diligence standard. We are aware of several cases in which the failure to give notice of, or to execute upon, a judgment within 30 days has been considered by courts to be a factor in determining whether plaintiff has acted so unfairly as to justify relaxation of the due diligence standard. Elfman v. Evanston Bus Co., 27 Ill. 2d 609, 614 (1963); George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 19 Ill. App. 3d 973, 979-80 (1974); Hall v. Hall, 15 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603 (1973); George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Morris, 128 Ill. App. 2d 454, 458-59 (1970); Boughton v. Jones, 98 Ill. App. 2d 396, 400 (1968); Gary Acceptance Corp. v. Napilillo, 86 Ill. App. 2d 257, 263 (1967).) However, as the Elfman court carefully pointed out, such factor is “not completely controlling or conclusive.” (Elfman, at 614.) We have found no case which, on this factor alone, held the plaintiff’s action so unfair as to warrant such relaxation. There are no statutory requirements which call for notice to be given on entry of a default judgment. To impose such requirements judicially would be improper and would ignore the clear implication of Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 39 Ill. 2d 464, 468-69 (1968), wherein the supreme court reaffirmed the duty of litigants to follow their own case in court. There the court affirmed the circuit court’s refusal to reinstate a case where it was apparent that the section 72 dismissal resulted from the inadvertent failure of plaintiff to follow her case and no circumstances indicated fraud or unconscionable behavior on the part of defendants.
In the case at bar, the failure of defendants to defend was not, in fact, simple inadvertence. Here, the defendants had notice of the nature of the action and the date of the default prove-up. Defendants failed to adequately apprise their counsel of the nature of the action in their not forwarding the appropriate documents to him. Defense attorney could have appeared on February 5 to protect his clients’ interests but elected not to, thinking this default was for monies due rather than for forfeiture of the subject property. The failure of defense counsel to appear and defend arose, therefore, not from inadvertance or from plaintiff’s failure to provide notice, but from defense counsel’s electing not to appear because of an erroneous concept of the nature of the action. As defense counsel labored under this mistaken belief until late April, we have no reason to. believe that he would have appeared and defended on February 15, February 27, or March 6, even if plaintiff’s counsel had volunteered the courtesy of calling defense counsel regarding the continuance dates. We do not find plaintiff’s conduct of this litigation unfair or cause for relaxing the due diligence standard required for section 72 petitions.
In summary, we conclude that defendants’ section 72 petition failed to allege facts that would show: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense (this alone would sustain the trial court’s action); and (2) due diligence on the part of the defendants or actions on the part of plaintiff (e.g., fraud, deception or unfair conduct) which would invoke the equitable powers of the court to grant relief.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
RECHENMACHER, J., concurs.