Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc.

537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13294, 2008 WL 517014
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 22, 2008
Docket06-22128-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13294, 2008 WL 517014 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Curagao Drydock Company, Ine.’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (D.E.# 35), filed on March 13, 2007. Defendant originally moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: a) lack of personal jurisdiction over the corporation, and b) forum non conveniens. On September 28, 2007, Defendant conceded the issue of personal jurisdiction. *1272 For the reasons stated below, the remainder of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, arguing forum non conveniens, is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between the Defendant and the government of Cuba to traffic laborers from Cuba to Cu-ragao and force them to work on ships and oil platforms there. One goal of this conspiracy, it is alleged, was to aid and abet Cuba’s evasion of the Cuban Embargo. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 prohibited ships that call on Cuban ports to visit U.S. ports for six months. It also limits commerce between the United States and Cuba. Further, it is alleged that the defendant benefited from hosting an outpost of totalitarian Cuba’s forced labor system by enjoying the labors of workers compelled to work by the Cuban state.

Plaintiffs are three Cuban nationals who are now residents of Florida. The complaint alleges they suffered an arduous ordeal, as follows: The Defendant and the Cuban government trafficked the Plaintiffs from Cuba to Curagao under threat of physical and psychological harm including the threat of imprisonment. Upon arrival in Curagao, the Plaintiffs’ passports were taken and they were held on the grounds of the Defendant, along with scores of their compatriots. The workers were only allowed to leave those grounds under the guard of Cuban government agents. They were forced to work in slave-like conditions for 112 hours per week performing drydock services on ships and oil platforms. The pay for their work, the complaint alleges, was paid to the Cuban government. (In discovery, Defendant admitted that it credited Cuba on a debt it was owed by Cuba in exchange for the labors of the Cuban workers). The complaint alleges a situation in which the government of Curagao was likely complicit due to the circumstances in which the Plaintiffs were transported to Curagao and held there. Further, the Plaintiffs were denied all protections of the laws of Curagao for injuries they suffered there, and, when any of the workers were injured or complained, they were promptly deported to Cuba and treated as enemies of the state. If they escaped and were caught, they were likewise deported to Cuba and punished. Plaintiffs, however, successfully escaped the Defendant’s drydock facility, and were hunted by Defendant and agents of the Defendant within Curagao and by the agents of the Cuban government all the way to Colombia, where they were granted political asylum. The United States then granted Plaintiffs parole to enter the United States.

Plaintiffs’ principal claims are that the Defendant and its government agents and co-conspirators violated the laws of nations by trafficking them from Cuba to Curagao and by holding them and forcing them to work there. The main thrust of their action travels under the Alien Tort Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1350, which grants district courts jurisdiction over actions by aliens alleging torts in violation of international law, and under federal RICO laws. Defendant has withdrawn its challenge to personal jurisdiction. The only issue before this court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [a] case, and when trial in the chosen forum would establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience, or when the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems, the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case,’ even if juris *1273 diction and venue are established”. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F.Supp. 1078 (S.D.Fla.1997), quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447-48, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981)).

A four-part test has been developed:

As a prerequisite, the court must establish whether an adequate alternative forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case. Next, the trial judge must consider all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial forum choice. If the trial judge finds this balance of private interests to be in equipoise or near equipoise, he must then determine whether or not factors of public interest tip the balance in favor of a trial in a foreign forum. If he decides that the balance favors such a foreign forum, the trial judge must finally ensure that plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.

La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir.1983) (citing Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C.Cir.1980)). In sum, the four parts of the test are: a) an adequate alternative forum, b) balance of private interests, c) balance of public interests, and d) ability to reinstate without undue inconvenience or prejudice to the plaintiff.

In applying this test, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to a strong presumption of suitability, and “positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances” must be present and ... the court must be “thoroughly convinced that material injustice is manifest” before ousting a domestic plaintiff from this country’s courts. SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Me-canicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting La Seguri-dad, 707 F.2d at 1308 n. 7.)

One more concern bears mentioning. It has long been held that

where Congress has given the federal courts a special responsibility to implement federal law, that duty will outweigh factors of convenience and mandate that the suit be heard. If federal law applies to a case in which a forum non conveniens

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Babasola Kolawole v. Stacy Sellers
863 F.3d 1361 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)
Tellez v. Madrigal
223 F. Supp. 3d 626 (W.D. Texas, 2016)
Inverpan, S.A. v. Britten
646 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Florida, 2009)
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.
578 F.3d 1283 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc.
584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Florida, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13294, 2008 WL 517014, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/licea-v-curacao-drydock-co-inc-flsd-2008.