DISSENTING OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MASSEY, Chief Justice.
In the belief that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because of want of notice to the Industrial Accident Board as provided by Art. 8307, § S, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit. This was the decision reached in the original opinion of this Court on October 7, 1966.
Defendant insurance company appealed on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because of plaintiff’s failure to give notice to the Board that he would not abide by its final ruling and decision of March 13, 1964.
[34]*34Plaintiff filed suit in a district court of Tarrant County on March 19, 1964 to set aside the Board’s award.
On March 23, 1964, the Board received the following communication:
“Fort Worth, Texas
“Industrial Accident Board
“Austin, Texas
“Gentlemen:
“This will advise that a suit was filed in this Court to set aside the award of the Industrial Accident Board of Austin, Texas, and styled:
“Harold E. Smith
“Vs. No.-33993-C
“Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
“The number of the Board is-
“The Date of the alleged injury was 5-10-63
“The Name of the Employer was Bell Helicopter Co.
“Yours very truly,
“George Johnson
“District Clerk Tarrant County, Texas
“By Sally B. Moran, Deputy.”
On March 24, 1964, defendant was served a copy of the petition and citation in the case filed in District Court.
The Board received no communication concerning notice and appeal except the letter from the deputy District Clerk.
Neither plaintiff nor his attorney communicated in' any manner with the Board within twenty days after the date of the Board’s award.
In the District Court suit defendant filed a sworn denial that notice was given the Board as required by Article 8307, Sec. 5, V.A.T.S.
Defendant, prior to trial, moved for dismissal and later moved for instructed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all based on lack of jurisdiction because of plaintiff’s failure to file notice with the Board in compliance with Article 8307, Sec. 5.
All motions were overruled and judgment, based on jury verdict, rendered for plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the letter from the deputy District Clerk to the Board was substantial compliance, if indeed not strict compliance, with the statute, and also relies strongly on the well-established rule that the workmen’s compensation laws should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.
The pertinent portion of Article 8307, Sec. 5, is as follows: “All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein and within the provisions of this law, shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the Board. Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision of said Board shall, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with said Board notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision.”
In Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926), the Supreme Court held: “This suit arises out of a workman’s compensation proceeding, and it is therefore [35]*35in derogation of the common law. The rights to be enforced, and all the remedies provided therefor, are purely statutory, as distinguished from the common-law rights and remedies. * * * The general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable. * * * The Workmen’s Compensation Act having created the rights to be enforced and provided the remedy therefor, each step in the progress of the maturity of a claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a mandatory requirement, necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and succeeding statutory agencies. * * * ”
In Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Lincecum, 126 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Civ.App., 1939, no writ hist.), this court, speaking through Justice Speer, held: “It is so well settled in this state that the rights of the parties in such cases as this are determined alone by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, to the exclusion of all other remedies, that it requires no citation of authorities. It is equally well settled that the rights and remedies provided by the Act are statutory and must be complied with in all respects to mature the claim preparatory for the adjudication by the courts when not satisfactorily determined by the Industrial Accident Board. Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084; Federal Surety Co. v. Jetton, Tex.Com.App., 44 S.W.2d 923.”
In Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Leake, 196 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Civ.App., 1946, ref., n. r. e.), we held: “The liberality with which the Act is to be construed cannot be extended so as to ignore the plain unambiguous language by virtue of which the Legislative Act is to effectuate its most wholesome purpose. Its very strength lies in the language of the statute and any recovery must come within its provisions. There are many essential elements which enter into the rights of one seeking to recover compensation under the Act. A compliance with each is necessary for the courts to acquire jurisdiction on the statutory appeal from the award of the Board. Federal Surety Co. v. Jetton, Tex.Com.App., 44 S.W.2d 923; Scott v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 354, error refused; Johnson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 131 Tex. 357, 112 S.W.2d 449.”
Substantially the same holdings were made in Hood v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 260 S.W. 243 (Tex.Civ.App., 1924, no writ hist.); Taylor v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Civ.App., 1955, no writ hist.); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Underwood, 33 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Civ.App., 1930, no writ hist.).
Texas is cited in 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation, § 721, pp. 1070-1071, as one of the states where procedure provided by statute must be strictly followed.
In Pappas v. Royal Indemnity Company, 251 F.2d 439 (U.S.Ct.
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DISSENTING OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MASSEY, Chief Justice.
In the belief that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because of want of notice to the Industrial Accident Board as provided by Art. 8307, § S, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit. This was the decision reached in the original opinion of this Court on October 7, 1966.
Defendant insurance company appealed on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because of plaintiff’s failure to give notice to the Board that he would not abide by its final ruling and decision of March 13, 1964.
[34]*34Plaintiff filed suit in a district court of Tarrant County on March 19, 1964 to set aside the Board’s award.
On March 23, 1964, the Board received the following communication:
“Fort Worth, Texas
“Industrial Accident Board
“Austin, Texas
“Gentlemen:
“This will advise that a suit was filed in this Court to set aside the award of the Industrial Accident Board of Austin, Texas, and styled:
“Harold E. Smith
“Vs. No.-33993-C
“Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
“The number of the Board is-
“The Date of the alleged injury was 5-10-63
“The Name of the Employer was Bell Helicopter Co.
“Yours very truly,
“George Johnson
“District Clerk Tarrant County, Texas
“By Sally B. Moran, Deputy.”
On March 24, 1964, defendant was served a copy of the petition and citation in the case filed in District Court.
The Board received no communication concerning notice and appeal except the letter from the deputy District Clerk.
Neither plaintiff nor his attorney communicated in' any manner with the Board within twenty days after the date of the Board’s award.
In the District Court suit defendant filed a sworn denial that notice was given the Board as required by Article 8307, Sec. 5, V.A.T.S.
Defendant, prior to trial, moved for dismissal and later moved for instructed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all based on lack of jurisdiction because of plaintiff’s failure to file notice with the Board in compliance with Article 8307, Sec. 5.
All motions were overruled and judgment, based on jury verdict, rendered for plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the letter from the deputy District Clerk to the Board was substantial compliance, if indeed not strict compliance, with the statute, and also relies strongly on the well-established rule that the workmen’s compensation laws should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.
The pertinent portion of Article 8307, Sec. 5, is as follows: “All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein and within the provisions of this law, shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the Board. Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision of said Board shall, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with said Board notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision.”
In Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926), the Supreme Court held: “This suit arises out of a workman’s compensation proceeding, and it is therefore [35]*35in derogation of the common law. The rights to be enforced, and all the remedies provided therefor, are purely statutory, as distinguished from the common-law rights and remedies. * * * The general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable. * * * The Workmen’s Compensation Act having created the rights to be enforced and provided the remedy therefor, each step in the progress of the maturity of a claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a mandatory requirement, necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and succeeding statutory agencies. * * * ”
In Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Lincecum, 126 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Civ.App., 1939, no writ hist.), this court, speaking through Justice Speer, held: “It is so well settled in this state that the rights of the parties in such cases as this are determined alone by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, to the exclusion of all other remedies, that it requires no citation of authorities. It is equally well settled that the rights and remedies provided by the Act are statutory and must be complied with in all respects to mature the claim preparatory for the adjudication by the courts when not satisfactorily determined by the Industrial Accident Board. Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084; Federal Surety Co. v. Jetton, Tex.Com.App., 44 S.W.2d 923.”
In Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Leake, 196 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Civ.App., 1946, ref., n. r. e.), we held: “The liberality with which the Act is to be construed cannot be extended so as to ignore the plain unambiguous language by virtue of which the Legislative Act is to effectuate its most wholesome purpose. Its very strength lies in the language of the statute and any recovery must come within its provisions. There are many essential elements which enter into the rights of one seeking to recover compensation under the Act. A compliance with each is necessary for the courts to acquire jurisdiction on the statutory appeal from the award of the Board. Federal Surety Co. v. Jetton, Tex.Com.App., 44 S.W.2d 923; Scott v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 354, error refused; Johnson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 131 Tex. 357, 112 S.W.2d 449.”
Substantially the same holdings were made in Hood v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 260 S.W. 243 (Tex.Civ.App., 1924, no writ hist.); Taylor v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Civ.App., 1955, no writ hist.); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Underwood, 33 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Civ.App., 1930, no writ hist.).
Texas is cited in 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation, § 721, pp. 1070-1071, as one of the states where procedure provided by statute must be strictly followed.
In Pappas v. Royal Indemnity Company, 251 F.2d 439 (U.S.Ct. of App., 5th Cir., 1958), the question before the court was whether or not failure to file notice of appeal with the Board within twenty days was fatal to the appellee. The Court held: “We think it is.” The reasoning of the Court in reaching that result is applicable to the instant case. Said the Court: “Appellant would have had a better argument if the law had not been changed in 1927. Prior to 1927, Section 5 of Article 8307 required, in addition to notice of appeal to the Board, personal service of the notice on all adverse parties. It might have been argued then that omission of notice was cured by filing suit within twenty days; that the object of the requirement was to place the adverse parties on notice. But the 1927 Amendment, excising notice to-adverse parties, makes it clear that the sacramental notice is the notice to the Board. This is not just a technicality. (Emphasis added.) Under Article 8306, Section 12d, the Board retains jurisdiction of a claim and may issue new orders and [36]*36alter its award until the notice of appeal is filed. There can be no appeal from an award that is not final. The effect of filing notice of appeal therefore is to make the award final and from that moment cut off the Board’s power to issue further orders affecting the award.”
The statute is clear and unambiguous in providing that “any interested party” who does not consent to abide by the final ruling shall file with the Board notice that he will not abide by the final ruling and decision.
The District Clerk was not an “interested party.” He was not affected by the award of the Board. Southern Surety Co. v. Arter, 44 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Com.App., 1932).
Whether statutory law would properly be construed liberally or strictly as applied to any action necessarily depends upon existence of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction to decide a cause of action does not exist a court should dismiss. In my opinion that was the condition existent in the court below.