Libby, McNeill & Libby v. James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor

256 F.2d 832
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 11, 1958
Docket16865_1
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 256 F.2d 832 (Libby, McNeill & Libby v. James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Libby, McNeill & Libby v. James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, 256 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1958).

Opinion

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

The question here is whether the production of citrus pulp cattle feed and citrus molasses simultaneously performed during the processing of fresh citrus fruits into canned or concentrated frozen juices or fruit entitled the Employer to an Fair Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(b) (3) “seasonal industry” exemption. It is conceded that for these two by-product operations the Employer is entitled to the § 7(c) exemption.

At the outset it simplifies our understanding to contrast in a gross way these two exemptions 1 §§ 7(b) (3) and *834 7(c). Section 7(c), if applicable, is so because of its own terms. It is self-executing and requires only that the facts bring the employer’s activity under it. Section 7(b) (3), on the other hand, is not self-executing. It applies only to “an industry 2 3 found by the Administrator to be of a seasonal nature.” A finding by the Administrator is therefore an indispensable requirement. Under § 7 (c) the fourteen week exemption relates to overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours. Under § 7(b) (3) the exemption is limited to a maximum of 12 hours in any one day and 56 hours in any one workweek. And, of extreme importance, under § 7(c) the exemption applies only to those employees “engaged in the first processing of * * * seasonal fresh fruits or vegetables * * * ” whereas § 7(b) (3), on the other hand, extends the exemption to “any employee * * * if such employee is * * * employed * * * in an industry.” It is at this point that the issue is crucial here for while those employees engaged directly and immediately in the manufacturing process of citrus pulp feed and citrus molasses come under § 7(c), a large number of clerical, administrative and service employees who would be “employed * * * in an industry” under § 7(b) (3) are not within the reach of § 7(c). In addition, although not stressed here, we understand that the two exemptions may under some circumstances be cumulative.

“7(c): * * * in the case of an employer engaged in the first processing of, or in canning or packing, perishable or seasonable fresh fruits or vegetables * * *, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, during a period or periods of not more than fourteen workweeks in the aggregate in any calendar year, shall not apply to his employees in any place of employment where he is so engaged.”

Both exemptions are therefore valuable and if applicable are as important in the Congressional pattern as any other provision. For the Wage and Hour Act is a complex piece of legislation in which Congress, articulately seeking to accommodate the general aims of this legislation to our diverse economy, was as acutely concerned over the areas and circumstances not covered as those covered. See Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254, 75 S.Ct. 719, 99 L.Ed. 1040.

The problem becomes somewhat unmanageable and awkward if the two exemptions are not carefully distinguished. This is especially so where such terms as “first processing” are used in the definitive description of an industry found by the Administrator to be seasonal under § 7(b)(3) and which are, of course, the statutory basis under § 7(c). Indeed, this is the heart of the Employer’s approach. For in the final analysis it treats the “first processing” of § 7(e) and the “first processing” in the Administrator’s 1940 determination of the seasonal nature of the fresh fruit industry as a common denominator. The Employer, transposing this in the equation, then contends that whatever comes within “first processing” under § 7(c) automatically is eligible under § 7(b)(3) if the Administrator’s determination of a given seasonal industry expressly encompasses a “first processing” operation. In this approach the Employer has respectable-analogous support in the so-called Mus-selman doctrine, now formally recognized by an Administrator’s Regulation 3 under which by-product operations carried on simultaneously with and as an integral *835 part of first processing of fresh fruits or vegetables are deemed to be § 7 (c) “first processing” up to the point in the manufacturing process of the first non-perishable by-product.

With “first processing” as the common denominator and the Musselman concept as its theme, the Employer makes a substantial factual showing. For it is without dispute that, almost as with any modern manufacturing undertaking, the impact of irrepressible, competitive drives and forces has brought about in the Florida citrus industry during the postwar decade, a remarkable industrial process in which by efficient stream and assembly line techniques the fresh whole citrus fruit is simultaneously processed 4 to the point of practical exhaustion of all edible as well as inedible products and by-products.

Were this approach correct, we would certainly agree with the Employer and disagree with the Court below.

But this approach, in our view disregards, first, the necessity for a finding by the Administrator that production of citrus pulp feed or citrus molasses (or both) is a seasonal industry, and second, the fact that, as to part in 1952, and as to all of it in 1955, the Administrator has found that such operation is not a seasonal industry.

It is true, of course, that in 1940 the Administrator dealt with two phases of the fresh fruit and vegetable business *836 and as to them it found two things. First, that “3. The packing, handling, and preparing in their raw or natural state of perishable or seasonal fresh fruits and vegetables is a branch of an industry and of a seasonal nature within the meaning of Section 7(b)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Part 526, as amended, of the Regulations 5 issued thereunder.” Having found the first, the question then followed whether first processing and canning of such perishable fruit was a branch of an industry of a seasonal nature. The second finding then was that “5. The first processing and canning of perishable or seasonal fresh fruits and vegetables is a branch of an industry and of a seasonal nature within the meaning of Section 7(b)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Part 526, as amended, of the Regulations issued thereunder.” 6

But while Courts were some day to hold, and the Administrator finally recognized, see note 3, supra, that by-product operations carried on simultaneously to the point of the first non-perishable product were to have the § 7(c) “first processing” status, this was not the course followed as to citrus pulp. Almost immediately it was, as a practical matter, treated as something other than “first processing.” At least it was in the sense of the 1940 finding that first processing of fresh fruit was a branch of an industry and of a seasonal nature within § 7 (b)(3).

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Bluebook (online)
256 F.2d 832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/libby-mcneill-libby-v-james-p-mitchell-secretary-of-labor-united-ca5-1958.