Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC Group, Inc.

655 F. Supp. 897, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1097, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1992
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMarch 2, 1987
DocketCiv. A. 80-1568
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 655 F. Supp. 897 (Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC Group, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 897, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1097, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1992 (D.N.J. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, District Judge.

This case has had a tortuous and protracted life, having commenced in 1980. Trial on the issues at hand did not begin until May of 1985 and was heard as the court schedule permitted. It was completed in December of that year. I am pleased to now put those issues to rest.

This was a consolidated action brought by Materials Research Corporation (“MRC”), Libbey-Owens-Ford Company (“LOF”), Leybold-Heraeus, GmbH (“LH”) and Leybold-Heraeus Vacuum Systems, Inc. (“LHVS”) against the BOC Group, Inc. (“BOC”) seeking a declaratory judgment that United States Patent No. 4,166,018 is invalid and unenforceable.

The plaintiffs claim that the Chapin patent is invalid because it lacks novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and regardless of novelty would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, making it unpat-entable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The plaintiffs claim further that the patent is unenforceable because it was obtained as a result of inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the patent incorrectly names Chapin as the sole inventor, rendering it invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).

These claims present mixed questions of law and fact. They have been presented to the court for final adjudication. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982).

The opinion below sets out findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). My findings and conclusions are based on the testimony heard at trial, the exhibits in evidence, and the applicable law, including the United States patent laws, Title 35 of U.S. Code. The parties have aided the court tremendously with their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and their critiques of each other’s proposals.

*900 I. Factual Background

A. Parties

Plaintiff LOF is an Ohio corporation having a place of business at 811 Madison Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43695.

Plaintiff LH is a West German corporation having a place of business at 25 Wilhelm-Rohn Street, d-6450 Hanau 1, West Germany.

Plaintiff LHVS is a Delaware corporation having a place of business at 120 Post Road, Enfield, Connecticut 06082.

Defendant BOC is a Delaware corporation having a place of business at 85 Chestnut Ridge Road, Montvale, New Jersey 07645. BOC, formerly named Aireo, Incorporated (“Aireo”), is a wholly owned subsidiary of The BOC Group pic, a company organized and existing under the laws of England and having a place of business at Hammersmith House, London, England.

Defendant BOC is the present owner of United States Letters Patent No. 4,166,018 (“the Chapin patent” or “ '018 patent”) entitled “SPUTTERING PROCESS AND APPARATUS” which issued on August 28, 1979 to Aireo as assignee of John S. Cha-pin.

The Chapin patent describes and claims a device for coating objects with a very thin film of material. It also states a claim on the coating process, which uses the physical phenomenon of “sputtering”. The sputtering application most thoroughly discussed at trial was the manufacture of tinted or reflective architectural glass, the type of large plate glass that forms the exterior of many buildings. Through the claimed process, these pieces of glass are coated with a thin layer of metal. The metal used depends on the color desired. Other applicatipns range from coating the plastic tops of perfume bottles with a decorative layer of metal to coating machine tools with a thin layer of especially durable but expensive metal.

Plaintiffs LH and LHVS have been and are now engaged in the business of selling sputtering apparatus in the United States. LH and LHVS are designing and selling sputtering equipment for use in the semiconductor industry. This equipment is used to coat micro-chips and related devices. LH and LHVS are also designing and selling sputtering equipment for use in the glass coating industry. This equipment is used to coat large pieces of architectural glass. Plaintiff LOF has purchased and used sputtering equipment made by LH to coat architectural glass in the United States.

Originally, there were two actions brought by separate groups of plaintiffs for declaratory judgments that the Chapin patent was invalid and unenforceable and not infringed by the plaintiffs. (Civ. Action Nos. 80-648 & 80-1568). The plaintiffs also stated claims of patent misuse. The defendant raised counterclaims of infringement against all plaintiffs. On December 16, 1980, the cases were consolidated solely on the issues of validity and enforceability. (Order 12/16/80). The claims of infringement, which were different as to each plaintiff, were bifurcated and discovery on those issues stayed pending outcome of this action. On the first day of trial the plaintiffs dropped without prejudice their claim of patent misuse.

Prior to trial, Judge Biunno, to whom the case was at that time assigned, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the validity of the patent in an opinion dated September 13, 1983. Subsequently the case was reassigned to me. A trial without a jury was held in 1985 on the following dates: May 21, 23, 24, July 12,15 through 18, September 4 through 6 and December 10.

The Materials Research Corporation (“MRC”) was a plaintiff in this action, but following the complete trial on the merits and submission by the parties of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, including critiques of each other’s proposals, MRC settled its dispute with The BOC Group. (Civ. Action No. 80-648). MRC agreed that several of its sputter coating devices infringed the ’018 patent. An order issued on June 10, 1986 permanently enjoining MRC from making, using or selling planar magnetron sputter coating apparatus which infringes any claim or claims *901 of the ’018 patent. The order expressly stated that it could not be cited against third parties as an adjudication of the contested issues as to invalidity or infringement.

Several patents and technical publications were admitted into evidence as prior art to the Chapin patent. Both sides presented expert testimony evaluating this prior art. Other testimony and documentary evidence was presented on the issues of inequitable conduct before the PTO and the commercial success of the Chapin patent. Finally, the record was supplemented with the deposition testimony of several individuals.

B. Sputtering

Sputtering is a physical phenomenon in which a negatively charged electrode is disintegrated by positively charged gas ions violently colliding with it. This disintegration produces a shower of electrode' particles which coats objects placed in their path.

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655 F. Supp. 897, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1097, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1992, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/libbey-owens-ford-co-v-boc-group-inc-njd-1987.