2026 IL App (1st) 252276-U
FOURTH DIVISION
Order filed: August 27, 2026
No. 1-25-2276
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
RONALD LEZONA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 24 L 10038 )
RSD MASON & CENTRAL LLC, ) Honorable ) Kathy M. Flanagan,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE QUISH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint when defendant established that the alleged third-party tortfeasor was not an agent or employee of the defendant. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider.
¶2 Plaintiff Ronald Lezona (“Lezona”) 1 appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendant RSD Mason & Central LLC (“RSD”)
1 Lezona’s name appears in the record as both “Ronald Lezona” and “Ronald Lezona Effoua.” We use the version of his name that appears in the caption of his amended complaint.
and dismissing Lezona’s amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Lezona argues that the circuit court erred in granting RSD’s motion and denying his motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 The court dismissed Lezona’s initial complaint for failure to state a cause of action and gave him leave to amend. Lezona filed the operative amended complaint in September 2024. The amended complaint alleged that, on March 15, 2024, “(Landlord, Employer, Agent)” RSD “welcome[d]” Jermaine Fields “to perform work duties as a volunteer” at an apartment building on North Central Avenue in Chicago where Lezona lived. Fields also lived in that apartment building. Lezona alleged that Fields, “in the scope of his employment,” came to Lezona’s apartment and banged on the door. Lezona opened the door and confronted Fields. When Lezona went to the lobby to report Fields to “property management,” Fields “committed an aggravated battery” by striking Lezona in the head with a baseball bat. Lezona sought damages from RSD for “pain and suffering and mental distress and long term effects of head injury *** because it’s liable under vicarious liability or as an employer.”
¶4 RSD filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2024). RSD argued that it was not a landlord or in possession of the apartment building at the time of the incident, it did not have legal control of the property, and that Fields was not an agent or employee of RSD. Attached to the motion to dismiss was a declaration from Ayman Khalil, an operating manager at RSD. Khalil stated that RSD purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and did not obtain title to the property until May 2024, after the date of the alleged incident. Khalil averred that RSD did not welcome or consent to Fields residing at the property, and that Fields was never an agent or employee of RSD.
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¶5 Lezona argued, inter alia, in his “Motion & Affidavit/Affirmation” in response to RSD’s motion that his claim fell under the Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2024)) and that RSD owed a duty of reasonable care regarding “acts done or omitted” on the premises. Lezona stated that a property manager named “David,” an alleged RSD employee, informed him that Fields was “voluntarily performing work duties at the Premises.” He argued that RSD was liable under the Premises Liability Act for the “unsafe property conditions” and also vicariously liable for Fields because David exercised control over Fields’s actions. Lezona stated, “based on first hand information from David,” “Fields was not an employee of [RSD], but he was just working as a volunteer at the Premises.”
¶6 RSD argued in its reply that Lezona failed to plead specific facts establishing that Fields was acting as an agent of RSD, and Lezona merely stating the legal conclusion that Fields was working on behalf of RSD was not sufficient. RSD also pointed out that Lezona conceded that Fields was not an RSD employee in his response. RSD reiterated that it was not in control of the property on the date of the incident. Lezona filed a “Response to Defendant Reply” reiterating his assertion that RSD was vicariously liable for Fields’s conduct.
¶7 The circuit court granted RSD’s motion to dismiss, observing that Lezona did not state a claim for premises liability, as there was no allegation that Lezona was injured by a condition of the premises. Rather, he alleged he was injured by the intentional conduct of a third party. The court also found that there was no evidence that Fields was an employee or agent of RSD such that RSD could be held liable for Fields’s conduct. The court additionally held that the defects in Lezona’s complaint “can never be cured against this defendant,” and therefore, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
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¶8 Lezona filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court made an error of fact in its ruling because David, a purported RSD employee, authorized Fields to perform volunteer work duties on the property. Lezona also argued for the first time that RSD was liable due to its own negligent actions of hiring, supervising, or retaining Fields. He cited various criminal statutes and attached exhibits purporting to demonstrate that RSD took over management of the property before the date of the incident, and proof of his injuries. Lezona filed an accompanying “Memorandum of Law” citing various provisions of the Criminal Code and referencing purported cause of actions including “Aggravated battery,” “Criminal housing management,” and “Hate crime.”
¶9 Lezona filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order granting RSD’s motion to dismiss on November 10, 2025. On Lezona’s motion, this court stayed his appeal to allow the circuit court to resolve his motion to reconsider. On January 2, 2026, the circuit court denied his motion to reconsider, finding that Lezona failed to point to any change in or misapplication of existing law or any newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable. On January 7, 2026, Lezona filed an amended notice of appeal listing the circuit court’s orders granting RSD’s motion to dismiss and denying his motion to reconsider. Thus, we have jurisdiction to address his appeal. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. Jul. 1, 2017) (notice of appeal must be filed either within 30 days of a final judgment or “if a timely postjudgment motion directed against the judgment is filed *** within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order.”).
¶ 10 On appeal, Lezona argues that the circuit court erred by granting RSD’s motion to dismiss because RSD was vicariously liable for Fields’s actions, and erred by denying his motion to
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reconsider. RSD did not file an appearance or brief on appeal, so this court granted Lezona’s motion to take this appeal on his brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 11 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) seeks involuntary dismissal on the grounds that “[t]he claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2026). An “affirmative matter” is “something in the nature of a defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes critical conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). The affirmative matter must appear on the face of the complaint or in affidavits or other supporting evidence. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). When ruling on such a motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences that may rise from those facts, but cannot accept mere conclusions unsupported by specific facts. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. We review the circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Id.
¶ 12 First, we agree with the circuit court that Lezona’s amended complaint does not state a claim based on premises liability. While the amended complaint does not mention premises liability, Lezona’s response to RSD’s motion to dismiss and his brief on appeal assert that the Premises Liability Act applies. 740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2026). Setting aside the issue of whether RSD owned or had control over the property at the time, the amended complaint does not identify any condition of the premises that caused Lezona’s injury that would give rise to a premises liability claim. See Martin v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st) 221116, ¶ 22 (setting forth the elements of a premises liability claim). Instead, his complaint is solely based on an
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intentional tort committed by Fields, which does not fall under premises liability principles. See McKenna v. AlliedBarton Sec. Services, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133414, ¶ 22 (observing that, in a premises liability case, a landowner generally does not owe a duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party). Although there are certain exceptions, (see McKenna, 2015 IL App (1st) 133414, ¶ 22-23), Lezona does not allege any facts in his amended complaint to bring his claim within any of them. Thus, to the extent Lezona alleged a premises liability claim, the circuit court correctly dismissed it.
¶ 13 Lezona’s claim is better categorized as a vicarious liability or respondeat superior claim. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal or employer is subject to liability for the tortious conduct of its agent or employee only if the conduct falls within the scope of the agency or employment. Doe v. Lyft, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 191328, ¶ 19 (citing Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18). A party’s actions fall outside the scope of agency or employment if they are beyond the scope of conduct authorized by the principal or employer or too attenuated from a purpose to serve the principal or employer. Id.
¶ 14 Here, the amended complaint alleges in a conclusory fashion that Fields was a “volunteer” for RSD, RSD was his “Employer, Agent,” and that Fields committed a battery against Lezona “in the scope of his employment.” RSD rebutted Lezona’s legal conclusion in an affidavit from Khalil, in which he testified that Fields was never employed by, or an agent of, RSD. While Lezona maintained that Fields was a volunteer working for RSD in his response to the motion to dismiss, he did not provide any evidence to rebut Khalil’s affidavit that Fields was never an employee or agent of RSD. Lezona’s response instead asserts that Fields “was not an employee of the [RSD], but was just working as a volunteer at the Premises.” Lezona asserts this was “based on first hand
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information” Lezona obtained from someone named “David,” who Lezona asserts is a “Property manager or Company employee.”
¶ 15 While we are required to take all well-pled allegations in the amended complaint as true, we are not required to accept Lezona’s legal conclusion that Fields was a volunteer or employee of RSD without any supporting facts. Patrick Engineering, Inc., 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. We are likewise not required to accept the statements in Lezona’s response affidavit that Fields was a “volunteer” or that David was an RSD employee, which are conclusory and based on inadmissible hearsay. See id.; Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 191(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) (affidavit filed in opposition to section 2-619 motion to dismiss “shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence”). Additionally, Lezona never states that Fields was working as a volunteer on behalf of RSD, only that he was a volunteer “at the Premises.” Lezona failed to allege any facts to support his conclusion that Fields was an agent or employee of RSD, or that Fields was acting within the scope of any such agency or employment when he hit Lezona on the head with a baseball bat. Therefore, RSD met its burden, through Khalil’s affidavit, to show that Fields was not an employee, agent, or volunteer of RSD, and the circuit court correctly dismissed Lezona’s claim.
¶ 16 Lezona’s brief cites numerous municipal ordinances and statutes that he asserts apply to his claim, including section 5-14-050 of the Chicago Municipal Code, which allows for tenant relocation assistance for foreclosed properties. Chicago Municipal Code § 5-14-050 (added July 21, 2021). However, the amended complaint makes no reference to any claim under the Municipal Code, so it is unclear what relevance, if any, that provision has to Lezona’s claim.
¶ 17 Lezona also argues that he is not seeking damages due to a voluntary act by Fields, but due to RSD’s responsibility for its own negligent actions in hiring, supervising, and retaining
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employees. See, e.g., Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, ¶ 33. Lezona raised this theory for the first time in his motion to reconsider, and it does not appear either in his original or amended complaint. As such, Lezona has forfeited this argument. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 36 (“Arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration in the circuit court are forfeited on appeal.”).
¶ 18 In light of Khalil’s affidavit establishing that Fields was not an agent or employee of RSD, and Lezona’s failure to contradict that affidavit with any evidence, Lezona cannot maintain a claim against RSD for Fields’s conduct based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. As such, the circuit court properly dismissed Lezona’s amended complaint.
¶ 19 In his brief, Lezona asserts facts related to a separate eviction action which is not involved in this appeal. He also argues that his “case concerns a fundamental violation of due process because his right to present arguments or to be heard was deprived” and “judges violated the requirement for impartial tribunal,” but cites no authority to support his claims. Accordingly, they are forfeited. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (The argument portion of a brief “shall contain the contentions * * * and the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities * * *.”); Velocity Investments, LLC v. Alston, 397 Ill. App. 3d 296, 297 (2010).
¶ 20 We next address Lezona’s argument that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to reconsider. “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to a court’s attention: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) changes in the law; or (3) errors in the court’s previous application of existing law.” Liceaga v. Baez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181170, ¶ 25. When the motion is based on additional facts, new arguments, or new legal theories that were not previously presented, the circuit court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 26. An abuse of discretion occurs
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when the circuit court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court. Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 21 Lezona’s motion to reconsider presented new evidence and legal theories for the first time without a statement that he could not have raised them before or explanation as to why he could not do so. There was also no suggestion that any of the evidence attached to the motion was newly discovered. Even if we considered this evidence, none of it plausibly establishes that Fields was an agent or employee of RSD such that RSD could be held liable for Fields’s intentional conduct. While Lezona asserted that “David” authorized Fields to work on the property, he did not support that assertion with any evidence to support his conclusion that David was an RSD employee. He also has no admissible evidence to contradict Khalil’s testimony that Fields was not employed by or an agent of RSD. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of Lezona’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 22 In his brief on appeal, Lezona recites multiple provisions of the Criminal Code regarding mental states and asserts that Fields committed a hate crime against him. See 720 ILCS 5/4 (West 2026). He also cites to the section in the Criminal Code for the offense of “Criminal housing management.” 720 ILCS 5/12-5.1 (West 2026). These provisions do not appear in the amended complaint, and Lezona does not explain why these provisions are relevant to his civil lawsuit for money damages against RSD. Additionally, his amended complaint did not allege that Fields’s conduct constituted a hate crime or how that is relevant to a claim against RSD. Lezona has not shown that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reconsider.
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 24 Affirmed.