OPINION
BRAMMER, Judge.
¶ 1 This is the third appeal stemming from a tax lien foreclosure and redemption of real property located in Pinal County. See generally Leveraged Land Co. v. Hodges (Hodges II), No. 2 CA-CV 2009-0057, 2009 WL 3087551 (memorandum decision filed Sept. 24, 2009); Leveraged Land Co. v. Hodges (Hodges I), No. 2 CA-CV 2006-0210, 2007 WL 5556356 (memorandum decision filed Aug. 8, 2007).1 After protracted litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees Michael Hodges and David Cain and quieted title to the land in Cain’s name. Appellants Raven II Holdings, L.L.C., and Hanna 120 Holdings, L.L.C., (collectively “Raven”) and Bingham Arizona Land, L.L.C., challenge the court’s grant of summary judgment claiming they were bona fide purchasers of the property. Bingham also challenges the award of attorney fees to Hodges and Cain. Appellants Leveraged Land Company, L.L.C., and Norman and Cheryl Montgomery (collectively “LLC”) challenge the court’s denial of nearly all their requested attorney fees from Hodges and Cain. We vacate the court’s award of attorney fees to LLC and remand the case to the trial court to determine a reasonable fee award, but otherwise affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ 2 The background of this case is set forth in our prior memorandum decisions and may be summarized, in relevant part, as follows. In June 2005, after Hodges had been served [445]*445with notice by publication of a tax lien redemption foreclosure, a default judgment was entered in favor of LLC, and it took title to his land. Hodges I, No. 2 CA-CV 2006-0210, ¶ 2. LLC subsequently sold the land to Raven, and Raven conveyed a partial interest in the property to Bingham in February 2007.
¶ 3 In November 2005, Hodges moved to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process. Id. ¶ 3. He also moved for a new trial on the ground that he was able to redeem the tax lien. Id. ¶¶ 3, 10. LLC and Raven, the intervening party, successfully opposed the motions below. On appeal, we determined that service by publication was appropriate and that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. We reversed the court's denial of Hodges’s motion for a new trial and, because Hodges timely had shown he was able to redeem the tax liens, remanded the case to the trial court to allow him to do so. Id. ¶¶ 15-16,18-19.
¶ 4 On remand, the trial court granted a new trial and entered an order restoring Hodges’s right to redeem the tax liens. Hodges II, No. 2 CA-CV 2009-0057, ¶4. Hodges then redeemed the tax liens with money provided by Cain, his successor in interest, who had been permitted to intervene in the action. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 15. LLC then filed a complaint against Hodges and Cain, challenging the validity of Hodges’s redemption. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Hodges and Cain, dismissed the claims in LLC’s amended complaint, and entered judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Hodges II, No. 2 CA-CV 2009-0057, ¶¶ 5, 7. As it did below, LLC challenged Hodges’s redemption on appeal, and we affirmed. Id. ¶ 1.
¶ 5 While Hodges II was pending, Hodges and Cain moved for summary judgment against Raven and Bingham, asking the trial court to quiet title to the property in Cain. The court granted the motion, rejecting arguments by Raven and Bingham that they were bona fide purchasers of the land. In its final judgment, the court ordered Bingham and Raven to pay Hodges and Cain their attorney fees. It also required Hodges and Cain to pay $1,500 of LLC’s attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-18206. LLC, Raven, and Bingham filed separate appeals, which we have consolidated.
Discussion
Bona Fide Purchasers
¶ 6 Raven and Bingham challenge the trial court’s finding that they were not bona fide purchasers of the subject property. “The term ‘bona fide purchaser’ is often used to refer to one who purchases property for value and without notice” of another’s interest in it. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394, ¶ 12, 187 P.3d 1107, 1111 (2008); see also Davis v. Kleindienst, 64 Ariz. 251, 258, 169 P.2d 78, 82 (1946); Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 263, 798 P.2d 395, 401 (App.1990). Raven claims it lacked the requisite notice because, when it purchased the land from LLC, Hodges merely had a potential interest in the property but had not actually asserted a claim to it. Bingham argues it lacked notice because neither Hodges nor Cain recorded a lis pendens pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1191. Both appellants’ arguments are unavailing in light of our prior decisions and the case law cited therein.
¶ 7 In Hodges I, we held Rule 59(j)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and A.R.S. § 12-1560(A) give a person served by publication one year to appear and redeem tax liens. Hodges I, No. 2 CA-CV 2006-0210, ¶¶ 11-12. “Under Southwest Metals [Co. v. Snedaker, 59 Ariz. 374, 129 P.2d 314 (1942) ], the end result of a successful Rule 59(j) challenge is restoration of a defendant’s right to redeem under what is now § 42-18206.” Hodges I, No. 2 CA-CV 2006-0210, ¶ 18. The party prevailing under a Rule 59(j) motion is placed in the same legal position he would have been in had he appeared before the entry of default judgment. See Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d 911, 914 (2003). Hence, “[pjurehasing a tax lien entails risk[,] and the onus is on the purchaser to protect its own interests.” PLM Tax Certificate Program 1991-92, L.P. v. Schweikert, 216 Ariz. 47, ¶ 23, 162 P.3d 1267, 1271 (App.2007).
[446]*446¶ 8 As the trial court observed here, the treasurer’s deed obtained by LLC was recorded properly and the default judgment was attached to it, serving as constructive notice to all persons of its existence. See A.R.S. § 33-416. LLC, Raven, and Bingham thereby were made aware of the legal consequences of a successful Rule 59(j) motion by Hodges. See Conway v. State Consol. Pub. Co., 57 Ariz. 162, 171, 112 P.2d 218, 222 (1941) (“Every one is presumed to know the law.”). Rejecting LLC’s equitable arguments concerning the validity of the redemption in Hodges II, we stated:
Despite obtaining a default judgment to foreclose Hodges’s right of redemption, LLC knew the judgment obtained would remain vulnerable to a Rule 59(j) motion for a new trial for up to one year. Thus, the risk of disruptions to any subsequent conveyances of the foreclosed property fell squarely on LLC and its successors-in-interest.
2 CA-CV 2009-0057, ¶ 16.
¶ 9 In sum, Raven and Bingham had notice of Hodges’s interest in the property and, therefore, were not bona fide purchasers. This is the law of the case as provided by Hodges I. See Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Indus. Comm’n, 149 Ariz. 480, 482, 720 P.2d 81, 83 (1986) (explaining “the decision of a court in a case is the law of that case on the issues decided throughout all subsequent proceedings in both the trial and appellate courts, provided the facts, issues and evidence are substantially the same as those upon which the first decision rested”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hodges and Cain and quieting title in Cain.
Attorney Fees Against Bingham.
¶ 10 Bingham claims the trial court erred in ordering it to pay attorney fees to Cain because Cain’s application for fees was untimely under Rule 54(g)(2), Ariz. R. Civ. P.2 The interpretation of Rule 54(g)(2) is a question of law, which we review de novo, although we review the court’s application of the rule for an abuse of discretion. See King v. Titsworth, 221 Ariz. 597, ¶ 8, 212 P.3d 935, 936 (App.2009).
¶ 11 Rule 54(g)(2) provides that a “motion for attorneys’ fees shall be filed within 20 days from the clerk’s mailing of a decision on the merits of the cause, unless extended by the trial court.” Thus, the rule plainly gives the trial court the discretion to extend the time for requesting attorney fees and, absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the court’s ruling. See Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, ¶¶ 60, 62, 224 P.3d 960, 976-77 (App.2010). On February 11, 2009, the court mailed its decision quieting title and ruling on the various motions for summary judgment.3 Cain had requested attorney fees in his answer, and the form of judgment he lodged January 27 specified he would be filing a motion for fees. Before that occurred, however, LLC filed a motion for costs and attorney fees. Cain and Hodges requested a hearing on the issue and the court scheduled oral argument for April 3, 2009, regarding the forms of judgment and the motion for attorney fees. It ordered the parties “to meet and confer regarding the form of judgment to determine if a stipulated judgment may be entered in this matter with the issue of fees being left in blank for the Court to insert.”
¶ 12 Cain filed his motion for attorney fees on the day of the hearing. He had mailed it to the parties two days earlier. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement and permitted Bingham to file a response. In its response, Bingham’s only objection to awarding Cain his fees was that Cain’s motion had been filed untimely. The court disagreed and [447]*447granted the motion, awarding Cain attorney fees.
¶ 13 As noted, Rule 54(g)(2) gives a trial court discretion to extend the time for filing a motion for fees. See Aztar Corp., 223 Ariz. 463, ¶ 60, 224 P.3d at 976. Here, the trial court implicitly extended the twenty-day time limit to April 3, the date of the hearing. Because Bingham was given the opportunity to object to Cain’s motion for attorney fees both during the hearing on the motion and in its written response, we cannot find the court abused its discretion in extending the time for filing the motion. See id. ¶ 62 (finding trial court did not abuse discretion by granting untimely application for attorney fees given absence of prejudice to opposing party resulting from extension of time limit). Nor did the court abuse its discretion by failing to specify its reasons for extending the time for filing the motion. Cf. Nat’l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, ¶ 38, 119 P.3d 477, 485 (App.2005) (trial court does not abuse discretion “by summarily overruling objections to an untimely statement of costs”).
¶ 14 Bingham further argues the trial court committed reversible error in awarding-attorney fees in the quiet title action pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1103 because Cain did not tender five dollars along with a request for the execution of a quit claim deed as required by § 12-1103(B). See Lange v. Lotzer, 151 Ariz. 260, 262, 727 P.2d 38, 40 (App.1986) (holding payment of five dollars to other party prerequisite for recovering attorney fees pursuant to § 12-1103(B)). We review a fee award under this statute for an abuse of discretion. See Sonnenberg v. Ashby, 17 Ariz.App. 60, 62, 495 P.2d 500, 502 (1972). We find no such abuse here.
¶ 15 The record supports the trial court’s findings that Cain’s counsel sent Bingham correspondence that included a quit claim deed and a cheek for five dollars. Although “Bingham speeulate[d] the cheek may not have been enclosed,” the court found such speculation insufficient and noted it was “not inclined to believe the allegations that no check[ ] w[as] enclosed.” As the trier of fact, the court was in the best position to assess and resolve the conflicting evidence, and we defer to its determination that Cain had complied with § 12-1103(B). See Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz. 473, 479-80, 711 P.2d 612, 618-19 (App.1985) (credibility determinations made by trier of fact).
¶ 16 Bingham alternatively argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees under § 12-1103 because litigation in this case was unavoidable and involved novel legal questions. It contends granting a fee award in such circumstances would discourage parties from asserting meritorious claims and defenses. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985) (identifying factors that may lead court not to award discretionary attorney fees). The court considered these arguments below, necessarily rejecting them, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Attorney Fees to LLC
¶ 17 The sole issue LLC raises on appeal concerns the trial court’s award to it of attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-18206. Although LLC had requested attorney fees of $153,182, the court deemed this amount “unreasonable” and awarded it $1,500. LLC argues this constituted reversible error because the amount was arbitrary and had no reasonable basis. Our analysis of this issue revolves around our construction of § 42-18206, which provides:
Any person who is entitled to redeem under article 4 of this chapter may redeem at any time before judgment is entered, notwithstanding that an action has been commenced, but if the person who redeems has been served personally or by publication in the action, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff against the person for the costs incurred by the plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney fee to be determined by the court.
Although the court was required to award LLC attorney fees, the amount of fees it deemed reasonable and awarded was for it to determine in the exercise of its discretion; absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the court’s ruling. See Moedt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 Ariz. 100, ¶ 17, 60 P.3d 240, 244-45 (App.2002) (“When provided [448]*448with discretion to calculate the amount of fees to grant, the court may award less than the requested amount, a calculation not disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion.”).
¶ 18 The affidavit counsel for LLC filed with LLC’s application for attorney fees in accordance with Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 673 P.2d 927 (App.1983), shows the attorney fees requested were incurred after the original default judgment had been entered in its ultimately unsuccessful attempts to prevent Hodges from redeeming the property. Hodges argues § 42-18206 permits recovery only of those fees LLC incurred in obtaining the tax lien judgment, but not any fees it incurred in opposing redemption.
¶ 19 Persons with an interest in property who are ready, willing, and able to redeem their tax liens have a right to do so. Sw. Metals Co., 59 Ariz. at 390, 129 P.2d at 321. This right exists for up to one year if default judgment has been entered after that party was served by publication. See id. at 380, 389, 129 P.2d at 317, 321 (interpreting former A.R.S. § 21-1309, now contained in A.R.S. § 12-1560(A) and Rule 59(j)(1)). The issue with which we have been presented is whether a party such as Hodges, who successfully redeems property from a tax lien foreclosure judgment, is required by § 42-18206 to pay the attorney fees reasonably incurred by the judgment holder, here LLC, in resisting the redemption.
¶ 20 To resolve this issue, we must determine the meaning of the language in § 42-18206, which is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166,168 (2007). In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we determine the legislature’s intent in drafting it and give effect to that intent. Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, ¶ 8, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006). The best indicator of that intent is the clear language of the statute based on the ordinary meaning of the terms used. See State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 296, 413 P.2d 757, 763 (1966). If a statute is unambiguous and the meaning of its terms clear, we employ no other principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. See Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003); State v. Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, ¶ 16, 225 P.3d 1131, 1137 (App.2009); see also Jones v. Paniagua, 221 Ariz. 441, ¶ 19 & n. 5, 212 P.3d 133, 138-39 & n. 5 (App.2009) (finding reliance on constitutional and legislative history unnecessary to interpret statutory and constitutional provisions in light of provisions’ plain meaning).
¶ 21 Section 42-18206 states that, upon redemption, “judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff [here, LLC] against the person [redeeming] for the costs incurred by the plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney fee to be determined by the court.” The statute is not ambiguous and we need not look beyond its plain language to determine the legislature’s intent.4 Nor is there anything in the statute that suggests there is a temporal limit to its application, or that it only applies to certain matters and not others.
¶22 For this reason, we reject Hodges’s argument that LLC’s right to attorney fees ended when it obtained the default judgment foreclosing Hodges’s right to redeem. The trial court effectively set aside the default judgment when it granted, pursuant to our mandate, Hodges’s motion for new trial. See Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d 911, 914 (2003) (grant of new trial effectively vacates original judgment and places parties in position occupied before entry of judgment). In any event, LLC’s default judgment was superseded entirely by the court’s disposal of all of LLC’s claims, leaving open only the question whether it was entitled to attorney fees and, if so, how much.
¶23 Moreover, Hodges’s proposed interpretation of the statute would yield different results if the property owner sought redemption before a default judgment was entered rather than seeking redemption only after such a judgment is entered following the grant of a motion for new trial. Under [449]*449Hodges’s interpretation, if a plaintiff filed an action to foreclose a property owner’s right to redeem, and the property owner sought to defend that action by redeeming the lien before a default judgment was entered, the plaintiff would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred in contesting the redemption. But if the property owner delayed his or her attempt to redeem and filed a motion for new trial after the entry of a default judgment, he or she would be protected from - the obligation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees expended contesting the redemption. We can see no reasoned basis for making a plaintiffs right to recover attorney fees conditioned on the timing of the property owner’s attempt to redeem. See Lake Havasu City v. Mohave County, 138 Ariz. 552, 557, 675 P.2d 1371, 1376 (App.1983) (“Statutes must be given a sensible construction which will avoid absurd results.”).
¶ 24 Hodges also appears to suggest a plaintiffs right to attorney fees ends when the property owner makes his or her intent to redeem known. We find no support for this argument in the plain language of § 42-18206. Nor do we find any reasoned basis to engraft such a limitation on the statute, even if we had authority to do so. See Bilke, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d at 271 (“If the [statutory] language is clear, the court must ‘apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation.’”), quoting Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). As this ease amply demonstrates, whether a property owner properly can redeem is not always clear. The plaintiff should not be discouraged from litigating that question fully and reasonably. Although we recognize that public policy favors redemption, see Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 83 Ariz. 181, 185, 318 P.2d 359, 362 (1957), the legislature clearly has made the public policy choice that the plaintiff must be made whole before redemption is complete.5 As our supreme court observed in Southwest Metals Co., 59 Ariz. at 390-91, 129 P.2d at 321-22, “[i]f redemption is made, plaintiff will receive all that he has expended,” and that the defense of redemption to a foreclosure action requires the property owner to not only pay the “amount required for redemption of the property” but also “the costs incurred by plaintiff and a reasonable attorney’s fee.” And, “the onus is on the purchaser [of a tax lien] to protect its own interests.” PLM Tax Certificate Program 1991-92, L.P., 216 Ariz. 47, ¶ 23, 162 P.3d at 1271. Section 42-18206 contemplates compensating the purchaser its reasonable attorney fees in meeting this obligation.
¶25 We conclude that, based on the unambiguous terms of the statute, the trial court was required to award LLC its “reasonable” attorney fees.6 Indeed, the court concluded LLC was entitled to its fees, just not the amount it had sought. But the court abused its discretion by awarding LLC $1,500 in attorney fees. If the award was to [450]*450compensate LLC for fees incurred in connection with obtaining the tax lien judgment, the award cannot be justified because the affidavit and application for fees filed in the trial court did not relate to that work. Accordingly, the court must have intended to award LLC attorney fees incurred in resisting the redemption. But, because the application for fees and supporting affidavit establish significantly more than $1,500 in fees had been incurred, the court erred in awarding that amount.
¶ 26 In awarding LLC $1,500, the trial court found the amount LLC had requested was “unreasonable,” adding that it was not “inclined to award costs for [its] unsuccessful appeal ... on the primary issue contested.” But the court gave no reason for awarding LLC $1,500.7 Moreover, the fact that a position advanced by the judgment-holder ultimately was unsuccessful does not require the conclusion it is not entitled to statutorily mandated attorney fees reasonably incurred supporting that position. Indeed, the statute provides attorney fees be recovered by the plaintiff only in the event the plaintiff fails to foreclose the property because the defendant successfully had redeemed the lien. Thus, § 42-18206, unlike other fee-shifting provisions, specifically contemplates that a plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees despite ultimately having been unsuccessful in the underlying litigation.8 Because the court apparently based its conclusion on the erroneous assumption that LLC necessarily was not entitled to fees for an “unsuccessful appeal,” the court abused its discretion. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 285 (2003) (trial court abuses discretion when it commits legal error in reaching discretionary conclusion).
¶ 27 Moreover, the trial court denied Hodges’s motion for new trial and determined that service by publication had been effective. Although we reversed the denial of Hodges’s motion for new trial on appeal, we affirmed the court’s determination that service by publication had been effective. Even a conservative evaluation of LLC’s fee affidavit establishes it incurred a minimum of $10,000 in attorney fees litigating those issues in the trial court. Given that the court initially agreed with LLC’s position on these issues, the court’s apparent later determination that the majority of those fees were unreasonable is not supported by the record.9
¶ 28 Hodges asserts we can affirm the award in any event because the positions [451]*451LLC had taken below were “frivolous.” But the court made no such finding; indeed, the court denied the motion for sanctions Hodges brought on that basis. Moreover, nothing in the record supports Hodges’s assertion that LLC’s legal positions plainly were baseless. Indeed, many of the issues raised implicated questions of first impression that this court decided on appeal. Although LLC did not prevail, the arguments raised in those appeals were not frivolous.
¶29 We also reject Hodges’s argument that LLC was not entitled to fees because they had been paid by its former title insurance carrier and there had been no “subrogation of LLC’s rights to its ... insurer.” The trial court rejected this argument. As LLC points out, no award of fees would be justified if Hodges were correct. Because Hodges did not cross-appeal from the court’s award of attorney fees, he has waived this argument on appeal. See Bills v. Arizona Bd. of Educ., 169 Ariz. 366, 369-70, 819 P.2d 952, 955-56 (App.1991) (absent cross-appeal, appellee may not raise cross-issue that “result] in enlargement of appellee’s rights or a lessening of appellant’s rights on appeal”), quoting Bowman v. Bd. of Regents, 162 Ariz. 551, 559, 785 P.2d 71, 79 (App.1989). Finally, Hodges’s argument that LLC is not entitled to attorney fees because it “abandoned” its foreclosure action in its first amended complaint is unsupported by the record.
¶30 Because the trial court will be required to determine upon remand the amount of attorney fees LLC may recover for its continued resistance to redemption, we address that issue now. LLC clearly had the right to ensure that Hodges’s redemption claim was valid, and it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred in contesting that issue. At some point in the proceedings, however, it arguably became apparent to all concerned not only that Hodges had a right to redeem the property, but also that LLC’s further resistance was unreasonable. Because § 42-18206 requires recovery of only reasonable fees, it is for the trial court to determine when and the extent to which it became unreasonable for LLC to pursue its position.
¶ 31 The trial court need not find LLC’s legal positions frivolous or baseless in order to conclude the fees it incurred advancing or defending those positions were unreasonable. Instead, the court must determine whether LLC’s objections to Hodges’s attempt to redeem were sufficiently reasonable and meritorious to justify expenditure of the fees LLC claims.10 We recognize this approach gives the court considerable discretion to determine an appropriate fee award. But, as we have explained, nothing in the statute’s language compels the conclusion that attorney fees expended after a specific point in the foreclosure litigation are, in all cases, unrecoverable. Instead, the statute requires a trial court to determine a reasonable fee award and, in doing so here, to consider the reasonableness of the positions advanced by LLC throughout the ease.
Attorney Fees to Bingham
¶ 32 On appeal, Bingham requests attorney fees and costs incurred in the trial court pursuant to § 42-18206. Bingham has neither asserted on appeal that it requested fees and costs below nor provided citations to the record demonstrating that it raised this issue there, as required by Rule 13(a)(6), Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. And, a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Lemons v. Showcase Motors, Inc., 207 Ariz. 537, 541 n. 1, 88 P.3d 1149, 1153 n. 1 (App.2004). Consequently, we do not address this issue on appeal. We deny Bingham’s separate request for attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
Disposition
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees to LLC and remand this matter to the trial court with direction to reconsider LLC’s request for attorney fees and enter an award that is consistent with this decision. In all other respects, we affirm. We grant Hodg[452]*452es’s and Cain’s request for costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to § 12-1103(B), as against Raven and Bing-ham, upon compliance with the requirements of Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. The award shall compensate Hodges and Cain for all arguments raised in the answering brief, notwithstanding Raven’s partial withdrawal of its legal argument by motion filed October 21, 2009. Their request for sanctions against Raven and Bingham is denied.
CONCURRING: VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge.