Lettieri v. Four in One

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 19, 2024·No. 4:24-cv-02898·Unknown

Opinion

DAVID C. LETTIERI, Case No. 24-cv-02898-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA v. PAUPERIS SHOULD NOT BE DENIED

FOUR IN ONE, Re: Dkt. Nos. 2, 5 Defendant.

Plaintiff filed this pro se complaint alleging negligence and diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. Nos. 2, 5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause why his requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should not be denied pursuant to the three strikes provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. I. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) This action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”) which became effective on April 26, 1996. The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, i.e., may not proceed in forma pauperis, “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action . . . in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under Section 1915(g), the Ninth Circuit the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and apparently means the same thing. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) ( “Andrews I”). A case “is frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). “A case is malicious if it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g). Rather, § 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. at 1121. A district court is not required to announce in an order that its dismissal constitutes a strike under Section 1915(g) for that dismissal to later count as a strike. Id. at 1119 n.8. In determining whether a prior dismissal counts as a strike, the Court “should look to the substance of the dismissed lawsuit, and not to how the district court labelled or styled the dismissal.” Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). To be counted as a strike, a case must be dismissed in its entirety as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim. Id. at 674. A dismissal based solely on a finding that the plaintiff previously incurred at least three strikes, without any additional finding that the action is itself frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim, does not count as an additional strike under § 1915(g). El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). Generally speaking, a dismissal based on immunity does not constitute a strike because § 1915(g) omits the immunity language as a ground for a strike. Harris, 935 F.3d at 675. There are rare cases where immunity may be so clear on the face of the complaint that dismissal may qualify as a strike for failure to state a claim, or where immunity is so obvious that the suit is frivolous and dismissal counts as a strike. Id. at 676. “But these are exceptional cases where the affirmative defense is readily apparent without resort to any additional information outside the four corners of the complaint. Such will rarely be the case with immunity-based defenses.” Id.; see Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2022) (dismissal on basis of prosecutorial immunity for contents of government’s appellate brief constituted strike). “imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing of the complaint. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). The conditions that existed at some earlier or later time are not relevant. Id. at 1053 & n.5 (post-filing transfer of prisoner out of prison at which danger allegedly existed may have mooted request for injunctive relief against alleged danger, but did not affect Section 1915(g) analysis). “[T]he imminent danger exception to the PLRA three-strikes provision requires a nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged in the complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2022). The court “should not make an overly detailed inquiry into whether the allegations qualify for the [imminent danger] exception.” Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1055. It is sufficient if the complaint “makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Id. The Ninth Circuit requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of Section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that Section 1915(g) does not bar in forma pauperis status for him. Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. Andrews I implicitly allows the Court to sua sponte raise the Section 1915(g) issue, but requires the Court to notify the prisoner of the earlier dismissals it considers to support a Section 1915(g) dismissal and allow the prisoner an opportunity to be heard on the matter before dismissing the action. Id. A dismissal under Section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action in forma pauperis under Section 1915(g). However, the prisoner may still pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the action. II. Plaintiff’s Litigation History Plaintiff is a frequent litigant. Plaintiff has filed at least 128 civil actions in the federal district courts since 2022, including this action. See PACER Case Locator (last visited June 20, 2024); see also Lettieri v. City of Binghamton, C No. 24-cv-0074 (TJM/ML), Dkt. No. 4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024) (listing seventy-seven federal actions filed by Plaintiff between 2022 and up to January 17, 2024).1 In at least three of these cases, Plaintiff has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Lettieri v. Suffolk Cty Police, C No. 24-cv-30402 (HG) (MMH), 2024 WL 2319707 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2024); Lettieri v. Broome Cnty. Humane Soc’y, C Nos. 20-cv-7777, 23-cv-7830, 2023 WL 7017081, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2023), denying recons., 2023 WL 8003478, (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2023); Lettieri v. Broome Cnty. Humane Soc’y, C No. 23-cv-1223, 2023 WL 9066861, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2023); Lettieri v. Auricchio, C No. 23-CV-1121, 2023 WL 9066873, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2023).

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Related

Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md
833 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Tommie Harris v. K. Harris
935 F.3d 670 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Edward Ray, Jr. v. E. Lara
31 F.4th 692 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)