1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL Case No.: 19-cv-1082-AJB-AHG SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of 12 themselves and others similarly ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 situated, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 14 Plaintiffs, AND STAYING ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF 15 v. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 16 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 10, (Doc. No. 216) 17 inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend the First Amended 21 Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“FACC”). (Doc. No. 261.) Plaintiffs seek leave to 22 name Plaintiff David Huffstetler, the current representative of the certified South Carolina 23 class, as the representative of the Maine class. (Doc. No. 216.) Plaintiffs propose no other 24 substantive changes to the complaint. (See Doc. Nos. 216; 216-1.) Defendant Ford Motor 25 Company (“Ford”) opposed the motion (Doc. No. 223), Plaintiffs replied (Doc. No. 226), 26 and Ford subsequently objected to Plaintiffs’ reply arguing that Plaintiffs impermissibly 27 raise new arguments on reply. (Doc. No. 227). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 28 DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The underlying facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See, e.g., 3 Doc. No. 202.) In brief, Plaintiffs William Lessin, Carol Smalley, Patrick and Sheri 4 Powers, Lloyd Atterson, Brad Nielsen, David Appel, John Kigin, Susanne Hamilton, Steve 5 Selgado, Roger Saddler, Caroline McGee, and David Huffstetler (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 6 filed suit against Ford for alleged latent defects in four generations of Ford F-250 and F-350 7 trucks (“Class Vehicles”). (Doc. Nos. 44 at 7; 120-1 at 11.)1 8 Plaintiffs allege the Class Vehicles suffer from one or more defects in their 9 suspension and steering linkage systems, including, but not limited to, abnormal wearing 10 and/or loosening of the track bar bushing, steering damper, the ball joints, control arms, 11 shock absorbers, and/or struts (the “Suspension Defect”). (Doc. No. 44 ¶ 155.) The 12 Suspension Defect may result in severe shaking and oscillation of the steering wheel, which 13 Plaintiffs refer to as the “Death Wobble” or “Shimmy.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert the 14 Shimmy “often causes drivers to lose control of the Class Vehicles and causes difficulty 15 steering during their operation and under normal driving conditions or speeds[,]” exposing 16 drivers and others sharing the road with them to increased risk of accident, injury, or death. 17 (Id.) As alleged in the FACC, Plaintiffs allege claims on behalf of the following classes: 18 (1) a Nationwide Class, (2) California Class, (3) Arizona Class, (4) Colorado Class, (5) 19 Illinois Class, (6) Indiana Class, (7) Maine Class, (8) New Mexico Class, (9) Ohio Class, 20 (10) South Carolina Class, and (11) Texas Class. 21 On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 22 120.) That same day, Ford filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 122.) Both 23 motions were fully briefed. (See Doc. Nos. 136; 141; 154; 157.) On November 7, 2024, the 24 Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part both Ford’s motion for summary 25 judgment and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (the “November 7 Order”). (Doc. 26 No. 202.) Relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claims under 27 1 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 28 1 South Carolina and Maine law survived summary judgment. (Id. at 70–73.) Additionally, 2 the November 7 Order certified the South Carolina class and found that Plaintiff Huffstetler 3 met the requirements to be the class representative. (Id. at 11–13.) However, the Court 4 found that the proposed representative for the Maine class was atypical and did “not fit the 5 requirements of the class definition.” (Id. at 48.) The Court stated that if Plaintiffs so chose, 6 the Court would grant Plaintiffs leave to substitute another class representative for the 7 Maine class. (Id.) The instant motion to amend follows. 8 II. LEAVE TO AMEND 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which governs requests for leave to amend 11 pleadings, provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 13 2003). Leave to amend should be granted with “extreme liberality” in order “to facilitate 14 decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” U.S. v. Webb, 655 15 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the burden of persuading the Court that leave 16 should not be granted rests with the non-moving party. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 17 Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186–87 (9th Cir. 1987). 18 When a pretrial scheduling order has been issued and the deadline for amending the 19 pleadings has passed, resolution of a motion to amend is further governed by Rule 16 of 20 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 21 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b) provides that “[a] schedule shall not be modified 22 except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 16(b)(4). In interpreting the “good cause” requirement under Rule 16(b), the Court 24 considers, primarily, “the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 25 F.2d at 609. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the 26 modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 27 28 1 upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, 2 the inquiry should end.” Id. (citation omitted).2 3 B. Discussion 4 Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to substitute Plaintiff David 5 Huffstetler, the current representative of the certified South Carolina class, as the 6 representative of the Maine class. (Doc. No. 216.) Plaintiffs contend that Huffstetler, a 7 South Carolina resident who has no connection with Maine, may represent the Maine class 8 under the Second Circuit’s holding in Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., 9 897 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2018). Ford opposes Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend arguing 10 that amendment would be futile because Huffstetler cannot serve as a class representative 11 for the Maine class. (Doc. No. 223 at 13.) Ford contends that because Huffstetler is not a 12 member of the Maine class, he cannot serve as Maine’s class representative. (Id.) The Court 13 agrees. 14 The Supreme Court has identified several factors, known as the Foman factors, 15 which district courts should consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend: 16 (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay or dilatory motive on the part of 17 the movant; (3) repeated failure on the part of the movant to cure deficiencies by 18 amendments previously allowed; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 19 allowance of the amendment; and (5) futility of the amendment. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d 20 at 1052 (citing Foman v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL Case No.: 19-cv-1082-AJB-AHG SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of 12 themselves and others similarly ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 situated, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 14 Plaintiffs, AND STAYING ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF 15 v. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 16 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 10, (Doc. No. 216) 17 inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend the First Amended 21 Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“FACC”). (Doc. No. 261.) Plaintiffs seek leave to 22 name Plaintiff David Huffstetler, the current representative of the certified South Carolina 23 class, as the representative of the Maine class. (Doc. No. 216.) Plaintiffs propose no other 24 substantive changes to the complaint. (See Doc. Nos. 216; 216-1.) Defendant Ford Motor 25 Company (“Ford”) opposed the motion (Doc. No. 223), Plaintiffs replied (Doc. No. 226), 26 and Ford subsequently objected to Plaintiffs’ reply arguing that Plaintiffs impermissibly 27 raise new arguments on reply. (Doc. No. 227). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 28 DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The underlying facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See, e.g., 3 Doc. No. 202.) In brief, Plaintiffs William Lessin, Carol Smalley, Patrick and Sheri 4 Powers, Lloyd Atterson, Brad Nielsen, David Appel, John Kigin, Susanne Hamilton, Steve 5 Selgado, Roger Saddler, Caroline McGee, and David Huffstetler (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 6 filed suit against Ford for alleged latent defects in four generations of Ford F-250 and F-350 7 trucks (“Class Vehicles”). (Doc. Nos. 44 at 7; 120-1 at 11.)1 8 Plaintiffs allege the Class Vehicles suffer from one or more defects in their 9 suspension and steering linkage systems, including, but not limited to, abnormal wearing 10 and/or loosening of the track bar bushing, steering damper, the ball joints, control arms, 11 shock absorbers, and/or struts (the “Suspension Defect”). (Doc. No. 44 ¶ 155.) The 12 Suspension Defect may result in severe shaking and oscillation of the steering wheel, which 13 Plaintiffs refer to as the “Death Wobble” or “Shimmy.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert the 14 Shimmy “often causes drivers to lose control of the Class Vehicles and causes difficulty 15 steering during their operation and under normal driving conditions or speeds[,]” exposing 16 drivers and others sharing the road with them to increased risk of accident, injury, or death. 17 (Id.) As alleged in the FACC, Plaintiffs allege claims on behalf of the following classes: 18 (1) a Nationwide Class, (2) California Class, (3) Arizona Class, (4) Colorado Class, (5) 19 Illinois Class, (6) Indiana Class, (7) Maine Class, (8) New Mexico Class, (9) Ohio Class, 20 (10) South Carolina Class, and (11) Texas Class. 21 On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 22 120.) That same day, Ford filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 122.) Both 23 motions were fully briefed. (See Doc. Nos. 136; 141; 154; 157.) On November 7, 2024, the 24 Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part both Ford’s motion for summary 25 judgment and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (the “November 7 Order”). (Doc. 26 No. 202.) Relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claims under 27 1 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 28 1 South Carolina and Maine law survived summary judgment. (Id. at 70–73.) Additionally, 2 the November 7 Order certified the South Carolina class and found that Plaintiff Huffstetler 3 met the requirements to be the class representative. (Id. at 11–13.) However, the Court 4 found that the proposed representative for the Maine class was atypical and did “not fit the 5 requirements of the class definition.” (Id. at 48.) The Court stated that if Plaintiffs so chose, 6 the Court would grant Plaintiffs leave to substitute another class representative for the 7 Maine class. (Id.) The instant motion to amend follows. 8 II. LEAVE TO AMEND 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which governs requests for leave to amend 11 pleadings, provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 13 2003). Leave to amend should be granted with “extreme liberality” in order “to facilitate 14 decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” U.S. v. Webb, 655 15 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the burden of persuading the Court that leave 16 should not be granted rests with the non-moving party. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 17 Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186–87 (9th Cir. 1987). 18 When a pretrial scheduling order has been issued and the deadline for amending the 19 pleadings has passed, resolution of a motion to amend is further governed by Rule 16 of 20 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 21 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b) provides that “[a] schedule shall not be modified 22 except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 16(b)(4). In interpreting the “good cause” requirement under Rule 16(b), the Court 24 considers, primarily, “the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 25 F.2d at 609. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the 26 modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 27 28 1 upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, 2 the inquiry should end.” Id. (citation omitted).2 3 B. Discussion 4 Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to substitute Plaintiff David 5 Huffstetler, the current representative of the certified South Carolina class, as the 6 representative of the Maine class. (Doc. No. 216.) Plaintiffs contend that Huffstetler, a 7 South Carolina resident who has no connection with Maine, may represent the Maine class 8 under the Second Circuit’s holding in Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., 9 897 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2018). Ford opposes Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend arguing 10 that amendment would be futile because Huffstetler cannot serve as a class representative 11 for the Maine class. (Doc. No. 223 at 13.) Ford contends that because Huffstetler is not a 12 member of the Maine class, he cannot serve as Maine’s class representative. (Id.) The Court 13 agrees. 14 The Supreme Court has identified several factors, known as the Foman factors, 15 which district courts should consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend: 16 (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay or dilatory motive on the part of 17 the movant; (3) repeated failure on the part of the movant to cure deficiencies by 18 amendments previously allowed; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 19 allowance of the amendment; and (5) futility of the amendment. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d 20 at 1052 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also Smith v. Pac. Props. 21 Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth circuit has held that the 22 consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Cap., 23 316 F.3d at 1052 (“[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries 24 the greatest weight.”). However, “[t]he party opposing amendment bears the burden of 25 showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). “Absent prejudice, 26
27 2 Because the November 7 Order provides that the Court would grant Plaintiffs leave to substitute another class representative for the Maine class, the Court finds good cause exists under Rule 16. Accordingly, 28 1 or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption 2 under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1052 3 (emphasis in original). 4 “Futility of amendment is analyzed much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss— 5 an amended complaint is futile when it would be subject to dismissal.” Pappy’s Barber 6 Shops, Inc. v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 3d 738, 739 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020). 7 Generally, courts do not consider the validity of a proposed amended pleading when 8 deciding whether to grant leave to amend, instead deferring consideration of challenges to 9 the merits until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleadings are filed. 10 LifeVoxel Va. SPV, LLC v. LifeVoxel.AI, Inc., No. 22-cv-01917-GPC, 2023 WL 3729397, 11 at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2023). However, “leave to amend may be denied if the proposed 12 amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal.” Clarke v. Upton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 13 1037, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 14 1991)). Proposed amendments are futile if “no set of facts can be proved under the 15 amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” 16 Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 Here, Ford does not argue, and the Court does not find, that Plaintiffs are seeking 18 amendment in bad fad faith or that the proposed amendment would cause undue delay. See 19 AmericSourceBergen Corp v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] 20 district court need not grant leave to amend where the amendment” (1) prejudices the 21 opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) 22 is futile.”). Neither does the Court find that Ford would be unduly prejudiced if Plaintiffs 23 were granted leave to amend. Id. However, the Court agrees with Ford that granting 24 Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name Huffstetler as the Maine class representative 25 would be futile—Huffstetler is not a member of the class and therefore cannot serve as its 26 representative. (See Doc. No. 223 at 13–16.) 27 Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent “a class representative must be 28 part of the class.” E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2011) 1 (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). Huffstetler 2 is a South Carolina resident who purchased his Ford vehicle in South Carolina. (Doc. Nos. 3 44 ¶ 141; 216-1 ¶ 100 (“David Huffstetler is a resident of Lexington, South Carolina.”); 4 Doc. Nos. 44 ¶ 142; 216-1 ¶ 101 (Huffstetler purchased his vehicle “from Palmetto Ford 5 in Charleston, South Carolina.”). Plaintiffs define the Maine class as “All persons who 6 purchased or leased a Class Vehicle from an authorized Ford dealership within the State of 7 Maine primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Doc. No. 120 at 3–4.) As 8 such, Huffstetler is not a member of the proposed Maine class and therefore under Rule 23 9 cannot serve as the class representative. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a); see also Gen. Tel. 10 Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (“We have repeatedly held that a class 11 representative must be part of the class”); E. Tex. Motor, 431 U.S. at 403 (“As this Court 12 has repeatedly held, a class representative must be part of the class”); Dukes, 564 U.S. at 13 348–49 (“a class representative must be part of the class”); Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 14 909 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A named plaintiff must be a member of the class she 15 seeks to represent”). 16 Plaintiffs argue that Huffstetler, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Maine 17 class, may serve as the class representative under the Second Circuit’s holding in Langan, 18 897 F.3d 88. Langan does not support such a proposition. 19 The problem with Plaintiffs’ argument is that it conflates the issue of whether 20 Huffstetler has standing to represent class members whose claims arise under a different 21 state’s laws with his ability to serve as class representative of a class in which he is not a 22 member. 23 Langan, which involved whether unfair trade practice claims arising under the laws 24 of twenty states could be properly asserted in a class action by a single plaintiff from one 25 of those states, recognized that “[a]t some point . . . a named plaintiff’s claims can be so 26 different from the claims of his putative class members that they present an issue not of the 27 prudence of certifying a class under Rule 23 but of constitutional standing.” Langan, 897 28 F.3d at 94. Langan applied that principle solely to the question before it, i.e., “whether 1 there is a standing problem when a plaintiff attempts to sue on behalf of those who may 2 have claims under different states’ laws that generally prohibit the same conduct.” Id. at 3 95. The court ultimately concluded that there was not, stating that “whether a plaintiff can 4 bring a class action under the state laws of multiple states is a question of predominance 5 under Rule 23(b)(3), not a question of standing under Article III.” Id. at 96. 6 Here, the issue is much more straight forward—whether Huffstetler can represent a 7 class of which he is not a part. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have made clear that 8 he may not. See E. Tex. Motor, 431 U.S. at 403; Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348–49; Sali v. Corona 9 Reg’l Med. Ctr., 909 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2018). This is also consistent with the 10 language of Rule 23(a) which states that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be 11 sued as representative parties on behalf of all members. . . .”) Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a) 12 (emphasis added). Because Huffstetler is not a member of the Maine class as it is currently 13 defined, he may not serve as its representative. Accordingly, the Court finds it would be 14 futile for Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to name Huffstetler as the Maine representative. 15 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Doc. No. 16 216.) 17 III. STAY PENDING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 18 On January 29, 2025, Ford filed a petition for permission to appeal the Court’s 19 November 7 Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). (Doc. Nos. 213; 20 213-1.) Ford argues, inter alia, that the Court erred in finding that common issues 21 predominated over Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims—i.e. claims related to both the 22 South Carolina and Maine classes. (Id.) On April 1, 2025, the Ninth Circuit Court of 23 Appeals granted Ford’s permission to appeal. (Doc. No. 219.) Oral argument is currently 24 scheduled for December 8, 2025. Lessin, et al. v. Ford Motor Company, No. 25-2211 (9th 25 Cir. Sept. 30, 2025), Doc. No. 37. 26 Although the filing of an interlocutory appeal does not automatically stay 27 proceedings in the district court, the district court has broad discretion to decide whether a 28 stay is appropriate to “promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 1 litigants.” Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Fred Schakel Dairy, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1094 2 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Filtrol Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1972). A 3 district court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest 4 course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of 5 independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. 6 Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); Ernest Bock, 7 LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 842 (9th Cir. 2023) (The district court possesses “inherent 8 authority to stay federal proceedings pursuant to its docket management powers.”). The 9 decision to stay proceedings “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh 10 competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 11 254–55 (1936). 12 The Ninth Circuit has recognized “three non-exclusive factors courts must weigh 13 when deciding whether to issue a docket management stay: (1) the possible damage which 14 may result from the granting of a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer 15 in being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of 16 the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law. In re PG&E Corp. 17 Sec. Litig., 100 F.4th 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation omitted). 18 Here, the factors weigh in favor of staying this matter until the interlocutory appeal 19 is resolved. The resolution of the interlocutory appeal will alter the direction of the current 20 proceedings. First, Ford seeks to vacate the Court’s order granting class certification in its 21 entirety. Lessin, et al. v. Ford Motor Company, No. 25-2211 (9th Cir. June 16, 2025), Doc. 22 No. 14.1 at 66. Second, and more specifically related to the instant order, if the Ninth 23 Circuit determines that class members’ implied warranty claims depend on individualized 24 evidence, the need to find a Maine representative will be moot. Moreover, the Court finds 25 that the parties will not suffer any damage or hardship by a stay. Discovery is closed and 26 the motion cut-off date has passed. Ostensibly, this matter is ready for trial. Accordingly, 27 to preserve judicial and party resources the Court STAYS this matter until the interlocutory 28 appeal is resolved. 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ 3 Motion for Leave to Amend. (Doc. No. 216.) The Court STAYS this matter pending the 4 resolution of the interlocutory appeal. All further deadlines and hearing dates are vacated. 5 || The parties are ordered to notify the Court within 10 days of receipt of a decision from the 6 || Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: October 10, 2025
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