Lessin v. Ford Motor Company

District Court, S.D. California·Decided March 18, 2024·No. 3:19-cv-01082·Unknown

Opinion

WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL Case No.: 19-cv-01082-AJB-AHG SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND situated, DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO Plaintiffs, SEAL

v. (Doc. No. 128, 134, 138) FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant.

The parties have filed two motions to seal in connection with Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification: (1) Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) February 6, 2024 motion to seal documents attached to Plaintiffs’ December 1, 2023 Motion for Class Certification, (Doc. No. 128), and (2) Ford’s February 22, 2024 motion to seal in connection with its opposition to Plaintiffs’ class certification motion, (Doc. No. 134). Plaintiffs also filed a February 22, 2024 motion to seal in connection with its opposition to Ford’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 138). The Court must apply a different standard in analyzing the Class Certification and Summary Judgment Motions to Seal and will therefore address them separately. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the instant matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearings related to these motions set for June 6, 2024. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motions to seal. Plaintiffs raise several claims against Ford for alleged latent defects, which cause abnormal and premature wearing and/or loosening of the suspension parts, resulting in “violent shaking,” causing drivers to lose control of the Vehicles, and having difficulty steering during their operation under normal driving conditions or speeds. (See First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Doc. No. 44.) On December 19, 2023, the parties entered into a protective order permitting the parties to designate as “CONFIDENTIAL” information that qualifies for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). (Doc. No. 79 at 2–3.) The protective order also permits the parties to designate as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” documents they, in good faith, believe contain trade secrets or other confidential research or information. (Id. at 3.) Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). In order to overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record must articulate justifications for sealing that outweigh the public policies favoring disclosure. See id. at 1178–79. “In turn, the court must ‘conscientiously balance[] the competing interests’ of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). The court must consider these interests and “base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted). A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. The “good cause” standard requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). Unless the denial of a motion for class certification would constitute the death knell of a case, “the vast majority of []courts within this circuit” treat motions for class certification as non-dispositive motions to which the “good cause” sealing standard applies. Dugan v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 2013 WL 1435223, *1 (citing In re NCAA Student— Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., 2012 WL 6561088 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012)). Compelling reasons1 for sealing information exist “when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). Trade secrets “may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s

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