Lessin v. Ford Motor Company

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01082
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL Case No.: 19-cv-01082-AJB-AHG SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of 10 themselves and others similarly ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 11 situated, DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 12 Plaintiffs, RECONSIDERATION 13 v. 14 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 10, 15 inclusive, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Co.’s motion for reconsideration 20 of the Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class 21 certification. (Doc. No. 204.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Doc. No. 210), to which Ford 22 replied (Doc. No. 211). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART 23 AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s motion. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing 24 set for February 27, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 The facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 202.) 27 Ford challenges the Court’s November 7, 2024 Order (1) granting in part and denying in 28 part Ford’s motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) granting in part and denying in 1 part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 2 (the “November 7 Order”). (Doc. No. 204.) Specifically, Ford asserts the Court committed 3 clear error as to several findings related to the motion for class certification. (Id.) 4 As relevant to the instant motion, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff 5 Hamilton’s Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”) claim because the Court found 6 Plaintiff Hamilton used her vehicle for business, not personal, use. (November 7 Order, 7 Doc. No. 202, at 32–33.) Under MUTPA, a private right of action exists “only for those 8 who have purchased goods, services or property ‘primarily for personal, family or 9 household purposes.’” C-B Kentworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 10 (D. Me. 1988) (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 213(1)). Here, Hamilton stated throughout 11 her deposition that her F-250 was her business vehicle. (See November 7 Order at 33.) 12 Later, in analyzing Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the Court held that Plaintiffs’ 13 class definition—limited to persons who purchased or leased their vehicles for “personal, 14 family or household purposes”—did not preclude a finding of predominance. (Id. at 51– 15 53.) The Court found that “commercial purchasers (fleet and chassis-cab purchasers) can 16 be excluded from the notice process using Ford’s data, leaving only retail purchasers to 17 receive notice and an opportunity to submit proof that their vehicle purchases were 18 primarily for personal use.” (Id. at 53.) 19 Next, the Court granted class certification of Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims 20 under Maine and South Carolina law. (Id. at 70–73.) The Court noted that manifestation of 21 the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under Maine and South 22 Carolina law. (Id. at 71 (citing Lorfano, 569 A.2d at 197; Cole, 484 F.3d at 729).) 23 Moreover, “[w]hile the Court in the instant case analyzes the substantive laws of Maine 24 and South Carolina, they similarly require manifestation of the defect [as in California].” 25 (Id. at 72.) Thereafter, applying the Ninth Circuit’s federal procedural law, the Court held 26 that on class certification, the district court should not determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ 27 claims. (Id.) The Court ultimately found the predominance factor met and granted class 28 certification. The Court further found predominance met as to merchantability, as 1 “Plaintiffs have alleged from the beginning of litigation that the Class Vehicles contain a 2 design defect that was inherent in all Class Vehicles at the time of sale.” (Id. at 73.) 3 The Court also found Ford’s argument as to the varying rates of manifestation of the 4 defect unavailing. (Id. at 57–58.) Ford argued that field performance differences exist 5 across all dampers, and that there are “significant differences in performance across 6 different platforms, models, and model years . . . .” (Doc. No. 136 at 27.) The Court noted 7 that Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses this argument. (November 7 Order at 57.) As 8 discussed in the November 7 Order, 9 Where the injury alleged is a design defect, the Ninth Circuit has “held that proof of the manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class 10 certification.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173. This is because the injury occurred at 11 the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the lot—not when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy. See Butler, 2017 WL 1398316, at 12 *6 (“In general, courts have found consumer fraud claims amenable to class- 13 wide treatment where the claims were premised on the existence of a common, class-wide defect present in all of the relevant products at the time of sale.”). 14

15 (Id. at 57–58.) 16 The Court further denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (Model 17 Year (“MY”) 2005–2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, finding that individual 18 issues predominate over common questions as to Ford’s knowledge of a defect. (Id. at 61.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 District courts have the discretion to reconsider interlocutory rulings until a final 21 judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048– 22 49 (9th Cir. 2000). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not set forth a standard 23 for reconsidering interlocutory rulings, the “law of the case” doctrine and public policy 24 dictate that the efficient operation of the judicial system requires the avoidance of re- 25 arguing questions that have already been decided. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of 26 Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 27 /// 28 1 As such, most courts adhere to a fairly narrow standard by which to reconsider their 2 interlocutory rulings. This standard requires: (1) an intervening change in the law; 3 (2) additional evidence that was not previously available; or (3) that the prior decision was 4 based on clear error or would work manifest injustice. Id.; Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. 5 Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009); Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. 6 ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 7 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 8 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 9 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to renew 10 arguments considered and rejected by the court, nor is it an opportunity for a party to re- 11 argue a motion because it is dissatisfied with the original outcome.” FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 12 No. 06–CV–1952–JLS JMA, 2009 WL 56130, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2009) (quoting 13 Devinsky v. Kingsford, No. 05 Civ.2064(PAC), 2008 WL 2704338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14 10, 2008)). 15 Additionally, Civil Local Rule 7.1.i governs motions for reconsideration in this 16 District. The rule provides that a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any 17 motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any 18 judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 7.1.i.1. The party seeking 19 reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7.1.i.1 must show “what new or different facts and 20 circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior 21 application.” Id. 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Ford requests reconsideration of the Court’s class certification order on the ground 24 that the Court committed clear error. (See generally Doc. No. 204.) Ford argues: (1) the 25 Court clearly erred when it certified a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because 26 the Court had previously dismissed that claim and Plaintiff did not seek certification of it; 27 (2) the Court’s summary judgment order on Plaintiff Hamilton’s business usage shows that 28 individualized issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle 1 for personal, family, or household use; (3) the Court’s order certifying Maine and South 2 Carolina implied warranty classes uses the incorrect standard for manifestation and 3 conflicts with its summary judgment ruling regarding merchantability; and (4) Ford’s 4 argument that differing rates of manifestation defeat class certification was not fully 5 addressed by the Court. (See generally Doc. No. 204-1.) 6 A. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Claim 7 First, in the November 7 Order, the Court granted mistakenly granted certification 8 of a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. (See November 7 Order at 85.) As noted 9 by the Parties, this claim had previously been dismissed without leave to amend, (Doc. No. 10 41 at 23–24), and Plaintiffs did not seek certification of this claim, (see Doc. No. 120 at 4). 11 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration as to this claim. 12 B. Personal, Family, or Household Use of Class Vehicle 13 Next, as to the argument that Hamilton’s business usage shows that individualized 14 issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle for personal, 15 family, or household use, Ford previously made this argument in its opposition to 16 Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (See Doc. No. 136 at 22–24.) The Court did not 17 find it availing then, and Ford has not persuaded the Court it committed clear error, the 18 initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there has been any relevant intervening law or 19 newly discovered evidence the Court has not considered. Moreover, Ford’s argument that 20 allowing class members to attest to their purchase of their trucks for personal use deprives 21 Ford of an opportunity to cross-examine the class members has no basis in law. Case law 22 has acknowledged that, “to comport with due process, the court must ‘preserve’ the 23 defendant’s right ‘to raise any individual defenses it might have at the damages phase.’” 24 Makaeff v. Trum Univ., LLC, 309 F.R.D. 631, 642 (S.D. Cal. 2015). However, courts have 25 resolved this issue by permitting bifurcation of trial into a liability stage and a damages 26 stage. Id. at 642–43 (citing Mahoney v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 4:09–cv–2327, 2011 WL 27 4458513, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011), and Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 28 1168 (9th Cir. 2014)). However, allowing such cross-examination of class members, as 1 Ford suggests, would be the death knell for class certification. As such, the Court rejects 2 this claim. 3 C. Maine and South Carolina Implied Warranty Classes 4 Ford contends the Court used the incorrect standard for manifestation of defects for 5 Maine and South Carolina implied warranty classes. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 9.) Ford asserts 6 the Court applied California substantive law in finding Maine’s and South Carolina’s 7 manifestation requirements did not defeat certification. (Id. at 9–10.) However, Ford 8 misunderstands the Court’s previous ruling. In the November 7 Order, the Court first stated 9 that “[m]anifestation of the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under 10 Maine and South Carolina law.” (November 7 Order at 71.) The Court went on to note that 11 district courts within the Ninth Circuit, which apply a “substantial certainty” test under 12 their substantive law, are split procedurally as to whether arguments as to manifestation of 13 the defect is a “merits” issue that is suitable for class certification. (Id.) The Court did not 14 apply the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial certainty” test in its November 7 Order, but rather 15 held that “under federal procedural law on class certification, ‘the district court should not 16 determine the merits of any claims.’” (November 7 Order at 72.) 17 As to manifestation, Ford further asserts the Court should follow Chin v. Chrysler 18 Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448 (D.N.J. 1998), and Payne v. FujiFilm U.S.A., Inc., No. 07–385 19 (GEB), 2010 WL 2342388 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), two out-of-circuit cases which have no 20 binding on either this Court or the courts of Maine and South Carolina, which held that 21 certification was not proper when individualized evidence was needed for every class 22 member to prove that the defect manifested. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 10.) Ford previously made 23 this argument in its opposition to the motion for class certification and has not identified 24 any grounds for reconsideration. (See Doc. No. 136 at 37–38.) 25 Ford also argues the Court’s finding that the issue of merchantability can be proven 26 with common evidence is irreconcilable with its summary judgment ruling. (Doc. No. 204- 27 1 at 11.) Specifically, Ford asserts that by certifying the implied warranty classes, “the 28 Court is depriving Ford of its right to demonstrate that even if other class members 1 experienced steering oscillation, their individual vehicle uses could nevertheless 2 demonstrate merchantability.” (Id. at 12.) However, Ford’s assertion merely attempts to 3 litigate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and thus is improperly raised on a motion for 4 reconsideration. Indeed, Ford’s argument as to merchantability are better suited for trial or 5 a motion for summary judgment. The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration as to 6 these claims. 7 D. Differing Rates of Manifestation 8 Finally, Ford argues “the Court appears to have misunderstood, and therefore did 9 not fully address, Ford’s arguments that differing manifestation rates of steering oscillation 10 show that non-classwide issues predominate on the question of defect.” (Doc. No. 204-1 at 11 12.) To this point, as in its opposition to class certification, Ford asserts that warranty and 12 complaint claim rates varied significantly across the platforms and model years. (Id.) As 13 noted above the Court denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (MY 2005– 14 2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, with only the P356 (MY 2008–2010) and P473 15 (MY 2011–2016) classes certified. While the Court noted that proof of a manifestation was 16 not a prerequisite to class certification, it also stated that “the injury [as alleged by 17 Plaintiffs] occurred at the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the 18 lot—not when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy.” (November 7 Order at 57.) Thus, the 19 Court did not find persuasive the differing manifestation rates across two of the four model 20 year platforms. The Court considered, and rejected, Ford’s argument concerning differing 21 rates of manifestation, and the Court does not find grounds for reconsideration. 22 Because Ford fails to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration, the Court DENIES 23 its motion as to this claim. 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 26 Ford’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 7, 2024 order. (Doc. No. 204.) 27 The Court hereby AMENDS its November 7, 2024 Order to recognize that Plaintiffs’ 28 1 || Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was previously dismissed, and clarify that only 2 |}a Breach of Express Warranty claim has been certified under Texas law. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. > ||Dated: January 14, 2025 C ay Ko : 2 6 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28