Lerner Ex Rel. General Electric Co. v. Immelt

523 F. App'x 824
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMay 3, 2013
Docket12-2787-cv
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 523 F. App'x 824 (Lerner Ex Rel. General Electric Co. v. Immelt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lerner Ex Rel. General Electric Co. v. Immelt, 523 F. App'x 824 (2d Cir. 2013).

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Olga Lerner appeals from a judgment entered June 19, 2012 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote, /.). Specifically, Lerner challenges the district court’s September 12, 2011 grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants-Appellees, directors and executives of General Electric (“GE”), and the court’s June 15, 2012 denial of Lerner’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. In this derivative action, Lerner claims that the management and board of directors of GE violated their duties of care and loyalty to shareholders by engaging in risky corporate transactions and disguising those risks with accounting fraud and misstatements about GE’s financial condition. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, as well as with the issues on appeal.

Rule 23.1 requires that a plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action “state with particularity ... any effort by the plaintiff *826 to obtain the desired action from the directors ... and ... the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the effort.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1(b)(3). This rule governs only “the specificity of facts alleged with regard to efforts made to urge a corporation’s directors to bring the action in question!;] ... the adequacy of those efforts is to be determined by state law.” Halebian v. Berv, 590 F.3d 195, 206 n. 7 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (demand requirement “is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure’ ”). In other words, Rule 23.1 creates a heightened pleading requirement for a federal derivative action, In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Deriv. Litig., 700 F.Supp.2d 419, 430 (S.D.N.Y.2010), aff'd, 415 Fed.Appx. 285 (2d Cir.2011) (summary order); but whether a plaintiff has pleaded a plausible claim that the board of directors wrongly refused her demand is evaluated under the substantive state law governing the demand requirement, Halebian, 590 F.3d at 206 n. 7. GE is incorporated in New York State, and New York law governs its internal affairs, including when and how a shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors before bringing a derivative action. See Stein v. Immelt, 472 Fed.Appx. 64, 65 (2d Cir.2012).

Lerner made an unsuccessful demand on the GE board; she alleges in her complaint that the board wrongly refused her demand. In evaluating a board’s decision to reject a shareholder demand, New York law presumes that the decision was the exercise of valid business judgment. Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F.Supp. 790, 798-99 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979)). “[AJbsent a prima facie showing to the contrary, directors enjoy ‘wide latitude ... ’ under the business judgment rule.” Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.1984)). To overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must plausibly allege with particularity either that the directors who made the decision were personally conflicted with respect to the demand, or that they did not employ “adequate] and appropriate[ ] ... investigative procedures and methodologies” in considering the demand, such that they violated their duty of care. Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 634, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994; Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring allegations regarding demand to be pleaded with particularity).

Here, we find no error by the district court in concluding that Lerner failed to plausibly allege facts that would overcome the presumption created by the business judgment rule. First, we agree with the district court that, regardless of whether the New York Court of Appeals would find that Lerner conceded that the board was disinterested based on the facts that existed at the time she made her demand, see FLI Deep Marine LLC v. McKim, C.A. No. 4138, 2009 WL 1204363, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2009) (describing analogous doctrine in Delaware law), Lerner has failed to plausibly allege with particularity facts showing that the directors who rejected her demand were conflicted with respect to the demand. Among the factors that support the district court’s conclusion are the following: GE allowed only the outside (i.e., nonmanagement) directors to vote on Lerner’s demand. Lerner alleges two kinds of conflict with regard to these outside directors, and neither is sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule. She first argues that the outside directors lacked independence because of the social *827 and professional relationships they had with the inside directors. But simply alleging social and professional relationships is not in and of itself sufficient to cast doubt upon a director’s independence. See, e.g., Lichtenberg v. Zinn, 260 A.D.2d 741, 743, 687 N.Y.S.2d 817 (3d Dep’t 1999).

She also argues that the directors were not disinterested because they were personally implicated in the misconduct alleged in the demand letter and were named as defendants in other lawsuits arising out of the same alleged misconduct. That is not enough to overcome the business judgment rule. “[A] plaintiff must do more than simply demand litigation against every director ... and then name a majority of the Board which rejected demand as defendants in the complaint,” Stoner, 772 F.Supp. at 803, just as naming directors in a lawsuit, without more, is insufficient to establish that they are conflicted and demand is futile. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1983); Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 199-200, 644 N.Y.S.2d 121, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (1996). Indeed, in Stein, a parallel derivative action which contended demand should be excused, we rejected this exact same argument. Stein, 472 Fed-Appx. at 66. We explained that “[t]he test for self-interest-edness is not whether a director or someone who controls him has engaged in or is liable for some sort of misconduct, but whether he will ‘receive a direct financial benefit from the transaction which is different from the benefit to shareholders generally.’ ” Id. (quoting Marx, 88 N.Y.2d at 202, 644 N.Y.S.2d 121, 666 N.E.2d 1034). Here, as in Stein,

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523 F. App'x 824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lerner-ex-rel-general-electric-co-v-immelt-ca2-2013.