Lenorowitz v. Mosquito Squad Franchising, LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Connecticut
• Decided: September 21, 2022
• Docket: 3:20-cv-01922
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SAMUEPLl aLiEnNtiOffROWITZ, Civil No. 3:20-cv-01922 (JBA) v. , September 21, 2022

MOSQUITO SQUAD OF FAIRFIELD AND WESTCDHeEfeSnTdEaRn CtOUNTY,

. RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiff Samuel Lenorowitz brings claims for damages and injunctive relief against Defendant Mosquito Squad of Fairfield and Westchester County under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, stemming from a ringless pre-recorded message delivered to his voicemail inbox. Plaintiff has moved to certify a class of approximately 9,186 others who received the same message. [Doc. # 56] Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s motion. [Doc. # 68] For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion fo r clasFs accetrutiafilc Bataicokng. round The background for this putative class action is a single ringless message that was sent to the voicemail inboxes of Plaintiff and Defendant’s other customers. In June 2017, Plaintiff called Mosquito Squad seeking to sign up for its tick and mosquito control services. (Reich Dep., Pl’s Ex. D, [Doc. # 56-7] at 12:17-25, 13:1-3.) He remained an active customer through September 2019. (Lenorowitz Dep., Pl.’s Ex. E, [Doc. # 56-8] at 22:4-7.) In May 2019, Defendant used an online platform “Slybroadcast,” operated by MobileSphere, to send a recorded message to the voicemail inboxes of customers advertising its “Tick and Tube Granular” servIidc.e s. (Reich Dep. at 23.) Plaintiff was among 9,186 customers who received

the message. ( at 17:3-12; Mobarak Dep., Pl.’s Ex. F [Doc. # 68-7] at 26:9-21; Pl.’s Ex. B & C [Docs. ## 5-6].) The message stated: Hi this is Maria with Mosquito Squad. We sent you an email last week with details about our two supplemental tick control options, and I wanted to see if you had any questions. While tick tubes and granary treatments can be added to your current back pack service, tick tubes eliminate the nymph-stage tick underground and granular products increase the elimination rate of adult ticks above ground. Please call me back if you would like to discuss how we can go above and beyond to control ticks on your property. My number is 877- See 337-4415. Thank you and have a great day. ( Pl.’s Ex. A [Doc. # 56-4].) After Plaintiff received the voicemail message, he did not ask Defendant to stop but instead contacted Mr. Zelman, his neighbor and current counsel of record, to consult about the voicemail message on his personal cell phone. (Lenorowitz Dep. at 32:20-24; 34:15-18; 49:4-6.) Subsequently, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on behalf of himself and Defendant’s oth er cuLsetgoaml eSrtas nwdhaor dre ceived Defendant’s message. A plaintiff moving for class certification must demonstrate that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). “In determining whether class certification is appropriate, a district court must first ascertain whether the claims meet the preconditions of [Fed. R. CivT. ePa.m] s2te3r(sa L) oocaf l n4u4m5 eFrroeisgithyt, Dciov.m Pmenosnioanli tFyu, ntdy pv.i cBaolimtyb, aradnide r aIndce.quacy” of representation. , 546 F.3d 196, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2008). If the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a court “may then consider granting class certification where it ‘finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action iIsd s.uperior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’” at 202 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “The party seeking class certification bears the burden of establishinMg yberys va. pHreerptzo nCdoerpra.nce of the evidence that each of Rule 23’s requirements has been met.” , 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir.2010). A court must “receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony” to resolve factual disputeIns rree leInviatniatl tPou ab .d Oetfeferrminignsa tSieocn. aLbitoigu.t whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. , 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006). The obligation to make such a determination “is not lessened by overlap between a Rule 23 requiremIedn. t and a merits issue, even a merits issue that is identical with a Rule 23 requirement.” But the Court should avoid holding “a protracted mini-trial of substantial Ipdo. rtions of the underlying litigation” as it makes its det ermDiniastciuosns oionn c lass certification. A. Relevant Provisions of the TCPA Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of individuals who he believes received the same ringless pre-recorded voicemail messages in violation of the TCPA. That statute provides: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person within the United States” (A) to make any call (other than a call . . . made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States; [or] (B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes, is made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States, or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph (2)(B). 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(A), (B). B. Class Certification

Plaintiff defines the putative class as: All persons within the United States, other than any of Plaintiff’s counsel, who (1) received a pre-recorded voice message; (2) from or on behalf of the Defendant, placed via the Mobile Sphere platform, (3) marketing or promoting Defendant’s services (4) during the time period of April 1, 2019 to the present. (Pl.’s Class Cert. Mem. [Doc. # 56-1] at 6.) Additionally, he proposes that his litigation counsel Ari Marcus and Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. be appointed as class counsel. Through discovery, Plaintiff has determined that a potential 9,186 individuals will beId m. embers in the putative class, amply satisfying the numerosity requirement of Rule 23. ( at 7.) He claims that all these individuals received the same unIsdo. licited pre-recorded voice message, satisfying the commonality requirement of Rule 23. ( at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the typicaliItdy. requiremenEt sits. mofe Gt abredcnaeurs ev .t Choenret’ li sC naos. cCoon.flict between his claims and those of the class. ( at 9 (citing , 316 F.R.D. 57, 70–71 (D. Conn. 2016)).) Plaintiff maintains that the proposed class counsel is adequate because both Iadr.e qualified and there are no conflicts of interests between counsel and the putative class. ( at 12.) Plaintiff also maintains that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied. A class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) incorporates two requirements: (1) the questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members; and (2) “a class action [beI]d s.u perior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Plaintiff maintains both are met. First, “[f]or the reasons expressed [in support of the commonality and typicality requirements], it is respectfully submitted that this requirement is met here, particularly where the only issue in this action is whether the Defendant’s use of these unsoBliacritaendi vp.r We-reellcso Fradregdo vBoaicnek ,m Ne.Ass.ages violates the TCPA.” (Pl.’s Class Cert Mem. at 13 (citing , 2014 WL 1389329, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (“The central inquiry is whether Wells Fargo violated the TCPA by sending text messages to the Class Members. Accordingly, the predominance requirement is met”)).) Second, Plaintiff contends that “the class members’ interests in litigating separate actions is likely minimal given their potentially limited meaInd.s with which to do so and the prospect of relatively small recovery in individual actions.” ( at 14.) Thus, Plaintiff maintains that a clasIsd a. ction to address the repeated violations of the TCPA in the same manner is appropriate. ( ) Defendant opposes class certification on five grounds. First, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that standing exists for the entirety of the class. Second, Plaintiff’s class definition is overbroad. (Def.’s Opp’n to Class Cert. at 8.) ThirdI,d t.h e class is not ascertainable because individual issues predominatIed .o ver common issues. ( at 9-13.) Fourth, Plaintiff is an inadequate class representative. ( at 17.) Fifth, a class actionI dis. not a superior avenue for putative members to pursue TCPA claims against Defendant. ( at 21.) After reviewing Defendant’s arguments, the Court concludes that none are persuasive barriers to Plaintiff’s proposed class1 c. erAtriftiiccaltei oIInI. Standing Defendant did not initially raise arguments based on standing in its opposition to class certification. However, after the Court inquired about standing of the clSaeses at oral argument, Defendant moved for leave to file additional briefing on the issue. ( [Doc. # 79].) The Court granted the motion, and both parties have now submitted additional briefing. In a class action, “[e]veryT rcalansssU nmioenm bLLerC mv. uRsat mhairveez Article III standing in order to

recover individual damages.”) , 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021). Standing requires plaintiffs to show they suffered concrete harm. To evaluate whether an intangible harm is sufficiently concrete, “both the history and the judgment of Congress play important roles,” and it is “instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traSdpitoikoenoa,l lIyn cb. eve. nR roebginasr,d ed as providing a basis fora as lraewvissuedit in English or American courts.” 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016), (May 24, 2016). A “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” is not a concdree ftaec htoarm, but Congress “may elevate to the status of legIda.l l y cognizable injuries concrete, injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Defendant claims that the absent class members have not demonstrated concrete harm beyond a bare statutory violation, and other harm claTirmanedsU nwioonu ld require individualized inquiry. (Def.’s Brief on Standing [Doc. # 82]at 1-4.) considered whether the “mere existence of a misleading [] alert in a consumer’s internal credit file” was a concrete injury if it was never disseminated tdoe p faocteton tial creTdriatonrssU, nhioolnd, ing that i.t was not because it was not analogous to any real-world harm. 141 S. Ct at 2209- 2210. Because it was not a concrete injusreye eivde. n though Congress had created a statutory cause of action to remedy that conduct, at 2206, and because Plaintiffs rely on the statutory cause of action as the basis of their injury in fact, Defendant maintains they fail to plead a concrete injury. TransUnion Spokeo Plaintiff disagrees that “change[d] the holding or analysis of ,” maintaining it only “reiterate[d] that ‘e veSreye class member must have Article III standing in order to r ecover individual dMaemliatoge vs. .E’”x(periaPnl .M’sk Stgta. nSodlisn.,g I nBcr.i, ef, [Doc. #83] aStp o5k.)e o(c itation omitted).Plaintiff focuses on which aadpdpiltiieodn al to hold that “a recipient of an unsolicited marketing message – without any injury – has Article III standing to sue under the TCPA,” (Pl.’s Standing Brief at 2), because “nuisance and privacy invasion[s]” are “the very harms with which Congress was concerned when enacting the TCPA,” and “were traditionally regarded as providing bases for lawsuits in English or American coseuertasl,”s othGuosr rses qMuoirtienlsg, nInoc “. addLiatinodnsa' lE” nhda,r Imnc t.o be shown.” 923 F.3d 85, 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2019); v. Draze,n N vo. P. 2in0t-o589-CV, 2021 WL 1915998 (2d Cir. Ma y 13, 2021). Plaintiff also distinguishes , 41 F.4th 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022), which rejected a claTsrsa dnesfUinniitoinon that included individuals who received only a single text message based on , because in the Eleventh Circuit, unlike in the Second Circuit, a single text is insufficient to show concrete injury. 41 F.4th at 1362. No persuasive distinction has been shown between this single unMsoelliictiote d, pGroerrsescorde d voicemail advertisement and the circumstances addressed in either or ; thus,De2fe. ndOavnetr’sb mreoatdiotnh toof d tehney C cllaassss cDeerftiinfiictaitoinon based on lack of standing is denied. Defendant maintains that the class that Plaintiff seeks to certify is overbroad because “Plaintiff’s definition includes all prerecorded calls to all types of telephone lines,” (Def.’s Opp’n aItd 9. ), and the TCPA applies only to calls made to cell phones and residential telephone lines. ( citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B)).) Plaintiff proposes redefining the class to include only those who received messages on a cell phone or residential landline, thus tracking the TCPA: on either a cellular phone or a rae) sAildl epnetrisaoln lsa wnditlhiinne the United States, other than any of Plaintiff’s counsel, b) who received a pre-recorded voice message, , c) from or on behalf of the Defendant, placed via the Mobile Sphere platform, d) marketing or promoting Defendant’s services e) during the time period of April 1, 2019 tsoe ethSet rparuecshe nvt. .C omputer Scis. Corp., (Pl.’s Class Cert. Reply s[eDeo acl.s #o 6M8o]r aatn 3g)e;l li v. Chemed Corp. 322 F.R.D. 157, 180-81 (D. Conn. 2017); , 275 F.R.D. 99, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting James W. Moore et al., Federal Practice § 23.21[6]) (“The court may, in its discretion . . . modify the definition of the proposed class to provide the necessary precision or to correct other deficiencies.”). This revised class definition meets Defendant’s challenge, and it shall be used in notices to the p3u. taAtsivcee rctlaasins ambeilmitbye orsf .t he Class Defendant next argues that the class is not ascertainable because three individualized inquiries predominate over the issues common to the putative class: (1) whether individual putative class members received the messages on cell phones or otherwise; (2) whether class members’ phone numbers were registered or used as residential vs. business lines; and (3) whether the message was listened to by the consumer. (Def.’s Opp’n at 9-10, 12, 13.) Class membership for a Rule 23(b)(3) class must Ibne raes Mceertthayinl Taberleti aarty s Boumteyl pEothinetr, aPlrtohdouucgths Lnioatb n. eLciteisgs.arily as a requirement of certification. , 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). “An iidde.ntifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria,” , and “wBhreench iedre nv.t iRfyeipnugb iltisc mof eAmrgbeenrtsi nwaould not require a mini-hearing on the merits of each case,” , 806 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit has expressly declined “to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a showing of administrative feasibility at the class certification stage” because such “an absolute standard” wIno ruel dP ebtreo burnaws Soerck.able with the superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 23. , 862 F.3d 250, 265, 267-78 (2d Cir. 2017). “Though a court may not ignore concerns about the manageability of a putative class action,” a “failure to certify an action under Rule 23(b)(3) on the sole ground thatI dit. would be unmanageable is disfavored and should be the exception rather than the rule.” Defendant’s arguments boil down to this: Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the putative class includes only people who were called on applicable phone lines, not phones used for business purposes. However, Defendant’s concern is not with the ascertainability of the class, but instead with the feasibility of ensuring the class members meet the class 1 definition. Plaintiff proposes resolving ambiguities by subpoena to the phone companies or obtaining information by a questionnaire or affidavit as part of the class notice process: “Was your phone number ___________ a residential landline, or a cell phone number, in April and May of 2019? Yes___ No____.” (Reply at 4-6, 9.) As the affidavit or questionnaire process has been approvSeede be.yg .c, oBurartvse rh avn. Ndolirntgh stthaisr vAelarrym is sSueer visn., TLCLPCA class actions, the Court adopts it for this case. , 329 F.R.D. 320, 329 (W.D. Okla. 2018) (“[I]f issues need to be tried to determine whether a line is a business line or a residential line, those issues could be resolved by asking class members whether the line in question is a residential line during the class notification process, or, in any event, through a standardized and efficient claims 2 process at a later stage”). Finally, Plaintiff insists that the TCPA does not require that the message was actually listene d to by each class member and evidence that the message was sent is sufficient. (Pl.’s Replyat 9.)

1 Plaintiff represents that Defendant has identified a group of people called on their ‘Mobile’ phSoeen ea nlsuom Bbaekrosv ovr. sCeornvsiocel. dW aot rald r eTsriadveenlt, iIanl ca.ddress “on an account not listed in a business n 2ame.” (Reply at 4-6, 9B.r)a ver , 2019 WL 1294659, at *21 (N.D. Ill. MSaalra.m 2 1v,. 2Li0fe1w9)a(tacghr, eIenicn.g with that the TCPA class members “may self-identify by submitting documentation that they received a call by VVT, such as a phone bill or affidavit.”); , 2016 WL 8905321, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2016)(rejecting a defendant’s ascertainability challenge and certifying a TCPA class, noting that “noncustomer class members would also be able to self-identify through telephone records or affidavits where necessary”). using

The TCPA prohibits “mak[ing] any call . . . Ybar .r .a . av.n D airsthi fNiceitawl oorr kp,r LeLrCecorded voice.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). In , 807 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2015), on which Defendant relies, the message mechanism involved a pre-recorded voice that played only when a call was picked up such that there was a “positiIvde. voice” response, which could be either a human voice or a recorded voicemail greeting. at 637. The Fifth Circuit interpreted the TCPA text related to “usingid” . an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or “any automatic telephone dialing system [‘ATDS'],” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227), to be best understood as requiring that the artificial or pre-recorded voice “spoke,” and “that makingI ad .call in which a prerecorded voice might, but does not, play is not a violation of the TCPA.” Here, the technology for the pre-recorded message is thaSte iet is delivered successfully so long as the recipient has an operational voicemail inbox. ( Mobarak Dep. at 18:6-8 (explaining how the pre-recorded message using their platform is sent to a recipient: “It’s as if I called you and you didn’t answer; right? And it says hello. This is Mr. Peterson. Please leave a message after the tone. You play the tone. We deliver the message.”).) Thus, in this Court’s view, it is sufficient under the TCPA for Plaintiff to demonstrate that a meSsesea Sgue sicnonnot avin. Wingo rak Opruet- rWecoorlrdd eIndc .voice was successfully delivered to Ahrias nvdoai cve. mCaariilbbboexa. n Cruise Line, Inc. , 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3sde eC iarl.s o2 0W1a7r)n;ick v. Dish Network LLC , 179 F.Supp.3d 817, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2016); , 2014 WL 12537066 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2014) (collecting cases) (noting that numerous courts have rejected the argument that the TCPA’s prohibition on making a call also requires t4h.e “Ardeceeqiputa”c oyf oaf p Rheopnree csaelnl)t. ation Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s adequacy as a repre sentative “due to his personal relationship with his legal counsel, Mr. Zelman.” (Def.’s Opp’nat 19.) Plaintiff and his counsel are neighbors, attend the same synagogue, their children have attended school together, and on a couplIed o. f occasions Plaintiff’s daughter provided babysitting services for Mr. Zelman’s children. ( ) In determining the adequacy of class representation, courts seek to ensure (1) that the named plaintiffs' interests are not antagonistic to the interests of other class members aCnodrd (e2s )& t hCaot. pFliani. nSteifrfvss'. ,c Ionucn. sve. lA i.sG .q Eudawlifaierdds, e&x pSoenrise, nIncec.d, and able to conduct the litigatisoene. alsoMarisol A. v. Giuliani , 502 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); , 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997). Courts have found the adequacy requirement met even where the class representative and class counsel held a close personal relationship so long as Itnh ere c Couurrrt einsc ysa Ctiosnfiveedr sbioonth F weei lAl n“ftaitirrulys ta Lnidt iga.dequately protect the interests of the class.” , 230 F.R.D. 303, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the adequacy reqseueir aelmsoe nGtr omsse tv e. GveFnI Gwrhpe.,r Ien ccl.ass representative was “close personal friend of his attorney”); , 2017 WL 3668844, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) (Gfionldainn gv . nVoe rciotansfl iEcnt tomf 'itn, tLeLrCest where lead plaintiff and counsel were related by marriage); , No. 4:14CV00069 ERW, 2017 WL 193560, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 18I,n 2 r0e1 C7a)r (d“iAze fmri eCnDd sAhnitpit arunsdt sLhitairge.d passion for running do not create a conflict of interest.”); , 200 F.R.D. 326, 337-38 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding employment of the named representative's son at class counsel's firm “insufficient to create a conflict of interest and thus render him an inadequate class representative”). Protecting the interests of the class includes ensuring that “plaintiff has no direct inteDruepstle or rv .l iCkoeslithcoo oWd hoofl eosbatlaei nCionrgp .a portion of the attorney fees awarMdeadlc htom calna svs. Dcoauvnissel.” ab, r2o4g9a tFed.R o.Dn. o2t9h,e 4r 2g r(oEu.Dnd.Ns .Yby. 2A0m0c8h)e; m Prods., Inc. v. Win, d7s6o1r F.2d 893, 899 (2d Cir. 1985), , 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (affirming certification of class representatives who included the brother, mother-in-law, and personal friend of class counsel). Here, notwithstanding Plaintiff and counsel’s shared relationships and receipt of the same pre-recorded message, Defendant shows no clear conflict of interest, anSdee P laintiff’s counsel has opted out of the class to avoid any appearance of potential conflict. ( Pl.’s Dep. at 36-40.) The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff and his counsel will adequately represent the class. 5. Superiority of a Class Action Finally, Defendant disputes the superiority of a class action because (1) the TCPA provides sufficient incentives for plaintiffs to proceed individually in court, and (2) the crushing class damages far out of proportion to any harm suffered by Plaintiff.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 20.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that “a class action [be] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” and requires consideration of “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions,” “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members,” “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum,” and “the likely difficulties of managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). Superiority is often shown where class members’ claims would be too small to justify individual suits, and a class action would save litigation cAomsctsh ebmy Ppreordmuictttisn, Ign tch. e parties to assert their claims and defenses in a single proceeding. , 521 U.S. at 623 (noting that “the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of the rights of groups of people who inJderivmidyuna vl.l yB ewsto Buludy bSteo wreist,h Lo.Pu.t effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”); , 256 F.R.D. 418, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Here, the Rule 23(b)(3) factors favor certification. Damages for each individual in the putative class receiving one pre-recorded message, including Plaintiff, are statutorily limited to $500. (Pl.’s Reply at 16.) Given the small statutory damages, even individuals who know they have legal recourse are less likely to sue on their own. Reliance on statutory damages awards alone to incentivize individual litigants would lead to one of two suboptimal results—either “needlessly clogging the courts with repetitious suits if many are filed, or rewarding some law violators with liaPbailriktye rf ovr. Toinmlye Wa salringhert Eamntomu'nt tC oo.f, Lto.Pt.al damages if, as seems more likely, few suits are filed.” , 331 F.3d 13, 26 3 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring). Defendant’s argument against certification because of the potentially “crushing” judgment against it is not a barrier to certification, aKsa y“tehere is no per se bar to resolving large numbers of TCPA claims by means of Rule 23.” , 300 F.R.D. at 82 (“Even in a truly serious case, however, the remedy is not to decertify the class but to reduce the award.”). In the absence of any insurmountable difficulties in managing this case as a class action, the Court concludes that a class action is the superior method of fairly and efficiently adj udicCaotinncgl tuhsiiso cna se. Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [Doc. # 56]. The parties are directed to submit proposed class notice documents and procedures within 14 days from the date this ruling is docketed. IT IS SO ORDERED.

______/s/________________________ Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 21st day of September, 2022

3 The parties provide no indication of other TCPA actions against Defendant arising from this prerecorded message. Thus, the present case will not interfere with any pending litigation in other forums.