Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc.

581 N.W.2d 855, 1998 Minn. LEXIS 424, 1998 WL 410678

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Decided: July 23, 1998
• Docket: C3-97-261
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

Desiree Lefto commenced this action against Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. (“Hoggsbreath”) under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act (the “Act”),¹ on behalf of her daughter Nicole and herself, as a result of an August 28, 1993, motor vehicle accident that seriously injured Michael Lefto, her then flaneé and now husband. At the time of the accident, Desiree Lefto and Michael Lefto, while living together, were not married. After stipulating to the facts, which included an admission by Hoggsbreath that it had made an illegal sale of alcoholic beverages, the parties brought cross-motions for summary judgment. In responding to Desiree Lefto’s summary judgment motion, Hoggsbreath argued that Desiree and Nicole Lefto were not within the class of people having a right of action under the Act. The district court, finding, among other things, that Desiree and Nicole Lefto were within the class of people who have a right of action under the Act, granted Desiree Lefto’s summary judgment motion and denied Hoggsbreath’s. The district court then, pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(h), certified as important and doubtful the question of whether they fit within the class of people having a right of action under the Act. The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, affirmed. We conclude that Desiree and Nicole Lefto are within the class of people having a right of action under the Act.

The stipulated facts indicate that Desiree Lefto and Michael Lefto were engaged to be married on August 28, 1993. That day, Michael Lefto was a passenger in a car involved in a rollover motor vehicle accident. Hoggs-breath illegally sold liquor to the driver of the vehicle as well as to Michael Lefto, and those illegal sales were a contributing cause to the accident and to Michael Lefto’s injuries, which were severe and included a closed head injury with secondary cognitive impairment.

At the time of the accident, Desiree and Michael Lefto, though unmarried, had been living together for 5 years. Nicole Lefto, Desiree Lefto’s daughter, also lived with them. For at least 2 years before the accident, Desiree Lefto and Michael Lefto had been pooling their incomes and shared joint checking and Visa accounts. In addition, they owned furniture together and, although the title to their house was in Michael Lefto’s name, they shared household costs and expenses. Finally, they jointly owned recreational property in Jenkins, Minnesota. Desiree Lefto and Michael Lefto eventually married, as planned, and Michael Lefto adopted Nicole.

After the accident, the house the Lefios lived in and Michael Lefto’s truck had to be sold due to the loss of Michael Lefto’s income. They also had to sell their jointly owned recreational property and furniture. Further, Desiree and Nicole Lefto have incurred expenses on' behalf of Michael Lefto; have received less support from Michael Lef-to; and have not received the aid, advice, comfort, and protection that they would.have received but for the accident. Finally, Desiree and Nicole Lefto’s standard of living has been reduced because of the accident.

When the district court grants a summary judgment based on its application of statutory language to the undisputed facts of a case, as the district court did here, its conclusion is one of law and our review is de novo.2

Hoggsbreath contends that the term “other person,” as found in the Act, is ambiguous and its interpretation requires resort to our rulés of statutory construction. Specifically, Hoggsbreath argues that the principle of ejusdem generis controls the outcome of this ease. Ejusdem generis, as codified in Minn. Stat. § 645.08, subd. 3 (1996), requires that “[gjeneral words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.” Thus, Hoggsbreath argues because the categories of people preceding “other person” in the Act — spouse, child, parent, guardian, employee — all have a legal relationship with the “intoxicated person,” only people with a legal relationship with the intoxicated person are entitled to recover as an other person. Hoggsbreath contends that Desiree and Nicole Lefto did not have such a legal relationship and therefore do not have a right of action under the Act. Hoggsbreath also argues that to allow Desiree and Nicole Lefto to sue under the Act would offend public policy because Minnesota does not recognize common law marriage and, at the time of his injuries, Michael Lefto and Desiree Lefto were not married.

Although we have previously construed the Act’s term “other person,” we have not addressed the specific question presented here.³ In construing “other person” in those cases, we did not apply the principle of ejus-dem generis even though we had ample opportunity to do so.

We have said that the Act is both remedial and penal.⁴ In Herrly v. Muzik, we said, “when [the Act’s] provisions have been clear as to intent and purpose, we have liberally construed the act ‘so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.’ ”⁵ At the same time, we noted that liberal construction is not without limitations and that the Act “ ‘is to be strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its definite, scope.’ ”⁶ The intent and purpose of the Act’s provisions are clear. The mischief to be suppressed is the illegal furnishing of liquor causing a person’s intoxication and the remedy to be advanced is the protection of innoeent third persons injured as a result by providing those persons a claim of civil damage.⁷ We reinforced the remedy to be advanced by identifying the Act’s definite scope in Herrly where we said, “Our repeated view [is] that the [Act] was intended solely to protect ‘innocent third persons’ injured as a result of another’s intoxication * ⅜ ⁸ The dissent would have the court either ignore or overrule this line of cases. Therefore, consistent with our previous construction of the term “other person,” we conclude that the term “other person” refers to any other person injured by the intoxication of another and who played no role in causing the intoxication.⁹

Moreover, we note that it makes no sense to apply the rule of ejUsdem generis to only one category of injury — means of support— and not the others, personal injury, property or pecuniary losses. Clearly, any innocent third person injured in person or property need not have a legal relationship with the intoxicated person in order to have a cause of action under the Act.¹⁰ So why should an innocent third person who is injured in means of support?'

On this record, Desiree Lefto, the fiancée of Michael Lefto, at the time of his injuries, and Nicole Lefto, her daughter, are clearly “other” innocent third persons that played no role in causing the intoxication that contributed to the cause of the rollover accident and to Michael Lefto’s injuries. Further, unlike the situation in Hannah v. Jensen,11 and Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams,¹² they are not otherwise barred by law from asserting a claim of civil damage. Therefore, they are entitled to exercise their right of action under the Act.

Affirmed.

1 . The Act, in relevant part, provides that:

A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person, has a right of action in the person's own name for all damages sustained against a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages. All damages recovered by a minor under this section must he paid either to the minor or to the minor’s parent, guardian, or next friend as the court directs.

Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1992).

2 . See Wallin v. Letoumeau, 534 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1995).

3 . See Hannah v. Jensen, 298 N.W.2d 52, 54-55 (Minn. 1980) (on-duty police officer does not qualify as "other person” due to application of Fireman's rule); Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 159 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (1968) (injured party who purchased alcohol for the tortfeasor minor is not "other person” under the Act); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 337, 121 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1963) (tortfeasor’s insurance company does not qualify as "other person" due to application of subrogation principle); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83-84, 103 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1960) (voluntarily intoxicated minor is not “other person” under the Act).

4 . Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 1985).

5 . Id.

6 . Id. (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)).

7 . See Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 121-22, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1972).

8 . Herrly, 374 N.W.2d at 278.

9 . The dissent lists a parade of horribles, which it contends would flow from our decision. We do not believe the legislature intended to include every conceivable remote injury. In order to recover under the Act, a party seeking recovery must establish that they are "injured * * * by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person * ⅜ *." While the statute has no counterpart in the common law, presumably, in order to recover, the party seeking recovery will have to establish that his or her injury was reasonably foreseeable and proximately caused by . the intoxicated person.

10 . See McGuire v. C & L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn.1984) (motorcyclist injured by drunk driver brought suit under the Civil Damage Act); Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures, dfb/a Radisson Hotel South, 555 N.W.2d 328 (Minn.App.1996), aff'd 565 N.W.2d 433 (Minn.1997) (motorcyclist injured by drunk driver brought suit under Civil Damage Act).

11 . 298 N.W.2d at 54-55.

12 . 265 Minn, at 337, 121 N.W.2d at 583.