BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
On motion of the defendant, Sewer Construction Company, Inc. (hereafter Company or defendant), the district court dismissed this suit for lack of asserted admiralty jurisdiction. From the judgment of dismissal the plaintiff, Lawrence Whittington (hereafter Whittington or plaintiff), prosecutes this appeal.
In his complaint, containing two counts, Whittington alleged that the jurisdiction of the district court arises under and by virtue of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States; that this is an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that the defendant had in its possession and under its control a certain barge which was in navigation on the inland waterways of the United States, that is, on the Elk River in Kanawha County, West Virginia; that at all times mentioned in the complaint the plaintiff was employed on said barge by the defendant, “performing the work of a deckhand and seaman”; that while the plaintiff was a member of the crew of said barge working on the Elk River, within the terri[430]*430torial jurisdiction of the district court as an “able-bodied seaman in connection with his assigned duties and tasks,” the defendant was negligent in that the plaintiff was being lowered from an overhead bridge to said barge and, in being so lowered, the plaintiff fell into said barge and was thereby seriously injured. In the second count Whittington alleged that because of his injuries it became the duty of the defendant to furnish the plaintiff with prompt medical care, attention and medicine and “the expenses of his maintenances [sic] and cure.” The complaint concluded with a demand for the sum of $150,000 for injuries, $10,000 for maintenance and cure, court costs and attorneys’ fees, and a trial by jury.
After filing an answer the defendant, by leave of court, filed an amended answer alleging, in pertinent part, that the district court was without jurisdiction; that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted; and that plaintiff is barred from recovery by virtue of the Workmen’s Compensation statute of the State of West Virginia. The defendant denied, generally, the material allegations of the complaint, both in counts 1 and 2, and called upon plaintiff for strict proof.
The defendant took Whittington’s discovery deposition and, at the time it moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant moved that the discovery deposition be made a part of the record and the motion to dismiss. This was accomplished by a formal order.
At the time Whittington was injured he was 47 or 48 years old. His employer, the defendant, was engaged in the demolition of a bridge which spanned the Elk River in Kanawha County, West Virginia, and one section near the east bank of the river had partially collapsed. In that section a hole approximately twelve feet square had been cut in the bridge flooring and an open barge was moored in the water underneath the hole between a bridge pier and the river bank. As the bridge was dismantled some of the wood decking, steel, concrete, and portions of the bridge structure were loaded into the barge to be later towed away.
In his opening brief Whittington stated the question involved in the ease as follows:
Did the Court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not a seaman, and, therefore, the Court did not have jurisdiction under the Admiralty or Maritime Laws of the United States?
In his statement of the case he asserts in his brief that he filed his complaint alleging that he was a seaman, and that, as such, was entitled to recover under the admiralty laws of the United States for injuries sustained caused by the negligence of his employer and the unseaworthiness of the vessel “which he was assigned.” Further, he alleges that on the day he was injured “he was performing the work of a deckhand and seaman on Barge ABL358”; that the defendant was negligent, and that the barge or vessel was unseaworthy, and that the defendant failed to provide proper methods of ingress and egress; that the question of whether or not plaintiff was a seaman, or doing the work of a seaman, at the time of the injury was a question of fact to be determined by a jury, and not a question of law to be determined by the court.
The sole question here is the very narrow one of the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. The undisputed factual disclosures lead us to conclude that this controversy is not within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Consequently, we affirm the judgment dismissing the suit.
Turning to the discovery deposition of Whittington, we glean from the questions asked and his answers thereto certain facts which will be shown in the following four paragraphs.
At various times and for about twenty-one years of his adult life he had worked as [431]*431an overhead crane operator for different manufacturing plants and he had labored at different jobs, including seasonal work for the West Virginia Highway Department.
When employed by the defendant he was hired “as a crane and backhoe operator” on a bridge demolition job. Whittington checked out a crane for approximately two hours when he first went to work for the defendant and then he was put to work operating a pick, shovel and a jack hammer tearing up the concrete on the bridge deck. The west end of the bridge was intact and the workmen gained access to the bridge from that end as it was possible to drive trucks out on the bridge to help carry away the debris. Referring to the hole in the bridge flooring Whittington stated “You could have dropped a truck down through it if you had backed it up.”
There was a barge in the river underneath the hole in the bridge which was for the purpose of “hauling away” the dismantled portions. Stationed on the bridge was a motored winch equipped with a drum and a cable line, the line running from the drum through a pulley on the superstructure of the bridge which was used for lowering materials through the hole in the bridge into the barge. There was a hook on the end of the cable and on the day before the plaintiff was injured he and another workman were, in turn, lowered through the hole in the bridge into the barge by means of the cable so they could detach bridge materials from the cable hook. On that occasion Whittington thought he worked there as much as “a half of a day.” On the following day the plaintiff was directed to go into the barge again by the same means, riding the cable down with a “choker on the end.” As the plaintiff explained — “A choker is a steel cable with two eyes in the end, one in one end and one in the other; that would be two loops.” The choker was a piece of steel cable about five feet long; and he stated that he put his foot in the lower loop of the choker, the upper loop being fastened to the hook on the end of the winch’s cable, and he grasped the cable line above the hook, above the top end of the choker line. In preparing to be lowered he was standing at the east side of the hole in the bridge and a short distance underneath there was a steel beam with a flange on it which went across the bridge below the flooring. He had one foot on the flange of the beam and put his other foot in the eye of the choker which was swinging free, preparing to descend into the barge.
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BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
On motion of the defendant, Sewer Construction Company, Inc. (hereafter Company or defendant), the district court dismissed this suit for lack of asserted admiralty jurisdiction. From the judgment of dismissal the plaintiff, Lawrence Whittington (hereafter Whittington or plaintiff), prosecutes this appeal.
In his complaint, containing two counts, Whittington alleged that the jurisdiction of the district court arises under and by virtue of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States; that this is an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that the defendant had in its possession and under its control a certain barge which was in navigation on the inland waterways of the United States, that is, on the Elk River in Kanawha County, West Virginia; that at all times mentioned in the complaint the plaintiff was employed on said barge by the defendant, “performing the work of a deckhand and seaman”; that while the plaintiff was a member of the crew of said barge working on the Elk River, within the terri[430]*430torial jurisdiction of the district court as an “able-bodied seaman in connection with his assigned duties and tasks,” the defendant was negligent in that the plaintiff was being lowered from an overhead bridge to said barge and, in being so lowered, the plaintiff fell into said barge and was thereby seriously injured. In the second count Whittington alleged that because of his injuries it became the duty of the defendant to furnish the plaintiff with prompt medical care, attention and medicine and “the expenses of his maintenances [sic] and cure.” The complaint concluded with a demand for the sum of $150,000 for injuries, $10,000 for maintenance and cure, court costs and attorneys’ fees, and a trial by jury.
After filing an answer the defendant, by leave of court, filed an amended answer alleging, in pertinent part, that the district court was without jurisdiction; that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted; and that plaintiff is barred from recovery by virtue of the Workmen’s Compensation statute of the State of West Virginia. The defendant denied, generally, the material allegations of the complaint, both in counts 1 and 2, and called upon plaintiff for strict proof.
The defendant took Whittington’s discovery deposition and, at the time it moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant moved that the discovery deposition be made a part of the record and the motion to dismiss. This was accomplished by a formal order.
At the time Whittington was injured he was 47 or 48 years old. His employer, the defendant, was engaged in the demolition of a bridge which spanned the Elk River in Kanawha County, West Virginia, and one section near the east bank of the river had partially collapsed. In that section a hole approximately twelve feet square had been cut in the bridge flooring and an open barge was moored in the water underneath the hole between a bridge pier and the river bank. As the bridge was dismantled some of the wood decking, steel, concrete, and portions of the bridge structure were loaded into the barge to be later towed away.
In his opening brief Whittington stated the question involved in the ease as follows:
Did the Court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not a seaman, and, therefore, the Court did not have jurisdiction under the Admiralty or Maritime Laws of the United States?
In his statement of the case he asserts in his brief that he filed his complaint alleging that he was a seaman, and that, as such, was entitled to recover under the admiralty laws of the United States for injuries sustained caused by the negligence of his employer and the unseaworthiness of the vessel “which he was assigned.” Further, he alleges that on the day he was injured “he was performing the work of a deckhand and seaman on Barge ABL358”; that the defendant was negligent, and that the barge or vessel was unseaworthy, and that the defendant failed to provide proper methods of ingress and egress; that the question of whether or not plaintiff was a seaman, or doing the work of a seaman, at the time of the injury was a question of fact to be determined by a jury, and not a question of law to be determined by the court.
The sole question here is the very narrow one of the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. The undisputed factual disclosures lead us to conclude that this controversy is not within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Consequently, we affirm the judgment dismissing the suit.
Turning to the discovery deposition of Whittington, we glean from the questions asked and his answers thereto certain facts which will be shown in the following four paragraphs.
At various times and for about twenty-one years of his adult life he had worked as [431]*431an overhead crane operator for different manufacturing plants and he had labored at different jobs, including seasonal work for the West Virginia Highway Department.
When employed by the defendant he was hired “as a crane and backhoe operator” on a bridge demolition job. Whittington checked out a crane for approximately two hours when he first went to work for the defendant and then he was put to work operating a pick, shovel and a jack hammer tearing up the concrete on the bridge deck. The west end of the bridge was intact and the workmen gained access to the bridge from that end as it was possible to drive trucks out on the bridge to help carry away the debris. Referring to the hole in the bridge flooring Whittington stated “You could have dropped a truck down through it if you had backed it up.”
There was a barge in the river underneath the hole in the bridge which was for the purpose of “hauling away” the dismantled portions. Stationed on the bridge was a motored winch equipped with a drum and a cable line, the line running from the drum through a pulley on the superstructure of the bridge which was used for lowering materials through the hole in the bridge into the barge. There was a hook on the end of the cable and on the day before the plaintiff was injured he and another workman were, in turn, lowered through the hole in the bridge into the barge by means of the cable so they could detach bridge materials from the cable hook. On that occasion Whittington thought he worked there as much as “a half of a day.” On the following day the plaintiff was directed to go into the barge again by the same means, riding the cable down with a “choker on the end.” As the plaintiff explained — “A choker is a steel cable with two eyes in the end, one in one end and one in the other; that would be two loops.” The choker was a piece of steel cable about five feet long; and he stated that he put his foot in the lower loop of the choker, the upper loop being fastened to the hook on the end of the winch’s cable, and he grasped the cable line above the hook, above the top end of the choker line. In preparing to be lowered he was standing at the east side of the hole in the bridge and a short distance underneath there was a steel beam with a flange on it which went across the bridge below the flooring. He had one foot on the flange of the beam and put his other foot in the eye of the choker which was swinging free, preparing to descend into the barge. He had descended about five feet when the hook on the end of the cable rubbed against a piece of steel. As Whittington described it, “Well as I was going down, trying to push myself off the flange of the bridge, the hook caught on the flange of the bridge and rubbed the choker off — rubbed the eye off that hook, that is all. I just fell the rest of the way.” A workman was on top of the bridge to push the whipline out so that plaintiff could descend into the barge but apparently the line was not pushed out far enough to avoid the flange of the steel beam. Plaintiff was injured when he landed on the debris and dismantled materials which had already been placed in the barge.
Near the end of his deposition Whittington stated that when he was employed he was supposed to have been the only skilled craftsman on the bridge, an “operator,” but he wound up, in effect, doing laborer work which was what most of the other men on the demolition job did. He was asked the question whether, at any time, he considered himself an able-bodied seaman. He was instructed by his counsel not to answer. He was asked further whether, at any time from the time he was hired until he was injured, he understood that he was to work on a boat as such, and his counsel again objected. His deposition concluded, however, with interrogation by his own counsel and answers to the questions. His counsel asked whether he understood' on the day before he was injured and the day on which he was injured that he was to work on a barge and he answered “The day before — I will phrase it this way: On the day before I got hurt, Gary Backland come to me and said, ‘Larry, they need a guy to work down on the barge.’ I said, ‘All right; I don’t mind.’ ”
[432]*432One who seeks to recover for injuries in a suit based upon admiralty jurisdiction must show (1) that his injuries occurred upon navigable waters and had a maritime nexus, or (2) that the injuries were caused by a vessel in navigable waters or an appurtenance of the vessel, or (3) that the person injured was a seaman, a member of a crew of a vessel, injured in the course of his employment. See Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4-5, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045 (1946); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972); Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740; 7A J. Moore, Federal Practice, 2nd Ed. 1972, ¶.325[4] at p. 3575.
It is clear that Whittington’s injuries do not qualify under the first ground of admiralty jurisdiction as injuries occurring upon navigable waters and having a maritime nexus. For jurisdictional purposes we must look to the place where the incident occurred which ultimately gave rise to the cause of action. T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 48 S.Ct. 228, 72 L.Ed. 520 (1928);1 Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4 Cir. 1965).2 In the instant case the tortious act which caused the plaintiff’s injuries occurred while he was suspended from the shore-based winch. There is no allegation of negligence with respect to the barge. The alleged tortious conduct involved the shore-based winch and its attached “choker.” Since the accident was “initiated” while the plaintiff was upon an extension of the land3 and involved only shore-based equipment and conduct, no admiralty jurisdiction exists. See May v. Lease Service, Inc., 365 F.Supp. 1202 (E.D. La.), aff’d per curiam, 487 F.2d 915 (5 Cir. 1973).4 The mere fortuitous circumstance [433]*433that the winch line dropped Whittington onto the barge rather than onto the shore is insufficient to qualify his injuries as occurring upon navigable waters for jurisdictional purposes. Bible v. Chevron Oil Co., 460 F.2d 1218 (5 Cir. 1972).5 Since the alleged tort did not occur upon the navigable waters, it fails to meet the first of the above-stated conditions necessary to establish that ground of admiralty jurisdiction. We need not, therefore, consider whether the tort and the resultant injury had a maritime nexus.
It would seem equally clear that Whittington was not injured by a vessel in navigation or an appurtenance thereof. The winch from which Whittington fell was located on the bridge which was being demolished. It is well established that a bridge is not a vessel within admiralty jurisdiction. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969). Thus, the fact that the winch was attached to a bridge establishes that it was not an appurtenance of the vessel, even though it may customarily be utilized in loading operations. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971); McCullum v. United International Corp., 493 F.2d 501 (9 Cir. 1974). We conclude, therefore, that Whittington was not injured by a vessel in navigation or an appurtenance thereof, and that admiralty jurisdiction cannot be invoked upon this ground.
Having found the first two grounds for admiralty jurisdiction to be absent, our analysis must now turn to the third ground — whether the injured plaintiff was a “seaman,” a member of the crew of a vessel, injured in the course of his employment. Whittington appears to base his conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction may exist in this case upon the theory that Whittington suffered his injuries while “doing the work of a seaman” in the service of a vessel and that he is, therefore, entitled to the status of a “seaman” for the purpose of invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. We find the argument presented to support this proposition wholly unpersuasive. It represents a confusion of admiralty principles and constitutes a substantial departure from accepted jurisdictional standards.
There is a failure on the part of the plaintiff to distinguish “seaman” from “one who does the work of a seaman.” The term “seaman” when used in a jurisdictional sense refers to one who is a “member of the crew” of a vessel. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732 (1940). The phrase “one who does the work of a seaman” is used to define the class of workers who are protected by the warranty of seaworthiness, and is applied only after jurisdiction has been found to exist. See United Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 79 S.Ct. 517, 3 L.Ed.2d 541 (1959); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). The Supreme Court in Victory. Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971), has rejected the idea that admiralty jurisdiction can be invoked by a shore-based worker, injured while ashore, based solely upon evidence that he was doing work traditionally done by a seaman at the time he was injured.6
[434]*434Here, there appeared to be a failure to distinguish jurisdiction on the one hand and the scope of available remedies on the other. As we said in Garrett v. Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228, 231 (4 Cir. 1974):
. There appears to be no little confusion concerning restrictions upon the right to recover under maritime law. This confusion is attributable, in great measure, to the fact that the scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not always equal to the breadth of the seaworthiness warranty. Thus careful consideration of the limits of admiralty jurisdiction is essential .
Since the plaintiff in Garrett was a longshoreman injured while ashore, he could invoke admiralty jurisdiction only by showing that he was injured by an unseaworthy appurtenance of a vessel in navigable waters. Jurisdiction in that case was predicated solely upon evidence that plaintiff was injured by an appurtenance of the vessel. Assuming in the instant case that Whittington was, as a matter of law, doing the work of a seaman, that fact would be pertinent to a determination of the question of whether the warranty of seaworthiness extended to him, but would not determine the jurisdictional question.
A “seaman” as the term is used in a jurisdictional sense means one who is “permanently attached to and employed by [a vessel] as a member of its crew.” Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 372, 77 S.Ct. 415, 417, 1 L.Ed.2d 404 (1957). A “member of the crew,” as we interpret that phrase, refers to those employees of a vessel “who are naturally and primarily on board to aid in her navigation.” South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 260, 60 S.Ct. 544, 549, 84 L.Ed. 732 (1940). Hence, one cannot invoke admiralty jurisdiction by alleging his status as that of a “seaman” merely because he happens to be injured while performing a task in the course of his employment which traditionally would be the task of a seaman. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra7
Whittington’s discovery deposition before the court below demonstrates the plaintiff was not a “seaman” and that he had no basis to support his assertion of admiralty jurisdiction. He was a laborer, employed to help demolish a bridge. Prior to the accident plaintiff’s only contact with a vessel in navigation was that he had spent one day on board a barge tied to a pier of the bridge while helping to load scrap from the demolition of the bridge. On the day of the accident, plaintiff was being lowered by winch onto the barge to continue loading scrap. We are of the opinion that a mere shore-based worker, such as the plaintiff in this case, who has incidental and intermittent nonnavigational duties aboard a barge moored to a bridge is not a “seaman” for jurisdictional purposes. The following excerpted statement is of particular interest:
Plaintiff further argues that he was entitled to a jury determination concerning the jurisdictional facts surrounding [435]*435both his Longshoremen’s and Jones Act claims. We find this contention likewise without merit. The controlling facts concerning the nature of the structure and . . . [plaintiff’s] duties thereon are clear. These are factual inflexibles requiring no further evidential elucidation. Accepting the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no reasonable basis on which a jury could determine that he was injured upon navigable waters or that he was a seaman. . Stanley v. Guy Scroggins Const. Co., 5 Cir. 1961, 297 F.2d 374; Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott and Co., 5 Cir. 1960, 276 F.2d 42.
Labit v. Carey Salt Co., 421 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5 Cir. 1970).
There are dangers inherent in the shoreward encroachment of admiralty law, a body of law peculiarly suited to the high seas.8 The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to assert a claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, if he can show that he was injured while doing work traditionally done by a seaman.
The Jones Act affords a remedy to all who fall within the class of “seamen.”9 But that remedy so provided would appear to be applicable to the class of persons defined as “seamen” for jurisdictional purposes.10
It seems that the plaintiff fails to distinguish the scope of the remedy available under the Jones Act and the scope of the remedy available under the warranty of unseaworthiness. Since the standards are different under the two theories of recovery there is a difference in the remedies and coverage. See 7A J. Moore, Federal Practice, 2nd Ed. 1972, f .325[1] at page 3501, note 1.
This court has previously had occasion to note that merely because one undertakes a task which is traditionally the work of a seaman, he is not automatically entitled to the remedy afforded “seamen” by the Jones Act. Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 [436]*436F.2d 360 (4 Cir. 1966). At page 364 the court stated, “However, if the claimant is not simply substituting in a single phase of a seaman’s duties, but is a member of the crew, we see no reason why . . he may not . . . sue his employer on the Jones Act.”
The Supreme Court has held that the passage of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) shows that Congress intended “to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters . . .” Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045 (1946); accord, Lawrence v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 319 F.2d 805, 806 (4 Cir. 1963); McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132, 135-136 (5 Cir. 1953).11 To qualify as a “member of the crew” under the Jones Act one must be more or less permanently attached to a vessel or fleet;12 he must be one whose duties serve “naturally and primarily as an aid to navigation” in the broadest sense,13 and the vessel must be in navigation.14
The plaintiff in the instant case was a laborer who, in the course of his employment, was assigned to work on a barge and did work for a part of only one day prior to his accident. His duties related to the demolition of a bridge; not to the navigation of the barge. Such work wholly unrelated to the navigation of the barge does not qualify the plaintiff as a Jones Act “seaman.” See Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989, 991 (5 Cir. 1973). Pertinent is the following passage from Burns v. Anchor-Wate Co., 469 F.2d 730, 733 (5 Cir. 1972):
For it is here uncontroverted that decedent was not more or less permanently attached to a vessel or a specific fleet of vessels. He neither took his meals or slept on any of the barges or their towing vessels. Nor did he perform any function necessary to the operation of either the barge upon which he was injured or any of the other numerous barges upon which he assisted in the loading/unloading of pipe. . . .
The court in Burns affirmed the entry of a directed verdict for the defendant on the Jones Act claim, holding that the plaintiff was not a “seaman” as that term is used in the Jones Act.
In his discovery deposition, under oath, which was made a part of the motion to dismiss and a part of the record, without objection, Whittington had the opportunity to state facts to support his general allegations of the complaint with respect to the district court’s jurisdiction.
In its memorandum decision and order of dismissal the district court discussed the normal requirements which must be met in order to establish admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The court noted that the record in the case, particularly the plaintiff’s own deposition, discloses that Whittington was employed by the defendant as a crane operator and laborer in the demolition of a bridge; his primary work was on the bridge, not an instrument or structure in navigation; the tort or wrong or negligence which resulted in his injury was committed on the bridge; he fell onto the barge with which he had no permanent relation or connection; he was not a member of a barge crew aboard in aid of navigation; [437]*437unseaworthiness of the barge was not the cause of his injury; the wrong which caused the injury must bear some significant relationship to admiralty activity in order to invoke the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court.
In colorful and forceful language, the district court stated further:
Judicial imagination, despite the creative language of the complaint, is not sufficiently elastic to transform plaintiff, a laborer on a bridge demolition job, into a seaman or member of a barge crew in order to satisfy admiralty and maritime jurisdictional requirements. Plaintiff’s deposition does not sustain his position on jurisdiction and generalizations and conclusions in the complaint and in memoranda presented by counsel do not sustain the burden of proof placed on plaintiff by defendant’s motion to dismiss.
We conclude that the judgment of the district court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
The case was decided by the district court by granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court based its conclusion upon the pleadings, briefs, arguments of counsel and the discovery deposition of the plaintiff himself which deposition was made a part of the record by formal order without objection.