ACCEPTED 13-14-00380-CR THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 9/23/2015 1:24:07 PM Dorian E. Ramirez CLERK
NO. 13-14-00380-CR-CR
IN THE FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS 9/23/2015 1:24:07 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk THIRTEENTH DISTRICT
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
LAWRENCE JAMES, JR.
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 12-14114
252ND DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE LARRY GIST, JUDGE PRESIDING
BRIEF FOR STATE BOB WORTHAM CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS TBL # 19959725 1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300 BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701 (409) 835-8550 (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us) IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(a), a complete list of the names of all
interested parties is provided below so the members of this Honorable Court may
at once determine whether they are disqualified to serve or should recuse
themselves from participating in the decision of the case.
Lawrence James, Jr., Appellant
Defense Attorney on the Trial: Judge Presiding: Nathan Lee Reynolds, Jr. The Honorable Larry Gist 3500 Memorial Blvd. Port Arthur, Texas 77640
Defense Attorney on the Appeal: Kevin Sekaly Cribbs 7705 Calder Avenue Beaumont, Texas 77706
Prosecutors on the Trial: Eric Houghton Jefferson County Courthouse 1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300 Beaumont, Texas 77701
Prosecutor on the Appeal: Wayln G. Thompson Jefferson County Courthouse 1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300 Beaumont, Texas 77701
Bob Wortham, Criminal District Attorney Jefferson County Courthouse 1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300 Beaumont, Texas 77701 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................2
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................4
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE .......................................5
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by being denied effective assistance of counsel.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO ......................................8
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by being denied an open and public trial.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. THREE ..................................9
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because he was not given notice of the changes of trial judge and prosecutor.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FOUR ....................................9
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because based upon the arguments of the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing and by the trial court by relying on the pre-sentence report and its contents relative to extraneous offenses and victim statements.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FIVE ....................................10
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in accepting Appellant's guilty plea without providing the necessary admonishments and therefore the plea was involuntary.
i STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SIX.......................................11
The Appellant claims his due process rights were violated when he was not provided a complete record/statement of facts from his court proceedings.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SEVEN ................................12
The Nunc Pro Tunc admonishments and unagreed plea agreement does not properly correct the trial court's clerical error [date of documents] and should be withdrawn and replaced with an Order Nunc Pro Tunc.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. EIGHT .................................14
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting Appellant's motion to dismiss court appointed counsel prior to trial.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. NINE....................................16
The Appellant's case should be remanded and returned to his prejudgment status in order that he may be allowed to file a motion for new trial.
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................18
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
TEX. R. APP. PROC., Rule 33.1.............................................................................10
TEX.R.APP. PROC., 33.1(a)(1) ..............................................................................11
TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) .............................................................................7,8.9
TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g).............................................................................7,8,9
UNITED STATE CASES Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ......................................................................................................................5
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) .....................7
TEXAS CASES
Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ....................................13
Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) ........................................6
Cooper v. State, 500 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973.................................11
Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) ...............................11
Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)..............................5
Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) ................................7
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) ............................7
Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) ...........................5
King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)......................................15
iii Malcolm v State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)......14,15
Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) .....................................13
Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2012)...............................6
Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) ...........................................11
Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)......................................11
Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ....................................16
Rogers v. State, 488 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) ................................15
Rylander v. State, 101 S .W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)...............................7
Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977)...................................14
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)..................................6
iv NO. 13-14-00380-CR-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
LAWRENCE JAMES, JR.
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 12-14114
252ND DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE LARRY GIST, JUDGE PRESIDING
BRIEF FOR STATE The State does not believe that oral argument would significantly aid the
Court in determining the legal and factual issues. However, should the Court grant
any request for oral argument by Appellant, then the State requests the opportunity
to respond in oral argument.
1 TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, the State of Texas and makes and files this, its Brief,
respectfully showing to this Honorable Court as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury for commission of
an alleged murder. [Enhanced] (CR:5-6.) The record indicates that voir-dire was
conducted on April 29, 2014, but that before evidence was presented, Appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the trial court. (RR.Plea:II:5.) The trial court found
Appellant guilty and reset the case for preparation of a pre-sentence report. The
State recommended a life sentence. Appellant asked for a 25 year sentence.
(RR.Plea.II:6; CR. Supplemental:5-7.) On June 2, 2014, the trial court assessed a
life sentence. (RR.III:11.) The trial court certified that this is not a plea-bargain
case and the defendant has the right of appeal. (CR:60.) Timely, written notice of
appeal was filed on June 5, 2014. (CR:72.)
2 ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant presents nine issues for review, while conceding in the summary
of his brief that the first six (6) issues do not warrant reversal. He first claimed he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He also claims he was denied due
process of law because he was allegedly denied an open public trial, that he was
not given notice of the change of trial judge and prosecutor, and arguments at
sentencing relied upon extraneous offenses and victim statements from the pre-
sentence report. In issue five, Appellant claims he was not properly admonished.
In issue six, he claims he was not provided a complete record of facts from his
court proceeding. In issue seven, Appellant complains of an alleged clerical error
regarding the dates of his plea admonishments. In issue eight, he alleges the trial
court abused its discretion in not granting his motion to dismiss court appointed
trial counsel prior to trial. Finally, in issue nine, Appellant argues that his case
should be remanded to the trial court to enable him to file a motion for new trial.
3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant concedes in his first two issues there are no meritorious issues
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel or an alleged closed courtroom that are
supported by the record. In his third issue, Appellant fails to state a factual basis
for an argument and concedes he is unable to set forth an argument to support that
he was harmed by a change of judge and prosecutor. In issue four, Appellant
concedes that no objections were made to the pre-sentence investigation report and
that any alleged error regarding the pre-sentence report was waived. In issue five,
Appellant concedes that no error occurred regarding an allegation that he was
denied a complete record/statement of facts from his court proceedings and that
any alleged error was not preserved.
As to issue seven, written plea admonishments appear to have been executed
on both April 28th and 29th of 2014, the day of the pretrial hearings and the day the
trial started and halted for his plea following voir-dire. In either or both instances,
the admonishments were provided. The State believes no further correction is
therefore needed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's
request to fire his trial lawyer the day before trial. Finally, as to issue nine,
Appellant is not entitled to hybrid representation. Thus, the trial court was not
required to rule on his pro se motion for new trial. Relief requested in all issues
should be denied.
4 STATE'S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE
Appellant Asserts:
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by being denied effective assistance of counsel.
A. Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:
Appellate courts measure a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against
the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hernandez v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (applying Strickland test). A
person claiming that counsel was ineffective must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an “objective
standard of reasonableness,” and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ex
parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts “indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell
within the wide range of reasonable assistance and that the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. “The mere fact that another attorney might
have pursued a different tactic at trial does not suffice to prove a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. “The Strickland test is judged by the 5 ‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel's isolated acts or omissions, and the
test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through
20/20 hindsight.” Id. Thus, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly
founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged
ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to
show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or
strategic decision-making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct
was reasonable and professional. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833
(Tex.Crim.App.2002) Rarely will the trial record contain sufficient information
to permit a reviewing court to fairly evaluate the merits of such a serious
allegation. Id. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. In the majority of cases, the record
on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of
trial counsel. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. “Trial counsel should ordinarily be
afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as
ineffective.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). “If
trial counsel is not given that opportunity, the appellate court should not find
deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no
competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id.
6 Appellate courts ordinarily will not declare trial counsel ineffective where
there is no record showing counsel had an opportunity to explain himself. See
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Without
evidence of the strategy employed, appellate courts will presume sound trial
strategy. See Rylander v. State, 101 S .W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
Texas procedure makes it “virtually impossible” for appellate counsel to present an
adequate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct review. Trevino v.
Thaler, 569 U.S ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013). This is because the
inherent nature of most ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims means the trial
court record “will often fail to contain the information necessary to substantiate’
the claim.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475
(Tex.Crim.App.1997) (en banc)).
B. Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Are Not Supported By the Record:
Appellant conceded in his brief that there are no meritorious issues regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel in this cause that are supported by the record.
Other than providing general law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, his
brief fails to state concise issues or points to be presented in that regard as required
by TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as
required by TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g). He concedes that any allegedly
7 meritorius “claims should be litigated after the full development of supporting
evidence for those claims and that such full development is not currently in this
record.” (See App. Brief – p.21.) The State concurs.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO
Appellant Asserts:
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by being denied an open and public trial.
Appellant concedes in his brief that the record does not support an allegation
that the courtroom was closed to the public. (See App. Brief – p.22.) His brief fails
to state concise issues or points to be presented in that regard as required by TEX.
R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as required by
TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g).
8 STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. THREE
Appellant Asserts:
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because he was not given notice of the changes of trial judge and prosecutor.
Appellant concedes in his brief that he is unable to set forth an argument on
Issue No. Three and that he cannot establish that he was harmed by the change in
trial judge and prosecutor. (See App. Brief – p. 22.) His brief fails to state concise
issues or points to be presented in that regard as required by TEX. R. APP.
PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as required by TEX. R.
APP. PROC., 38.1(g).
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FOUR
Appellant Asserts:
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because based upon the arguments of the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing and by the trial court by relying on the pre-sentence report and its contents relative to extraneous offenses and victim statements.
Appellant conceded in his brief that there were no objections made to the
presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing and that there are no
preserved grounds to complain of the report or its use on appeal. (See App. Brief –
9 p. 26.) Failure to object to the pre-sentence report waives any error in the
admission of the P.S.I. contents. TEX. R. APP. PROC., Rule 33.1.
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FIVE
Appellant Asserts:
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in accepting Appellant's guilty plea without providing the necessary admonishments and therefore the plea was involuntary.
Appellant concedes in his brief that, “The trial court's admonishments were
both orally and in writing, and completely apprise Appellant of all requisite
admonishments under the statute. There is no trial court error regarding
admonishments resulting in Appellant's complained of involuntary plea. (No
meritorious argument of trial court error relative to an involuntary plea are
supported by the record.”) (See App. Brief – p.30; See also, CR:29-31 and CR.
Supplemental: 5-7.)
10 STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SIX
Appellant Asserts:
The Appellant claims his due process rights were violated when he was not provided a complete record/statement of facts from his court proceedings.
Appellant concedes either that no such error occurred, or that if error
occurred it was not preserved, because of lack of objection. (See App. Brief – p.
32-33.) To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must timely object, stating the
specific legal basis. TEX.R.APP. PROC., 33.1(a)(1); Rhoades v. State, 934
S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). To be timely, an objection must be raised at
the earliest opportunity or as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent.
Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The objection
must simply be clear enough to provide the judge and the opposing party an
opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct the purported error. Pena v. State,
353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). Without a timely objection, nothing is
presented for appellate review. Cooper v. State, 500 S.W.2d 837, 841
(Tex.Crim.App. 1973).
11 STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SEVEN
Appellant Asserts:
The Nunc Pro Tunc admonishments and unagreed plea agreement does not properly correct the trial court's clerical error [date of documents] and should be withdrawn and replaced with an Order Nunc Pro Tunc.
This Cause was called for pre-trial matters on April 28, 2015. Voir-dire
commenced on April 29, 2014. (RR.II.) There are two sets of written plea
admonishments found in the record. The first is found at CR:29-31 that is dated
April 28, 2014. From the scrawled writing it is easily identified as a computerized,
tablet generated document utilized by our courts. The second is the Nunc Pro Tunc
written plea admonishments found at CR.Supplemental:5-7, dated April 29, 2014.
That document is clearly one that has handwritten notations. Appellant entered his
plea of guilty on April 29, 2014. (See CR:5.) Appellant complains of the April 29th
documents, asking the appellate court to order the trial court to adopt the original
document of April 28, 2014, and to nunc pro tunc that document to correct the date
as April 29, 2014, as the correct document. The State here argues that the two
documents just as easily work in conjunction with each other. The original
document dated April 28th, and the document dated April 29th both contain the
same proper admonishments, although the April 28th documents contain all the
necessary signatures. Substantial compliance with the admonishment requirements
12 is satisfied by both documents. The April 29th document (nunc pro tunc) appears
to have been a subsequent effort by the trial court to insure Appellant was again
admonished after voir dire in order to further facilitate the plea. The State urges
that no further correction is therefore needed. Substantial compliance with
admonishment requirements is sufficient to inform a defendant about plea
consequences. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
Appellant has not established that the admonishments themselves are incorrect,
much less that he was in any way misled or harmed. See Anderson v. State, 182
S.W.3d 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).
13 STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. EIGHT
Appellant Asserts:
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting Appellant's motion to dismiss court appointed counsel prior to trial.
Trial began on April 29th, 2014. (RR.II) Appellant waited until April 28th, at
a pretrial hearing to present a motion to dismiss trial counsel. (RR.I-Pretrial
Hearing:6.) At that hearing Appellant alleged his appointed lawyer had a conflict
of interest (with no supporting information), that his lawyer was not properly
representing him, had not filed any motions on his behalf or given him “full
disclosure” or “presented anything.” His lawyer responded that time that he had
filed for the standard discovery order, the State had complied, and that he had
received a plea offer and gone over the range of punishment with his client. Trial
counsel added he had received the DNA report and a video he could show his
client. (See CR:7 – Docket sheet reflecting Nathan Reynolds was appointed trial
counsel; See RR.I-Pretrial Hearing: 4-6.) Based upon trial counsel's comments, the
trial judge denied Appellants attempt to dismiss the lawyer.
Appellant had no right to an appointed counsel of his choice. See Thomas v.
State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). A trial court has no duty to
search for an attorney until it finds one suiting Appellant's liking. See Malcolm v
14 State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Rogers v. State,
488 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). Criminal defendants unhappy with
their court-appointed attorneys have the burden of proving to the trial court that
they are entitled to a change. The burden includes requesting a hearing.
Personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy are typically not
valid grounds for withdrawal. See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566
(Tex.Crim.App. 2000). There is little, if anything, in the record to assist an
appellate court in reviewing Appellant's claim that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to fire this appointed counsel on the day before trial began. The
record reflects instead that trial counsel had done everything required of him.
Appellant also has made no showing of harm by the denial of his request to
fire trial counsel. Appellant changed his plea after voir-dire. Appellant's Eighth
Issue is without merit and should be overruled.
15 STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. NINE
Appellant Asserts:
The Appellant's case should be remanded and returned to his prejudgment status in order that he may be allowed to file a motion for new trial.
Appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial while represented by counsel.
(See App. Brief – p.41; See also RR.III:11; see CR:61-69 wherein the Pro se
Motion for New Trial filed before trial counsel permitted to withdraw; see CR:80 –
Trial courts Order allowing withdrawal of trial counsel not signed until June 12,
2014). Note that Appellant admits in his brief on p.41, that Notice of Appeal was
filed after the Motion for New Trial was filed and trial counsel was permitted to
later withdraw on June 12th. It appears from the record that the trial court never
ruled on the pro se Motion for New Trial, therefore Robinson v. State is not
controlling. See Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.Crim.App.
2007)(holding that when a trial court rules on the merits of a pro se motion
presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel, such ruling is subject to
appellate review). Appellant's Pro Se Motion For New Trial was apparently
overruled by operation of law. There is no indication from the record that trial
counsel or appellate counsel adopted the motion for new trial. A defendant has no
right to “hybrid representation,” and the trial court was free to disregard the
16 motion. Appellant may not raise this issue on appeal. Appellant's Ninth Issue
should be overruled and the requested relief denied.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully prays
that this Honorable Court, upon consideration of the record, the briefs, and law,
overrule the Appellant’s points of error and affirm the judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
BOB WORTHAM CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
/s/ Wayln G. Thompson
WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS TBL # 19959725 1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300 BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701 (409) 835-8550 (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us)
17 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify
that the number of words in this brief, excluding those matters listed in Rule
94.(i)(1) is 2,859.
/s/ Wayln G. Thompson
WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS TBL #19959725 1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300 BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701 (409) 835-8550 (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A copy of this brief has been sent by United States Mail to Kevin Sekaly
Cribbs, 7705 Calder Avenue, Beaumont, Texas 77706, and the State’s brief has
been eFiled with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, this 23rd day of September,
2015.
/s/ Wayln G. Thompson
WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS